Byelorussian terrain

[Der Alte Fritz]

Translated version of the image:

Have a look at the article given in the link http://militera.lib.ru/science/peredelsky_ge/index.html

it gives details of the artillery part of both attack and defence and has details of both Bagration and Lvov-Sandomir

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

Fair point. I think that with two separate games covering roughly (note qualifier) the same ground, I may've posted to the wrong place, but only in part. The TM 30-548 info is very much on point.

All,

This is a most interesting discussion, with the high power grog intellectual artillery on full display. So far, the single most worthwhile thing I've found in this thread is the operational schema DAF provided in his #23. This is useful both from a historical standpoint and from determining in-game frontages for specific combat situations.

We can also see who's got what for fire support, as well as reserves. My quick read is that the center unit is the point of main effort, in that it has the most combat power on the narrowest sector, but also has two RCs, vs one for the others, and in echelon, something neither of the other two sectors has. Note, too, the formidable artillery, even though I can't really follow all that.

I don't, absent a map, have a handle on why fire support is allocated the way it is, and I see some super heavy tube artillery (Artillery of the RVGK) in the bottom sector. If you wish to make a demonstration, it's a real attention getter. Were I attacking with one RC on a 7.5 km front, I'd want a distraction, too.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Der Alte Fritz]

John

There is a good comparison of Soviet, British and German artillery methods complete with fire plans, overlays, etc at this site: http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=135327

The Soviet one we looked at was the Vistula Oder Operation but it is not too far off the methodology of the Belorussia Operation.

[JasonC]

JK - I'd say the artillery group looks stronger on the left, actually. Admittedly for twice the width of sector. But basically it is just as strong in that whole bottom (left) as in the middle (center) portion of the front.

In terms of the pieces described, there are 2 305mm railroad guns, based on the Russian 12 inch naval gun; 18 of the 280mm howitzer M-5/1939, the heaviest Russian field piece, 280 single rounds of 300mm rocket, 48 of the standard heavy 8 inch howitzer, 68 132mm MRLs, and then the usual 152mm gun-howitzers, 122mm guns, and 120mm mortars as corps and army artillery.

[John Kettler]

Der Alte Fritz,

Thanks. Shall have a look.

JasonC,

I noted the super heavy stuff on the left, hence, my reference to getting attention, but does it necessarily even follow, given the power and range of the 305s, they're shooting in that sector, or merely that their siting is based on where the railway line happens to run? It's hard to tell much when I don't know the ground, the transport situation or the enemy targets to be hit.

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

JK - it is a fair point, but for the MRLs and the howitzers, they are probably firing in that sector (mostly), to keep the fire plan simple. But yes, the left side of that corps attack is right along the road, railroad, and river - all three - as well as the dry route to Orsha.

I think the long range heavies are likely firing clear back to Orsha the town, proper, not front line targets. The 122mm guns would have counterbattery targets, as well as possible road interdiction targets, back to Orsha again and its approaches from all directions. But the MRLs, the 120mm mortars are both modest range and are dumping on the front line positions (first 3, not literal first, but you get the point).

The 8 inch, 280s, and 152mm gun howitzers could hit deeper stuff too, but their main use is to drop very heavy shells on field fortifications, to blast through their overhead cover and take out guns and MGs and field communications inside, and the like. Normally, those would use more of their range to be positioned farther behind the Russian start line, to protect them from German counterbattery, and less of their range to reach deep into the German rear. That deep reach job is the mission of the 122 guns (rather than howitzers - notice the I and II designations in the graphic, which distinguishes the divisional 122mm howitzers from the longer range corps level 122mm guns).

In a case like the start of Bagration, though, the heavy howitzers might be somewhat closer to the front than normal, to reach deeper, just anticipating successive positions and a deep breakthrough battle. They would not expect to be exposed to much in the way of enemy counterbattery, because the line is expected to move pretty soon, and the German guns are expected to be heavily occupied with other tasks (starting with "stay alive").

[Grisha]

Jason, I have Soviet maps from previous to WWII (1930s?) of the areas around Minsk and such. Not sure I remember but I think the scale is 1:50000. Let me know if it interests you in mail.

[Grisha]

Also, from around Iassy-Kishinev.

[Grisha]

Incidently, lots of marsh with strips of good ground between. Also, lots of forests.

[TheVulture]

There is a nice map illustrating a first line German defensive belt from Bagration too, in the sector of the 5th Army's attack south of Vitebsk at the junction between the German 299th and 256th infantry divisions. Unfortunately it is one of the very few holes in the 1:25k Soviet topo maps from the 1930s of Belarus, so the best I've been able to find is 1:100k (N36-037).

These are the German positions as mapped by the Soviets dated the day before Bagration. Presumably it isn't 100% accurate, and will contain dummy positions and have missed real positions etc. but does give a good idea of what a German defensive zone looked like in this forested, marshy terrain.

http://i871.photobucket.com/albums/ab273/thevulture01/5A_Art_SAVO125_Jun_22_44.jpg~original

For those who are interested in the topo map, the best I've been able to get is this one. Look right at the top of the map, between 30 degrees 28' and 30 degrees 32' (i.e. top edge, about 2/3 of the way from left to right).

http://i871.photobucket.com/albums/ab273/thevulture01/100k--n36-037--1981.gif~original

(Links rather than embedded images because they are pretty huge, and will take ages to download for people innocently browsing a forum)

[BletchleyGeek]

For those who are interested in the topo map, the best I've been able to get is this one. Look right at the top of the map, between 30 degrees 28' and 30 degrees 32' (i.e. top edge, about 2/3 of the way from left to right).

http://i871.photobucket.com/albums/ab273/thevulture01/100k--n36-037--1981.gif~original

(Links rather than embedded images because they are pretty huge, and will take ages to download for people innocently browsing a forum)

Careful with that map, mate, it's a 1980s Red Army map. For some regions - like Ukraine west of the Dnepr - 1980s maps of rural areas and 1930s maps are pretty much the same. For other, more developed, regions, road networks, expanse of forests and urban build up level has changed quite dramatically.

[TheVulture]

Careful with that map, mate, it's a 1980s Red Army map. For some regions - like Ukraine west of the Dnepr - 1980s maps of rural areas and 1930s maps are pretty much the same. For other, more developed, regions, road networks, expanse of forests and urban build up level has changed quite dramatically.

Bugger - linked the wrong one then. Pretty sure I had a 1930s version around somewhere ... (goes off to hunt for it)

[Der Alte Fritz]

John

In fact we do know the artillery fire plan of the 11 Guards Army, it is shown on this diagram: http://militera.lib.ru/science/peredelsky_ge/s34.gif

and the counter battery programme is given on this diagram: http://militera.lib.ru/science/peredelsky_ge/s35.gif

in short it ran roughly like this:

5 min fire raid

105 min steady aimed fire on defensive structures

20 min destructive fire by direct fire guns on front line

40 minutes suppression of forward edge

15 min before start of barrage attack by 18 IL-2 on 78.Sturm HQ and 160 Pe-2 bomb rear areas

5 min before start of barrage attack on front line attack by IL-2 on artillery and mortar positions and on personnel

start of lifting barrage (by regimental and divisional guns) (heavier pieces target reinforcement routes)

Troops move up to within 200m of barrage and then assault forward

[BletchleyGeek]

Bugger - linked the wrong one then. Pretty sure I had a 1930s version around somewhere ... (goes off to hunt for it)

Check out the website I mentioned earlier in the thread

loadmap.net

and that pretty much everyone seems to have ignored.

It's a great resource, although you won't always find 1930's maps. In that case, I cross-examine the AMS maps I also mentioned above with the 1980s maps to see if the differences are big as to have changed "the name of the game".

[John Kettler]

Der Alte Fritz,

I should clarify. What I was trying to say is that since I don't have the physical map and overlays in front of me nor one of those huge Microsoft displays onto which one can fly imagery and data to do the same digitally, it's hard to suss out what's going on and why. Am quite literally on terra incognita here. Contrast this with my military analyst days in which I once had all of East Germany on two 8'x4' foam core sheets, with four classified overlays per map. Radar sites. Fixed SAMs. Fixed C3. Mobile SAMs. There, I could readily look at all sorts of things, take measurements, compute exposures, etc., and draw informed, reasoned conclusions. Trying to put together something similar in Digital World™, on a 21.5" screen, is tough. Without the severe language barrier thrown in.

Effectively, I know almost nothing when it comes to Operation Bagration, since my knowledge base runs pretty much to Kursk, then resumes, with a few recent exceptions, at the Vistula-Oder Offensive. You guys seem perfectly at home with the whole shebang, as evidenced by the depth and breadth of knowledge on display, whereas I'm working from military principles and knowledge of how they fought.

Given that I don't have the various pieces in hand, in a form in which I can readily analyze parts and the whole, I'm at a real disadvantage in this discussion. Certainly, there are places in which I can and will contribute, but in many other areas, I'm out of my depth. Hope no one yanks my grog creds as a result!

Fire Programs

I've never seen anything like those--regardless of language. The recipients of all that Bog Voiny attention must've been very unhappy! Nor, I imagine, would those on the wrong end of the CB program have been capering for joy. Regarding the CB program, what are the red measles on the far right? To me, they look like some sort of impact pattern footprints, but that's more speculation than anything else.

Regards,

John Kettler

[BletchleyGeek]

BG- that one I can see, thanks.

And I think it makes my case very well. One, this is the built up main drag with the best communications routes, right into a major town. But still the Berezina is a meandering fenland along its length, except for one narrow built up area where the main road bridge goes across. There are two other railway crossings, that have to be up on stilts across the marshland, much wider than the river course itself. And one small path crossing north of the road bridge, north of "downtown".

Then scan back along the main road, and you see it has a small stream crossing well east of the city, then another stretch where the marsh comes right down to the road on the north side for a whole grid-square's length, with marsh off on the other side a quarter of a grid square away. The whole route east of the river is half in woods, a quarter in open farmland, a quarter as a raised tree-lined road rising to the bridge entrance downtown. Hardly the stuff of freewheeling offroad armor maneuver - it is a heavily channeled route and an AT mine pioneer's dream come true, for blocking armor.

Sure there are physical routes you can push armor along. But to get them past each "stopper", you will need to send the poor bloody infantry slogging through the woods or marsh for one more short hook, to clear out that blown stream crossing or mined narrow "bridge" between sections of marsh, and the like - over and over.

I don't see that many chokepoints - there's plenty of forestry tracks cutting across the forests. I can totally see Soviet T-34s negotiating those without problems, and infantry riding on their backs, moreso with the collaboration of partisan elements guiding them.

Besides that, a chokepoint which cannot be defended isn't a chokepoint. I mean, I can totally see that a reasonably up to strength German infantry division being able to put up a formidable defense of an area like the one east of Borisov. The problem for the Germans is that they didn't have any of such combined arms formations to defend the approaches to key crossings - like the ones at Borisov - and keep the retreat routes towards the west open.

If you had - say - a force roughly the size of a battalion, consisting of a hodge-podge of railroad security and maintenance troops, personnel on furlough in transit to or from Germany, and possibly a heavy flak battery, which chokepoint would you choose to defend? How would you prevent the Soviet armour to move around your positions?

This is the aspect I would love to see CM Red Thunder scenario designers get right. That the tanks are powerful but almost caged beasts, in their separate "rooms" divided by segments of impassible tank terrain, with only narrow funnels between them. Making the cooperation of other arms essential, to get them into the next "room", then the next, and so on...

Indeed, that would make a great scenario. But I think that the more common occurrence was that of a German column feeling their way across that "maze" of rooms, trying to avoid the Red Wumpus. And getting assaulted at close range by Soviet tanks.

[Der Alte Fritz]

John

As someone who has given so much to the community over the years, I think you deserve to get a little back. And if Bagration is it, then so be it.

These maps are of the Orscha area and are taken from 1925 maps from several sheets, although being on the state border there seems to be a short section which is missing which I have filled in with a 1981 map.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_TIwZr3Mmx8V2VxSnlOeUctalU/edit?usp=sharing

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_TIwZr3Mmx8QWlVazdqYkh1Qzg/edit?usp=sharing

Yes you are right the red spotty thing shows the density of counter battery fire on a position for various periods of the war.

From the previous mentioned Armchair General Forum is this diagram which shows the number of shells fire per mortar/gun per 5 minute time period/fire type for the Vistula Oder Operation. Bagration was pretty similar rate of fire for each period so from this you could work out what they were firing.

So a 5 minute Fire Attack is going to be 20 rounds per 82mm mortar, 12 76mm rounds, 8 122mm rounds and that steady aimed fire is going to be roughly 1/4 of this rate. So 3 rounds a minute for a 76mm gun crew for the aimed sustained fire would be fairly typical.

The actual details of the attack for each Rifle Corps for 11 Guards Army are given here to download:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_TIwZr3Mmx8QUlpWjdyQnV1TVU/edit?usp=sharing

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_TIwZr3Mmx8VE9yM3hsMWJwU0E/edit?usp=sharing

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_TIwZr3Mmx8bHFqWm5NNm1KbFU/edit?usp=sharing

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_TIwZr3Mmx8TXZwVFRCUjZmOEU/edit?usp=sharing

[Crinius]

On a sidenote. How did the germans cope with the terrain in 1941?

[TheVulture]

I don't see that many chokepoints - there's plenty of forestry tracks cutting across the forests. I can totally see Soviet T-34s negotiating those without problems, and infantry riding on their backs, moreso with the collaboration of partisan elements guiding them.

If you check the map symbol keys though you'll find that most of those are footpaths - not even dirt roads. Most forest footpaths I've been along certainly aren't wide enough to drive a tank down - it's about the same as trying to drive through the forest directly. You don't clear trees to make a footpath, you go around them.

[TheVulture]

Check out the website I mentioned earlier in the thread

loadmap.net

and that pretty much everyone seems to have ignored.

It's a great resource, although you won't always find 1930's maps. In that case, I cross-examine the AMS maps I also mentioned above with the 1980s maps to see if the differences are big as to have changed "the name of the game".

It is a great resource - it was one of the main places I used when finding maps for Bagration. Griefwald university has the same set of maps, with a few of the 1:25k ones that loadmap is missing, although without the user friendly interface. Neither of them has N-36-037-B though, which is the one that covers the area of that 5th army deployment map.

Annoyingly another of the ones missing from both sites is (IIRC) the 1:25k map of the Bobruisk area where some of the fighting of the 1st day of Bagration took place.

[JasonC]

BG - I am lousy at manipulating Paint, but here is an ImageShack of my first thoughts on that map, as an obstacle focused defense, especially vs a mechanized enemy approaching from the east and trying to force a crossing.

http://imageshack.com/a/img34/5004/3ff.gif

The first position - forward and center - uses a place where the main road is going through woods between two patches of marsh. Put a roadblock and mines on that main artery. A secondary roadblock on the railroad to the south. Mixed minefields for the obvious short flanks, covered by MG positions in the buildings or treelines.

The second position is based on a stream and its associated wet low ground, where the main drag has a very small bridge across it. Blow that bridge or roadblock it. Put ATGs on the treeline on the west and northwestern sides of the field, looking out over the open ground toward position 1, and covering anything that gets through it. Off on the left, in a town in the next field, a field artillery position can cover the north flank field direct, and fire indirect wherever else needed.

The third position is based on the ramp up to the bridges proper, "downtown", but on the east side of the river. It incorporates the marsh on that side, using mines and wire in the breaks in that obstacle, and infantry positions immediately behind those. They can shoot up any engineers who try to close, and use infantry AT on any tanks that try to go first etc.

There are two flanking positions, both using guns emplaced on the west bank of the river. North of town that is across one field, with a wide field of fire up and downstream, including raking the main road bridge from a nearly 90 degree flank. The position would also have HMGs of course, and cover the whole river area against any sort of infantry or boat crossing close to the town.

On the south side, it uses a gully on the north side of the river, leading up from the river proper and already steep, which is improved to an anti-tank ditch with steepened walls. Then the gun position is immediately south of the river, raking that gully again at a 90 degree flank.

The final defensive position is downtown, in the city, on the west bank of the road bridge, but that is initially just a reserve position. It is a rally point if all the others are penetrated.

Note that is or when the attackers switch from using tanks down the main road to trying to turn the German right through the woods, between the river and the main road, the defender's response is just to shell that whole forested area with mortars and div arty. There are no friendly bodies there and no attempt is made to challenge infantry in that woods interior. (They do have mines behind and wire and mines and an infantry positon in front - the bridge-covering 3rd position in the diagram. But everything south of the main road and east of that 3rd position, but the time it is the front line, is an artillery free fire zone).

As for the notion that the Germans would only have alarm units to defend such a position, of many less important ones throughout the campaign that would be true. But historically, by the time the Russians were pushing to Borisov, the German 5th Panzer division had arrived. This position was held not by a few rear area troops and security detachments, but by a kampgruppe formed around the armored recon battalion of that division, backed up by 29 Tiger Is. They first engaged east of the position your map depicts, and the recce guys had to screen a wider area to the north, to be sure. But the Germans didn't fight the whole campaign on a shoestring. Army Group Center may have been outnumbered, but it was a whole army group, and it was rapidly reinforced from the south.

[Battlefront.com]

Let's also keep in mind that an offensive can only sustain forward momentum if there's a steady supply of fuel, ammo, replacements, etc. following close behind. The problem with the terrain in this area is there was only a minimal road network for trucks to utilize. Tanks that zig-zagged all over the countryside to make their way from Point A to Point B would have a difficult time continuing on if there wasn't a concerted effort to seize key roads.

To put it another way, a choke point (in my mind) is anything which hinders forward progress. It doesn't make a difference to me if it hinders only trucks or both trucks and tanks. And in that sense the terrain in this region was full of choke points.

In fact, I think the map that Elvis and Bil played their AAR on shows pretty well how the terrain shaped operational strategy. I thought the AAR really showed the difficulties of both offense and defense in such terrain. Bil was obligated to split his infantry off from his armor, Elvis was left with very poor choices for deploying his armor effectively.

Steve

[BletchleyGeek]

BG - I am lousy at manipulating Paint, but here is an ImageShack of my first thoughts on that map, as an obstacle focused defense, especially vs a mechanized enemy approaching from the east and trying to force a crossing.

http://imageshack.com/a/img34/5004/3ff.gif

Will reply to this, later on, that's going to be interesting, nonetheless

As for the notion that the Germans would only have alarm units to defend such a position, of many less important ones throughout the campaign that would be true. But historically, by the time the Russians were pushing to Borisov, the German 5th Panzer division had arrived. This position was held not by a few rear area troops and security detachments, but by a kampgruppe formed around the armored recon battalion of that division, backed up by 29 Tiger Is. They first engaged east of the position your map depicts, and the recce guys had to screen a wider area to the north, to be sure. But the Germans didn't fight the whole campaign on a shoestring. Army Group Center may have been outnumbered, but it was a whole army group, and it was rapidly reinforced from the south.

Jason, the 31. PzGr Regt of 5th Panzer Division was hit by the 11th Guards Army on 29th June near the village of Kostritsa - which is about 8 kilometers to the NE of Borisov - and after a tough fighting withdrawal, found itself in Borisov itself by the evening of the 29th. The Red Army was in hot pursuit, or so I reckon, since the main road - which runs across the map - was blocked by a full Soviet Rifle division by that time. I can't read - given the German initial positions and the Soviet strength - there anyting like the kind of situation you're describing. In fact, it appears to me they didn't even have any kind of 'alarm' units to back up those Panzer Grenadiers.

Krupki - where the Aufklarungs and the Tigers were - lies 25km east of Borisov. Whatever they were doing by the 29th of June, it was rendered irrelevant by the crossings north and south of Borisov (and Borisov itself being blocked).

Indeed, the Germans didn't operate on a shoestring the whole campaign (which we could say spans from June 22nd to late September). But one week into the show, they were indeed operating on a shoestring.

[BletchleyGeek]

If you check the map symbol keys though you'll find that most of those are footpaths - not even dirt roads. Most forest footpaths I've been along certainly aren't wide enough to drive a tank down - it's about the same as trying to drive through the forest directly. You don't clear trees to make a footpath, you go around them.

Well, a couple weeks back I spent a weekend at the Huon Valley in Tasmania, and we indeed went to visit the amazing forests there. We also went through an area which was being harvested, and I could see how wide are the avenues opened by forestry operations. They were easy 100 meters wide or more.

Back to Borisov. The circular 'roundabout' cutting through the forest totally looks like the kind of avenues foresters still open up in Tasmania today. I wouldn't rate those as mere footpaths, either

[JasonC]

BG - I quote my previous "They first engaged east of the position your map depicts, and the recce guys had to screen a wider area to the north, to be sure." Engaging farther east was by choice, obviously. The Germans had more than just alarm units to try to oppose the whole passage of the Berezina river position. Yes, of course they were turned out of their position on both flanks - I already said as much.