Goering and Luftwaffe Infantry

[Gamer58]

Thank you Jason.

In your estimate, how many men would they have lost trying to get back across the Med?

What made Kesselring want to stay there in North Africa?

How would all of this have made a difference to the war in Europe? Would Italy have stayed on as part of the Axis? Would it have resulted in a different looking Europe? Would it have made a difference to Allied command decisions or Soviet ones?

At a lower strategic level, isn't there an argument that hugging the enemy on the beach is a valid way to slow or stop them, because sea borne artillery will not be used as effectively? Wasn't there something famous about Rommel's view on this on D Day?

What happened during Goodwood? I can't see the point. Counterattacking is a fine art it seems and Italy has very interesting terrain.

Wouldn't a bloodied nose in Italy have resulted in the Allies taking a different view of France?

Were there any lessons from Italy that were transferable to the Wermacht's effort in France or were they not useful at all given the terrain or other factors?

[JonS]

Get as much men and material - especially the seasoned vets of the DAK panzer formations, and 10th panzer etc sent to counterattack historically, out through Tunis. If a rear guard has to stay and fight it out, let it be Italian infantry with minimum sufficient German infantry force stiffeners.

Either Jason has all the strategic chops usually associated with the German general staff, or he's been playing too much Strategic Command solo against the AI.

Hint: the Italians get a say too.

[Michael Emrys]

What made Kesselring want to stay there in North Africa?

Orders from Hitler. Once any ground had come under Axis control, he was reluctant to give it up, even after it had become a liability. In one sense that wasn't entirely irrational. If the idea is to keep Allied armies as far away from the Reich as possible as long as possible, then fighting in Tunisia is consistent with that strategy. But only if the Axis can maintain a maritime lifeline open, and this they could not do. So as it turned out, forces sent to Tunisia were simply thrown away. It may have delayed the invasion of Italy for six months, give or take, but it would also mean that there would be less on hand to defend Sicily and the mainland when the time came.

Michael

[JasonC]

Michael is correct that it was Hitler orders, and that Hitler was reluctant to give up any ground ever taken. He found it personally pyschologically distressing as a sign of impending defeat, and believed that generals who faced such things were defeatists. He had all the mental ability of a spoiled 3 year old in the matter. But yes, it was entirely irrational, and no where more obviously so than in this case. It ignored all the logistic underpinings of warfare. It was the responsibility of the professionals to make that point to him. But that set, as a crowd, faced the constant difficulty that one overly optimistic yes-man breaking from the professional view and overpromising, would be instantly believed and used as "evidence" that the others were just defeatist. In the case of Tunisia, Kesselring was that yes-man. And he was completely wrong, transparently so.

Hitler was fond of claiming that retreat helped nothing because the enemy still had to be fought somewhere, and forward was as good as anywhere else. But in the case of Tunisia, it clearly was not as good as anywhere else. It meant fighting across a sea the Axis could not control. It meant fighting on a shoestring of air supply lines for much of the ground force's needs, as well as the air force. It meant decimation of the German air transport arm, flying opposed against regions in reach of enemy fighters with inadequate fighter cover.

The Axis lost 4500 combat aircraft in the fight for Tunisia. They entered the battle for Sicily with less than 1000. Then they lost half of those in the fight for Sicily. Then the Italian part left the war. The Tunisia stand was in short an absolute disaster for the Axis air arm in the Med.

As for how much would have gotten out had they evac'ed instead, lots more than actually got out, for certain. The 10th Panzer might never have been sent in the first place. It and DAK certainly did not need to lose 80% of their armor in grand counterattacks that never had any prospect of achieving anything, since no offensive from the Tunisian beachhead could be sustained in any direction, logistically. They should have been running for the ports and out, under surge Luftwaffe cover.

Next I am asked wasn't the idea of stopping the enemy at the water's edge valid? Answer no, it never worked. Dieppe was a raid. The greatest water's edge success of the war was Omaha, and that held for all of 6 hours, and resulted in an "exchange off" success for the invasion. Armored counterattacks into the beachheads were tried at Gela, Salerno, Anzio, and outside Caen right after D-Day. All were utter failures. The idea is comprehensively busted by empirical test; it was never more than a desperate hope wrapped inside an overly aggressive tactical doctrine generally, and on the use of armor specifically.

As for what happened in Goodwood, the allies used massive HE from strategic bombing and a mass armored attack trying to achieve a major breakthrough, but against a portion of the line still manned by German mobile formations with several hundred running tanks. The result was a complete failure of that offensive, with a single day loss of 300 tanks for the attackers. That is the kind of thing that armor standing on the defense was capable of, and if it hadn't all been thrown away in reckless counterattacks, might have pulled off many more times. Anzio was kept bottled up in similar fashion for months, while German AFV strength opposite was intact.

What difference would a better defense of Italy have made? Would it have kept Italy in the war? Unlikely, they saw that Germany was losing and they would still have seen things that way. But a fight into Italy against a much stronger German air force would have been much harder. The allies didn't not achieve anything decisive in the theater beyond knocking Italy out of the war as it was, and they would have struggled to achieve even that much against stronger air and more mobile division defenders. It might have taken them more forces to do so, which could easily have prevented the Anvil operation against southern France.

Nothing truly decisive for the war was ever at stake in the Med. The Americans and Russians both saw that clearly the entire time, and it was true. The Germans could have lost a lot less and held more easily there, but nothing that happened there could change the basic outcome of the war. That was decided above all on the eastern front, and secondarily in France and the campaign into Germany itself from the west. There was never the slightest prospect of a campaign up the whole length of Italy --- and then through the Alps? Right... --- getting there before either or both of those. Kesselring had nothing to do with that. It was just geography, and logistics.

[Erwin]

Interesting points. However, I thought that Normandy was an example of not defending at the beaches as Rommel wanted. Wasn't he bummed that so many forces were kept away from the beaches and had to take days getting there after the invasion?

[Cuirassier]

Interesting points. However, I thought that Normandy was an example of not defending at the beaches as Rommel wanted. Wasn't he bummed that so many forces were kept away from the beaches and had to take days getting there after the invasion?

It is true that Hitler and the OKW prevented the full implementation of Rommel's plan. However, 21st Panzer on the edge of the Brit sector, along with actions in Italy (eg Salerno, Gela) showed conclusively that Rommel's strategy was unworkable. Massing more PD's into Allied naval gunfire would not have improved the chances of success; it would only result in higher German casualties. The reason being the naval gunfire stripped German tanks of their supporting arms and rendered them quite vulnerable.

I think the only reason the 'drive them back into the sea' method is still kicked around as a viable tactic is because Rommel was its greatest proponent. If a less well known General had managed the defense of Normandy, and advocated the same tactic and it failed, it would probably not be as well regarded as it is today.

[Gamer58]

Wasn't there a theory that hugging the enemy formations would result in enemy ship borne artillery being rendered ineffective? I understand that's easier said than done. What reasons did Rommel have for thinking that his tactics could work? Wouldn't enemy air be just as effective or dangerous against such a counter-attack as ship borne artillery?

[JasonC]

Gamer58 - Rommel's reasoning for his water's edge defense had nothing to do with avoiding naval gunfire. It was based on his experience of trying to operate mobile divisions offensively under Allied air dominance, particularly in Africa. He thought that the PDs would not be able to maneuver effectively and deliver the sort of counterattacks German doctrine envisioned, under Allied tac air.

In reality, the PDs moved to the invasion zone with some delay and disruption certainly, but without serious loss to Allied air. Grand 1940 style operational maneuvering did have difficulty against Allied air, but was never in the cards to begin with.

The Germans only had two doctrinal stances - armor as mobile and attacking, and static defense as a WW I style layered fortified zone with local counterattacks by minor reserves at all scales. They did not have a sensible mobile defensive doctrine. Plenty of able German commanders improvised one in scramble fashion, on this or that occasion (Manstein, Model e.g.). But not because they had an actual doctrine that stressed full reserves of mobile formations, their use of linebackers to cancel enemy concentration, countering enemy force with force to space effect (artillery concentration, mine and terrain barriers etc).

Rommel's chain of reasoning was, effectively, "I won't be able to 1940 France them because they have the air and I don't; so I can only 1916 Somme them at the water's edge." He had no third alternative in the kit bag...

[Erwin]

"In reality, the PDs moved to the invasion zone with some delay and disruption certainly, but without serious loss to Allied air."

I understand the argument. I am not historian, but IIRC didn't some at least of the PD's suffer massive armor losses in trying to get into action due to having to travel distances under Allied air attack. Coupled with naval artillery up to 25 miles from the coast, it sounds like no effective defense strategy was possible.

[JonS]

Nope. Pz Lehr lost a lot of trucks to air on the way up, but approximately zero tanks were KO'd by f/b during WWII as a whole, let alone during the Normandy campaign.

[Michael Emrys]

Such absences of armor due to air were as usual caused indirectly. With the rail net disrupted, and almost nonexistent near the front, armor was having to travel greater distances on its own tracks, something German armor did not excel at. Consequently, there were mechanical breakdowns and resulting delays in reaching the front. Similarly, as Jon says, their losses among supporting supply vehicles were huge. If your tank runs out of gas it won't be going anywhere very fast. But there were almost no significant losses due to outright destruction from the air.

Michael

[JasonC]

Michael - no, their losses in supporting transport were not huge. They were larger than their zero losses to AFVs, but that is all. None of the German mobile formations moving to Normandy was unable to get there, or to supply its armor, or to get it into action, due to allied air power. The largest delays came from equipment shortages in the first place (e.g. half of 2SS remaining in southern France for a while because the whole division - which was in the middle of a rebuild - lacked sufficient trucks to lift its full complement, regardless). There were other delays from pure organization and upgrades -e.g. Panther battalions still training in Germany, 116th Panzer being left in reserve out of the theater and training up, etc.

The formations moving to the front were delayed by days at most, by multiple cuts to the rail network and by some air attack on their truck and SPW columns when or if they tried to move by day rather than confining their road marches to night. There were some cases of the bulk of the division committed while e.g. a Panzerjaeger battalion or one of the Panzer battalions was still on the way by train. All of that may have prevented an imaginary massed armored counterattack by full panzer armies in the first few days after the invasion, certainly.

But the Germans basically matched the rate of build up in theater that the Allies managed over the beaches, despite Allied air. And got 2000 AFVs to the theater, in fighting order. To break out of the beachhead, the Allies had to fight through all of that armor and defeat it, in pure attrition processes. They could not avoid fighting it by delays imposed by air, or by killing it from the air, either directly or indirectly. They instead fought it, on the ground, and killed it. Over the nearly 2 months between the invasion and the breakout.

It was never a matter of days. The campaign lasted two months - delays of a few days were immaterial. It was never a matter of maneuvering speed or operational razzle dazzle. It was a matter of attrition, force sent and efficiency of exchange as those forces smashed each other. None of those things - which actually did matter and drove everything, in the reality - were in Rommel's frame of reference, or in wider German defensive doctrine, to enable them to plan their campaign rationally and realistically. That was instead framed by imaginary ideals of offensive maneuver and static impenetrable defense that had no basis in operational realities, in the summer of 1944.

[JonS]

Be careful how far you push that particular barrow, Jason. You appear to be heading towards a position of "the effect of airpower was negligible, so possessing air supremacy or not was immaterial."

[JasonC]

I think the biggest effect of allied air superiority was actually defensive. It made it possible to land entire armies over open beaches and keep them supplied, with thousands of ships and small lighters working close off shore for weeks. That was about the juiciest target for defending air power in history - but the allies lost nothing to German air.

I think the second biggest effect was observation, the little L-5s directing allied artillery fire. From all reports that helped their own artillery and multiplied their counterbattery by tons, detering German guns from opening fire whenever they were overhead, silencing firing German batteries and like.

Tac air had a marginal attrition effect beyond those, especially on soft transport. However, they also lost a lot of aircraft getting that effect. The allies lost several thousand fighter bombers over Normandy, mostly to light AA.

Allied heavy bombers tried to intervene several times, and certainly inflicted loss and especially disruption on the ground when they did so. That helped Cobra but made little difference in Goodwood. It was a blunderbuss, in other words. Not reliable but occasionally destructive etc.

Beyond all those direct effects during the main battle, it had delay effects on the German build up, and morale effects. It made the German retreat more expensive - tac air did more in the pursuit / Falaise pocket smashing than driving the Germans out of position.

None of which won the war on the ground. The first was necessary but not sufficient to even have the ground fight, logistically speaking. All the rest were minor supplements, not any substitute for defeating the German ground force by direct attrition in ground fighting. That is what had to do the heavy lifting to win the battle, and was the decisive struggle, throughout.

[GSX]

No. That is, of course, not what military trainers aim for.

Too right Jon. I would think that in today's military especially when forces are much diminished and so much emphasis is on training and casualty minimisation that blind obedience to everything is definitely not sought.

However, the higher ranks do tend to be very political and this has consequences for the lower ranks in today's forces that can at times mirror the situation and commanders outlined here.

The Germans had some excellent commanders, but all of the higher ones were politicised to a greater or lesser extent.

[GSX]

I think the biggest effect of allied air superiority was actually defensive. It made it possible to land entire armies over open beaches and keep them supplied, with thousands of ships and small lighters working close off shore for weeks. That was about the juiciest target for defending air power in history - but the allies lost nothing to German air.

I think the second biggest effect was observation, the little L-5s directing allied artillery fire. From all reports that helped their own artillery and multiplied their counterbattery by tons, detering German guns from opening fire whenever they were overhead, silencing firing German batteries and like.

Tac air had a marginal attrition effect beyond those, especially on soft transport. However, they also lost a lot of aircraft getting that effect. The allies lost several thousand fighter bombers over Normandy, mostly to light AA.

Allied heavy bombers tried to intervene several times, and certainly inflicted loss and especially disruption on the ground when they did so. That helped Cobra but made little difference in Goodwood. It was a blunderbuss, in other words. Not reliable but occasionally destructive etc.

Beyond all those direct effects during the main battle, it had delay effects on the German build up, and morale effects. It made the German retreat more expensive - tac air did more in the pursuit / Falaise pocket smashing than driving the Germans out of position.

None of which won the war on the ground. The first was necessary but not sufficient to even have the ground fight, logistically speaking. All the rest were minor supplements, not any substitute for defeating the German ground force by direct attrition in ground fighting. That is what had to do the heavy lifting to win the battle, and was the decisive struggle, throughout.

I think the Allies had Air Supremacy over Normandy, this enabled the Allied tac Air to range far and wide, and while it may not have effected the battle at the front lines, it certainly affected the ability of the Germans to conduct their operations. 2 TAF alone had almost 30 Sqns of rocket firing typhoons on Cab rank daily providing a huge number of sorties.

While they might not have killed the German AFV in any great numbers they certainly dominated the battle space. For instance they flew a massive number of sorties during the Mortain campaign, which was praised by Eisenhower himself for being a decisive part of that battle.

During the Bulge, the Germans planned their offensive in bad weather to counter Allied airpower, and when the weather broke, well, the rest is history.

I think, since 1940, the side that consistently controls the skies, wins the battles.

[Battlefront.com]

While I agree that TacAir is greatly overstated in terms of it's killing potential, it had two profound effects on Germans:

1. Morale. Look at post war interviews of Germans fighting in Normandy. They felt that TacAir was a big problem for them so it was. Perception is reality.

2. Movement. One of the reasons why TacAir was not as successful as it theoretically could have been is that the Germans made major adjustments to their operational planning and tactical actions to avoid being victims of it. Specifically they did a ton of stuff at night instead of the day. Poorly trained units fighting at night is a recipe for disappointing results. Add to that tactically units had to spend a lot of time hiding themselves and limiting road movement to take into consideration the possibility of being pounced on by fighter bombers.

On any battlefield the primary thing you want to do is shape conditions so your decisions affect how the enemy behaves and not the other way around. TacAir was one of the ways that the Allies were able to do this, though there were plenty of others in the mix.

It's difficult to say how much of an effect this had on the ultimate outcome, but I think it should be safe to say it was a contributing factor to Allied success and not a neutral.

Steve

[GJR144]

While I agree that TacAir is greatly overstated in terms of it's killing potential, it had two profound effects on Germans:

1. Morale. Look at post war interviews of Germans fighting in Normandy. They felt that TacAir was a big problem for them so it was. Perception is reality.

If your Panzerregiment arrives with a handful Panzers because of enemy air superiority, then calling it only a morale thing is the overstatement of the year.

In the east the Luftwaffe had air superiority and the Ostfrontkämpfer in Normandy knew the fighting with tactical air superiority. But the air superiority of the Western Alliies was something completely different according to these accounts. It simply was not possible to move without being decimated by 30-70%.

In Normandy the battles were lost even before they had begun because of the incredible amount of Allied airforce.

I understand that US people play down the role of the airforce, to give the ground troops a more favourable appearance, but the facts of German losses due to air attacks are there. As soon as the Western ground troops were without help from above, they always had huge difficulties. This also can be observed from WW2 over Vietnam, Afghanistan until today.

On any battlefield the primary thing you want to do is shape conditions so your decisions affect how the enemy behaves and not the other way around. TacAir was one of the ways that the Allies were able to do this, though there were plenty of others in the mix.

It's difficult to say how much of an effect this had on the ultimate outcome, but I think it should be safe to say it was a contributing factor to Allied success and not a neutral.

You will probably find not a single account of a Ostfrontkämpfer who fought in Normandy, who will support such a statement while unison every German analysis shows, that the total air superiority with incredible neverending amounts of weaponry made any normal fighting almost impossible. As soon as the support was not there, things almost immediately changed dramatically in favour of the Wehrmacht.

@Jason C:

Rommel is hugely overrated and mostly only a Western propaganda hero because of several reasons. What are the facts about Rommel?

1. He attacked in North Africa without sufficient forces. The propaganda hails this as great. In fact 2/3rds of the supply over the Mediterranean Sea did not arrive. Nevertheless Rommel didn't care that for every tank he gets two others were lost even before he could get them.

2. Rommel is the main cause, that the Western Alliies could keep the Mediaterranean Sea as their base. The attack on Malta, their most important base, was already rolling, when Rommel flew to Berlin and made wrong hopes about pushing further to Alexandria. Rommel's promises were the reason, why the taking away of Malta was cancelled.

3. In his HQ in Normandy he accepted staff that openly admitted to want to lose the war.

4. He tried to convince (with other traitors) Hitler to remove the Panzerdivisions from Normandy. Hitler contrary to this "genius" expected the Invasion in Normandy despite all disinformation efforts of Fremde Heere West.

The three Pz.Divs. placed in Normandy was a sole decision of Hitler.

5. A few days before the Invasion, Rommels HQ ordered the vision of the heavy artillery to be removed. Luftwaffe was removed, too.

6. When the Invasion was expected and the troops were put into alarm state, Rommel left Normandy to celebrate a party at home. In one of the three most important nights the invasion was expected, the most important commander left his place of duty and left the command in the hands of the open traitors.

7. With Rommel away his staff had free hands: When the Kriegsmarine around midnight gave alarm the HQ didn't respond.

When the units in the back also gave alarm because paratroopers were landing, Rommel's HQ remained silent.

When the ground units at the coast gave alarm. Rommels HQ stayed silent.

The HQ was silent for several hours, although everywhere the messages were coming in, that this was the invasion and the next few hours will be decisive.

It was that obvious from listening to the radio, that a commander of a tank regiment, placed close to the coast (IIRC it was the 21. PzDiv.), ordered his regiment on his own decision to the coast, after the Division couldn't reach the HQ. That was around 3 AM.

The mistake was: they notified the HQ in case the HQ could hear them. Suddenly the muted HQ was answering immediately: Wrong direction, move away from the coast, enemy is behind you.

When 1 or 2 hours later the regiment reached the location, there was no enemy at all. They lost three hours and instead of already being in close combat when the day will brake they stood far away from the coast and were shot into pieces by the USAF later.

Speidel, Rommel's "successful" commander who did the dirty work of slaughtering the own troops, later became NATO-chief in Europe...

[Battlefront.com]

I understand that US people play down the role of the airforce, to give the ground troops a more favourable appearance, but the facts of German losses due to air attacks are there.

Actually, it's because many of the researchers who have looked into this specific issue have wound up concluding that even the USAF recognized that it had a limited role in destroying war material. Artillery, tanks, and bazookas did the heavy lifting. The numbers only support that argument and MANY debates over the years on these Forums have come to the same conclusion.

If Allied and German airpower were taken out of the equation in France and in Italy Germany would still have lost the war. The superiority of Allied air forces simply made it happen a little quicker and with a little less losses for the Allied ground forces. Critics of TacAir are quick to point out that even these modest contributions came at a great cost in terms in terms of resources and lives. So there's even room to debate there as well.

Tactical and strategic air power played a significant role in defeating Germany in WW2. No question about it. But the Germans lost the war because it lost the ground war. German vets loved to complain that they lost the war against inferior ground forces because of air and artillery. They helped build up the myth of Allied air impact in part to excuse their own failings.

Steve

[sburke]

Hmm my spidey sense is tingling.... whenever I hear a diatribe about why the Germans lost the war and a large part of it focuses on "traitors" undermining the German defense.......

Yeah I think I am hearing that same old tired tune again. Jeez you'd think after all these years and the oh so blatant self immolation of a nation following that political philosophy that it would just die out. Guess not.

[poesel]

It will never die out. If you follow a sports team and they loose: how often would you really, from the heart, say they lost because they were just bad? Its the weather or the referee or if he had scored just that goal or... It's not rational.

Even in those war movies were the Germans are depicted as pure evil I'm somehow always rooting for them and am happy if they manage to achieve anything (of course the rightful revenge always comes soon). Can't help, it's your team.

There are also of course those that are politically motivated. They don't die out, too.

Search for 'Dolchstosslegende' or 'ungeschlagen im Felde' and you will find a lot of things how WWI was used to rationalize WWII.

[womble]

It will never die out. If you follow a sports team and they loose: how often would you really, from the heart, say they lost because they were just bad? Its the weather or the referee or if he had scored just that goal or... It's not rational.

What you're talking about isn't the same thing as what sburke is talking about. Tribalism is a base fact of human nature, sure. But it can be extended to include more people, and doesn't, at its heart, demand the extermination of the "not we". What sburke fears is rearing its ugly head is something altogether more selfish than that.

It's also somewhat uncivilised, isn't it, to let non-rational urges out to play on what ought to be a neutral field for discussion?

[Battlefront.com]

It will never die out. If you follow a sports team and they loose: how often would you really, from the heart, say they lost because they were just bad? Its the weather or the referee or if he had scored just that goal or... It's not rational.

Agreed. There is a big difference in having a debate with a fan of a sports team and having a debate with a sports historian. Excuses and bias will be stronger with the fan of Team X than someone who has dedicated himself to being a fan of the sport itself. The more focused the interest the narrower the perspective. Distortion is inevitable.

It is also interesting to note the age of the people debating German combat capabilities and failings. Most of us here (including me) probably went through a "phase" of worship, or at least strong admiration, for Germany's fighting forces of WW2. There are MANY reasons for this, but most grow out of it as they learn more about the war.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

What you're talking about isn't the same thing as what sburke is talking about. Tribalism is a base fact of human nature, sure. But it can be extended to include more people, and doesn't, at its heart, demand the extermination of the "not we". What sburke fears is rearing its ugly head is something altogether more selfish than that.

Yup, but I don't know which way this particular one is going yet. Not enough data to reach a conclusion.

It's also somewhat uncivilised, isn't it, to let non-rational urges out to play on what ought to be a neutral field for discussion?

Definitely. Which is why we occasionally have to ban someone. Thankfully it happens very, very, very rarely.

Steve

[Saferight]

Most of us here (including me) probably went through a "phase" of worship, or at least strong admiration, for Germany's fighting forces of WW2. There are MANY reasons for this, but most grow out of it as they learn more about the war.

Steve

This is very true.