US Guns, German Armour

[poorfish]

This may be of interest to those who are into WWII tanks and armor - the suprise and struggle the US had with German Armor. The US was confident that M4s and the .75 and .76 rounds would penetrate anything the Germans had. Until they met the Panther tank at Normandy ...

Complete with actual testing reports and images of various tanks and penetration of armor ... including the late introduced M18S and M26s.

http://worldoftanks.com/news/919-chieftains-hatch-us-guns-vs-german-armour-part-1/

[winkelried]

This may be of interest to those who are into WWII tanks and armor - the suprise and struggle the US had with German Armor. The US was confident that M4s and the .75 and .76 rounds would penetrate anything the Germans had. Until they met the Panther tank at Normandy ...

This is not correct. The first Panther's the U.S. met were in Italy well before Normandy. Despite the problems to be able to deal with those tanks, no other measures were taken, than to up-gun the M4 with the 76mm gun which entered service only in mid-1944. The reason for this was, that the U.S. intelligence assumed that the Panther was the successor to the Tiger I and not intended to become the mainstream tank as replacement of the Panzer IV. So suprise in Normandy to encounter Panther's in larger numbers ...

[poorfish]

You must not have read the article - the points you make are fully covered in it. See opening paragraph below:

"The US Army forces in the ETO went through a flurry of testing for one primary reason: The Panther tank.

"The Panther tank came as a shock to US forces in the days after the Normandy invasion. Not that the Panther was unheard-of before D-Day. But somehow, the substantial information on the characteristics of the new German tank that were available to the US Army had not been correctly interpreted, and so its combat capabilities and its impact on operations had not been anticipated."

The article is more than worth reading in its entirety, even to a non-historian like myself, exposing the overconfidence of the US command about the effectiveness of the .75 and the .76, despite repeated tests to the contrary, showing that the only weapon the Allies had to penetrate German armor was the British 17pdr - proving itself both in the tests and in real battles. The offer to the US from the Brits of the 17pdr was turned down, resulting in heavy losses of M4s alone.

"During the period of 6 June through 30 November, 1944, the US First Army suffered a total of 506 tanks knocked-out in combat (counting both those written-off and reparable). Of these 506 cases, in 104 cases there were no casualties associated with the loss of the tank. In 50 cases the casualties were not recorded. Out of the remaining 352 cases there were 129 KIA (0.37 per tank) and 280 WIA (0.80 per tank), for a total average rate of 1.16 casualty per tank lost in combat."

The focus of the article is the reproduction of the actual testing results of various rounds on different types of armor and what, if anything, was done - which prior to Normandy was to correct a slight deficiency - per Eisenhower.

The original article uses small white text on a black background, making it difficult to read, the link below is easier to read.

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/2998207/posts

[poorfish]

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/2998207/posts

Several interesting comments and further reading from the link above:

Poster 1:

A great book on the subject is “Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II,” by Belton Cooper. The author was in charge of recovering, cleaning out and repairing or dismantling damaged and destroyed tanks for Patton’s 3rd Armored Division.

One of the revelations in the book is that the US was ready to replace the Sherman before DDay. The US Army could have gone to war in France with the M26 Pershing, which was ready to start being produced as the US main battle tank in late 43. The major opponent of the change was none other than Gen. George Patton, who falsely believed that a heavier tank with wider tracks would have to be slower on roads. He took the view that tanks would fill the roll of cavalry, running free behind enemy lines, and did not consider tank to tank fighting to be a major role. The Germans had other ideas, and the Americans were forced into unequal battles that cost over 100% casualties in his tank crews over a period of 8 months.

Poster 2:

Part of the situation was Army Ground Forces doctrine. Tanks were vehicles of exploitation. They were to play the role of horse cavalry. Tank to tank warfare was to be the domain for the tank destroyer force. The Pershing was a not ready for early 1944 manufacture. Consideration was given to replacing the Sherman with the T 20 series. These tanks had the lower silhouette of the Pershing but carried the same armament as the 75mm and 76mm Shermans. The Shermans proved ideal for the open warfare of July, Aug and early Sept 44, and combined with the Jabos of the 9th AF their results would not have been improved upon had they been replaced with half as many Pershings.It was true that in tank to tank battles US tankers were at a disadvantage, but in infantry combat US troops were also at disadvantage given the quality and numbers of the MG42 which all but negated any advantage of the Garand over the Mauser. What really gave US forces a solid advantage was the superiority of its artillery. In terms of its quality, numbers and time on target doctrine it was the King of the battlefield from the earliest days at Kasserine to the very end.

Poster 3:

True. That doctrine was part of the debate between wars between the traditional three branches of the Army, Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery, each of which claimed the tank should be dedicated to them.

The Infantry wanted it to be a support vehicle. They wanted a heavy, wide tracked tank with a long, high velocity gun for destroying bunkers and enemy tanks. They didn't care about speed, as they claimed it didn't need to go faster than the infantry.

The Artillery considered anything with a cannon to be theirs, and viewed tanks as mobile artillery. They objected to any long, high velocity gun, as they burned out barrels faster. They insisted that a barrel should last at least 1,000 rounds. According Belton, it's doubtful any tanks lasted long enough in combat to ever fire a thousand rounds.

Finally there was the Cavalry. With horses obsolete, the clear answer for cavalry officers like Patton was the tank. They wanted light fast tanks to fill the cavalry role. Although they won the argument in terms of doctrine, the M4 was a compromise; light and fast, but with a low velocity gun the artillery favored.

Poster 4:

Very thorough and informative article. Thank you. In regard to some of the earlier posts, and some additional comments:

The Germans did indeed employ Panthers at Kursk. In part, Operation Zitadelle had been delayed until a quantity of Panthers was available. However, those Panthers had been rushed into production before they had been properly tested and were prone to breakdown, particularly their transmissions. The gun and armor scheme was still the same that the Allies would face in Normandy a year later. The Soviets captured a number of Panthers, and several of them were undamaged and had simply broken down. The Soviets knew exactly what they were faced with and as a result, they up-gunned the T-34 from the 76mm to the T-34/85.

The problem was that our Soviet friends didn’t allow an American military mission to go to the front or make a meaningful personal inspection of the captured German equipment. They didn’t tell us that they knew their T-34/76, which was comparable to the Sherman, was not a match for the Panther. And they didn’t tell us that the Germans were producing the Panther in substantial numbers.

Poster 5:

Freedom's Forge:

How American Business Produced Victory in World War II

Arthur Herman

It was realized that you could pack ten times the tonnage in a Liberty Ship as parts as you could as assembled vehicles. So the agreement was made with Iran to set up an assembly line in Iran, and just make all the parts in America. Parts would arrive by Liberty ship and be efficiently laid out to feed the assembly line. Each Soviet driver who arrived at the port would be handed the keys to a truck which had just been assembled there and been loaded with other military supplies. They would drive in convoys back to the USSR.

Poster 6:

If the switch was made to the Pershing tank before D-Day, there would have been no American tanks at the landing. They would have been too big for the landing craft, and there would have been no way for them to wade ashore.

Add to that the fact that most American rail cars has a load limit of 40 tons. The Pershing weighed 43-46 tons. According to the book “Tanks Are Mighty Fine Things,” put out by Chrysler in 1946, the minimum load limit of the cars required to ship one Pershing was 118,000 pounds. That means a lot fewer tanks in theater.

There was also a shortage of flat cars of of any capacity. On Christmas day of 1944 the Chrysler plant had 75 tanks ready to ship and only 18 flat cars on hand. Even Shermans had to be shipped one to a car unless a 50 ft flat car turned up. If the US Army was building tanks as heavy as the King Tiger, it would have reduced the number of rail lines able to move the loads, further clogging the pipeline.

These logistical issues never seem to show up in armchair discussions of the M4 in WWII.

Poster 7:

“On Shermans. We called them “Emchetyrye”, from M4 [in Russian, em chetyrye]...Overall, this was a good vehicle but, as with any tank, it had its pluses and minuses. When someone says to me that this was a bad tank, I respond, “Excuse me” One cannot say that this was a bad tank. Bad as compared to what?...

In the first place, this track had a service life approximately twice that of steel track. I might be mistaken, but I believe that the service life of the T-34 track was 2500 kilometers. The service life of the Sherman track was in excess of 5000 kilometers. Secondly, The Sherman drove like a car on hard surfaces, and our T-34 made so much noise that only the devil knows how many kilometers away it could be heard...

In general the American representative worked efficiently. Any deficiency that he observed and reported was quickly and effectively corrected...

For a long time after the war I sought an answer to one question. If a T-34 started burning, we tried to get as far away from it as possible, even though this was forbidden.”

When a Sherman burned, the main gun ammunition did not explode. Why was this?

“Such a case occurred once in Ukraine. Our tank was hit. We jumped out of it but the Germans were dropping mortar rounds around us. We lay under the tank as it burned...We thought we were finished! We would hear a big bang and it would all be over! A brother’s grave! We heard many loud thumps coming from the turret. This was the armor-piercing rounds being blown out of their cases. Next the fire would reach the high explosive rounds and all hell would break loose! But nothing happened. Why not? Because our high explosive rounds detonated and the American rounds did not? In the end it was because the American ammunition had more refined explosives...

The Sherman could never defeat a Tiger with a frontal shot. We had to force the Tiger to expose its flank. If we were defending and the Germans were attacking, we had a special tactic. Two Shermans were designated for each Tiger. The first Sherman fired at the track and broke it. For a brief space of time the heavy vehicle still moved forward on one track, which caused it to turn. At this moment the second Sherman shot it in the side, trying to hit the fuel cell. This is how we did it.

-Dmitriy Fedorovich

Interview with Russian WW2 tank commander

http://www.thefewgoodmen.com/thefgmforum/threads/interview-with-russian-ww2-tank-commander.6905/

[winkelried]

You must not have read the article - the points you make are fully covered in it. See opening paragraph below:

True - commented your post where it lacked accuracy

[Erwin]

Interesting material poorfish. Althought it's the allied air superiority that probably was more the determinant for victory than simply the quantity of arty and its ammo.

[JonS]

Several interesting comments and further reading from the link above:

Poster 1:

A great book on the subject is “Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II,” by Belton Cooper. The author was in charge of recovering, cleaning out and repairing or dismantling damaged and destroyed tanks for Patton’s 3rd Armored Division.

One of the revelations in the book is that the US was ready to replace the Sherman before DDay. The US Army could have gone to war in France with the M26 Pershing, which was ready to start being produced as the US main battle tank in late 43. The major opponent of the change was none other than Gen. George Patton, who falsely believed that a heavier tank with wider tracks would have to be slower on roads. He took the view that tanks would fill the roll of cavalry, running free behind enemy lines, and did not consider tank to tank fighting to be a major role. The Germans had other ideas, and the Americans were forced into unequal battles that cost over 100% casualties in his tank crews over a period of 8 months.

Death Traps is a terrible book.

No, wait. That's not fair.

Death Traps is like the Curate's egg; good in parts.

When Coopers sticks to talking about stuff that he - an ordnance officer - actually did, his experiences, the things he was responsible for, it's pretty good. Unfortunately that's only about 1/4th - /3rd of the book. The rest of it is Kettlerian flights of fantasy, second hand stories, and rumours with made up or badly out of context numbers. Those bits are terrible.

[fatehunter]

Kettlerian

a new adjective!

[JonS]

Not really. It's been in the dictionary for five years.

[c3k]

^^^

Perhaps, but wielding it with such aplomb is surely worth some kudos.

[Sakai007]

I am both horrified and entertained by the word Kettlerian. Horrified since it's made the rounds to get into the urban dictionary, entertained by Jon's effortless use of the word in a sentence. c3K said all that much more eloquently then myself, but I just couldn't resist.

[JasonC]

The whole meme is as bad as that book, actually.

1/4 of one KIA and 1/2 of one WIA per knocked out tank. Some deathtraps.

Fewer knocked out US mediums (all types) than German full AFVs knocked out in return.

Thoroughly incorrect claims about TDs and imaginary doctrinal failings.

Cherry picked comparisons of the top 1/6th of the Germans AFV force with the bottom half of the US force, with no accounting for the size difference in said forces.

Missing the single most important point about Sherman 75s - that they were all already built before the Germans fielded tanks they could not handle. They just weren't lost in action sooner because US forces were only lightly engaged until late in the war.

No discussion of how reckless German tank doctrine threw away practically the entire advantage of their superior tanks. No discussion of the complete failure of every large scale use of armor by the Germans in the west (their largest outlier success lasted all of one week and reflected total local odds by operational surprise, not armor anything).

Basically, it is pretty much a muckrakers crapstorm, thrown at much better men than those doing the throwing...

[sburke]

Basically, it is pretty much a muckrakers crapstorm, thrown at much better men than those doing the throwing...

rotflmao - well said.

[Michael Emrys]

People also seem to forget that the Sherman's main employment did not consist of fighting other tanks. Most of the time, they were shooting at MG nests, AT guns, or other concentrations of German firepower. And when they weren't doing that (you know, the kind of "infantry support" that amateur tacticians like to sneer at as a waste of a valuable resource), they were in pursuit of retreating enemies and overrunning their rear guards, or just running around in the enemy's rear areas raising hell and destroying whatever they came across. The 75 mm gun may not have been a very good AT weapon during the last coupe of years of the war, but it served just fine at what was its main job.

It's worth keeping in mind when shedding tears for all the tankers who died or were wounded because they lacked a high velocity AT weapon for their vehicles, that the men in the rifle companies were dying at vastly higher rates, indeed at rates that very nearly became insupportable. Suddenly, "infantry support" does not seem like such a trivial or unworthy task. The problem was that at this point in time, the technical demands for producing an effective AT round conflicted with those of an effective anti-personnel round. Designing a round that could do both, then designing a gun that could fire it, then designing and manufacturing a tank that could carry both were not things that could be done in a week. Hard decisions had to be made, and the men who had to make them did not have our advantage of 70+ years of hindsight. The decisions that they made were not perfect and this far down the road we may wish that certain other things had been done. However, it seems to me after many years of pondering this issue that the decisions that were made weren't really as bad as they are sometimes made out to be by those with a narrow point of view or obsession about one aspect of combat neglecting a whole swath of reality.

Michael

[JasonC]

All they needed was tungsten rounds for their 76mm guns, on the later model Shermans and on TDs, and they were just fine. The Israelis were still killing tanks superior to the best tanks of WW II in gun and armor terms with upgunned Shermans in 1973; there is nothing wrong with it as a medium tank, with the right ammo.

2/3rds of the German AFV fleet of 1944-5 could not withstand a 75mm round from the front (Pz IVs, StuGs, Marders, etc), and less than 5% of that fleet could withstand a 75mm round from the side (Tigers only, and the Is only at range). Meanwhile the western allies fielded 3 upgunned AFVs (TDs, Brit Fireflies, US 76mm Shermans, 105mm Shermans with HEAT) for every uparmored German tank facing them - and had them in the field, in quantity, a full year before the Germans got Panthers to any western front. The US built more M10s alone, by the end of 1943, than the Germans built Panthers over the whole war.

The only true screw ups on allied armor war planning were not finding shatter gap in testing until it came up in the field, and being slow to get enough APCR to the troops to address the issue that caused. If you read the US tanker reports after Normandy, they said just get us the hyper velocity stuff and we will win.

[winkelried]

The US built more M10s alone, by the end of 1943, than the Germans built Panthers over the whole war.

Often it is forgotten that a lot (or even almost each) of the U.S. infantry divisions had 150 guns in an anti-tank role (thereof 90 mobile) - since it had a tank batallion with 60 Shermans and a tank destroyer batallion (most of them SP) with 36 M10/18/36 subordinated - in addition to the AT guns in the three regimental AT companies and the AT platoon in each of the nine batallions.

That was far more direct and AT firepower than any German infantry division could muster ... and more than half of what a German panzer division could bring to the table.

There was so much AT firepower, that the U.S. could allow for the tank destroyer batallion be used in an indirect fire role as an artillery batallion ...

[JonS]

All they needed was tungsten rounds for their 76mm guns, on the later model Shermans and on TDs, and they were just fine. The Israelis were still killing tanks superior to the best tanks of WW II in gun and armor terms with upgunned Shermans in 1973; there is nothing wrong with it as a medium tank, with the right ammo.

So, yeah. It's a decent point but ... bait and switch, much?

There was just a tad more to the M-50 and M-51 than 'the right ammo'. That's like saying the USAF is still able to kill people with the B-52, even though it entered service 60 years ago, because 'it has new engines.'

Meanwhile the western allies fielded 3 upgunned AFVs (TDs, Brit Fireflies, US 76mm Shermans, 105mm Shermans with HEAT) for every uparmored German tank facing them - and had them in the field, in quantity, a full year before the Germans got Panthers to any western front.

Wha? That's ... that's just flat out wrong :confused:

The Panthers were first in combat on a western front at Anzio in ~Feb '44. Fireflies didn't see combat until 6 June 44, the 76mm Sherman in July 44, and the 105mm Sherman about a month after that. (And, really? The 105? That's a huuuge stretch. What next - the Brumbar was a anti-tank weapon?)

Oh, wait - the M-10 TD was in combat in Tunisia, which was about a year before the Panther showed up. Of course the M-10 then sat out Sicily, although it was in combat again from Salerno in September '43 onwards. Is Tunisia a 'western front'? Maybe.

[Michael Emrys]

Often it is forgotten that a lot (or even almost each) of the U.S. infantry divisions had 150 guns in an anti-tank role (thereof 90 mobile) - since it had a tank batallion with 60 Shermans and a tank destroyer batallion (most of them SP) with 36 M10/18/36 subordinated...

Er, not quite. Most divisions had a tank battalion or a TD battalion. It sometime happened, but rarely and usually only temporarily, that a division had both. A few divisions had neither for much of the time they were in combat.

Michael

[JonS]

If somebody has a mind to do some serious number crunching, the information about attachments for all Inf Divs in NWE can be found here:

http://history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/ETOOB-TOC.htm

At a quick and superficial look, it seems that the divisions that landed in France early on (1, 2, 4) typically did have both a tank and an SP TD bn continuously throughout the campaign. The later landing divisions (eg 84, 100) usually had at least one or the other.

[winkelried]

Er, not quite. Most divisions had a tank battalion or a TD battalion. It sometime happened, but rarely and usually only temporarily, that a division had both. A few divisions had neither for much of the time they were in combat.

Michael

Just to get the figures right:

There were 28 separate tank batallions for 42 infantry divisions in ETO which means that 2/3 of the IDs could have such a batallion attached (sometimes they had none, sometimes even more than one). BTW this means that 1'700 tanks were in these batallions overall.

and there were 17 tank destroyer batallions in ETO (3 remained towed, 3 began towed and were re-fitted with SP).

then overall the average infantry division would still have 90 to 114 guns in AT role (36 to 60 mobile). Still: A German infantry division would still have trouble to match this figure ...

[Badger73]

People also seem to forget that the Sherman's main employment did not consist of fighting other tanks. Most of the time, they were shooting at MG nests, AT guns, or other concentrations of German firepower. And when they weren't doing that (you know, the kind of "infantry support" that amateur tacticians like to sneer at as a waste of a valuable resource), they were in pursuit of retreating enemies and overrunning their rear guards, or just running around in the enemy's rear areas raising hell and destroying whatever they came across. The 75 mm gun may not have been a very good AT weapon during the last coupe of years of the war, but it served just fine at what was its main job.

It's worth keeping in mind when shedding tears for all the tankers who died or were wounded because they lacked a high velocity AT weapon for their vehicles, that the men in the rifle companies were dying at vastly higher rates, indeed at rates that very nearly became insupportable. Suddenly, "infantry support" does not seem like such a trivial or unworthy task. The problem was that at this point in time, the technical demands for producing an effective AT round conflicted with those of an effective anti-personnel round. Designing a round that could do both, then designing a gun that could fire it, then designing and manufacturing a tank that could carry both were not things that could be done in a week. Hard decisions had to be made, and the men who had to make them did not have our advantage of 70+ years of hindsight. The decisions that they made were not perfect and this far down the road we may wish that certain other things had been done. However, it seems to me after many years of pondering this issue that the decisions that were made weren't really as bad as they are sometimes made out to be by those with a narrow point of view or obsession about one aspect of combat neglecting a whole swath of reality.

Michael

At the risk of becoming just one more entry in someone else's sig line, good post, Michael.

I suspect that if the war had lasted longer, Sherman's would have aged out and the newer improved tanks would have comprised greater numbers in post '44 Allied forces.

[John Kettler]

JonS,

It's a pity that, given your real contributions here, that you seem to constantly default to bashing me in every way you possibly can. It was old a very long time ago, and why you're still around, what with your ongoing vicious and outrageous behavior, is beyond me. The only rational reason I can come up with is that your value to BFC is somehow an offset to the misery you inflict on anyone whom you deem has offended your delicate sensibilities. You, sir, are a grown man who's behaving worse than most two-year olds. And, unlike a two-year old, you have no excuse. None whatsoever!

Everyone else,

This is a most worthwhile thread, to which I'd like to add that Michael Wittmann, back in his days in a short barreled StuG III, racked up quite a tally by shooting T-34s in their vulnerable turret rings. Unfortunately, I don't have his open fire range, but I'd expect it to be pretty short, considering the looping trajectory of the 75/L24.

I'd never encountered the railroad car argument before, but Uncle George, who served in Boat Two (Patton's LCM Navy detachment), reported that attempts to load/test load a U.S. heavy tank (suspect M6) failed when the tank crashed through the wharf!

If the tank crew loss stats not derived from Cooper are to be trusted, they indicate enormous improvements in crew protection measures (wet ammo stowage), for, as I've presented repeatedly, the typical losses from APHE partial penetration/ full penetration, followed by detonation, were far worse in the Western Desert than those presented here for NW Europe. Shall have to go back and look at the period the stats cover. If I have the British numbers right, the direct fire KE losses dropped, but the shaped charge losses soared as the war wore on. This is consistent with the attrition of German principal antitank weapons and the shift to city fighting, where handheld weapons (Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck) became the real threat.

I haven't deconstructed Cooper, but he was there dealing with the carnage of blown up tanks and crews, and we were not. If he says that we were so short of tank crews that infantrymen were pressed into service as tank crews after a mere two hours of training, then I'm inclined to believe him. By contrast, 2nd AD had over two years to work up before being committed to battle!

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

On Cooper, besides being a brass hating blowhard and a typical rear echelon you know what er, he is also a cherry picker. The 2nd AD had the highest tank losses of any US AD in the war, even adjusted for time in combat. Well over 3 times the tank losses of the average AD and 1.7 times adjusted for days in combat.

Casualties in the armor branch were 1/3rd of the rate of casualties in the armored infantry or ordinary infantry branches, and were comparable to those in the combat engineers or artillery, not under armor cover but frequently well off the front line. That is per man in the units, it does not reflect lower numbers in the armor branch. The reason is quite obvious - shell fragments were the leading cause of all casualties and armor of any kind is excellent protection against that leading cause.

The "death trap" was to have to go through the whole war in the ETO on the front lines and in a wool shirt, not in a 30 ton medium tank. And even that wasn't much of a death trap - the western allies had the lowest KIA to forces engaged of any side in the war. A Japanese island garrison, a German U boat crew late war, or a Russian infantry battalion in the early war, now those were death traps. It is like listening to spoiled LA teenage preppies whine about how deprived they are.

[JasonC]

To JonS - against a T-62 in 1973, upgunned might mean a 105mm, against a T-55 in 1962, a 75L70 might suffice, against German tanks in WW II, 76mm with APCR (or 17 pdr) is just fine.

As for upgunned before the threats, yes M-10s are a year earlier than Panthers, and they count as "upgunned" answers, and appear before the threat. The Germans had all of 76 Panthers at Anzio, in a single battalion. The US had produced 6700 M10s by the same date.

All the other answers you mention appear at the same time as the Normandy fighting and the more numerous uparmored German AFV threat there. And heavily outnumbered that threat.

As for why I mention the Sherman 105 and do not consider it a stretch, the reason is the US armor force commanders themselves called it the best all around weapon they had, as early as Normandy. With HEAT is was perfectly adequate as an answer to armor, and the lower muzzle velocity did not matter at typical Normandy ranges. Would I rather have a Firefly or an easy 8 with tungsten? Sure. But it still counts as part of the upgunned portion of the fleet that could kill a Panther or Tiger I from the front.