Strongpoint defenses.

[Apocal]

I assume these were used fairly often by the Germans and Italians in Italy. How were they laid out? How many men would they generally contain?

[JonS]

It varied a lot, to the degree that pretty much anything you want to do is at least plausible. As a rule of thumb, I'd suggest dealing with either a platoons of infantry, or a company of infantry, with each platoon-sized element having an HMG in support, and each company having an anti tank gun.

81mm mortars would typically be in support - maybe 2 for a platoon, or 6-8 for a company. Probably offmap, although depending on the size and presumed spacing between strongpoints you could have them as part of a company strongpoint.

In terms of footprint, a platoon strongpoint might be a circle roughly 75-100m across (10-12 tiles), and a company strongpoint might be 150-200m across (18-25 tiles). So quite small.

All would be adjusted based on terrain - there's not much point having anti tank guns at the top of a freaking big ridge, for example. And 200m across would probably be way too big for a company in a city.

Some examples:

http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2-2Epi-c5-WH2-2Epi-i.html

http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/etexts/WH2-1Ita/WH2-1Ita238a.jpg

[Broadsword56]

If you want more guidance, you can find WWII German manuals online that show diagrams for strongpoints.

There's also an Osprey book, "World War II Infantry Assault Tactics" that diagrams prepared defenses very well.

[LongLeftFlank]

I like the jail next to the nunnery.

[JasonC]

Apocal - strongpoint defense is a scheme for defending a whole sector, as well as a single element within that scheme, the strongpoint proper.

As a scheme, the idea is to have large portions of the frontage covered only by obstacles and ranged fire (both direct and artillery registrations), with at most a thin screen of outposts and listening posts as a supplement to those, as the overall "linear" defense. No even spreading of the available force along the entire line.

Then strongpoints act as anchors between sectors only covered in the manner described above. They are themselves typically layered in 2-3 belts or lines, but are discontinuous. A blob here, nothing for 800 meters, a blob there, nothing for 600 meters, etc. Then, behind the 800 meter gap but 1200 meters farther to the rear, another such blob.

The usual formation strength assigned to a single strongpoint is an infantry company. But that varied. A reduced company because some forces were detached to the outpost line would be the most common variation. Or a reinforced company (extra platoon), in the middle of a battalion defensive scheme, say, meant as an "overage" that could act as a reserve. But think company as the baseline amount.

The second or third line "tiers" could be formed around artillery or mortar formations with some infantry attachment, or could be looser, less fortified positions (assembly areas, rally points) for mobile reserves (tanks, mechanized infantry, etc). Again these would be more likely in the last tier of the strongpoint layers.

The core of any strongpoint is some form of range firepower that can reach out to either side to cover the obstacle barriers between that strongpoint and the next along the line. The strongest schemes would overlap the effective ranges and lines of sight from two adjacent strongpoints, to that both could "bear" with their ranged weapons on any force assaulting either one, let alone a force trying to pass between them.

That ranged firepower component could be as limited as a pair of 82mm mortars and a few heavy machineguns, or as elaborate as a PAK, field artillery, or light FLAK battery. Or an infantry gun section, you get the idea. Something bigger than rifles and personal side arms. There would also be FOs in each strongpoint, with authority to call down div arty fires on registration points in front of their perimeter, and between the strongpoints, in dead ground areas for direct fire especially (a low draw, a large wood, etc).

The forward defense screen is an obstacle belt. Mines were the favorite form, with uneven density, some heavy enough to actually block passage, some just light enough to deter it by looking like the previous. Dead ground areas could be mined without being covered by direct fire. Wire obstacles, on the other hand, needed to be covered by direct fire. Natural terrain would be incorporated here - water barriers, steep terrain, bogs e.g.

Next string a screen of small outposts, fire team size, along the frontage. These would be around 200 meters apart, the idea being listening post coverage at night, and close small arms coverage during the day, overlapping from one to the next. These might have covered routes to them, or might just have to be manned or relieved in darkness. One log bunker, or a fire team in a foxhole, is all we are talking about here. Overall they are a "tripwire", early warning system, and meant to prevent the whole position from being scouted or penetrated without a full attack. There wouldn't be more than a single platoon deployed on such duties (at any one time that is), even for a full battalion scheme.

Ok, that covers everything about the scheme and why it is expected to work, other than the actual strongpoint itself. Those are typically all around defense, but might be weaker in a rear direction away from the enemy. They use platoon sized sub-forts, linked by communications trenches. Plus heavy weapons positions, best case in log bunkers, sometimes open firing pits (e.g. for mortars, infantry guns, or howitzers). A mortar position toward the rear but within the strongpoint is a typical addition, perhaps a second rear position that serves as a company CP, or a reserve point.

The platoon subforts and company CP area each would get a dugout, a deeper fortification with overhead cover in which to shelter from artillery fire. Depth of a cellar or more, wood ladders to get out of them, tunnel rat living. Usually only one per platoon subposition. Then radiating from that, short communication trenches to firing trench positions (fire step, embankment with sandbags, that sort of thing), which let the riflemen and LMGs cover one of the approach routes to the strongpoint itself. Their main mission was direct defense of the strongpoint proper against enemy infantry assault. Each subfort might also have associated heavy weapons (HMGs at a minimum) that had a role in the strongpoint to strongpoint, open areas fire scheme. These heavy weapons could also help defend that part of the strongpoint from direct attack, but that was not their main mission. Interdicting the obstacle barriers and unmanned open ground to the next strongpoint over on their side, was.

A typical configuration of one of these platoon subforts would be a semi circle of firing trench looking over say the east face of the overall strongpoint, one log bunker HMG to the left and 20-30 yards behind that semi circle, communication trenches of all of those to a central dugout, which could also hold a local reserve squad to "repel borders" by remanning a threatened point or "grenading up the trenches". The perimeter of the platoon subfort itself might be covered by wire obstacles at 50 yards or so - meant to be far enough away to prevent approach within grenade-throw of the fighting trenches, without crossing the wire. But otherwise close enough that small arms from those trenches would be murderous to anyone trying to make such a movement. The layout of the individual subfort would however confirm to the nature of the ground, sighting opportunities, etc.

Last elements of the scheme... It was expected that in quiet periods, the enemy might try to infiltrate through the gaps e.g. at night, so one of the active parts of the defense would be occasional night patrols of squad to platoon strength into the uncovered areas, to see what was moving around out there.

And second, when actually under attack, it was expected that some strongpoints in the whole scheme would be hit harder than others, while others would be left alone or rapidly defeat their local attackers. Reserves could be gathered from those, and from the second tier strongpoints if unmolested so far, to retake any lost portions of the defensive works by a local counterattack. The ideal was to organize and launch those as soon as possible after it was learned a position was lost, or even when it was still just threatened. The hope was that the occupiers would be so disorganized and lack battlefield situational awareness at the conclusion of their fight into the strongpoint itself, and could thus be temporarily vulnerable to a sharp counterattack (up communications trenches / covered routes wherever possible), even by numerically shoestring forces.

With that idea in mind, all the defense weapons and sighting schemes included someone or other having the job of being able to plaster friendly positions that fell to the enemy, to cover such attempts by fire. The company HQ position might e.g. be "reverse slope" to the original enemy start line, but have observation to the platoon subforts, for example. Artillery or mortars from adjacent strongpoints could also have the range to those positions, to drop fire on them if they fell, whether to support a counterattack or just to pin down the intruders and keep them from getting any further.

If many of these tactics sound quite WWI trench warfare -ee, that is because they were developed in the last 2 years of that war, basically. Formations tended to be thinner on the ground in WW II, and the gaps between strongpoints wider. But the internals of each followed WWI lessons, that were still sound on a small unit level.

Does that give a clear picture of the tactics?

[Cuirassier]

Interesting summary, thanks.

Jason,

Have strongpoint defenses changed much since World War II? I'm assuming they have spread out more and obviously incorporate better weapons and sensor techs, but have the essential principles remained the same? I know that Soviet doctrine advocated the Kursk-style strongpoint defense in depth well into the 80's, though I'm not sure about NATO.

And do you think that a future land war between first-rate powers would be more similar to World War I conditions rather than World War II? That is, given the advances in modern, guided firepower, there will be a reduction in operational mobility and breakthrough fights relying on concentrated shock action will become much more expensive, even if under armor. Armored artillery, airpower and long range missiles will be in the drivers seat rather than the more traditional armor and mech infantry forces. Thoughts? Just some random considerations that crossed my mind a week or two back.

And sorry to the OP for moving off topic. I can start a new thread with this stuff if wanted.

[Jaeger Jonzo]

Wow, thats a very comprehensive answer Jason...hope I never have to assault one of your defensive positions! As a counter, can you now provide a textbook assault to take a position like that

[LongLeftFlank]

The platoon subforts and company CP area each would get a dugout, a deeper fortification with overhead cover in which to shelter from artillery fire. Depth of a cellar or more, wood ladders to get out of them, tunnel rat living. Usually only one per platoon subposition.

Then radiating from that, short communication trenches to firing trench positions (fire step, embankment with sandbags, that sort of thing), which let the riflemen and LMGs cover one of the approach routes to the strongpoint itself. Their main mission was direct defense of the strongpoint proper against enemy infantry assault.

Each subfort might also have associated heavy weapons (HMGs at a minimum) that had a role in the strongpoint to strongpoint, open areas fire scheme. These heavy weapons could also help defend that part of the strongpoint from direct attack, but that was not their main mission. Interdicting the obstacle barriers and unmanned open ground to the next strongpoint over on their side, was.

A typical configuration of one of these platoon subforts would be a semi circle of firing trench looking over say the east face of the overall strongpoint, one log bunker HMG to the left and 20-30 yards behind that semi circle, communication trenches of all of those to a central dugout, which could also hold a local reserve squad to "repel boarders" by remanning a threatened point or "grenading up the trenches".

The perimeter of the platoon subfort itself might be covered by wire obstacles at 50 yards or so - meant to be far enough away to prevent approach within grenade-throw of the fighting trenches, without crossing the wire. But otherwise close enough that small arms from those trenches would be murderous to anyone trying to make such a movement. The layout of the individual subfort would however confirm to the nature of the ground, sighting opportunities, etc.

A quick footnote to Jason's remarks, with bolding -- Mickey Mouse stuff to many here, but perhaps not to some, and it's seldom that I find a "prepared battlefield" scenario where the designer has followed these rules well.

It may seem tempting to site your strongest bunkers and entrenched HMG nests on hilltops or upper slope locations that maximize their fields of fire, so that you can focus withering crossfires on the enemy the moment he stands up, but that is an elementary mistake. Such positions are readily observable by the enemy, who registers them for early destruction by artillery concentrations or ranged direct fire weapons/AFVs. The only exceptions might be Maginot/Westwall style armoured cupolas and pillboxes (which aren't provided in CM -- the in game bunkers are fairly weak though 2.0 strengthened them a bit I gather).

Therefore, as Jason notes, MGs are sited so that they're obscured from enemy positions opposite but can pour enfilading fire on their flanks into attackers struggling in the obstacle belts, or to shoot lengthwise (defilade) along gullies or trenches that the enemy might use to approach in cover.

So at range, each position ideally:

- First covers the obstacle belts in front of its neighbours

- Second covers covered approach routes to itself

- Third can deliver intense FPF and grenades into a killzone across its own immediate front, and hopefully can summon reserves before that situation arises.

[Duckman]

As a counter, can you now provide a textbook assault to take a position like that

I'm not him but I'll try anyway.

The counter would be the new offensive tactics also developed in the last years of WWI, the so-called infilitration tactics.

- Infantry goes forward in dispersed formations probing for weaknesses.

- Artillery provides on-call support, i.e. not the rolling barrage of 1914-16.

- There should also be some kind of direct fire support. WWI German stormtroopers used manhauled infantry guns, but tanks or SP guns are of course even better. The Sturmgeschutz was developed for this purpose, i.e. shooting the infantry through the fortified zone. Heavy "breakthrough" tanks like the Char B1 and IS-2 are variations on the same theme.

The German attack at Sedan in 1940 is an example of how small forces with relatively weak support could roll up a strongpoint defense using infilitration tactics.

[JasonC]

Um, the French at Sedan didn't have much of a defense. Mostly the Germans just used suppression by air power (more psychological than direct - French guns stayed silent while planes were overhead to avoid giving away their positions, that sort of thing) and artillery fire across the river, to cover a crossing. The crossing itself was made by infantry, and it had to carry the heavy part of the fighting on the opposite shore, but the French gave way with relatively weak resistence at that point. The Germans then got armor across by ferry operations and sent it running to the French rear. The French belatedly counterattacked with armor, largely unsupported by other arms, and the German infantry formations mostly sufficed to stop it, while the armor continued on. (The armor did have to fight some of the French reserves and beat them pretty easily).

Not a case study in how to crack a strong defense, because the defense just wasn't strong to begin with, in that case. Lots of the German early war successes stemmed less from any great ability on their part, than on hamfisted greenness and lack of stomach for serious war on the part of their opponents. Of course, the Germans thought it showed how brilliant they were, resulting in "victory disease" (overconfidence leading to overreaaching), etc etc. But none of that is tactics.

[JasonC]

How to break a strongpoint defense intelligently designed and operated - first you have to pick an actual method, rather than just throwing everything at the defense in straight ahead attacks, which would let every aspect of the defense work as designed and make it as hard as possible. Pick a method that the scheme is actually vulnerable to, that you actually have the resources to execute, and execute that method and that method only.

What methods? One possible method is infantry infiltration. That means, after good tactical recon first (well before the attempt - days not hours) to ID the main enemy positions and locate their OP/LP line and all the obstacles, you pick a dark night and attempt to push an entire infantry battalion through the gaps between the strongpoints, without engaging the strongpoints. Stealth is the watchword, and there is no rushing.

First, small picked detachments "blind" the OPs by creeping very close to them and then taking them out rapidly with SMGs and grenades (knives if they are lax enough, but that rarely works), then go quiet as a church. Not all of them, but enough to uncover a route or two and feint possible routes not actually used, in addition.

Then pathfinder groups, very small (fire team to squad sized) sneak into the position and through obstacle belts, clearing routes and marking them. They go between the strongpoints and use all available dead ground. They head for the enemy rear. They want to locate positions that cut off withdraw routes from the strongpoints by fire, that is, that will once daylight comes. They have to be positions that men can reach the same night, and improve somewhat (dig shallow scrapes or slit trenches e.g.).

Only after a route is marked and the way believed to be clear, does a full company pass along it in narrow column, as quiet as they can. At some points the column may go flat and crawl part of the route. They don't want to engage anything, and it is agonizingly slow. They want to catch up with the pathfinders, draw in the long column's tail, form a perimeter, and improve positions until dawn. Several companies are making the attempt by different routes, a battalion in all is involved.

Now obviously a hundred things can go wrong with this. The enemy can simply hear the intrusion, fire a bunch of flares, and open up. But that is the reason the first groups in are tiny, so that failure at that stage loses as few men as possible. If one company is discovered, they hug whatever cover they can (shellholes the most common expedient), and overwatch back at the start line fire-duels with the strongpoints. The exposed formation tries to get out under cover of that fire, but that part of the attempt is a failure. In the meantime, however, what with the war and all as a distraction, perhaps a company two gaps over gets in.

In the morning, the infiltrated formation cuts up movement into or out of the strongpoints by their own fire, and observes for artillery and mortars The idea is to put the shoe on the other foot, and dare the overall defenders to counterattack the infiltrated group, which tactically just defends its position.

Now do the same thing 2 nights later. Eventually if the defenders don't pull out, they get cut off by friendlies that have oozed through them. Or they waste their strength in local counterattacks that bleed them white enough that some of the positions can be stormed frontally, while subject to fire from the rear etc.

That is the infantry infiltration method. It stresses the attacker's infantry quality and numbers, and his patience, and exploits any laxity or lack of fitness on the part of the defenders (perhaps exasperated by long fighting without relief, inclement weather conditions, etc).

The next asymmetric method is a combined arms solution, instead. Again the target is the gaps between the strongpoints, but now the intruding arm is an entire tank brigade. Drive between the strongpoints, dare their fire and outshoot their heavy weapons positions, and push on to the next line. Drop a company of medium tanks to cut off the bypassed points, otherwise a lot like the previous, in the sequel. Obviously this requires a massive armor edge over a mostly infantry defense, but it can work a treat if you have one handy.

Next method is the systematic approach. Long observation of the whole position is its prequisite, and massive artillery support. Every firing point in the enemy position is exactly plotted. Infantry probes discover these - the hard way - along with night recon by small infiltration teams, and direct observation from the front line over an extended period. In addition, counterbattery work needs to locate all the main enemy batteries supporting the position, even ones kilometers deep behind it - accurately.

When everything is ready, artillery fire is laid on every single fighting position. Including the deep batteries, hit by longer range counterbattery guns. This is expected to force the defenders into their dugouts and quarter the whole position's outgoing firepower. Anything left out of the scheme risks failure. Now assault a central, chosen strongpoint frontally, not between them in the gaps but head on. That is where the strongpoint relies the most on its squad infantry, which the artillery fire is confining to their cellars. The infantry attack needs to be launched with the barrage still in progress, with a closely timed "lift" of that fire right when the friendlies approach the outer wire.

Naturally there will be some firing positions left active, and the attackers need to be able to take those out themselves, directly. Infantry support tanks help with this, but you don't need as many as in the armor brigade option.

The overall goal is a "race to the parapet" between the attackers and the defenders in their dugouts, with the defenders starting when the artillery lifts, the attackers starting sooner but with farther to go. If the attackers get to and through the platoon-fort wire before the trenches are fully manned - or if the trenches are manned too soon and inundated with 122mm howitzer fire - attacking infantry gets in.

Meanwhile the artillery suppression is continuing to hammer the adjacent strongpoints and counterbattery is trying to keep the defending artillery out of the game.

When the strongpoint is taken, consolidated and defended, the game starts again on the next tier back. Overall the method is very slow, but it can be slow but sure, if the attacker's artillery weight is dominant enough. The idea is to spend HE and time, instead of blood, to grind through the defense.

What you don't want to get caught doing is trying a little of each of the above, incoherently. Sending infantry with tanks into the gaps e.g. sacrifices stealth and can't create the effects of the first method. Big artillery preps likewise. If when a night attempt is discovered, the commanders try to turn it into a frontal assault on the nearest strongpoint with shoestring, last minute artillery suppression, you get a bad attempt at the last method, and likely a long casualty bill and probable failure.

Pick one method, that you have the means to accomplish, and stick with it until it works.

I hope that helps...

[Jaeger Jonzo]

Great comprehensive answer once again Jason, many thanks for taking the time to type all that.

As I was reading the first paragraphs on the infantry infiltration method, I am assuming ops with that subtlety and discipline would only be tasked to more highly trained troops like rangers, paras, recon and commandos? I can't see your average British or US infantry division conducting such disciplined night manouvres? Though I guess veteran troops could pull it off.

[JasonC]

The Russians gave pathfinder jobs to their regimental recon formations. Their other main job was to live in the enemy rear after a night infiltration, for days at a time, to gather info and sometimes prisoners. When it was a matter of getting through obstacle belts, pioneers would be involved, in specially tasked, small teams. They were used to marking routes through obstacle belts and similar. But the company sized column infiltration along a route already marked, as expected of any rifle company. Russians also used "storm companies" to follow the pathfinders sometimes, to attack OPs and blind them, and those would also be used in "race of the parapet" style attacks. Basically those are upgunned rifle companies with extra SMGs, sometimes LMGs, and sometimes explosives, and might include volunteers etc.

But it wasn't a matter of only rangers or special commandos.

[JonS]

The Russians gave pathfinder jobs to their regimental recon formations. Their other main job was to live in the enemy rear after a night infiltration, for days at a time, to gather info and sometimes prisoners.

There is - or at least was - a very good Russian novella called "Star" about a Soviet regtl recon platoon in WWII (set in 1944, I think) available on the web. Unfortunately I can't find it anymore, and "Star" is kind of a useless word to put into Google. There are print copies available though.

[sburke]

There is - or at least was - a very good Russian novella called "Star" about a Soviet regtl recon platoon in WWII (set in 1944, I think) available on the web. Unfortunately I can't find it anymore, and "Star" is kind of a useless word to put into Google. There are print copies available though.

Here is some stuff on the author, may help folks narrow their search.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emmanuil_Kazakevich

[Apocal]

That is incredibly in-depth and helpful, thank you. Now I just have to finagle what you told me into something workable on the CMx2 scale (I don't feel comfortable fighting full battalions on the attack in CMBN or CMFI). I'm thinking maybe just downsize the strongpoint companies to platoons and seeing if that keeps things interesting without being too much.

[Sublime]

In looking for an english version of 'star' (on amazon) I did find what seems a book detailing a collection of several novellas by soviet writers on WW2 called The Damned and the Dead. Does anyone know for sure if Star is included or is this a book analyzing the stories? It only says it has earliest writings by several writers including Emmanuil Kazakevich...

thx

[JonS]

A good chunk of it is on Google books:

http://books.google.co.nz/books?id=-gdFAAAAMAAJ&q=Kazakevich&dq=Kazakevich&hl=en

and here:

http://books.google.co.nz/books?id=FONfAAAAMAAJ&dq=Kazakevich&q=star

(thanks for the author name sburke)

Sublime: if you're talking about The Damned and the Dead, Amazon UK has a look-inside, and it looks like it's talking about the Russian novelists and their books, rather than being a compilation of the books themselves. It does have a detailed description of the story though. Also, Amazon UK have a 2nd hand copy of Star.

[Bartokomus]

years and years ago, someone (maybe Andreas?) linked a pdf to Star in it's entirety. after reading it i deleted it off of my hard drive and i still regret that to this day.

[Broadsword56]

Thanks to your good reference links, I just was able to reserve a copy of "Star" via interlibrary loan. It seems to be in a lot of university libraries (my copy is coming from San Jose State -- sorry sburke!)

[Michael Emrys]

Unless you read Russian, you'd better be sure this is a translated edition.

Michael

[John Kettler]

JonS,

Part of the difficulty in finding this work is likely tied to confusion about its title, which is The Star. There have been two war films made based on the novella, as shown here. Absent the novella, for which I'm still searching, this should give at least a flavor of what's depicted in the novella.

http://pipss.revues.org/369?lang=fr

(Fair Use)

"4 Nikolai Lebedev’s The Star (2002) is the second screen version of a 1947 story by the respected war writer Emmanuil Kazakevich (1913-62). The earlier film was made in 1949 by Alexander Ivanov, but was released only after Stalin’s death in 1953. Grigorii Mar’iamov explains why:

The demand to remake the picture based on E. Kazakevich’s well-known novella The Star, about the heroic death of a group of reconnaissance troops operating in the enemy rear, can be labelled as nothing less than crude, arbitrary violence. Stalin did not agree with the tragic finale, considering that it might ‘deter soldiers from becoming reconnaissance troops’. His demand boiled down to having the soldiers carry out their mission and return to base without loss. All arguments to the effect that such a dénouement destroys the authorial design, reduces artistic quality and subverts characterization, came to naught. As a result the director A. Ivanov tried to reconcile both conclusions, leaving an open-ended finale that allowed the viewer to decide the fate of the soldiers himself. The picture was saved.2

5 It is set in the Spring of 1944, when the Red Army is pushing back the German forces to the Soviet border. The ‘Star’ of the title is the name given to an elite Red Army reconnaissance unit that creates havoc behind the enemy lines. One by one they are picked off, until the final shoot-out against overwhelming odds when the remaining few die heroically, but not before warning their commanders of an impending German counter-offensive which is then repulsed. Kazakevich’s story hints that the soldiers prefer to die rather than return to base and face possible recriminations from the ever-vigilant NKVD, recriminations that could lead to accusations of desertion and cowardice, but this political dimension is missing in Lebedev’s film.

6 Lebedev’s film is standard fare about handsome, patriotic and bright-eyed Russian boys dying for their Motherland, the pathos of death and the anguish of the sweetheart Katia back at base foregrounded by rising orchestral music. There is no sense of the pernicious effect of NKVD activities in the rear. The bitter anti-Stalinist note comes only in the epilogue, when we learn that the ‘Star’ unit was for many years regarded as missing in action, and only in 1964 were all its members posthumously awarded medals.

7 The Star has much in common with Andrei Maliukov’s TV serial Saboteur (2004), also about a Red Army elite unit operating behind German lines, causing confusion among the enemy and thinking nothing of risking their own lives for the sake of Mother Russia. What distinguishes Saboteur from The Star, however, is that here the main enemy is not the Germans, but the NKVD, waiting to use any failed mission as an opportunity for repression and execution. Indeed, Saboteur creates the impression, confirmed by historians and writers, that during the war against Nazi Germany, Red Army soldiers were in more danger from their own side than the enemy."

The 2002 version of the film is available here.

http://veehd.com/search?tag=sia.fascism

Regards,

John Kettler

[Michael Emrys]

Absent the novella, for which I'm still searching...

You might look into this, John. It appears to be a selection of Kazakevich's works, and given the title probably includes the novella. But it isn't cheap and it may be in Russian.

Michael