Fire Superiority & Suppression with CW Squads

[Sabot6]

I'm struggling with getting adequate squad firepower from my Commonwealth troops against German squads, who always seem abundantly equipped with MG34's & MG42's. I've had some particularly embarrassing moments against SS troops who simply would not cower, let alone break, after several minutes of sustained area fire against their foxholes with up to a platoon of CW troops (the Germans in question were two and three man squads with at least one but often two machine guns).

Are there any suggestions for helping the CW troops in general and the Bren gunners in particular be a bit more effective? Currently I split my squads, but perhaps keeping them intact would produce better results?

Thanks in advance for any suggestions!

Sabot6

[womble]

I've had some particularly embarrassing moments against SS troops who simply would not cower, let alone break, after several minutes of sustained area fire against their foxholes with up to a platoon of CW troops...

The Motivation of the troops under fire has a huge effect on their reaction to suppressing/pinning. I would imagine that most scenario designers give SS troops better than average motivation scores, which will mean you have to apply the lead broom more briskly and persistently.

Currently I split my squads, but perhaps keeping them intact would produce better results?

There's no difference at all between the combined fire output of two teams in adjacent AS and the output of a squad where the teams are shooting from the same AS's. Splitting squads can even increase the number of bullets downrange, because you can find a better vantage for the second team if they are further away than the unsplit squad can deploy them. In addition, suppression of one team will not suppress the other, when the squad is split.

[Michael Emrys]

We may be witnessing one more reason why the British relied so heavily on artillery to do the heavy lifting. British infantry in general seems not to have been terribly effective in using their own weapons to gain objectives. Mostly this has been attributed to inadequate training in fire and movement techniques and leadership at the platoon and company level that was both unsophisticated and hesitant.

Michael

[undercovergeek]

a british paratroop company comes with so many mortars you wont know what do with them all - something a recent opponent complained about and when i took the ground he was defending - youd be surprised at the amount of dead germans behind the bocage

[TrailApe]

We may be witnessing one more reason why the British relied so heavily on artillery to do the heavy lifting. British infantry in general seems not to have been terribly effective in using their own weapons to gain objectives. Mostly this has been attributed to inadequate training in fire and movement techniques and leadership at the platoon and company level that was both unsophisticated and hesitant.

aaah yes, the CW infantry were rubbish mantra.

Funnily enough in the few first hand accounts that were written from the British perspective luckily it seems that they didn't believe this themselves.

Of course they did go up against most of the SS and armoured divisions that the Germans had in Normandy, and yes you will find that CM will usually give the SS some very high moral and training factors - for good reason.

Could you provide me with the numerous instances where the "unsophisticated and hesitant" tactics are repeatedly shown that will back up your assertions?

Obviously there will be examples where particular units did not perfom as well as they should - but this charge can be levelled at all of the Armies that were in Normandy at the time, so to single out the CW forces as a whole for this is unusual.

[Baneman]

a british paratroop company comes with so many mortars you wont know what do with them all - something a recent opponent complained about and when i took the ground he was defending - youd be surprised at the amount of dead germans behind the bocage

Wait, you win games ?

[Field Marshal Blücher]

I think it has more to do with the lack of real machine guns at the company level. The Bren is a fine gun for what it is, but it's not capable of sustained fire the same way that MG34s/42s/M1917s/M1919s/Vickers are. The fact that the British centralized their heavier machine guns meant that often the British did not have them where they were needed, while the Americans had M1917s and/or M1919s available in most cases. Therefore, you'll need to rely on tanks, artillery, and mortars for suppression.

-FMB

[Michael Emrys]

aaah yes, the CW infantry were rubbish mantra.

For god's sake take the chip off your shoulder and stop putting words in my mouth while you're at it. I never said they were rubbish. On defense they were at least as good as anybody else, and considering how skillful and determined the Germans were on the defensive, that's saying a lot.

But that they were less than inspiring on offense (we're talking about infantry here, remember) by the time of Normandy is a well established fact. The reasons for this are numerous and complicated and I'm not going to try to even begin to go into them now. But if you really want to pursue the subject you might try some of the following:

Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day

Dr Timothy Harrison Place

OPERATION EPSOM - OVER THE BATTLEFIELD

Ian Daglish

Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945

David French

Michael

[LukeFF]

The manual even mentions how British infantry formations will suffer on their own without artillery and armor support. I guess it's for good reason they developed infantry tanks like the Churchill. They make for good HE-chuckers, are well-armored, and they have a pair of .303 MGs.

[TrailApe]

Well Michael, I'll look at those books you have listed - although a quick look at the reviews on the first one you mentioned did not impress me - seemed as if the author had already made his mind up about the subject and was just trying to prove his point.

However, I've got an open mind and I'm willing to take on new facts - although I baulk at ingrained perceptions such as "they were less than inspiring on offense " and "British infantry in general seems not to have been terribly effective in using their own weapons to gain objectives".

And as for

"I never said they were rubbish. On defense they were at least as good as anybody else"

by god - damned by faint praise - as least as good as anybody else. Makes you wonder how they advanced around 700 miles by being so crap at the offensive and by defending -albeit as least as good as anybody else....

How did they manage it I wonder? prior arrangments with the Germans? "Hey lads - we'll form up in an infantry square over in that field and you come and attack us - we'll keep doing that all the way through France, Belgium, Holland and once we get across the Rhine we'll have a really big one - **** or bust - how's that?"

Can't see it somehow.

.

[undercovergeek]

Wait, you win games ?

oooooo that smarts!!!

[John Kettler]

Here is study of what infantry weapons really do on the battlefield.

PDF]

The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat - RUSI

www.rusi.org/.../Real_Role_of_Small_Arms_RDS_Summer_09.pdfFile Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - Quick View

Regards,

John Kettler

[ArgusEye]

Unfortunately, your link gets mangled. Can you fix it?

[Fernando]

http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Real_Role_of_Small_Arms_RDS_Summer_09.pdf

[ArgusEye]

Thanks! Some reading to do...

[PzKpfw 1]

I'm re-reading Tout's "The Bloody Battle for Tilly" ATM so it sorta goes with this thread .

Regards, John Waters

[TrailApe]

COBRA fully deserves the attention given to it, but if it wasn't for the likes of the lesser known Canadian/British operations GREENLINE, POMEGRANATE, GOODWOOD, ATLANTIC and SPRING that went on during the days preceding it COBRA is unlikely to have been the success that it was.

Here's the dates and the opposing Divisions

GREENLINE 15th July 9th Pz Div. 10th Pz Div

POMEGRANATE 16th July 2nd Pz Div, 10th SS Pz Div, 9th SS Pz Div

GOODWOOD 18/20th July 1st SS Pz Div, 12th SS Pz Div, 101 SS Heavy Pz Battalion, 272nd Inf Div , 503rd SS Heavy Pz Battalion, 16th Luftwaffe Fd Div, 21st Pz Div,346th In Div, 711th In Div

ATLANTIC 18/20th July 1st SS Pz Div, 12th SS Pz Div

SPRING 25/28th July 9th SS Pz Div, 12th SS Pz Div

COBRA 25/31st July 5th Fallschirmjager Div, 2nd Pz Div, Pz Lehr Div, 2nd SS Pz Div, 17th SS Pz Gd Div, 116th Pz Div,352nd Inf Div, 353rd In Div

Tilly was part of Operation SPRING and there is evidence that for about 48 vital hours the Germans thought SPRING was the main effort in Normandy and drew their focus away from COBRA and the Pz divisions that were involved in COBRA mainly became evident after the 28th July.

The one question I have is how come the CW operations all had crappy names?

Greenline and Pomegranate?

Now COBRA - you just know that's going to succeed!

.

[c3k]

BLUECOAT and EPSOM, as well.

Crappy names, indeed. Something about upper-crust jollies. Races and whatnot, don't you know? Er, and Bob's yer uncle, for good measure.

Ken

[PzKpfw 1]

COBRA fully deserves the attention given to it, but if it wasn't for the likes of the lesser known Canadian/British operations GREENLINE, POMEGRANATE, GOODWOOD, ATLANTIC and SPRING that went on during the days preceding it COBRA is unlikely to have been the success that it was.

Here's the dates and the opposing Divisions

GREENLINE 15th July 9th Pz Div. 10th Pz Div

POMEGRANATE 16th July 2nd Pz Div, 10th SS Pz Div, 9th SS Pz Div

GOODWOOD 18/20th July 1st SS Pz Div, 12th SS Pz Div, 101 SS Heavy Pz Battalion, 272nd Inf Div , 503rd SS Heavy Pz Battalion, 16th Luftwaffe Fd Div, 21st Pz Div,346th In Div, 711th In Div.

Tilly was part of Operation SPRING and there is evidence that for about 48 vital hours the Germans thought SPRING was the main effort in Normandy and drew their focus away from COBRA and the Pz divisions that were involved in COBRA mainly became evident after the 28th July.

Just an note, s.H.Pz.Abt 503 was not an s.SS.Pz.Abt, it was a HEER Abt.

Regards, John Waters

[John Kettler]

TrailApe,

I take your point, but I think most of us are familiar with GOODWOOD. It's also my understanding that the British faced most of the high quality German units, especially the armor, making them and it unavailable to oppose the the breakout.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Peregrine]

All the operations were conducted with a breakout in mind.

[Michael Emrys]

BLUECOAT and EPSOM, as well.

BLUECOAT I am particularly in admiration of. That was one operation that fulfilled its hopes. Mostly because the formations involved (especially 11th. Armoured div.) had finally worked out successful armour/infantry cooperation. Bold leadership by Roberts played an important role. By drawing off 9th. and 10th. SS at a critical moment, they contributed importantly to COBRA.

Michael

[gunnersman]

Here is study of what infantry weapons really do on the battlefield.

PDF]

The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat - RUSI

www.rusi.org/.../Real_Role_of_Small_Arms_RDS_Summer_09.pdfFile Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - Quick View

Regards,

John Kettler

Well...hell...I made the mistake of starting to read that at the end of my lunch. Interesting.

[PzKpfw 1]

Anyone remember Carlo D'estes "Decision in Normandy". If so was wondering on thoughts on his later books. Fatal Decision & Bitter Victory. Thinking about getting them.

Regards, John Waters

[JonS]

Anyone remember Carlo D'estes "Decision in Normandy".

I have a friend who's opinion I regard well who thinks very highly of it. On the other hand, IMO his chapter on the British Army is utterly worthless. He is fundamentally wrong about the state of British replacements. D'Este also goes into great detail at great length explaining all the different ways in which the British and Canadians were useless in Normandy, then in a sly footnote towards the end of the chapter coyly observes (paraphrasing) "of course, the US Army had similar problems too." The difference in emphasis between a 30-40 page chapter on the one hand, and a two-line footnote on the other, is telling.

Still, as a single volume history of the Normaandy campaign it's probably better than either Hasting's or Beevor's books.

I've read D'Este's other campaign histories, but so long ago now that I don't really remember much except that they seemed to be quite good.