Billy Ringo

Decided to delete.

Decided to delete.

First of all, my posts are not about who was worse. My posts about disinformation being spread here:
Calling RU evil is incorrect RU needs to be given the benefit of doubt RU is not bad yet etc.  The disinformation above is wrong and must stop. 
You think wrong. German Extermination camps were just German way of mass execution. They must be compared to RU mass executions. RU used different creative ways to mass murder people. When they needed to genocide UKR they used famine. When they needed to genocide Crimean Tatars, they used deportation. Unlike Germans, they used plausible deniability in both cases. The rest was done by gullible westerners who lied that RU needs to be given benefit of doubt - it was by accident; they did not mean it; they are not bad yet. 
 
It is because you have no idea how it worked in reality. They fooled you with labor word in the name. In reality prisoners themselves called these labor camps Extermination-Labour Camps. RU used famine to slowly kill prisoners without much trace and with plausible deniability - it was by accident; we did not mean it. For that they implemented Frenkel Method - they aligned food ration to work norm. Except they calculated work norm in such way that you could never complete work norm to receive normal ration. As soon as you got there you started to die but very slowly.
Quote:
 Welcome to the real world of RU Evil. The world where I was born and the world you know nothing about.  
 
RU attacking Chechnya and committed genocide of Chechens - They are not that bad! There are nuances! RU attacking Georgia twice and committing genocide of Georgians (1,2) - They are not that bad! There are nuances! RU attacking UKR twice and committing genocide of UKR - They are not that bad! There are nuances! The only nuance is that now the Western World does react somewhat to crimes against humanity severely limiting scale of RU war crimes. It is just difficult for Putin to commit crimes on the scale of Stalin. Nothing more, Nothing less.
This is my last post about RU evilness. But I strongly advise everybody who gives RU benefit of doubt to stop talking and start learning - the real world is different Western European school textbooks. 

I think the difference here is that people actually want to know when they're wrong so they can make better assessments in the future.  It's not about the "narrative", it's about understanding what's happening, going to happen, and how either side can/will achieve a particular outcome.
Ukraine is arguably better equipped and trained now than they were on Feb 24. They've been getting a steady supply of materiel from protected areas.  First it was old Warsaw Pact stuff compatible with what they started with, and it underwent a transition to NATO stuff where the WP stuff is is running out and it's been possible to do the cross training.  Russia burned all their best forces and equipment in the initial tank rush and have been struggling to recover ever since. Finally reverting to just walking artillery slowly over the ground and trying to bring in troops behind it.
And back to the technical capabilities of the two forces - it started out as an interesting controlled experiment with essentially the same Soviet equipment and training on both sides, with one side augmented by a steady moderate level supply of NATO training for ~7 years, an assortment of fancy modern (and very effective) ATGMs, and the best air and spaceborne ISR money can buy.  We've seen the results, and it tilts heavily toward Ukraine in the long run as long as the west keeps up the spending and ISR.
As far as USSR/Russia spending all kinds of money to maintain parity, they blew a few major chances that left them decades behind in technology and have now set themselves up to not ever be able to catch up without a drastic change in how the country operates. Steve or Grigb or someone who studies history can probably tell you why, but I can point out the gaps and when they happened.  In the late 60s/early 70s, VLSI started ramping up in the west and at the time the USSR likely could have done the same - they had no shortage of very intelligent people and the country was rich in natural resources.  For whatever reasons, they never really had the electronics revolution that you see in the US/Western Europe/Asia.  As noted earlier - they were still launching film capsules that take a month to return in 2015 (even the early US dropped capsules got caught in-flight by planes, James Bond style), while the US had digital cameras in space on 2.4 m telescopes with real-time return in 1976. In 2010, the NRO was giving away telescopes that size to other agencies, presumably because they're mostly obsolete.  The USSR did have good optical capability, but mostly through the East German client state and not as part of the union.  When the USSR collapsed, it left Russia with some excellent capability on access to space and a lot of really smart people.  Had Russia made a strong effort towards joining the west and ramped up knowledge-based industries they might have had a chance.  They didn't do it hard enough for long enough, and enormous numbers of their scientists and engineers went to the west.  I've worked (and still work) with many, many scientists and engineers who were educated in and often started their careers in the USSR who are now very American (and still very smart).  And with the latest mess they're facing another brain drain.  So Russia really no longer stands a chance of ever catching up in the technology world.
For evidence of this on the ground: how many of Russia's tanks/planes/helicopters have GPS receivers in them?  How many of those are western made consumer devices (almost all).  Why aren't they using GLONASS receivers (LOL)?  Where do the cameras in their Orlan drones come from (Japanese consumer cameras)?  Why aren't we seeing effective APS on RU tanks (they don't actually have them)?  Why does Ukraine still have an Air Force (RU can generate radar signals but have 1970s processing of the return signal)?  How did Ukraine hit a ship at sea that has a sophisticated AD radar/missile system (it's not sophisticated enough to deal with even a few simultaneous targets effectively)? What about RU PGMs (see the note about GPS - RU PGMs mostly navigate by dead reckoning, and even if they have GPS it's probably being degraded over Ukraine by the US)?  
Basically, they don't have the tech and won't in your lifetime.  Some of the historians can explain why.  I can only give really simplistic answers (an 8008 chip looks kind of lame in a parade full of tanks?).  The USSR and Russia had the opportunities and blew them in favor of maintaining an extraction-based economy rather than a value-added based economy.

So this post got me thinking and raises a really good set of points.  Right now we have been handing out a lot of fish on this thread.  We pull in the data, filter it, assess and then pull out analysis, which leads to some level of prediction.  What we (I) have not done is provide enough fishing rods.  Of course you guys are swimming around the internet and being exposed to all sorts of narratives, some good and some bad.  It may be helpful to arm you with some ways to do your own analysis so that while you are out there you can come at it better.
Everyone has got their own system, western military teachings all tend to cover the same ground (e.g. PMESII, OPP, whatever that thing Bil does, which must work because he keeps beating me).  Eastern approaches are different and take into account different criteria, I am not an expert on these so I will let someone else weigh in on them.  I will give you my personal system and the one I teach, see if it helps and if it does not keep looking around.
My system is pretty simply to be honest and focuses on two main areas: what is seen, what is not seen, but should be.  That first one is much easier, the second requires a lot more depth but we can walk to that.
What is Seen
I think I posted this before and @sburke lost his mind a bit.  Let me try a less-powerpointy version (seriously guys it is the message, not the medium).

Ok so this is a representation of what is essentially the western operational system.  It starts on the left with what is basically "Command" and works its way to a desired Outcome.  Everyone is focused on the "Boom"...of course you are...it is exploding!  The reality, however, is that the Target is really only in the middle of this whole thing.  It is an indicator - one of many - but it is not the only indicator.  I think everyone here gets that but they often do not know what else to look for (although some clearly do).
So the big red system on the left is often referred to as the "kill chain" (thanks for nothing Brose).  It is really the center of what we call a "targeting enterprise" and frankly we in the west are very good at this.  This is "cause" space that translates human will, through capability, into energy (and here it can get quite complex), through mediums (also crazy complex) and onto a target and foresaid "boom" (yay!).   Be it an ammo dump, shopping mall, tank or goose (I hate geese) the process is pretty much the same, and volumes have been written as to how to do this faster/better than an opponent.
The point of the big red circle is that when we see a "boom" it is important to analyze the entire Cause chain all the way back to determine 1) if that was the actual intended target or was it simply happenstance, 2) how well the chain is doing in competitive terms and 3) what is this all signaling about Will?  All of this also has to take into account context and the situation on the ground.
Cool. We now have a bead on Cause.  Effect is much harder and more important.  The big blue area is where the pay dirt really sits.  A lot of big booms are impressive, but trust me if they do not translate into that big blue space you are going nowhere loudly - and I speak from experience here.  
So the first question is "what effect is this actually happening?"  Here an effect is a "consequence of action", so for example the effect of all those HIMARS booms - who are at the end of their own kill chain - was (allegedly) to have the Russian logistics system tie it self in knots to get away from them.  Great, outstanding...but was it decisive?
Second is Decision.  I have written about the three types of decisions available in warfare (at least) - positive, negative and null.  Let's leave off the last two and just focus on the first one.  A positive decision is a "death of alternate futures".  There was a future where Russia pounded Kyviv into submission for two months in Mar-Apr 22.  The Ukrainian government tapped out because western support was being cut off from the west and Russia occupied half of Ukraine and the capital, set up a puppet government and then enjoyed an insurgency-from-hell that would last 20 years.  That future died in March when the Russians were held off and pushed back from Kyviv: it was positively Decisive.  The Russians may actually have a future where they are back at Kyviv but it won't be in Mar-Apr of 22, the reality will be very different.  The HIMARS are having an effect, that much is clear.  What is not clear is how decisive the sum of those effects are as yet.  If the Russians lose the ability for operational offensive for a significant duration (e.g. this "pause" never ends) then we can say it has been decisive, because there are dead futures on the floor.
Last are Outcomes.  "What is the difference between a Decision and an Outcome Capt?"  My personal definitions is that an Outcome is a death of options, normally strategic options.  The sum of decisions in western doctrine is supposed to lead to "Objectives" which are the "Deal Done" points in western military planning.  Frankly these have let us down in the past, so I go with Options.  If Options die, they kill off entire fields of futures....a future-cide if you will.  Here something like the entire collapse of the northern Russian front was an Outcome to my mind because the Russian strategic options space collapsed.  Same thing happened after the first week of this war as the strategic options spaces that led to a quick war also died - it is why we got all excited about it back then.  The most significant Outcome is the end of the war of course, but that Outcome is the sum of a bunch of other ones, that all loop back to Will.
So whenever something blows up, look both left and right on that spectrum, and ask a lot of questions.  How is the Cause chain doing comparatively? What is happening with Will? What is the problem with Russian Capability translating into Energy and Targets?  Really keep a close eye on the Blue circle, the indicators of the important stuff are there:  what is the actual effect?  Is this decisive?  what was the Outcome?
Ok, so that was the easy part.
What is not Seen, but should be.
While books have been written on the first part above, the second is the land of experience.  Here a deep understanding of history comes in very useful as it provides a lot of context.  This space (which I do not have a snazzy picture for) is essentially "what should be happening but is not..."  It is very tricky and takes a lot of experience to "see the blank spaces", it is where the effects should be happening but are not based on whatever time and space we are in within a given scenario.
For example, let's take the Russian cruise missiles (and this is not a beat up of @panzermartin, he is asking some good questions).  We know the Russians have a lot of missiles (https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/russia/) and they had launched roughly 1000 of them in about a month at the beginning of the war.
And another report that they were at 2125 total "68 days into the war" (https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare#:~:text=Russia launched more than 1%2C100,68 days of the war.).  Now if we take "What we see" as the only indication, well this is a clearly functioning Cause chain.  Will, Capability all landing on targets.  A little shaky on the dud rate and "missing" military targets by many reports, and the Medium of UA AD has been pretty effective (then we get into competitive system effects which is a whole other thing - there are red and blue circles in collision); however, that is a lot of "boom".  The Effects we saw were a lot of damage, some of it military and the UA definitely had to react to defend itself by moving AD and C2 around.  I am not sure they have been Decisive, but we will get to that.
So that is what we saw, and on the surface 2125 incoming missiles all over the Ukraine is not small and frankly looks scary...but I only see what is missing:
A Ukrainian strategic center of gravity is the inflow of support from the western world.  We are pushing a lot of money and boom-boom over the border from Poland.  High on Russia's list of high value targets has to be to cut off that incoming support anyway possible.  They have done strikes in Lviv on training bases, so they clearly have the capability to hit.  But what are we not seeing?  I am not seeing rail infrastructure being crippled in Western Ukraine.  I am not seeing road infrastructure being destroyed faster than Ukraine can repair.  I am not seeing 30 Ukrainian ammo depots in western Ukraine being hit to cut off the supply of 155mm shells - it is what I am not seeing that is the biggest indicator something is going very wrong on the Russian side.  The Russians have the capability - range is no excuse as they could park missiles in Belarus, so why are they not using all them there 2125 missiles on what really matters?  First answer is that they are "dumb" but that is too easy.  Split Will, missiles spread across disjointed commands all lobbing on their own priorities much more likely.  Lack of ISR to consistently hit things when they need to be hit like UA ammo dumps and logistics nodes, which tend to move around...also very likely.
This is the same thing very early on in the war - why was I still seeing Ukrainian social media feeds 72 hours into this war?  All them tanks getting lit up, old ladies with balls of steel etc.  Rule #1 of country invasion: make it go dark.  Russian failed in this, it was missing and should not have been.
Wargamers have an advantage here as they play these problem sets all the time.  We have seen it a lot on this thread.  A wargamer can ask..."why did they not do this?  I would have."  
And this has nothing to do with an echo chamber either, but we do need to be careful.  For example, we have not seen UA operational offence yet, and nothing that looks like all traditional arms manoeuvre.  This one has me particularly puzzled and we are getting more data in on why this may be happening.
I will sum up by saying that in order to really filter the "reality" from opinion and BS, take all this and apply it to what we can actually see and not see.  We can build assumptions but they have to remain on speaking terms with the facts.  Once an assumption becomes a fact [edit for @Combatintman. “without sufficient validation”]  we are in trouble.  Enough facts put through the lenses of the two frameworks I give here become a trend, and it is those trends that told us that Russia was losing the first part of the war while most of the mainstream were figuring out how to deal with a Russian victory.
Good luck and surf safe.
 
 

I agree this war will end as a stalemate, but not this year and perhaps not even next year. And I don't believe in a diplomatic solution. The Russians want to destroy the Ukraine, or at least weaken it so much that they can destroy it anytime they want in the future. That's no peace, that's postponed execution for the Ukrainian nation. As long as the Ukrainians want to fight, we must support them with all we can and make the Russians suffer. At the same time Ukrainians will also suffer, but that's their call. They are not fighting for a piece of land where the majority is Russian or for their right to belong to the West, but they are fighting for their very survival as a people and a nation. That's what folks who are talking about a diplomatic solution don't seem to understand. This is a fight to the death. And it must be the death of many Russian soldiers and with that the death of Russia's ability to wage war and inflict terror upon their neighbours. I agree that our support must be intensified, even if that means taking risks with our own safety. Ukraine must hold on, at ALL costs. The costs for the West don't interest me at all. Economical crisis, inflation, energy shortage? Welcome to the new reality, where finally the bill for all those cheap words about democracy, environment and freedom is presented to us all. Personally I would gladly give up my holidays, my second car and all of my luxury to get rid of the Russian menace once and for all. The price of facing an encouraged and vengeful 'Novorussiya' will be far greater than all that. So, yes, keep the Russians bleeding and the Ukrainians fighting. They have bloody good reasons for that. Remenber the Holodomor for instance. And let us keep our cheap Western lamenting for peace at all costs to ourselves. If I was an Ukrainian soldier, fighting in a destroyed and suffering country, I would vomit on that.
In the mean time and I'm ashamed to say it, Ukraine is buying us precious time to rearm and prepare for war, that will come in some form or shape. We must consider Ukraine to be part of the West, which it is, and act accordingly. By the end of this year Western Europe can't be blackmailed by Russian oil or gas anymore and we can go to the next level. Unlimited support and weapons for Ukraine and unlimited sanctions against Putin. Payback time.

!00% disagree, Himars has nearly shattered Russian logistics. Their forces on the west side of the Dnipro are half a step from being hostages as opposed to a military force, and the Russians are stalled and bleeding everywhere else. The Ukrainians are just getting revved up to start pushing them back. The Russians can choose to stop dying at any time, just leave. If they try to stay they get to bleed, and bleed, and bleed, until they give up and go home after all. The only thing Putin is getting out of this is zinc coffins and debt.

So you've got:
Team Ukraine: United States, UK, Norway, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, France, Canada, Australia, Poland, Lithuania, Spain, Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Estonia, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Portugal, New Zealand etc.   (With apologies to any country I missed---not intentional.)  
Team Russia: Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Nicaruaga, Venezuela, Syria. Sitting on the sidelines, China, India, most of the Middle East, Africa, South America, etc.
If I'm Ukraine, I like my team.
If you just look at the very rough GDP numbers for those countries---it's about a 22X difference.  And that's before Russia's economic downturn due to the war.  Then consider the logistics of non-hindered movement of goods and supplies, communication and intelligence sharing, military know-how and strategic thinking, depth and breadth of varied military capabilities, influence on non-aligned countries, etc. etc. etc.......
WTF are the Russians thinking?  Seriously, this is insane.
 
 
 
 

So you've got:
Team Ukraine: United States, UK, Norway, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, France, Canada, Australia, Poland, Lithuania, Spain, Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Estonia, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Portugal, New Zealand etc.   (With apologies to any country I missed---not intentional.)  
Team Russia: Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Nicaruaga, Venezuela, Syria. Sitting on the sidelines, China, India, most of the Middle East, Africa, South America, etc.
If I'm Ukraine, I like my team.
If you just look at the very rough GDP numbers for those countries---it's about a 22X difference.  And that's before Russia's economic downturn due to the war.  Then consider the logistics of non-hindered movement of goods and supplies, communication and intelligence sharing, military know-how and strategic thinking, depth and breadth of varied military capabilities, influence on non-aligned countries, etc. etc. etc.......
WTF are the Russians thinking?  Seriously, this is insane.
 
 
 
 

So you've got:
Team Ukraine: United States, UK, Norway, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, France, Canada, Australia, Poland, Lithuania, Spain, Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Estonia, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Portugal, New Zealand etc.   (With apologies to any country I missed---not intentional.)  
Team Russia: Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Nicaruaga, Venezuela, Syria. Sitting on the sidelines, China, India, most of the Middle East, Africa, South America, etc.
If I'm Ukraine, I like my team.
If you just look at the very rough GDP numbers for those countries---it's about a 22X difference.  And that's before Russia's economic downturn due to the war.  Then consider the logistics of non-hindered movement of goods and supplies, communication and intelligence sharing, military know-how and strategic thinking, depth and breadth of varied military capabilities, influence on non-aligned countries, etc. etc. etc.......
WTF are the Russians thinking?  Seriously, this is insane.
 
 
 
 

So Kherson...ooo boy.  Well first off, I am buying off on the whole "traitor" theory that Kherson was likely sold-out, that or the UA simply got stretched too thin but this is the major southern axis so I do not see how they did not prioritize it - maybe they did and Russians down this way actually demonstrated talent.  Why?
Well because on paper this city should be damn near impossible to take from the South:

By my eyes there are roughly 5 crossing sites that one can pull from Google.  The Dnieper is a deep old river so I cannot tell if there are any fording sites but I doubt it.  Wiki says the Dnieper runs at about 1.5 m/sec which is fairly slow and easily swimmable and pontoon-able.  However, Kherson is right on a major delta stretch, to the point that a second river breaks out called the "Konka" (sp?).  Anyway this is a major water obstacle, like Rhine river "major".  The river itself ranges from 500-1000m but that is not the rub, it is the delta - that is a very angry and hungry looking swamp that looks like the mouth of a Dune Sandworm to mobility.  Sure you can pontoon the bridge but those wetlands look like they will eat Divisions, we are talking major road and causeway work in order to sustain.
As I said there are 5 possible crossing sites: 
-Starting on the far left, there is a possible amphibious run between Sofiivka and Rybal'Che but this is also a major undertaking.  That is a 12km run so we are basically talking D-Day but there is infrastructure on either side to support (I am not sure about the shoreline, would need to do an MSFS flight).
- Then we have the Antonovskiy Bridge that the UA is currently turning into swiss cheese.  That is a 1000m crossing without the bridge and a lot of greenish looking swamp hell on the N bank.  Tough.
- We then have what looks like a rail bridge called "Antonivsʹkyy Zaliznychnyy", not sure if it still up but it is about 6km upstream from the Antonovskiy.  If the UA did not blow that one up it will have to go as well (did a quick check but cannot see if it was already).
- Next is what I think is the only decent amphib/pontoon site along this gawd-awful shoreline.  Just on the western outskirts of L'vov about 34 km up from the Antonovskiy there is what looks like a viable crossing site.  The south bank aint great but this is a hydro-electric line crossing so road infrastructure is there (note would have to do a second small bridging op about 1km to the east on a small inlet), which takes one up to an old monastery in Korsunka.
- Last, is the road bridge at the Kakhovka hydro electrical station.  Looks modern and solid.
After that further upstream the Dnieper expands out and although one could find a decent shore line we are basically back to D-Day.
So What?  Well it is like Stalingrad, a city with it back to a major obstacle coming from the UA side.  All war is communication and retaking Kherson will send big political signals in all directions.  It would be a clear sign that the UA can do offensive in a major way, which should assist in shoring up the cottage-cheese spines of some in the West.  It would also be a major blow to Russia, effectively undeciding that entire front.  I am sure they will try and sell it as "we withdrew for the good of the people" noise but even the most doe-eyed Russian believer will have a seed of doubt planted.  
So to the big question: how does the UA take Kherson? Well a couple schools of thought, first a Western solution:

Coming from the Western School of Manoeuvre, the game here would be to cut off Kherson and choke it out, without having to do heavy urban combat.  So Shape, Manoeuvre, Isolate and Attrit would be the order of the day.  A big armored led spearhead thrust down from the North across all that wonderful tank country.  A bounce crossing on those two eastern sites, complete with SF, Airmobile snaps and then swing westward and cut the Russian LOCs completely.  Meanwhile keep the pressure on Kherson from the North, while using deep strike to Fix supporting forces.  Very nice, so long as one has air supremacy.  
I will say it now, if the UA can do this, the war will be over much sooner than anyone thinks. As I have noted before, I have grown allergic to big bold strokes in this war.  The biggest issue, beyond establishing pre-conditions, is time-space-force.  That is about a 130 km thunder run and would likely take a couple modern heavy divisions to pull off, maybe three.  I do not think the UA has that kind of force, nor are they going to get the pre-conditions to support it.  I have no doubt that pundits will start drawing stuff like this...use it for profiling purposes.  I pray to god that the UA could pull off this offensive but I also do not think he is listening...very unlikely.  So what could a UA offense look like?

Attrition-to-Manoeuvre, not the other way around.  The UA could compress Kherson and pull in a lot of RA in reaction.  With their superior ISR and deep strike they could do a lot of damage in depth - given the ranges, this whole thing at Antonovskiy could be a setup for ATACMS arrival.  If they start hitting EW, then UAS are also back on the menu.  As they compress Kherson, their artillery will pull in range as well.  As they pull and bleed the RA, an opportunity to do a North South offensive opens up but only take it to the bridge at the hydro-plant, while cutting every crossing.  You might bag the RA forces to the east.
The major problem with this one is Kherson itself.  If the RA is trapped like rats, they will fight like them.  The UA could break itself in a city of that size (which they know after Mariupol).  My guess is that they will simply bleed the RA white here, hitting them once again along the entire length of the RA operational system.  This presents the modern dilemma of "stay and bleed out" or "withdraw, preserve force and lose the city", either way, so long as the UA can keep pulling the RA in and killing them in numbers while they try and hold onto Kherson it is a winnable situation.
Key will be setting operational conditions and holding onto them.  Deep strike, deep strike and deep strike.  They need to keep hitting RA logistics to keep the RA guns silent and then the UA guns can go to work on the rest without fearing overwhelming c-btty.
How is it actually going to go down...no idea.  In fact it might not happen at all, the whole thing could be a feint.  But one thing is for sure, it has got the Russians wondering.  And on the battlefield uncertainty on your opponent is a useful thing. 

Not going to read too much into this but still an interesting video from Putin's meeting with Erdogan.

A lot depends on how the question was asked.  In my opinion--most Republicans associate the ridiculous gas prices with Biden's closing the Keystone pipeline and playing games with US fuel assets, not the Ukrainian war.  Thus, any Republican response to questions related to the tolerance of high gas prices is going to come back negative.  And the Republicans are going to try and hammer Biden and the Dems on inflation and gas prices this Fall.  I realize this is only a tiny sample, but my conservative friends unanimously support US efforts in Ukraine.
LIke others, I'm surprised that Putin is flying to Iran.  Surprised that Assad is sending a representative and not going himself.  And...will be shocked if Erdogan aligns himself and Turkey more closely with Putin and Russia.   Talk about joining a losing battle with an extremely isolated and failing partner who's military hardware has been shown to be of little value and who's economy offers virtually nothing.  I don't see any "win" for Erdogan.

I have an exclusive image showcasing one of the new Ukrainian Biolab™ created super soldiers.
 

Stumbled upon this blogpost about RU logistics/ materiel. There's hardly anything new written there, that wasn't already posted here, but it sums up everything quite nicely. Great for somebody not neurotically keeping up with every tweet
https://nadinbrzezinski.medium.com/logistics-collapse-945984f5d48e

Putin & Associates, LLC
With regards to the "why", from a financial perspective I was shocked that Putin made the decision to invade Ukraine.  He and his cronies were worth 100's of billions of dollars.  More money than they could ever spend and the freedom to live and behave in almost any manner they chose.  Virtually no limits to the level of extravagance and decadence they desired.  
The potential incremental financial gain from invading Ukraine was minimal compared to the wealth they had already achieved.  And the downside risk was massive.  And that has transpired.  Putin's and his oligarchs' wealth and freedom to do as they please has been devastated--and many will eventually face criminal charges.  They can move to Qatar or other semi-welcoming countries and try to maintain access to their wealth, but in the end they have and will continue to pay dearly for Putin's mistake. 
I'm not a military historian nor do I have any military experience.  I'm a business guy---and this invasion was an absolutely terrible business decision. 
 
 

Putin & Associates, LLC
With regards to the "why", from a financial perspective I was shocked that Putin made the decision to invade Ukraine.  He and his cronies were worth 100's of billions of dollars.  More money than they could ever spend and the freedom to live and behave in almost any manner they chose.  Virtually no limits to the level of extravagance and decadence they desired.  
The potential incremental financial gain from invading Ukraine was minimal compared to the wealth they had already achieved.  And the downside risk was massive.  And that has transpired.  Putin's and his oligarchs' wealth and freedom to do as they please has been devastated--and many will eventually face criminal charges.  They can move to Qatar or other semi-welcoming countries and try to maintain access to their wealth, but in the end they have and will continue to pay dearly for Putin's mistake. 
I'm not a military historian nor do I have any military experience.  I'm a business guy---and this invasion was an absolutely terrible business decision. 
 
 

And the Academy Award for Music Score in the Short Version Film category goes to the Ukrainian 93rd Mechanized Brigade.
( I realize this adds nothing to the informative and intellectual discourse in this thread, which I truly appreciate, but damn---this may be the most awesome clip I've seen in the entire war.)

And the Academy Award for Music Score in the Short Version Film category goes to the Ukrainian 93rd Mechanized Brigade.
( I realize this adds nothing to the informative and intellectual discourse in this thread, which I truly appreciate, but damn---this may be the most awesome clip I've seen in the entire war.)

And the Academy Award for Music Score in the Short Version Film category goes to the Ukrainian 93rd Mechanized Brigade.
( I realize this adds nothing to the informative and intellectual discourse in this thread, which I truly appreciate, but damn---this may be the most awesome clip I've seen in the entire war.)

I know it's more complicated than this, but when you clear all the smoke and see the situation clearly; it's still all about Putin's ego.   Most everything else is secondary and could be resolved relatively quickly.
 
Kill Putin's ego. End the war.

Checked recent Girkin video. Notes are below. As usual take is with a grain of salt.
 
 
 
 
 

All right guys, this is a post where I spill my guts in quite an emotional manner, please move along if your're not up for it.
I'll start with stating that I'm really fond of this community that I accidentally found thanks to @Der Zeitgeist. While we differ in perception of some minutiae of the events unraveling in front of us, we all seem to share the same view on whats right and moral in this context. And that is really a lot, more that I could expect from most of my average 'real', 'physical' acquaintances.
For my whole life, since I was an 8 years old kid listening to my grandpa's war tales, I was deeply interested in all things military related. It is easy to get a young boy interested  in this kind of stuff - the power, the agency, the feeling of purpose this provides is unmatched by anything else in the world. Of course  when you're still an adolescent, your understanding of what war/ armed conflict means cannot be deep enough. As I was entering my adulthood, even studying military history academically, I grew to hate the very notion of armed conflict and violence. I guess getting the real grasp of what war means to a regular person was too much to me at this point. I retained my interest, but didn't really pursue it apart from theoretical knowledge. Especially, I dodged the last years of draft i Poland - neither me, nor Polish civil society in general was really ready for it in early 2000's. I was living my life happily since then, like if "The End of History" was and undisputed fact of life.
And it really changed with the start of war in Ukraine. I could easily picture myself in the position of average Kyiv or Kharkiv citizen, a guy in his late 30s, with a reasonable career in IT, concentrated on making a living for his wife and young kids, who is suddenly confronted with the need to physically fight for all that is important for him. 
Of course, in this great community we mostly  concentrate of relatively coldly analysing what is going on, trying to get a grasp of events the way a historian narrates the Battle of Kursk - it is of course THE WAY to practically understand the events and be able to draw conclusions. That's how a commander should look at it, putting his feeling aside. This however isn't the only way to talk about war, especially it isn't the only "right" way to do so. 
On a personal or local society level, what this war is is the fight between right and wrong, between liberty and slavery, between good and evil. Of course, if you are a mature individual, you understand that the good and bad are very relative terms, and it's best to avoid such violent situations at all. Yet, it if comes to the conflict like this, for me the only true way to talk about the people on the very front line, in the trenches facing The Enemy, is poetry and epic prose. The cold analysis is of course important to practical understanding of the situation, yet it doesn't do justice to a person giving his or her life for a greater cause. Having said that, I run at a few videos kept very much in the spirit I outlined here:
A music video to Sabaton's 40:1 song, really fitting the evens of the first few weeks of war. We might've forget it already, but the first days were about the grassroots citizen resistance that in many cases stopped the orcs. Videos from February and March are really reminding of what it is all about:
Here's an Azov oath from 2015, it's as powerful as it gets:
And a subtitled Ukrainian anthem:
There's a conclusion to this rant - today I sent a letter to my local Territorial Defense brigade. They are overflowing with volunteers at the moment, but I'll should be able to join in the winter, early next year at the latest.
It's OK, I'll have the time to get used to morning jogs I guess.

On a megayacht, it has to be taking place on a RU General Staff megayacht.
As long as we're not serious, I ran across this thing that made me laugh really hard. I work and spend way too much time on the Internet lately, so maybe that's why find it hilarious. If after taking a look, community will ask me to delete my account, that's fine, I understand.
 

Sorry but why do the Russian speaking members of this forum have to be held up to a higher standard than anyone else? They are not obliged to provide anything, although I am very grateful they do. 
Can we just keep it civil please? Disagreement is ok, and being disrespectful to people who you disagree with is not a good way of encouraging a free conversation. 
Edit: just to be clear this is not aimed at only you, it's just I don't want this thread turning into a self-reinforcing echo chamber and I want to hear the "russian" narrative as long as it is expressed respectfully