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Josey Wales

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  1. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to Mord in So I had a hunch...   
    The other day I uploaded my old "Allah's Army" sound mod for SF & SF2. It's been long locked away in the Repos, so I figured I'd give new people access to it on CMMODs. Well, in the readme I wrote this: "This my old SF1 mod of insurgent fighters screaming Allahu Akbars and other phrases. They are edited and numbered so to be heard throughout various situations and orders. As SF1 and 2 do not have Syrian voice files for vehicle hits (like the other titles) I had to make due. There should be enough sprinkled among the voice files to increase the ambience and add some flavor to your experience." Which meant that the mod was and had always been a compromise on what I was aiming for vs the reality of what the game would allow me to do. I bent it the best I could to fit my vision.
    So, anyway I'd noticed, that NO country had the vehicle hit voice files in SF. However, those files were in every game since BN, including SF II. I have a tendency to go in forty different directions when I am dicking with mods, so, I scribbled a quick note in my modding note pad, "Check and see if Syrian sounds were implemented".  A few days went by and I decided to take up my note's challenge. So, I took all the US "hit" folders, copied them over and then renamed all the files to their Syrian counterparts (that way if they worked I'd hear American voices coming from Syrians and there'd be no mistakes). I created a bunch of silent vehicle files so I'd have a nice quiet map, and then set up a test. Below takes place after my tests.
    My hunch was that BF implemented the files for the US, Brits, and NATO (minus the Dutch) because these files have been in existence since CMBO. Not having any Arabic speakers on hand they just couldn't make anything new for the Syrians. I thought maybe the code was still there though, all it needed was something to point to. HOT DAMN. I WAS RIGHT!!! I am going to redo the Allah's Army mod for SF II shortly. As you can see from the vid, the mod FINALLY works in the way I'd originally intended. Almost ten years and my artistic vision comes to fruition! I am BEYOND STOKED!
    ALLAHU AKBAR!!!!!
     
    Mord.

     
  2. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to Swervin11b in A primer on WWII commo tech   
    Moderators, this is a general WWII interest piece. If it is not allowed, by all means let me know. 
    With CM being as much of a simulation it is, many players and scenario designers probably have an interest in the nuts and bolts of the tactics, technology, and equipment in use during WWII. 
    It took a long time for me to grasp the different ways in which combat units, especially infantry, communicated. Although there is a wealth of info the basics are lost in the pile of highly technical. 
    I wrote up a bit of a primer for the US Army infantry commo tech and methods here:
    https://battlelines.blog/2018/12/20/roger-that-army-communications-in-wwii/
  3. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to MOS:96B2P in Finally got in to the forum! could use some pointers   
    They both have advantages and disadvantages.  However a big advantage turn based (WEGO) has is the replay.  IMO when you are first starting out the ability to replay the turn from any angle and from any location on the map greatly helps to figure out what, why and how something happened.  In real time the bigger the battle the more stuff you completely miss because you can't be everywhere at the same time.  I definitely vote for turn based.  You'll learn more, faster.  
  4. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to IICptMillerII in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    Thanks for confirming! 
    It seems that the average behavior is pretty realistic to me, and every now and then one gets some "combat nuance" thrown in. One thing CM does really well is simulating the unexpected that occurs in reality, such as an ATG stubbornly sticking it out despite the punishment, etc. Its always a bit frustrating when its an enemy ATG that appears to be blessed, but I think its rare enough to not be a bug, or unwanted behavior overall. 
  5. Upvote
    Josey Wales got a reaction from General Liederkranz in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    I've just run some tests in the editor and gun crews do behave slightly differently from infantry when suffering from Combat Shock and Combat Stress. The tests were done with small arms so as not to confuse the results seen with the HE bug.
    Typically infantry that is 'Rattled' will stay put unless they become 'Pinned' at which point they will auto evade. A static gun crew however will stay on their gun when 'Rattled & Pinned'.
    Gun crews do seem to abandon the gun sometimes in the 'Shaken' & 'Panic' states, however there were times during the tests when 'Shaken' crews do not abandon the gun, and 'Panic'ked crews attempt to relocate the gun. The reason as to why a crew will choose to remain on the gun as opposed to abandoning it is not yet understood. I think it is too early to say it is a bug, it could just be a mechanic that is not yet well understood.
  6. Upvote
    Josey Wales got a reaction from IICptMillerII in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    Yes that would tie in with what I have seen. I tested this with a Green crew and a Regular crew. The Green crew abandoned the gun more readily when 'Shaken' than the Regular crew which tended to stay on the gun. 
  7. Upvote
    Josey Wales got a reaction from Gafford in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    Yes, a bad use of terminology on my part which I can see may muddy the water. 
    What I should have said was that the permanent impact on morale can only be caused by the build up of casualties (Combat Stress) either within the unit or units closely associated via the OOB (eg same platoon). 
  8. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to LongLeftFlank in How I view most scenarios and the designers...   
    Indeed.
    2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. 
    3 Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain. 
    4 Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. 
    5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. 
     
  9. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to BletchleyGeek in How I view most scenarios and the designers...   
    Instead of agitating for war, the Jewish groups in this country should be opposing it in every possible way for they will be among the first to feel its consequences. Tolerance is a virtue that depends upon peace and strength. History shows that it cannot survive war and devastation.
    ...
    No person with a sense of the dignity of mankind can condone the persecution of the Jewish race in Germany.
    ...
    I am not attacking either the Jewish or the British people. Both races, I admire. But I am saying that the leaders of both the British and the Jewish races, for reasons which are as understandable from their viewpoint as they are inadvisable from ours, for reasons which are not American, wish to involve us in the war. We cannot blame them for looking out for what they believe to be their own interests, but we also must look out for ours. We cannot allow the natural passions and prejudices of other peoples to lead our country to destruction.
    - Charles "Alabama Moon Boy" Lindbergh, September 1941
    As with every conspiracy theory - and Mr. Tittles rant was right there balleting around the grandaddy of conspiracy theories - there is a kernel of truth. Of somebody's truth - there were as many experiences and takes on Worl War 2 as people witnessed it (and survived).
    It is historical fact that there existed a sizeable "America First" political movement. Which we can say it was pro Axis since anything not actively opposing the Fascist powers were enabling them.
    Pearl Harbour - last step in an escalation that started with the Japanese invasion of China - and the German declaration of war - final act in an escalation that started perhaps with the tearing down of the Munich agreements and the Kristallnacht - marked a turn in public opinion in America. Lindbergh himself tried to get into the war against the Empire of Japan and eventually managed to participate in combat in the Pacific by chance. No interest whatsoever with what was going on in Europe.
    I don't think that 100% of the millions (?) of US citizens that were in agreement with Mr. Lindbergh and his associates just woke up one Sunday morning to the news of Pearl Harbour, and just like Saul of Tarsus after his traffic accident on the way to Damascus, shed their ideas like one sheds dry skin or loses hair. Maybe draft dodging wasn't as much of a thing as it was in 1950 to 1953, or 1966 to 1972, other than some misguided guys of German ethnic backgrounds finding their way into the Wehrmacht. But definitely selective volunteering for service, to cherry pick the Axis power to fight was a thing. And many too came to see the war as doing their civic duty and changed their opinion, embracing the cause of their Republic as the Glorious One.
    Rooselvelt had to deal too with a restive Congress. They just did not have Twitter and a 24/7 news cycle to record every little bit for posterity. But I am pretty sure that there was a lot of log rolling, pork barreling and what not going on.
    Swervin has given some examples of how ruthless some senior US commanders actually were or wanted to be remembered by posterity. But quotes like that of Bradley need to be presented within their context: was it part of an interview with US newspaper reporters? During or after the war?
    For another example of "callousness", Rick Atkinson in Guns At Last Light goes in length and detail to remind us of the disastrous "adventure" George Patton sent an armored infantry battalion to rescue his son in law from a German POW camp.
    And definitely not every man in uniform was a saint of democracy. In the same book by Atkinson, the account of the logistical echelon of SHAEF isn't precisely an edifying read. More of a facepalm really.
    Do these examples tarnish the memory of those who sacrificed their lives in the altar of freedom from fear? I do not think so. If anything, being aware of these highlights  even more strongly the value of what they gave up. Convinced of the cause, by accident, or in the many thousands of different random ways death visits upon soldiers in the battlefield.
    Going back to the topic of sensitivity to losses, I think that a useful framework to understand how States at war deal with casualties is the following. Each casualty conveys a political cost for the State. That cost detracts from the political capital and legitimacy for the existing political system to conduct war.
    In the 1930s and 1940s democracies, that cost was shouldered by the system, as political capital is evenly dustributed amongst a wide portion of the population. It is the government of the many, most of the time, for the many. There was certainly war weariness by 1945 in the UK, to a lesser degree in the US. This "accounting" was a factor in the decision making process that unleashed the first weapons of mass destruction.
    In totalitarian states, this cost is sublimated. Somebody, anybody really, pays for it in full, and an example is made of those found responsible. Typically the oligarchy at the top, led by the despot they enabled, deflects the blame to individuals via an efficient and ruthless army of enforcers. 
    Stalingrad was the spark that inspired several plots to change the despot leading Germany. On the Soviet side Beria's NKVD never had difficulties to find spies, saboteurs and "wreckers" to make up for that political cost.
    Not sure how to translate any of this in game terms... other than what is done already by using victory levels. The downside is that those numbers are a surrogate for something which is always emotionally charged for anybody but psychopaths.  We don't have cutscenes with us inspecting anti aerial batteries in Seattle after a bad result in CMFB or the image of two NKVD officers turning up at our command post, to illustrate historical outcomes.
  10. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to Kinophile in How I view most scenarios and the designers...   
    Calm down.
    This forum doesn't need this kind of acidic negativity. 
    It's the the interwebs, lad. Nothing is real, nothing matters. Give the emotional outrage a rest.
  11. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to Lethaface in How I view most scenarios and the designers...   
    While I don't design CM scenario's myself, I don't think you have grasped what Mark said about 'vision'. When you design something, you need to have a 'vision' of what you want to achieve with you design. Otherwise you aren't designing anything, you are merely clicking around in the editor.
    The same goes for product development in general. 
     
  12. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to mjkerner in How I view most scenarios and the designers...   
    Sburke’s references to Monty Python skits confirm it’s a frat. (You weren’t supposed to give it away, you Git!)
    I agree 100% with LLFs arguments. I have no idea where simplesimon came up with his first paragraph assessment, but I grew up with family and family friends who lived through the war, and had a lifelong interest in it, read thousands of books regarding it and, more importantly, over the last 5 or so decades, have talked to dozens (more likely hundreds) of those family, friends and acquaintances about those times. None ever expressed anything other than being extremely pissed at the Axis and wanting to get at it and get it over with as quickly as possible.
  13. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to LongLeftFlank in How I view most scenarios and the designers...   
    Wow, I disagree with pretty much every word you have written here on prevailing American doctrine and public opinion. This is a post-Vietnam revisionist lens, buttressed by some postwar Generalstabs ax-grinding.
    Neither early loss of the US army in the Philippines nor heavy casualties in the 1943 bomber offensives, then Tarawa and Anzio, triggered defeatism at home, or timidity in US field commanders. Quite the reverse!
    Early US debacles at Midway, Guadalcanal or Salerno are readily imaginable, but they weren't about to drive Uncle Sam to down tools either.
    Both Nazis and Japanese learned the hard way that American people and soldiers were far from the 'weak-kneed cosmopolitans' that their agitprop (and its pre-1941 Comintern equivalents) made out. 
    And any Moon of Alabama crank standing up and declaiming 'Our Boys are dying like sheep for British imperialism and the Rotschilds!' would have been tarred and feathered by an angry mob. 
    There is plenty to criticise in America's conduct of the war, but nothing like you've claimed here. 
     
     
     
  14. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to LongLeftFlank in How I view most scenarios and the designers...   
    Hmm. Instant resort to ad hominem attack, plus entirely fanciful assertion that I have spent significant time commenting on your posts seems... faintly familiar.
    Mr. Tittles, is that you?
  15. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to domfluff in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    Taking out the enemy leader will replace the leadership modifier with a different one though, which is generally worse. That will not degrade the morale faster, but having worse leadership will hurt recovery.
  16. Upvote
    Josey Wales got a reaction from A Canadian Cat in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    No, the impact on morale from casualties (Combat Stress) for a platoon losing all 4 members of its HQ team is the same as if it lost 4 junior members from from one of the platoon's rifle squads.
    The only difference would be is, if that HQ unit was providing a buffer against Combat Shock (the effect of suppression on the morale of a unit) immediately prior to being wiped out, then the impact would be greater for those squads that were within it's C2 and under fire as that buffer would now be gone.
  17. Upvote
    Josey Wales got a reaction from MOS:96B2P in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    No, the impact on morale from casualties (Combat Stress) for a platoon losing all 4 members of its HQ team is the same as if it lost 4 junior members from from one of the platoon's rifle squads.
    The only difference would be is, if that HQ unit was providing a buffer against Combat Shock (the effect of suppression on the morale of a unit) immediately prior to being wiped out, then the impact would be greater for those squads that were within it's C2 and under fire as that buffer would now be gone.
  18. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to MOS:96B2P in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    A HQ higher up in the same CoC will be able to take over command of an element from lower down the chain if its immediate HQ is out of range or KIA. This can only take place at "Close Visual" or "Voice" range (or both). 
    From the Engine Manual: If a squad or team is out of contact with its immediate superior (usually a platoon HQ) then its company or battalion HQ may provide voice and close visual contact, but not radio or distant-visual contact. This simulates that a higher HQ can step in and provide command-and-control in a limited radius in emergency situations.
  19. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to JoMac in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    Yes, perhaps...Now, it's time for you to get going on the next DAR/AAR for our viewing pleasure
    Joe
  20. Upvote
    Josey Wales got a reaction from MOS:96B2P in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    Yes, a bad use of terminology on my part which I can see may muddy the water. 
    What I should have said was that the permanent impact on morale can only be caused by the build up of casualties (Combat Stress) either within the unit or units closely associated via the OOB (eg same platoon). 
  21. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to JoMac in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    This reminds me of an old ACW Miniature Rules System called 'Stars -n- Bars' by Scotty Bowden (70's-80's)...
    Units (Battalion/Regiment/Battery) had what's called UCM (Unit Combat Moral), and during Combat a Unit would take Temporary Moral Loss (Suppression during Battle, if you will), and would gain some of it back every turn by throwing dice (or completely get it back if withdrawn from front-line for an hour). However, if it took a Casualty, then it had a Permanent Moral Loss (on top of any Temporary Moral Loss) that it wont get back during the Battle.
    Of course, you would then throw your Dice during the Moral Stage to determine what happens to a Unit. 
  22. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to MOS:96B2P in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    This is a nice, understandable explanation which I'll add to my notes.
    Only a small nit / clarification.  If the fire teams are in the same platoon they will be effected by combat stress caused by casualties.  It does not matter if the teams are in C2 or not for the purposes of receiving combat stress.  They somehow know that their "out of C2" buddy just bought the farm on the other side of the map and are stressed by this event.      
  23. Like
    Josey Wales reacted to MOS:96B2P in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    Not sure if you find it helpful but the below statement is where I took my understanding from.   
     
     
  24. Like
    Josey Wales got a reaction from Bulletpoint in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    No, the impact on morale from suppression is only temporary. As you have seen, you can reduce a unit from OK to Panic with suppression alone, but if they sustain no casualties, they will recover all the way back to OK. Hence the term Combat Shock, as a shock is a temporary effect that wears off. 
    The permanent impact on morale can only be caused by the build up of casualties either directly within the unit or by casualties sustained by units connected via C2 (eg same platoon). This is termed Combat Stress as stress insinuates an ongoing effect. 
    You can cause a unit to Panic using suppression alone, but you will not cause it to become Broken. For that you will either need to kill or maim them or their buddies. 
  25. Upvote
    Josey Wales got a reaction from Bulletpoint in Wehrmacht resilience vs. Dogface nervousness   
    I am not sure that this is correct. The 'Brittle' indicator only appears when troops are in the 'Broken' morale state. The only other states that a 'Broken' unit can be in are 'Shaken' or 'Panic' (which are caused by the Broken unit being under suppression). The Brittle indicator disappears when a Broken unit is Shaken or Panicked, but returns once the unit reverts back to 'Broken'.
    If I am wrong about this then it would be pretty easy to prove. Just show an image of the Brittle indicator present in any other morale state other than Broken.
    If I am correct then I am not sure why there is a Brittle indicator at all.
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