Kaunitz

My recent H2H game taught me the differences between self-propelled ATguns (or tank-destroyers) and proper tanks in an infantry support role the hard way. I thought it would be interesting to discuss the topic and share some experiences here. If possible, though, I'd like to keep the discussion based on gameplay, not on real doctrines. I'm not really an expert, when it comes to definitions. For easyness' sake (disregarding that the two types discussed here were probably more differentiated based on their tactical and operational deployment rather than by technical intricacies?), let's just say that: 
A tank has a turret and at least 1 MG (more often 1 turret and one hull MG). Most tanks in CM have ample supply of both, HE and AP ammo. In CM, it's usually much more expensive than a sp. ATgun A sp. ATgun has no turret (and the traversable angle of the gun is often very limited) and no MG. Most sp. ATguns in CM are focused on AP ammo and carry only few HE rounds (with some exceptions, e.g. SU 76M). An ATgun is usually much cheaper than a tank. Now a few thoughts:
In an assault, you often want to lay down fire on several positions within a single turn at slightly varying angles to your vehicle's front. Because of its turret, the tank is so much better at this. As the whole vehicle needs to point in the direction of the shot, a spATg would need to approach in a curved, snake-like line or, alternatively, stand still for long intervalls to turn on its tracks. Any errors in planning the movement can be fatal, as the spATg might not fire at all if you fail to give it enough time to turn (pay attention to the turning stat of your vehicle!!). The tank, by contrast, can go in a straight line and fire at any angle.   For the same reason, the tank is much superior to the spATg in what could be called "corner situations" - these are the typical situations in which you want to go in one direction, but fire in another direction. For example, take a crossroad in a village - you know there is an enemy position around the corner. The tank can rotate its turret while still in cover, then expose itself and fire almost immediately at 90°. The spATg would need to expose itself, then rotate slowly on its tracks, and only then could it fire. So, for any kind of close combat and corner situation, the tank is superior.  In many cases in CM, main guns - the only weapon spATguns have - are tricky to use. The main gun is more dependent on proper aiming (and on confirmed contacts, for that matter). If your target is positioned somewhere around the same height as your muzzle, you will run into troubles. The main gun's HE shells are effective only if they actually hit something - either the ground or an obstacle. If they miss, they often have no effect on the intended target whatsoever, depending on the lay of the land. E.g. if the opponent is behind a gentle ridge, almost at the same height as your muzzle, and the surroundings are flat, it can be very hard to get a valid area target anywhere close to the suspected contact. Shots aimed too low will do nothing as the target is in cover behind the ridge. Shots aimed too high will sail over the heads of the target harmlessly. Note that this problem is most notable on flat terrain with main guns that are located close to the ground (vehicles with low silhouettes) and therefore may affect spATguns more than tanks. Main guns in turrets are located "higher" and can therefore see over terrain much better and area-target spots more accurately/easily - on a flat surface, the target will be positioned lower than the gun, making it easier for the gun to hit somewhere close to it. Positioning yourself somewhere higher than your target (on a hill) can solve the problem, if you're lucky enough to find such an elevation on the map. NOTE: I wished that assault guns with low velocity/curved trajectory weapons would get some kind of bonus here. I really think they should be allowed to target reverse slope areas (like mortars). The MG, by contrast, is less dependent on actually hitting the target in order to be "effective". So this is a big plus for tanks. With a tank, you can try to get the turret-MG in a position where it can deliver grazing fire (bullets traveling close to the ground over flat terrain), which allows you to strafe areas (far beyond your MG's line of sight) that are hard to hit with your main gun. Tanks would be even better if the game allowed you to use their hull-MG for area-fire commands (unless hull-down, the hull MG, being closer to the ground level, can often achieve grazing fire more easily than the turret MG whose fire will be directed "downwards", hitting the ground instead of traveling on at dangerous grazing height).   
 

Some additional info: In the link posted as post scriptum in my previous post, MOS:96B2P quoted official sources that there are 5 heights in the game: prone, kneeling, standing = small vehicle, tall vehicle, very tall vehicle. According to Vanir Ausf B's addition, reverse slope height extends to "very tall vehicle" height (so it's taller than a man). LOS aimpoint height is 1m above the ground.
I've also rediscovered my own video, showing some MG grazing fire action: 
The MG can only area-target a spot at 180m distance. Tiles at greater distances are in reverse slope areas (LOS gets blocked by cumulative tall grass tiles that at some point act like a wall that casts a LOS-shadow/dead zone) and therefore can't be area-targeted. However, as the angle between the muzzle (prone height) and the area-targeted tile's aimpoint (height = 1m) is suitable and the terrain beyond the area-targeted tile is flat, the MG's bullets travel on much further at a dangerous, effective (suppress/kill) height.

Also, the usual "trick" to fire in a direction with prone infantry doesn't work that well with large squads that occupy 2 squares. In most terrain types, prone infantry can't see that far and therefore has problems to fire. So what I do is to area-target a square at a very close distance, and if the terrain is flat, the prone infantry's fire can be very effective even without clear LOS. With large squads, this does not work as well because only the soldiers located on the "primary square" of the unit will fire according to the line of fire. The other soldiers (positioned on the "secondary sqaure") will fire at the targeted square's center from their current position. So you end up with an X fire pattern, with some of the fires deviating about 45° of the intended line of fire.
 
 

Small (easy to oversee) ridges bare of concealment that cannot be flanked/evaded are the worst kind of thing, especially if there are no hills around to take a look what's behind them. A few ideas:
Have a TRP - my latest game reminded me of that. If there are reverse slopes on the map, buy that TRP. 30 pts is still cheaper than the squad you're going to loose if you crest that ridge without smoke. As far as I know, onmap mortars can also target reverse slopes, so if the ridge/hill is not too steep, you should at least be able to lay down a smoke screen that lets you crest the ridge even if you don't have a TRP.   The problem when going over the ridge with infantry is that the enemy usually is waiting for you - he's prone and stationary (good spotting, hard to spot), while your guys are moving upright (bad spotting, easy to spot).This is especially true if there is no concealment on the ridge. With vehicles, you have a very similar problem (hidden + stationary versus moving). With infantry, consider crawling over the ridge if some concealment is available. Even if you suffer casualties, they will be more limited. The big downside is that it will slow you down horribly, which increases the danger of an artillery strike if you're detected. In modern titles, this is obviously more risky as better spotting devices are available (IR/heat detection). PS: Don't fire!!! (unless you're already detected by many enemy positions). Soldiers are spotted individually. Even if one gets spotted and shot, the rest of the squad might be safe - by firing, they give away their position. When you really have to push, I think it's a good idea to take a look first. Crawl some infantry up the ridge, use the hide command to stay low, un-hide your infantry for a few turns so that they can just look over the ridge (some guys will kneel). Crawl a bit further and unhide to risk another look, etc. This increases the area you're exposing yourself to and you can observe in little increments. At some point you will have gained a picture of what's awaiting you in the dead ground on the other side. Needless to say that this takes lots and lots of time. Next, share this information (via C2) with the troops who are going to push. For the actual push, make sure that all assets crest the ridge at the same time to throw the enemy's fire into chaos (that's why I find crawling is not the method for infantry to push over a ridge) and reduce your units' total time of exposure. Area fire at the targets that you've been scouting. Try to get to the depression on the other side of the ridge fast - often the top of the ridge is exposed to many enemy positions.   With vehicles, shooting and scooting can be usefull. First scout for targets with infantry as described above. Then drive up your tanks/vehicles in hulldown positions for 10 seconds or so, either with a target arc on an identified target or an area fire order. After 10 seconds, your vehicles need to reverse back behind the ridge. Unless the enemy is very close and experienced, 10 seconds should give you a chance to retreat back into cover before the enemy can spot and zero-in on you. This is especially true against ATGMs who travel at relatively slow speed. For your next shoot & scoot, pick a different spot (the enemy will still have a suspected contact on your former position). As with infantry scouting, fight as little of the enemy at any time, expose yourself little by little. Again, fighting like this takes a lot of time. More time than many scenarios would give to you.

Interesting! Thanks for the info! Afaik though, the engine can't handle firing ports (e.g. in modern titles with the IFVs)? 
I've been playing CM for a long time, but I've come across this just now, analyzing why my squad was so bunched up in my current H2H game. I guess most of you already know (lol)?
In the crew/infantry UI-window, there is a maximum of three columns. For infantry, these columns actually represent squares occupied by the unit. The first/left column shows you the soldiers that are positioned on the "primary square" of the unit, the second/center column those positioned on the "secondary square" (if any) and the third/right column those on the "tertiary square" (if any). The "combine squad" order lets you concentrate more soldiers on fewer squares. E.g. with the "combine squad" order,  you can fill up empty slots in the first and second column with soldiers from the third to reduce the unit's footprint from 3 to 2 squares. Note that you can observe how the individual soldiers from the third column will move over to their new square/column individually. Each column can hold up to 7 soldiers. So, if your unit is stronger than 7 soldiers, it will take up 2 squares. Finally a tip: When splitting squads, make sure you never end up with a "7 men on one square" unit. It's horribly bunched up.  

Interesting! Thanks for the info! Afaik though, the engine can't handle firing ports (e.g. in modern titles with the IFVs)? 
I've been playing CM for a long time, but I've come across this just now, analyzing why my squad was so bunched up in my current H2H game. I guess most of you already know (lol)?
In the crew/infantry UI-window, there is a maximum of three columns. For infantry, these columns actually represent squares occupied by the unit. The first/left column shows you the soldiers that are positioned on the "primary square" of the unit, the second/center column those positioned on the "secondary square" (if any) and the third/right column those on the "tertiary square" (if any). The "combine squad" order lets you concentrate more soldiers on fewer squares. E.g. with the "combine squad" order,  you can fill up empty slots in the first and second column with soldiers from the third to reduce the unit's footprint from 3 to 2 squares. Note that you can observe how the individual soldiers from the third column will move over to their new square/column individually. Each column can hold up to 7 soldiers. So, if your unit is stronger than 7 soldiers, it will take up 2 squares. Finally a tip: When splitting squads, make sure you never end up with a "7 men on one square" unit. It's horribly bunched up.  

And you will probably remember next time.
Hey, luck counts!
 
Looking good BTW - well done screen shots. One tip - if you press <shift><esc> the game pauses but with out the notice at the top of the screen. In any given turn if you do that once then the VCR controls in the UI will continue to work without that notice showing up.

Ian Daglish wrote 3 incredible volumes. Here's one link: https://www.amazon.com/Operation-Goodwood-Over-Battlefield-Daglish-ebook/dp/B00DN5TWK8/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1539565698&amp;sr=8-1&amp;keywords=over+the+battlefield&amp;dpID=51uTRJtegYL&amp;preST=_SY445_QL70_&amp;dpSrc=srch
They focus on Goodwood, Espom and Bluecoat. Those were Commonwealth battles out of Normandy. He used copious aerial recce footage. They are great resources. Ian was very active in the ASL scene (and, I'm sure, elsewhere). His life was cut far too short due to an aircraft accident.
I would think the kindle/ebook versions would be poor. The printed copies were outstanding, especially his use of the photos. Try one: you'll end up buying all three.

Here is a list of tiny details I've been unaware of and that are not described in the manual. I came upon them more or less by accident. Even though they're of minor importance, I think it's a good idea to note them down, also to show how detailed the game really is! Feel free to add your own tiny discoveries!
When buying  the mechanized/motorized version of a force, the organic (i.e. bought as part of a formation) trucks sometimes carry special extra ammunition. If part of an AT-gun unit, they carry extra AT-gun ammo (e.g. for the Soviet 45mm AT-gun: 4x HE, 16x AP, 2x cannister). If bought for other unit types, soviet trucks labeled as "(weapons)" come with additional extra ammo for the light mortar and the AT-rifles (24x 50mm mortar rounds, 50xAT rifle rounds).  Even though you can't tell from their ingame appearance/UI, soviet AT-hunter teams (3men) do have AT capabilities. They are listed as carrying "6 grenades". What the game does not tell you (also no special symbols in the equipment UI-slots) is that 4 of these 6 grenades are anti-tank-grenades. The team leader carries two ordinary HE grenades on him while each of the remaining two soldiers carries 2 AT grenades. You need to be really close to use them (within 10m?). So they're like breach teams with detonation charges, just cheaper. On the Soviet SU 76M (self propelled AT gun), you get some standard extra ammo that is automatically shared with infantry units close by (710x 7.62mm rounds). There is no need for the "acquire" command. Maybe it's meant for the weapons of the crew - the manual mentions that they can somehow fire their weapons in self-defence? The enclosed SUs also have extra ammo - I need to test if they also share it.

Here is my clumsy translation of the first few pages, more to follow: 
The assault-platoon in the grenadier-company
 I. General remarks
Based on the experiences in the war, a new structure and new armament is required for the grenadier-companies, both for the attack and the defence. The partition of grenadier companies into assault-platoons allows their unitary and flexible/swift employment. [? pretty general remark]  With its new structure, namely two assault-squads and a fire-squad, as well as with its new armament, the assault-platoon will fulfill a very clearly defined role. The uniform armament of the squads facilitates their lead, so that even young and inexperienced squad leaders who have not finished their full training, can lead them into battle more readily. The adoption of the assault rifle 44 [Sturmgewehr 44] increases firepower and the manoeuverability of the squads. The withdrawal of grenade-launchers and sharpshooters from the squads relieves them of specialists. It allows the grenade-launchers to be concentrated on the platoon-level and the sharpshooters on the company-level.  II. Structure of the assault-platoon [you can compare it to the diagrams on p. 15 of the electronic document]
5. The assault platoon consists of:
 the platoon leader  the platoon HQ team, including the grenade launcher team 2 assault squads (7 men each) 1 fire squad (7 men) 2 infantry carts (Jf. 8), coupled, 1 horse, 1 operator/rider 1 backup/reserve/supply [?]  cart (“Feldwagen oder Panjewagen”), two-horse, 1 operator/rider  6. The platoon HQ team consists of:
2 messengers/runners 1 litter bearer/medic 1 Grenade-launcher-team (3 grenadiers) [probably this means 3 tubes], one of the greandiers is teamleader; The concentration of the grenadiers at the platoon-leader increases the effectiveness of fire and allows them to be used in a concentrated/focused manner  7. The assault squad consists of 1 squadleader and 7 soldiers. The soldiers are equipped with assault rifles 44. They are to engage in close combat and are equipped with plenty of ammunition and grenades. One of the soldiers is second-in-command of the squad leader.
 8. The fire squad consists of 2 light MG teams. The squad leader is in command of the squad as a whole and one of the MGs in particular. His second-in-command commands the other MG. Each MG is crewed by a gunner (“Schütze 1”) and two ammo-bearers (“Munitionsschützen”).
The first [=standard?] ammunition-allotment is 720 rounds for each assault-rifle 44. On them, the soldiers are to carry 6 magazines for a total of 180 rounds (30 rounds per magazine).
 III. The assault platoon in combat
 General principles
 9. In the attack, it’s the assault platoon’s task to wipe out the last resistance of the enemy. In the defence, the assault platoon defeats the final assault of the enemy.
 10. The assault platoon can accomplish any task, both in the defence and in the attack.
 11. The assault platoon is best used for the following tasks:
For assault and recon missions, for combat in rough/difficult (lit. hard to oversee) terrain, for missions during night or in foggy weather In the defence as a mobile reserve for the counter-attack and the protection of open flanks For the pursuit of the enemy and as an advance guard, riding on Stugs, trucks/cars or tanks; As rearguards in retreat actions, or for combat “im Zwischenfeld” (?) as a hunter-platoon of a ski-unit or as a ski-equipped part of a winter unit [… I don’t know how to translate all the special terms – generally it refers to their usage on skis]  12. The assault platoon is the smallest tactical combat unit of the grenadier-company. The individual deployment of assault squads or the fire squad is an exception.
 Attack
13. In all combat conditions, the completely hidden, hunter-like (“jägermäßige”) approach into the rear or a flank of the enemy and the sudden, overwhelming and surprising employment of fire at short distance is the key to success.
14. When approching, the platoon leader leads his assault platoon close to the enemy, evading fire combat. 
15. Proper assessment of the terrain is required prior to any action. Every opportunity of concealment needs to be taken. It’s not that important to reach the forming up point for the final assault as fast as possible, [but – is missing] to reach it undetected by the enemy and without any casualties.  
16. The assault platoon opens fire as late/close as possible and needs to make even more use of the support fire of heavy weapons [to cover its movement, obviously] than before. It’s not the assault-platoon’s task to use [it’s own] suppressive fire to get/manoeuvre within large or medium distance to the enemy.  
17. To advance, the assault platoon evades enemy fire zones, exploits even the smallest cover, and crosses areas observed by the enemy in a trickling manner (“Vortröpfeln”). Very narrow but deep formations as well as spreading out a lot helps reduce casualties. Any method of advance that does not offer good targets to the enemy is suitable.  
18. When crossing open areas in a trickling manner (“Vortröpfeln”), the intervalls between the men (or pairs of men) are to be set between 0.5 and 5 minutes. The objective area for the manoeuvre needs to be determined beforehand. An energetic squadleader should be picked to be “Schießender” (lit. firer). He oversees the manoeuvre, and ensures that the men move from one waypoint to the next in irregular intervals. (see example attachment 3) 
19. Only if all other means (support by heavy weapons, terrain, fog/smoke, darkness) fail, the assault platoon may stop its forward movement and advance by fire [so that means providing its own suppressive fire]. 
20. Concentrated fire by all supporting weapons needs to be exploited for a swift and cohesive advance.  
21. When assaulting, one or both assault squads are to be deployed in front/attack. The fire squad  and the grenadier-team are following closely. They provide fire-support wherever the enemy is still resisting. 
Assault squads roll up enemy trenches (“stoßtruppartig”). See the details about rolling up trenches in “Merkblatt 25/3: Instruction for close combat and grenade-training”, Nr. 73-86)
22. If the fire support delivered by the company or battalion proves insufficient for the assault, the platoon leader needs to employ his fire squad and the grenadier-team for fire support or suppressive fire. 
23. The platoon leader needs to plan the attack according to H.Dv.130/2a Nr. 458-463.
24. The combat-plan needs to consider the following questions:
 Where do I need to go? What/who is preventing me from going there? How/where do I launch the assault? From where and when can the assault be supported by the fire squad?  25. The combat-plan then needs to be broken down into individual orders:
a) To the fire squad: Fireposition – where?, Target – where? Fire support – how? (time to open fire, duration of fire); Follow up – when? Where? b) To the assault squad: Target of the assault – where? How to approach? How to assault? c) For the grenadier-team: Follow up – to whom? (advance together with the assault squad or stay with the fire squad?) – fire position – where? Target, where? Ammo-consumption  26. This is how the assault squad is to be used on the attack:
a) When conducting a two pronged attack [“zangenförmiger Angriff”], the fire squad and both assault squads are to be used in a way so that they don’t lose their communication with each other b) The grenade-launcher team follows the assault squads to support them in the attack and in the assault against targets that pop up surprisingly c) The assignment of the grenade-launcher-team to the fire squad is an exception and depends on the terrain and the distance to the target d) Holding back one of the assault squads as a reserve of flank-guard to support the fire squad is the exception  27. Assault and fire squads complement each other even if there is no explicit order for it. The light MGs of the fire squad always need to cover the assault squads, even when they [the MGs] are advancing in alternate bounds. The assault platoon’s squads act upon signals or shouts.
 28. The platoon leader takes in hand all the preparations for the assault. He is the first to charge forward, motivating his soldiers to do the same, and assaults with the assault squads.
During the assault itself, a lively fire of all of the platoon’s weapons is employed, as well as loud and continous cheering. The assault-rifle 44 is fired on the move, the enemy needs to be drowned in fire. In the first phase of the assault [? not sure; “beim Sturm”], the soldiers are to fire aimed single shots in quick succession, in the second phase [?  not sure; “beim Einbrechen”] bursts (2-3 rounds).
29. The big effect that  the assault rifle 44 has on morale needs to be exploited for a quick assault sprint into the enemy line/position. When approaching close to the target, going prone and throwing grenades often leads to unneccessary casualties and threatens the success of the action.
30. After the successful assault, the fire squad and the grenade launcher team follow up without orders.
31. After the successful assault, the platoon-leader reorganizes his platoon for the next assault. Any success needs to be exploited further. The enemy must not be given time to reorganize his defences.
32. If the assault was directed at a limited target [so the platoon is supposed not to exploit a success with continous attacks?], the platoon leader sets up a defence of the conquered position with the two light MGs of the fire squad and the grenade-launcher team. They (the MGs + grenade launchers) ensure that the position is not lost to a counter attack, even if no explicit order is given.
33. Due to its quick readiness to fire and its high firepower, the assault rifle 44 is of particular use in the night attack. Assault-platoons are to be used in the first line. Moonlit nights and snow are favourable conditions for a night attack.
 34. A night attack requires a very detailed attack- and fire plan. The attack needs to proceed according to the very strict plan. It is impossible to redirect the attack on the fly.
 35. Night attacks are always conducted against a limited target. The enemy position is taken by a surprising dash/assault by the asssault squads in line [? “in breiter Front”, on a broad front], with continous fire of all soldiers. The fire squad follows up closely.
Defence
a) The assault platoon in the main defensive line ("Hauptkampflinie")
 36. When the assault platoon is used in defence at the front line, it deploys in a way to defend the position.
 37. For defending a large front, the light MG from the reserve [? “Gerätereserve” - the diagrams at the end of the document show it being transported on the horse cart] is to be used [in addition to the other MGs, obviously]. It is to be manned by the ammo-bearers of the fire-squad. The platoon leader decides where to position the fire squad, either deploying it in individual nests over the platoon sector, or, depending on the terrain, he might use concentrations of the light MGs and the assault squads. All MG positions need to be fortified as “fighting nests” and equipped with anti tank weapons. Additional anti tank weapons (Panzerfausts, blinding devices, mines, Molotov cocktails) are to be distributed all over the position, readily available for every man.
38. The grenade-launcher team needs to cover those folds in the terrain that cannot be reached by the fire of the light MGs and the assault rifles 44. It supplements the effect of grenades to cover the dead angles in front of the position. The grenade-launcher team has to be mobile.
39. The counter-attack-reserve of the platoon leader consists of one assault squad. If the sector is very large, however, the counter-attack-reserve only consists of the platoon leader and a few soldiers. Counter-attacks in various situations/in different directions need to be preplanned and practiced.  
40. On the defence, one needs to consider daytime and nighttime positions (setup of pickets, organization of the sentry duties, coordination with other observation posts close-by).
 b) The assault platoon as a counter-attack-reserve
 41. Usually, a battalion’s or regiment’s counter-attack-reserve is made up of its assault platoons (fire extinguisher!).
 42. The assault platoons that are deployed in the rear area of the front (“in der Tiefe des Hauptkampffeldes”) need to be set up in a way so that their fire squads can destroy any breakthroughs by the enemy and support the assault squads’ counter attack.
 43. If the whole assault platoon counter-attacks, the fire squad is to be used as the fire-reserve of the platoon leader in the re-conquered position. [?]
 44. Counter-attacks have to be conducted against the flanks or rear of the enemy, along the main line of defence (“Hauptkampflinie”). The faster/earlier the assault platoons counter-attack, the better their chance for success, even if the enemy is in superior strength. Therefore, the platoon-leader needs to make his own decision [on his own initiative] if/when to counter-attack.
 45. Fire by all weapons and any means available are applied in order to destroy an enemy breaktrough and overrun it with a swift counter-attack.  The counter-attack is to be carried out with all guns blazing, reckless personal commitment, and continous cheering.

Here is my clumsy translation of the first few pages, more to follow: 
The assault-platoon in the grenadier-company
 I. General remarks
Based on the experiences in the war, a new structure and new armament is required for the grenadier-companies, both for the attack and the defence. The partition of grenadier companies into assault-platoons allows their unitary and flexible/swift employment. [? pretty general remark]  With its new structure, namely two assault-squads and a fire-squad, as well as with its new armament, the assault-platoon will fulfill a very clearly defined role. The uniform armament of the squads facilitates their lead, so that even young and inexperienced squad leaders who have not finished their full training, can lead them into battle more readily. The adoption of the assault rifle 44 [Sturmgewehr 44] increases firepower and the manoeuverability of the squads. The withdrawal of grenade-launchers and sharpshooters from the squads relieves them of specialists. It allows the grenade-launchers to be concentrated on the platoon-level and the sharpshooters on the company-level.  II. Structure of the assault-platoon [you can compare it to the diagrams on p. 15 of the electronic document]
5. The assault platoon consists of:
 the platoon leader  the platoon HQ team, including the grenade launcher team 2 assault squads (7 men each) 1 fire squad (7 men) 2 infantry carts (Jf. 8), coupled, 1 horse, 1 operator/rider 1 backup/reserve/supply [?]  cart (“Feldwagen oder Panjewagen”), two-horse, 1 operator/rider  6. The platoon HQ team consists of:
2 messengers/runners 1 litter bearer/medic 1 Grenade-launcher-team (3 grenadiers) [probably this means 3 tubes], one of the greandiers is teamleader; The concentration of the grenadiers at the platoon-leader increases the effectiveness of fire and allows them to be used in a concentrated/focused manner  7. The assault squad consists of 1 squadleader and 7 soldiers. The soldiers are equipped with assault rifles 44. They are to engage in close combat and are equipped with plenty of ammunition and grenades. One of the soldiers is second-in-command of the squad leader.
 8. The fire squad consists of 2 light MG teams. The squad leader is in command of the squad as a whole and one of the MGs in particular. His second-in-command commands the other MG. Each MG is crewed by a gunner (“Schütze 1”) and two ammo-bearers (“Munitionsschützen”).
The first [=standard?] ammunition-allotment is 720 rounds for each assault-rifle 44. On them, the soldiers are to carry 6 magazines for a total of 180 rounds (30 rounds per magazine).
 III. The assault platoon in combat
 General principles
 9. In the attack, it’s the assault platoon’s task to wipe out the last resistance of the enemy. In the defence, the assault platoon defeats the final assault of the enemy.
 10. The assault platoon can accomplish any task, both in the defence and in the attack.
 11. The assault platoon is best used for the following tasks:
For assault and recon missions, for combat in rough/difficult (lit. hard to oversee) terrain, for missions during night or in foggy weather In the defence as a mobile reserve for the counter-attack and the protection of open flanks For the pursuit of the enemy and as an advance guard, riding on Stugs, trucks/cars or tanks; As rearguards in retreat actions, or for combat “im Zwischenfeld” (?) as a hunter-platoon of a ski-unit or as a ski-equipped part of a winter unit [… I don’t know how to translate all the special terms – generally it refers to their usage on skis]  12. The assault platoon is the smallest tactical combat unit of the grenadier-company. The individual deployment of assault squads or the fire squad is an exception.
 Attack
13. In all combat conditions, the completely hidden, hunter-like (“jägermäßige”) approach into the rear or a flank of the enemy and the sudden, overwhelming and surprising employment of fire at short distance is the key to success.
14. When approching, the platoon leader leads his assault platoon close to the enemy, evading fire combat. 
15. Proper assessment of the terrain is required prior to any action. Every opportunity of concealment needs to be taken. It’s not that important to reach the forming up point for the final assault as fast as possible, [but – is missing] to reach it undetected by the enemy and without any casualties.  
16. The assault platoon opens fire as late/close as possible and needs to make even more use of the support fire of heavy weapons [to cover its movement, obviously] than before. It’s not the assault-platoon’s task to use [it’s own] suppressive fire to get/manoeuvre within large or medium distance to the enemy.  
17. To advance, the assault platoon evades enemy fire zones, exploits even the smallest cover, and crosses areas observed by the enemy in a trickling manner (“Vortröpfeln”). Very narrow but deep formations as well as spreading out a lot helps reduce casualties. Any method of advance that does not offer good targets to the enemy is suitable.  
18. When crossing open areas in a trickling manner (“Vortröpfeln”), the intervalls between the men (or pairs of men) are to be set between 0.5 and 5 minutes. The objective area for the manoeuvre needs to be determined beforehand. An energetic squadleader should be picked to be “Schießender” (lit. firer). He oversees the manoeuvre, and ensures that the men move from one waypoint to the next in irregular intervals. (see example attachment 3) 
19. Only if all other means (support by heavy weapons, terrain, fog/smoke, darkness) fail, the assault platoon may stop its forward movement and advance by fire [so that means providing its own suppressive fire]. 
20. Concentrated fire by all supporting weapons needs to be exploited for a swift and cohesive advance.  
21. When assaulting, one or both assault squads are to be deployed in front/attack. The fire squad  and the grenadier-team are following closely. They provide fire-support wherever the enemy is still resisting. 
Assault squads roll up enemy trenches (“stoßtruppartig”). See the details about rolling up trenches in “Merkblatt 25/3: Instruction for close combat and grenade-training”, Nr. 73-86)
22. If the fire support delivered by the company or battalion proves insufficient for the assault, the platoon leader needs to employ his fire squad and the grenadier-team for fire support or suppressive fire. 
23. The platoon leader needs to plan the attack according to H.Dv.130/2a Nr. 458-463.
24. The combat-plan needs to consider the following questions:
 Where do I need to go? What/who is preventing me from going there? How/where do I launch the assault? From where and when can the assault be supported by the fire squad?  25. The combat-plan then needs to be broken down into individual orders:
a) To the fire squad: Fireposition – where?, Target – where? Fire support – how? (time to open fire, duration of fire); Follow up – when? Where? b) To the assault squad: Target of the assault – where? How to approach? How to assault? c) For the grenadier-team: Follow up – to whom? (advance together with the assault squad or stay with the fire squad?) – fire position – where? Target, where? Ammo-consumption  26. This is how the assault squad is to be used on the attack:
a) When conducting a two pronged attack [“zangenförmiger Angriff”], the fire squad and both assault squads are to be used in a way so that they don’t lose their communication with each other b) The grenade-launcher team follows the assault squads to support them in the attack and in the assault against targets that pop up surprisingly c) The assignment of the grenade-launcher-team to the fire squad is an exception and depends on the terrain and the distance to the target d) Holding back one of the assault squads as a reserve of flank-guard to support the fire squad is the exception  27. Assault and fire squads complement each other even if there is no explicit order for it. The light MGs of the fire squad always need to cover the assault squads, even when they [the MGs] are advancing in alternate bounds. The assault platoon’s squads act upon signals or shouts.
 28. The platoon leader takes in hand all the preparations for the assault. He is the first to charge forward, motivating his soldiers to do the same, and assaults with the assault squads.
During the assault itself, a lively fire of all of the platoon’s weapons is employed, as well as loud and continous cheering. The assault-rifle 44 is fired on the move, the enemy needs to be drowned in fire. In the first phase of the assault [? not sure; “beim Sturm”], the soldiers are to fire aimed single shots in quick succession, in the second phase [?  not sure; “beim Einbrechen”] bursts (2-3 rounds).
29. The big effect that  the assault rifle 44 has on morale needs to be exploited for a quick assault sprint into the enemy line/position. When approaching close to the target, going prone and throwing grenades often leads to unneccessary casualties and threatens the success of the action.
30. After the successful assault, the fire squad and the grenade launcher team follow up without orders.
31. After the successful assault, the platoon-leader reorganizes his platoon for the next assault. Any success needs to be exploited further. The enemy must not be given time to reorganize his defences.
32. If the assault was directed at a limited target [so the platoon is supposed not to exploit a success with continous attacks?], the platoon leader sets up a defence of the conquered position with the two light MGs of the fire squad and the grenade-launcher team. They (the MGs + grenade launchers) ensure that the position is not lost to a counter attack, even if no explicit order is given.
33. Due to its quick readiness to fire and its high firepower, the assault rifle 44 is of particular use in the night attack. Assault-platoons are to be used in the first line. Moonlit nights and snow are favourable conditions for a night attack.
 34. A night attack requires a very detailed attack- and fire plan. The attack needs to proceed according to the very strict plan. It is impossible to redirect the attack on the fly.
 35. Night attacks are always conducted against a limited target. The enemy position is taken by a surprising dash/assault by the asssault squads in line [? “in breiter Front”, on a broad front], with continous fire of all soldiers. The fire squad follows up closely.
Defence
a) The assault platoon in the main defensive line ("Hauptkampflinie")
 36. When the assault platoon is used in defence at the front line, it deploys in a way to defend the position.
 37. For defending a large front, the light MG from the reserve [? “Gerätereserve” - the diagrams at the end of the document show it being transported on the horse cart] is to be used [in addition to the other MGs, obviously]. It is to be manned by the ammo-bearers of the fire-squad. The platoon leader decides where to position the fire squad, either deploying it in individual nests over the platoon sector, or, depending on the terrain, he might use concentrations of the light MGs and the assault squads. All MG positions need to be fortified as “fighting nests” and equipped with anti tank weapons. Additional anti tank weapons (Panzerfausts, blinding devices, mines, Molotov cocktails) are to be distributed all over the position, readily available for every man.
38. The grenade-launcher team needs to cover those folds in the terrain that cannot be reached by the fire of the light MGs and the assault rifles 44. It supplements the effect of grenades to cover the dead angles in front of the position. The grenade-launcher team has to be mobile.
39. The counter-attack-reserve of the platoon leader consists of one assault squad. If the sector is very large, however, the counter-attack-reserve only consists of the platoon leader and a few soldiers. Counter-attacks in various situations/in different directions need to be preplanned and practiced.  
40. On the defence, one needs to consider daytime and nighttime positions (setup of pickets, organization of the sentry duties, coordination with other observation posts close-by).
 b) The assault platoon as a counter-attack-reserve
 41. Usually, a battalion’s or regiment’s counter-attack-reserve is made up of its assault platoons (fire extinguisher!).
 42. The assault platoons that are deployed in the rear area of the front (“in der Tiefe des Hauptkampffeldes”) need to be set up in a way so that their fire squads can destroy any breakthroughs by the enemy and support the assault squads’ counter attack.
 43. If the whole assault platoon counter-attacks, the fire squad is to be used as the fire-reserve of the platoon leader in the re-conquered position. [?]
 44. Counter-attacks have to be conducted against the flanks or rear of the enemy, along the main line of defence (“Hauptkampflinie”). The faster/earlier the assault platoons counter-attack, the better their chance for success, even if the enemy is in superior strength. Therefore, the platoon-leader needs to make his own decision [on his own initiative] if/when to counter-attack.
 45. Fire by all weapons and any means available are applied in order to destroy an enemy breaktrough and overrun it with a swift counter-attack.  The counter-attack is to be carried out with all guns blazing, reckless personal commitment, and continous cheering.

The danger of having a split squad is that each individual team will Rattle, Shake and Panic quicker when taking casualties than a combined squad. This is due to the percentages. 1 man KIA in a 4 man team is a 25% casualty rate, whereas 1 man KIA in a 12 man squad is...well you do the maths!
There is a case to be made for keeping a squad intact for certain specific tasks. Although this increases the risk of higher casualties from explosives, it can be useful when you want that extra bit of punch and resilience.
I will use a combined squad against a weakened position that I want gone but have no other means of getting it done other than to send in the grunts, and am confident that the position has been isolated.
Additionally splitting teams in a green or conscript squad is the best way to ensure everyone runs away at the first sign of trouble. Also if you split a squad that is Nervous (when not under suppression), you will have 1 or 2 of the teams become Rattled when split.
To add my 2 cents into the 'Fire and Manoeuvre' debate, I think that the concept would be clearer if the drill were renamed 'Fire, Fire, Fire, Fire & Manoeuvre'. The reason that this drill fails in game is typically because equal weight is given to each component. That is to say that a typical way of interpreting 'Fire and Manoeuvre' is to have 1st squad firing and 2nd squad manoeuvring (or 1 team firing and 1 team manoeuvring)
If the 80/20 rule is used, then Fire and Manoeuvre becomes much more successful.
Therefore;   'Fire, Fire, Fire, Fire & Manoeuvre'
 
 
 
 

Good example, but the enemy hMG was badly positioned and isolated. In a proper defence, the approach to the hMG would be covered by other positions - e.g. behind the house to the left or in a house further to the rear/left (cannot be reached by your cover team), in the little wood to the right. It's the tunnel vision that can give you a bloody nose in CM if you try to advance by fire and manoeuvre. 
Also, I wonder whether the fire team actually fired? Trading fire with a hMG with some rifles usually doesn't end very well for the rifles. ^^ (Unless the very short range here helped the rifles. The MG is deployed within 110m of a wood that provides excellent cover for attackers to approach)
Personally, I find it too risky to just suppress the one position I'm aware of and manoeuvre against it, keeping my fingers crossed that there are no other enemy positions. It's much safer to suppress all potential positions within the line-of-sight-sector and only then start to move.  Ammo traded for fewer casualties! Of course you need much more firepower to pull this off. 
Sometimes, I get the impression that the whole "fire & manoeuvre" for infantry was just propaganda to give the infantryman the idea they can win. Yah! You can do it! If the enemy is isolated and offers his flanks, and if there is no enemy armor around, and if artillery doesn't hit you! No really, you can do it! I guess CM has spoilt me *thousand yard stare*
 

Well what you're saying here is not the opposite. Rather, we seem to be agreeing. I've said that it handicaps the attack, but not that the attack per se is underpowered. 
I'm an avid activist for more/better fortifications and implementing measures to decrease the infantry casualty rate. In fact an increase of area-suppression should also help to reduce casualties. And, as you've also mentioned, it can also be very usefull for the defender, whose knowledge of the exact whereabouts of the enemy is usually not that clear. A larger area of suppression could help to pin down the guys that "must be moving somewhere around these bushes".

Mark's book "Island of Fire" provides a great level of detail on some of the Stalingrad battles, I expect that most if not all of his battles are like this.  His book "Objective Ponyri" is similar, although there is not as much content and more pictures (maps).  Glantz's books are also very detailed, although it sounds like at a higher level than you are interested in (ie, operational, divisional scale rather than tactical).  
Also, not to toot my own horn, but many years ago now I wrote a companion book for CMAK which included descriptions of many tactical level actions in the Med theater, including North Africa, Sicily, and Italy.  I think you'd find it interesting.  I don't see the book on Battlefront's website anymore, but I might have copy or two lying around, would have to check.  Also, from when I wrote that book, I seem to recall that some excellent New Zealand regimental histories were available for free online, but it has been many years, so you would have to look around.

Not directly related to the game itself, but a small collection of youtube links that might be pretty usefull for people like me who are not very familiar with warfare after WWII. There are probably many more videos out there in the vast spaces of the world wide web, so this list is far from complete. 
 
British instructional videos (1980s)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b1qgSrv1emo (recon patrol, part 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WB7cKWK5nH0 (recon patrol, part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QuQJTLv2jV0&amp; (fighting patrol, part 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qJoshHLU4v8 (fighting patrol, part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hy0zu1oXRro&amp; (field craft)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rMDdsXmkshA&amp; (fighting in the woods)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZgV5LY7oBpU (An unthinking moment)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24LRnE6HwVo (snipers, part 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bbq9NMoZv2c (snipers, part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aEKOku3jxmM (finding the enemy, part 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YBmz3zhzqms (finding the enemy, part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hrubDDcygb4 (effect of artillery fire)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zo5f6l-ZP4 (troop platoon tactics [tank + mech inf], part 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDAQV4fMaUk (troop platoon tactics [tank + mech inf], part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ciFnTiacaDU (section fire and manoeuvre, part 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0mIm50Od8U (section fire and manoeuvre, part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kvB9LzziqfA (section fire and manoeuvre, part 3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UW5Qem8AHsk (map reading)
 
 
(West-)German videos 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z3OB7sfGTEM (camouflage, 1993, part 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v2i1tkd_qaE (camouflage, 1993, part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hof5V126f3U (camouflage, 1993, part 3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RQaFyxNxZm8 (camouflage, 1993, part 4)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHicBQFFHIQ (anti tank team, 1988, part 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QhdK6V9Wn6k (anti tank team, 1988, part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UZT-Y0Ziog (anti tank team, 1988, part 3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlMZZMxMqxc (anti tank team, 1988, part 4)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LEdbK3K2ctk (fighting in built-up areas, date?, chapter A, part 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YqY1C0zW30Q (fighting in built-up areas, date?, chapter A, part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wicsKnklv9A (fighting in built-up areas, date?, chapter C, part 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bugWXzfjUo (fighting in built-up areas, date?, chapter D, part 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W_XJrNGKglk (fighting in built-up areas, date?, chapter D, part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C6bvlDNrqGA (fighting in built-up areas, date?, chapter D, part 3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bdqClaVV_Uc (fighting in built-up areas, 1980s?)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dj2bjhgDlIU (tactics for the individual tank, 1957 - slightly out of our timeframe )
 
USA
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EpCmJcw6W5Y (individual camouflage, 1967)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QUTW4ktu798 (sniper employment, 1992)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TF2wCUaLH8s (map symbols, 1966)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HAK8h4mqFsM (map reading, 1966)
 

I also use it whenever possible. As mentioned before, it gives several advantages:
Squads are less bunched up (not as vulnerable against artillery) Splitting up a squad gives you two units, which are two seperate positions for eyeballs. Better/more flexible observation! Splitting up a squad in two units lets you target two targets instead of one. Very handy for suppressive fire (still I'd like to point out that MGs should be allowed to cover several targets within a single turn! Imho this is a huge issue and it's the number 2 on my CM-wishlist) Better  control over movement (a split-up squad only occupies one square instead of two) I suppose that small units are spotted less easily (Spotting is based on individual soldiers, not units. The fewer soldiers there are moving through a square, the fewer of them can be potentially spotted!) Higher manoeuverability (I need to check that out again, but some infantry actions/waypoints are only triggered once every member of a squad has reached his final position in the square. With larger squad, this simply takes more time. Especially once you get a few injured squad members - they move slowlier).   There might be some disadvantages in terms of morale though (unfortunately, splitting up squads is not covered in Josey Wales' excellent analysis of soft factors in CM games). Note that splitting up squads changes/creates a new the leadership modifier for 1 team of the squad. For Russian squads in Red Thunder, a negative effect on morale is officially confirmed.

All the time. Aside from creating special use teams like scouts or AT guys, just using the Split Squad command allows me to spread my troops out, making them less lucrative targets for artillery or mortars. That also allows me to use a favorite tactic if I am having to cross open ground. That is to used bounding overwatch. One team will start off using Quick and dash about 24 meters before stopping to pause for 10 seconds. The second team, after waiting 10 seconds, starts off to do the same thing. The third team, after waiting 20 seconds, starts their first leg. Keep repeating this until the turn has expired or all troops have reached their final destination. The advantages of moving this way are twofold. The spotting cycle in CM is usually around 7 seconds. So if your guys are lying down in tall grass for 10, the enemy units that might have noticed them running will forget about them and switch their attention elsewhere, which can make their fire less effective. The second advantage is that while one of your teams is up and running, the other two are able to spot and return fire on any enemy units that may have opened up on the runners. Even if they don't create any casualties, that tends to suppress the enemy and make his fire less effective.
Michael

I'm working on the translation. Give me a couple of days.
 
Some quick basics: 
The new assault platoon (of a Grenadier-company) described in the paper consists of: 
2 assault squads (7 men each, armed with assault-rifles 44 (Sturmgewehre 44*), plenty of ammo, grenades)  1 fire squad (2 light MGs) - to provide covering fire during the final assault platoon HQ squad/team + 3 grenade launchers (I suppose these are very light ones; they're taken from the squads, concentrated on the platoon-level) the grenade launchers are supposed to follow the assault squads, not stay back with the fire squad (!) (The snipers formerly employed on the squad-level (?) are to be ceded to/used on the company-level.) It seems as if it was not mobilized/mechnized? The paper only mentions horse-carts and that the soldiers might ride on tanks/trucks when forming part of an advance guard.
It was to be used particularly for assault and recon missions (special emphasis also on clearing trenches, but here the paper just cites other manuals), for combat in rough/difficult terrain, in fog, during night, as a mobile reserve for counter attacks and the protection of open flanks, for the pursuit of the enemy and as an advance guard, as a rear guard during retreat movements, and also as a ski-unit in some circumstances. 
What I found very interesting is that the paper puts great emphasis on the fact that the squads are supposed not to fire during the approach phase (only during the final assault, over very short distances, "fire-ambush"). As much as possible, the squads were to advance to the assault-FUP undetected by the enemy, moving in very open order, relying on the support of heavy weapons / other units. The squads were not supposed to provide their own covering fire ("sich vorschießen") in this phase. I found the advance by "Vortröpfeln" or "Sickern" (lit. trickling) especially interesting: If the squads found themselves forced to cross open terrain that was observed by the enemy, the men were supposed to cross individually or in pairs, with very large and irregular time intervalls (0.5- 5 minutes). The paper emphasises that it's not about time, but about approaching as undetected by the enemy as possible, and suffering as few casualties as possible. So really, the assault platoon was supposed to deliver shock - getting into very close range to the enemy undetectedly at full strength, then using this hidden concentration of force to surprise the enemy with an ambush-like assault, including loud cheers. Such an assault - sudden opening of fire, high volume of fire with assault-rifles, cheers, a fast sprint - was supposed to break the defender's morale.
 
--
* So we're safe to assume that this document is post 1943?

I'm working on the translation. Give me a couple of days.
 
Some quick basics: 
The new assault platoon (of a Grenadier-company) described in the paper consists of: 
2 assault squads (7 men each, armed with assault-rifles 44 (Sturmgewehre 44*), plenty of ammo, grenades)  1 fire squad (2 light MGs) - to provide covering fire during the final assault platoon HQ squad/team + 3 grenade launchers (I suppose these are very light ones; they're taken from the squads, concentrated on the platoon-level) the grenade launchers are supposed to follow the assault squads, not stay back with the fire squad (!) (The snipers formerly employed on the squad-level (?) are to be ceded to/used on the company-level.) It seems as if it was not mobilized/mechnized? The paper only mentions horse-carts and that the soldiers might ride on tanks/trucks when forming part of an advance guard.
It was to be used particularly for assault and recon missions (special emphasis also on clearing trenches, but here the paper just cites other manuals), for combat in rough/difficult terrain, in fog, during night, as a mobile reserve for counter attacks and the protection of open flanks, for the pursuit of the enemy and as an advance guard, as a rear guard during retreat movements, and also as a ski-unit in some circumstances. 
What I found very interesting is that the paper puts great emphasis on the fact that the squads are supposed not to fire during the approach phase (only during the final assault, over very short distances, "fire-ambush"). As much as possible, the squads were to advance to the assault-FUP undetected by the enemy, moving in very open order, relying on the support of heavy weapons / other units. The squads were not supposed to provide their own covering fire ("sich vorschießen") in this phase. I found the advance by "Vortröpfeln" or "Sickern" (lit. trickling) especially interesting: If the squads found themselves forced to cross open terrain that was observed by the enemy, the men were supposed to cross individually or in pairs, with very large and irregular time intervalls (0.5- 5 minutes). The paper emphasises that it's not about time, but about approaching as undetected by the enemy as possible, and suffering as few casualties as possible. So really, the assault platoon was supposed to deliver shock - getting into very close range to the enemy undetectedly at full strength, then using this hidden concentration of force to surprise the enemy with an ambush-like assault, including loud cheers. Such an assault - sudden opening of fire, high volume of fire with assault-rifles, cheers, a fast sprint - was supposed to break the defender's morale.
 
--
* So we're safe to assume that this document is post 1943?

Thanks, it's rare for me to get such an infantry heavy battle going in Black Sea and I definitely was in the mood for one.


 
 

A PBEM game from about two months ago. Long overdue for release. Working subtitles as well if you have trouble understanding me on the mic. Enjoy.

I've redone the CMRT database to use links to files in the same directory rather than importing image files into the DB  file itself--it should make the file easier to use as I add more maps.  Note that I've changed one thing in this version of the DB--now I am only listing unique maps, because there are too many maps at this point to reliably indicate which maps are alternative versions or submaps of another map.  
While I've tested it on a couple of computers here, before I spend more time adding more maps, I would like for a couple of you to test the file to make sure that the links work, etc.  You should be able to install the directory and files anywhere you want, the main thing is to keep the Excel DB file and all of the map images in the same directory.
Here is the file, note that it is a fairly large file, at about 650 MB:
CMRT Map Database v3
Could someone please test it, make sure that the map images open, etc. and then let me know here?  Then I'll start adding converted maps from CMFI and CMFB.

The hellfire is a laser guided missile capable of striking its targets using a top down attack profile. In Afghanistan it was heavily used as an anti personnel weapon, targetting cave entrances, emplaced positions, machine gun nests, etc. Check out the wiki page for a lot more information on it. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-114_Hellfire
 

There is no kill like overkill. Forget efficiency, use your ammunition at prodigious rates until the bad guys stop shooting so much, then you can turn it down a notch. The ONLY ammunition I try to conserve is submachinegun ammunition. Everything else gets spent like a spoiled teenager with a platinum credit card.
 
As far as I'm concerned, ammunition IS currency, but what you purchase with it is the prevention of casualties. You expend your ammunition with the idea that preventing the enemy from shooting back at you effectively, you will receive fewer casualties, and thus suffer lower attrition than the enemy. This keeps your force in shape for longer, and gives you more meat for the grinder during those critical moments.
 
Find a flank, or withdraw. If you've gotten your butt kicked, sitting down and continuing to shoot it out with the enemy is the LAST thing you want to do. This is also a prime time to use whatever arty you have available in a Heavy/Maximum strike against the enemy lead positions. That will enable you to break contact.
Oddly enough, I did much the same thing in a recent quick battle. It worked like a charm.