Hapless

Ukraine hitting the nail on the head again:
 

Here used play of words in UKR and RUS - "zamis"/"zamyes" - "kneading", which except bakery term means "intensive and hard fighting". This video is for multiple "armchair generals", who concerning about slow offensive, demand immediate results and give advices how to make war.
Soldier bakes the same sort of bread, calling "palianytsia", which became a shibbolth in first stage of war and a meme ) 

Ukraine hitting the nail on the head again:
 

Ukraine hitting the nail on the head again:
 

I first mentioned this concept way back in the thread, but I think we can expand it right down to the tactical for drone warfare:

Forces survive under counter-drone snowdomes enabled by EW and air defence assets.
Under a friendly snowdome, forces fight with drone supremacy (re. artillery direction, strike, logistics etc).
Fighting under an enemy snowdome, in the face of enemy drone supremacy, is suicidal.
The result is stalemate.

However, snowdomes are not impermeable.
Gaps and weaknesses exist due to the effects of terrain, the performance of human operators and the availability and technical characteristics of EW-AD equipment.
An attacker can penetrate snowdomes by exploiting these gaps and weaknesses, then widen them by neutralising EW-AD assets.
If an attacker suceeds in compromising a snowdome, it collapses.
In this case, there is a race between attacker and defender to maximise damage and re-establish the snowdome, respectively.
If the defender is successful, the attack takes on the characteristics of a raid with attacking forces maximising damage before getting caught under the re-established snowdome and being destroyed or forced to evacuate.
If the attacker is successful, the defending forces are destroyed or forced to evacuate, and the attacker can extend their snowdome coverage into the new area.

Rinse and repeat, bite and hold with drones.

Right now, I'd go out on and limb argue that an early interation of this is going on in Ukraine. Drones aren't available in the mass needed to really flood and sanitise compromised areas. Instead, they act as enablers for artillery with some limited strike capability (ie. nade dropping and kamikazes).
So while snowdomes spring up, collapse and flicker on and off along the front, the exploitation element either isn't there to take advantage or is slowly grinding it's way through villages and minefields.

Give it a few years, we'll get there. In the meantime, I think it's a good lens to look through.
And there's probably some air force types looking at it saying "Welcome to our world!"

I first mentioned this concept way back in the thread, but I think we can expand it right down to the tactical for drone warfare:

Forces survive under counter-drone snowdomes enabled by EW and air defence assets.
Under a friendly snowdome, forces fight with drone supremacy (re. artillery direction, strike, logistics etc).
Fighting under an enemy snowdome, in the face of enemy drone supremacy, is suicidal.
The result is stalemate.

However, snowdomes are not impermeable.
Gaps and weaknesses exist due to the effects of terrain, the performance of human operators and the availability and technical characteristics of EW-AD equipment.
An attacker can penetrate snowdomes by exploiting these gaps and weaknesses, then widen them by neutralising EW-AD assets.
If an attacker suceeds in compromising a snowdome, it collapses.
In this case, there is a race between attacker and defender to maximise damage and re-establish the snowdome, respectively.
If the defender is successful, the attack takes on the characteristics of a raid with attacking forces maximising damage before getting caught under the re-established snowdome and being destroyed or forced to evacuate.
If the attacker is successful, the defending forces are destroyed or forced to evacuate, and the attacker can extend their snowdome coverage into the new area.

Rinse and repeat, bite and hold with drones.

Right now, I'd go out on and limb argue that an early interation of this is going on in Ukraine. Drones aren't available in the mass needed to really flood and sanitise compromised areas. Instead, they act as enablers for artillery with some limited strike capability (ie. nade dropping and kamikazes).
So while snowdomes spring up, collapse and flicker on and off along the front, the exploitation element either isn't there to take advantage or is slowly grinding it's way through villages and minefields.

Give it a few years, we'll get there. In the meantime, I think it's a good lens to look through.
And there's probably some air force types looking at it saying "Welcome to our world!"

I first mentioned this concept way back in the thread, but I think we can expand it right down to the tactical for drone warfare:

Forces survive under counter-drone snowdomes enabled by EW and air defence assets.
Under a friendly snowdome, forces fight with drone supremacy (re. artillery direction, strike, logistics etc).
Fighting under an enemy snowdome, in the face of enemy drone supremacy, is suicidal.
The result is stalemate.

However, snowdomes are not impermeable.
Gaps and weaknesses exist due to the effects of terrain, the performance of human operators and the availability and technical characteristics of EW-AD equipment.
An attacker can penetrate snowdomes by exploiting these gaps and weaknesses, then widen them by neutralising EW-AD assets.
If an attacker suceeds in compromising a snowdome, it collapses.
In this case, there is a race between attacker and defender to maximise damage and re-establish the snowdome, respectively.
If the defender is successful, the attack takes on the characteristics of a raid with attacking forces maximising damage before getting caught under the re-established snowdome and being destroyed or forced to evacuate.
If the attacker is successful, the defending forces are destroyed or forced to evacuate, and the attacker can extend their snowdome coverage into the new area.

Rinse and repeat, bite and hold with drones.

Right now, I'd go out on and limb argue that an early interation of this is going on in Ukraine. Drones aren't available in the mass needed to really flood and sanitise compromised areas. Instead, they act as enablers for artillery with some limited strike capability (ie. nade dropping and kamikazes).
So while snowdomes spring up, collapse and flicker on and off along the front, the exploitation element either isn't there to take advantage or is slowly grinding it's way through villages and minefields.

Give it a few years, we'll get there. In the meantime, I think it's a good lens to look through.
And there's probably some air force types looking at it saying "Welcome to our world!"

I first mentioned this concept way back in the thread, but I think we can expand it right down to the tactical for drone warfare:

Forces survive under counter-drone snowdomes enabled by EW and air defence assets.
Under a friendly snowdome, forces fight with drone supremacy (re. artillery direction, strike, logistics etc).
Fighting under an enemy snowdome, in the face of enemy drone supremacy, is suicidal.
The result is stalemate.

However, snowdomes are not impermeable.
Gaps and weaknesses exist due to the effects of terrain, the performance of human operators and the availability and technical characteristics of EW-AD equipment.
An attacker can penetrate snowdomes by exploiting these gaps and weaknesses, then widen them by neutralising EW-AD assets.
If an attacker suceeds in compromising a snowdome, it collapses.
In this case, there is a race between attacker and defender to maximise damage and re-establish the snowdome, respectively.
If the defender is successful, the attack takes on the characteristics of a raid with attacking forces maximising damage before getting caught under the re-established snowdome and being destroyed or forced to evacuate.
If the attacker is successful, the defending forces are destroyed or forced to evacuate, and the attacker can extend their snowdome coverage into the new area.

Rinse and repeat, bite and hold with drones.

Right now, I'd go out on and limb argue that an early interation of this is going on in Ukraine. Drones aren't available in the mass needed to really flood and sanitise compromised areas. Instead, they act as enablers for artillery with some limited strike capability (ie. nade dropping and kamikazes).
So while snowdomes spring up, collapse and flicker on and off along the front, the exploitation element either isn't there to take advantage or is slowly grinding it's way through villages and minefields.

Give it a few years, we'll get there. In the meantime, I think it's a good lens to look through.
And there's probably some air force types looking at it saying "Welcome to our world!"

I first mentioned this concept way back in the thread, but I think we can expand it right down to the tactical for drone warfare:

Forces survive under counter-drone snowdomes enabled by EW and air defence assets.
Under a friendly snowdome, forces fight with drone supremacy (re. artillery direction, strike, logistics etc).
Fighting under an enemy snowdome, in the face of enemy drone supremacy, is suicidal.
The result is stalemate.

However, snowdomes are not impermeable.
Gaps and weaknesses exist due to the effects of terrain, the performance of human operators and the availability and technical characteristics of EW-AD equipment.
An attacker can penetrate snowdomes by exploiting these gaps and weaknesses, then widen them by neutralising EW-AD assets.
If an attacker suceeds in compromising a snowdome, it collapses.
In this case, there is a race between attacker and defender to maximise damage and re-establish the snowdome, respectively.
If the defender is successful, the attack takes on the characteristics of a raid with attacking forces maximising damage before getting caught under the re-established snowdome and being destroyed or forced to evacuate.
If the attacker is successful, the defending forces are destroyed or forced to evacuate, and the attacker can extend their snowdome coverage into the new area.

Rinse and repeat, bite and hold with drones.

Right now, I'd go out on and limb argue that an early interation of this is going on in Ukraine. Drones aren't available in the mass needed to really flood and sanitise compromised areas. Instead, they act as enablers for artillery with some limited strike capability (ie. nade dropping and kamikazes).
So while snowdomes spring up, collapse and flicker on and off along the front, the exploitation element either isn't there to take advantage or is slowly grinding it's way through villages and minefields.

Give it a few years, we'll get there. In the meantime, I think it's a good lens to look through.
And there's probably some air force types looking at it saying "Welcome to our world!"

I first mentioned this concept way back in the thread, but I think we can expand it right down to the tactical for drone warfare:

Forces survive under counter-drone snowdomes enabled by EW and air defence assets.
Under a friendly snowdome, forces fight with drone supremacy (re. artillery direction, strike, logistics etc).
Fighting under an enemy snowdome, in the face of enemy drone supremacy, is suicidal.
The result is stalemate.

However, snowdomes are not impermeable.
Gaps and weaknesses exist due to the effects of terrain, the performance of human operators and the availability and technical characteristics of EW-AD equipment.
An attacker can penetrate snowdomes by exploiting these gaps and weaknesses, then widen them by neutralising EW-AD assets.
If an attacker suceeds in compromising a snowdome, it collapses.
In this case, there is a race between attacker and defender to maximise damage and re-establish the snowdome, respectively.
If the defender is successful, the attack takes on the characteristics of a raid with attacking forces maximising damage before getting caught under the re-established snowdome and being destroyed or forced to evacuate.
If the attacker is successful, the defending forces are destroyed or forced to evacuate, and the attacker can extend their snowdome coverage into the new area.

Rinse and repeat, bite and hold with drones.

Right now, I'd go out on and limb argue that an early interation of this is going on in Ukraine. Drones aren't available in the mass needed to really flood and sanitise compromised areas. Instead, they act as enablers for artillery with some limited strike capability (ie. nade dropping and kamikazes).
So while snowdomes spring up, collapse and flicker on and off along the front, the exploitation element either isn't there to take advantage or is slowly grinding it's way through villages and minefields.

Give it a few years, we'll get there. In the meantime, I think it's a good lens to look through.
And there's probably some air force types looking at it saying "Welcome to our world!"

Don't work ) Here longer video with drone attack over these nets
 

I always loved that painting.

I always loved that painting.

I always loved that painting.

I always loved that painting.

I always loved that painting.

I always loved that painting.

I always loved that painting.

I always loved that painting.

I always loved that painting.

One way to look at it is to consider what the Russians get out of the Black Sea Fleet:
Roving air defence/radar pickets that are much harder to track down than land-based assets. Strike capability with a much easier avenue of attack on Ukrainian grain exports- whether at sea or in port. As we've seen recently with Poland, forcing Ukraine to seek other means of distributing it's grain can create political friction within supporting international structures. Logistics back-up for the Kerch Bridge. A fleet-in-being: because naval forces can move faster and with less restrictions than land-based forces, Ukraine constantly needs to worry about what the BSF might do and where it might be today. That uses up assets and bandwidth that Ukraine could be using elsewhere, as well as impinging on Ukraine's freedom of action. Remove the Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine should have an easier time striking Russian logistics infrastructure in Crimea (only having to deal with comparatitvely predictable land based air defence (which they've been striking)), which should significantly degrade Russian forces in the south and lube up the counter-offensive.

That's on top the psychological benefits- we all saw the reaction when Ukraine sank Moskva. That wasn't only an important boost for Ukraine, but demonstrated Ukrainian abilities and resolve to the world.

Stuff like that.

I always loved that painting.

I always loved that painting.

I always loved that painting.

I always loved that painting.