The_MonkeyKing

Finland practically closes Russian border because of hybrid migrant operation:
https://yle.fi/a/74-20060587

 
A car trip that used to take a couple of hours from Saint Petersburg to Helsinki now will take over 20h. International media is not really picking this up because it is not "total closure" but in practise it is.

Finland practically closes Russian border because of hybrid migrant operation:
https://yle.fi/a/74-20060587

 
A car trip that used to take a couple of hours from Saint Petersburg to Helsinki now will take over 20h. International media is not really picking this up because it is not "total closure" but in practise it is.

Finland practically closes Russian border because of hybrid migrant operation:
https://yle.fi/a/74-20060587

 
A car trip that used to take a couple of hours from Saint Petersburg to Helsinki now will take over 20h. International media is not really picking this up because it is not "total closure" but in practise it is.

Didn't read it, but some experts on Ukraine actually living there are rather critical of the book- it is collection of interviews with various named and unnamed officials, not proper historical work that would cross the sources with each other and present effects to the reader. Interesting piece to be sure, but inherently subjective. We will need to wait for in-depth works for several years.
 
Meanwhile, short summary of effects of trip of the same crew of analytics as before. Conclusions are unsurprising and not very optimistic: https://threadreaderapp-com.translate.goog/thread/1725157813364600855.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=pl&_x_tr_pto=wapp
Given the length and character of FIN-RU border, it was to be expected. Problem will likely only grew in time and scope, as it is great source of income for middle-level aparatchiks.

Finland practically closes Russian border because of hybrid migrant operation:
https://yle.fi/a/74-20060587

 
A car trip that used to take a couple of hours from Saint Petersburg to Helsinki now will take over 20h. International media is not really picking this up because it is not "total closure" but in practise it is.

Finland practically closes Russian border because of hybrid migrant operation:
https://yle.fi/a/74-20060587

 
A car trip that used to take a couple of hours from Saint Petersburg to Helsinki now will take over 20h. International media is not really picking this up because it is not "total closure" but in practise it is.

Sweet, Denmark is letting know Putin we are not going to abandon Ukraine. I hope other NATO countries will demonstrate similar long term commitments.
 
 



 

https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/some-preliminary-thoughts-on-ukraines-position-in-the-war/
- The Ukrainian offensive has culminated 
- The last high-risk attempt to cross the river in Kherson to achieve results.
- Next year will be a year of static warfare 
- The coming year will be more difficult than this year. Less resources and the change to balance ongoing military operations and the accumulation of new capacity.
- It is important how the West commits to strengthening Ukraine's power. War economy and training**
- It is important what Russia does, hopefully it will continue to attack by force in the same style, and will not start to accumulating new power.
 
If there is no change in diplomacy and politics, militarily next year will be an intermediate year that will allow for solutions in 2025 onwards

https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/some-preliminary-thoughts-on-ukraines-position-in-the-war/
- The Ukrainian offensive has culminated 
- The last high-risk attempt to cross the river in Kherson to achieve results.
- Next year will be a year of static warfare 
- The coming year will be more difficult than this year. Less resources and the change to balance ongoing military operations and the accumulation of new capacity.
- It is important how the West commits to strengthening Ukraine's power. War economy and training**
- It is important what Russia does, hopefully it will continue to attack by force in the same style, and will not start to accumulating new power.
 
If there is no change in diplomacy and politics, militarily next year will be an intermediate year that will allow for solutions in 2025 onwards

https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/some-preliminary-thoughts-on-ukraines-position-in-the-war/
- The Ukrainian offensive has culminated 
- The last high-risk attempt to cross the river in Kherson to achieve results.
- Next year will be a year of static warfare 
- The coming year will be more difficult than this year. Less resources and the change to balance ongoing military operations and the accumulation of new capacity.
- It is important how the West commits to strengthening Ukraine's power. War economy and training**
- It is important what Russia does, hopefully it will continue to attack by force in the same style, and will not start to accumulating new power.
 
If there is no change in diplomacy and politics, militarily next year will be an intermediate year that will allow for solutions in 2025 onwards

This is really just an academic cop-out -“F#ck knows, so let’s call it ‘intermediate’ and dump the solution forward”
Some fundamentals of warfare have shifted.  Mass manoeuvre on offence is clearly broken as we knew it.  Establishing conditions to re-start it remain out of reach.  Neither side has been able to project and sustain mass precision, or at least the levels required to break deadlock.  I am not convinced that there will be a technological or doctrinal solution by 2025.
I think we are going to start seeing difficult conversations.  Ukraine will likely need to dig in and adopt small power strategies of continuing to bleed the RA.  At some point Russia will realize this is a waste of time and effort, probably need a few more disasters to drive that point home.
Defensive primacy might be back (for now).  Denial primacy definitely is happening.  Themes of Denial, Corrosion, projected friction, precision, smart mass, Illumination, Hyper-connectivity, dispersion, deception and attrition seem to really dominate.  A battlefield of negative decisions - I can’t have positive decisions but neither can you.
The military problem may be unsolvable.  Over to the political side.

https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/some-preliminary-thoughts-on-ukraines-position-in-the-war/
- The Ukrainian offensive has culminated 
- The last high-risk attempt to cross the river in Kherson to achieve results.
- Next year will be a year of static warfare 
- The coming year will be more difficult than this year. Less resources and the change to balance ongoing military operations and the accumulation of new capacity.
- It is important how the West commits to strengthening Ukraine's power. War economy and training**
- It is important what Russia does, hopefully it will continue to attack by force in the same style, and will not start to accumulating new power.
 
If there is no change in diplomacy and politics, militarily next year will be an intermediate year that will allow for solutions in 2025 onwards

Not sure it would have made a decisive difference.  It isn’t the weight of armour, it is being able to breach high density minefields 500m across while under the eyes of UAS, ATGM, tac aviation and artillery.  Even as beat up as the RA is it is a pretty low bar to detect, hit and kill the lead breaching vehicles with the levels of ISR on display.
Maybe the UA could have tried more breach lanes but I just don’t see how they could get through all three belts with more tanks when the lead ones get taken out.  Once those minefields were in place it raised the difficulty of offensive operations for the UA dramatically.  Further is requires conditions that they are unable to create - it may require conditions no modern military can create at the moment.
I am loathe to give the RA credit but Bakhmut may have been largely diversionary to allow for the creation of all these minefields.  It pulled a lot of UA attention away to deal with while the RA built the defensive belts.  It was one helluva expensive diversionary operation but it may have succeeded in that the UA summer-fall offensive was blunted.  The only counter-point to this is the fact that the RA had not a very great track record of operational synchronization prior to this.

https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/avdiivka-russian-losses-from-october?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2

https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/avdiivka-russian-losses-from-october?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2

https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/avdiivka-russian-losses-from-october?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2

Thread recommended by Michael Kofman: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1714715790153248909.html

Even though the first attacks were repelled, Russia will likely attack in this direction again in the future. There aren't many similar targets elsewhere. Progress will probably be slow, naturally depending on how much resources Russia will direct into capturing Avdiivka. 9/ 

In Bakhmut, Russians eventually switched from active flanking efforts into capturing the city block by block. If the Russians are fixated on capturing Avdiivka, there can be a long and difficult battle ahead, as Ukrainians are likely just as determined to hold it. 10/ 

In the long run, Ukraine may need to solve the encirclement threat with a counterattack. Especially the northern direction can develop into a real issue. Russians don’t need to advance far in order to make the situation more complicated for AFU. The distances are short. 11/ 

There are some worrying features, even though Ukraine managed to repel Russians for now.
Russia proved two things. It tried to take the initiative in a relatively fresh direction. Secondly, it still has reserves to do it, even though many have claimed the opposite. 12/ 

Even though it seems Russians have learned some lessions from previous offensives, for example from Vuhledar, the tactical outcome of the offensive in Avdiivka was still a failure. This, however, indicates that Russia aims to actively learn and adapt. 13/
 

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1715836719071686908

Rob Lee and Michael Kofman underline not to underestimate this.
North Korea has significant production capacity and latent production potential. And they are more than happy to exchange ammo for technology transfer and food.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1715836719071686908

Rob Lee and Michael Kofman underline not to underestimate this.
North Korea has significant production capacity and latent production potential. And they are more than happy to exchange ammo for technology transfer and food.

link to translated threadreader :https://threadreaderapp-com.translate.goog/thread/1715419274582356325.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=fi&_x_tr_pto=wapp
 

similar worry about this on the "War on the Rocks"
Some pointers from the episode:
Russian attack on Avdiivka is worrying. Russia has learned. The use of combined arms was on a completely different level than last year (artillery, air force, mechanized forces) and the scale was increased from companies to battalions. Even when it was a failure it was still a big improvement, as we have seen with Ukraine these types of operations are extremely hard to conduct even from competent and motivated forces. If this trend continues, there is cause for concern. Avdiivka shows that Russia feels it is in a strong position, at least proves that Russia is not on the ropes. Avdiivka risks becoming a new winter Bakhmut, i.e. a grinding, consuming battle. The culmination of Ukraine's offensive phase is around the corner. We will probably see the "last show" of this offensive within weeks. The likely goal is a breakthrough that would threaten Tokmak. The goals of the UKR offensives were not achieved. The political leadership announced the goals publicly at the beginning (minimum goal Tokmak, Bakhmut and Melitopol as maximalist obj.). Ukraine gets high marks for a good exchange ratio over the summer operation, especially taking into account the environment. Still, the substantial Russian losses seem to be sustainable for them. Now the eyes are on next year. Russia is going to have to conduct another major mobilization if it wants to "keep up the phase". Russian ammunition sources should not be underestimated. Iran, North Korea, etc. Russia has invested significantly in the war economy of these countries and its own. (note that this Ukrainian summer offensive was also carried out with E-Korean stocks) A significant challenge vs. Western production capacity. Next year, it will be challenging for the West to continue the same level of support as this summer, to enable Ukraine to keep the initiative. The political situation in the United States really becoming worrying. At the political level, complacency has spread in Europe and the United States that Russia is losing and cannot continue the war. The situation is the opposite, the West now has to make expensive decisions for a long war. Russia has resources and resilience as we have seen this year.

Another successful ATACMS strike, this time on a Luhansk airfield


Too bad we are seeing these strikes only now at the end of the Ukrainian offensive season. Probably these will be a big help for the awaited "last push" of the current southern campaign before culmination and mud season. 

Another successful ATACMS strike, this time on a Luhansk airfield


Too bad we are seeing these strikes only now at the end of the Ukrainian offensive season. Probably these will be a big help for the awaited "last push" of the current southern campaign before culmination and mud season. 

similar worry about this on the "War on the Rocks"
Some pointers from the episode:
Russian attack on Avdiivka is worrying. Russia has learned. The use of combined arms was on a completely different level than last year (artillery, air force, mechanized forces) and the scale was increased from companies to battalions. Even when it was a failure it was still a big improvement, as we have seen with Ukraine these types of operations are extremely hard to conduct even from competent and motivated forces. If this trend continues, there is cause for concern. Avdiivka shows that Russia feels it is in a strong position, at least proves that Russia is not on the ropes. Avdiivka risks becoming a new winter Bakhmut, i.e. a grinding, consuming battle. The culmination of Ukraine's offensive phase is around the corner. We will probably see the "last show" of this offensive within weeks. The likely goal is a breakthrough that would threaten Tokmak. The goals of the UKR offensives were not achieved. The political leadership announced the goals publicly at the beginning (minimum goal Tokmak, Bakhmut and Melitopol as maximalist obj.). Ukraine gets high marks for a good exchange ratio over the summer operation, especially taking into account the environment. Still, the substantial Russian losses seem to be sustainable for them. Now the eyes are on next year. Russia is going to have to conduct another major mobilization if it wants to "keep up the phase". Russian ammunition sources should not be underestimated. Iran, North Korea, etc. Russia has invested significantly in the war economy of these countries and its own. (note that this Ukrainian summer offensive was also carried out with E-Korean stocks) A significant challenge vs. Western production capacity. Next year, it will be challenging for the West to continue the same level of support as this summer, to enable Ukraine to keep the initiative. The political situation in the United States really becoming worrying. At the political level, complacency has spread in Europe and the United States that Russia is losing and cannot continue the war. The situation is the opposite, the West now has to make expensive decisions for a long war. Russia has resources and resilience as we have seen this year.

Another successful ATACMS strike, this time on a Luhansk airfield


Too bad we are seeing these strikes only now at the end of the Ukrainian offensive season. Probably these will be a big help for the awaited "last push" of the current southern campaign before culmination and mud season.