panzersaurkrautwerfer

Missed this.  The "battle carry" round usually reflects the sort of threat environment, and is usually mixed across the platoon/company.  Which is to say, it's Iraq 2004, we're all carrying HEAT rounds, while in a tank heavy environment something like a 2 sabot to 2 AMP rounds per platoon, or even having the spearhead platoon just roll all sabot is realistic.   
 
Sabot isn't a bad choice either way, it may not catastrophically kill BMP type targets as often, but it'll still ruin the vehicle pretty easily, and I'd rather kill a BMP with a suboptimal round, than ping an AMP off of a tank.  Also worth remembering the Abrams doesn't lack for anti-troop MGs (and honestly anti-light armor with the CROWS), so the AMP isn't always the go-to round.  

Again, I will emphasize, a lack of US air control is not defacto Russian air control.  There are many forward bases available, many with their own NATO aligned air wings.  The USAF for all its faults can surge into theater pretty quickly, and odds are Russian strike fighters will have a life expectancy that makes the old cold war A-10 life expectancy seem like practically dying of old age.  
 
The USAF simply is a better trained, equipped, and more ready force.  If there's a US ABCT in the Ukraine, there's already going to be fixed wing augmentation in theater.  The most pragmatic, and realistic situation is the Russian resistance is such to force the USAF to focus on eliminating the Russian air defense threat, but the question is how long it'll take before those defenses crack, not by any rational observer if the Russians will be able to fly meaningful strike missions.

Still genuinely unfun for all parties.  
 
Russian helicopters have to expose themselves a fair bit more to actually engage ground targets, while Apache users and some of the other NATO CCA guys can engage very effectively from standoff, making a lot of the ADA disparity less important to who's helicopters fly where (or to further illustrate, there's less shooting back at the Russians at the short-range realm, but the Russian short range ADA assets have a lot less to shoot at).  While hunting helicopters with fixed wing assets as proven tricky historically, at the same time, you're looking chiefly at the question of the helicopter being killed by fixed wing.  On the other hand the fixed wing just has to be dangerous enough to make the rotary wing be evasive to achieve a sort of mission kill vs actually shooting the helicopter down.
 
It's also worth noting that the Hind flight profile given the size, speed and altitudes employed will put that airframe at much greater risk to air intercept compared to MI-28/KA-52 platforms.  Further unlike Russian fixed wing, barring extraordinary measures such as replacing ordinance with fuel Russian rotary wing will have to deploy forward from the kind of locations NATO would be able to attack without going onto Russian soil.  This is equally true for NATO rotary wing, but NATO for reasons stated earlier is more likely to be able to get bombs on those targets.  
 
There's not many scenarios that put Russian aviation as something US ground forces would have to be deeply concerned with on a regular basis.  On occasion yes, and scenarios with some redair are legitimate (representing a lucky Russian mission, the results of a Russian surge to achieve air parity, etc) but SU-24s stacked up to 30,000 feet and a half dozen HINDs swooping in are very dubious.  

Yes.  But it'd be because the Russian Air Force would need to be committed to holding off NATO almost to a plane.  Further the same complications that make heavy NATO CAS doubtful are equally strong, if not stronger against the Russians (given a smaller air force and less capable system for the Russians, robust long range ADA from NATO and more common, and better air defense fighters).  
 
It's not going to be a period in which Russia bombs more or less at will with the US vainly flailing at waves of Russian CAS before a turning of the tide with NATO taking air dominance, it's going to be a bloody messy initial fight in which it's hard for anyone to accomplish air strikes, with Russia not having the strength or capabilities to continue this struggle, followed by a general decline in Russian resistance and increase in NATO capabilities.
 
Russian air defense will make it hard for NATO to bomb Russian forces throughout, but in terms of pushing Russian air strikes onto NATO positions, the number of 2S6s is going to be less relevant than then number of AWACS or recent generation fighters NATO fields.  

There's more than a few "wrong place, wrong time" penetration instances on otherwise very tough tanks.  The .50 cal SLAP penetration should be viewed as a fugitive from the law of averages, and an example of the whole "Alle Kunst ist umsonst Wenn ein Engel in das Zündloch Prunst" thing (translation milage may vary) rather than an example of armor quality.
 
Re: Challenger 2
 
Again, by all accounts I've seen it was an impact under the hull, which on the challenger II was not especially protected at all.  The round partially clipped the lowest sets of ERA, triggering them, but not in a way that'd prevent a penetration.
 
So basically the .50 cal SLAP round again, and improbable event occurring.  You'd struggle to replicate it, and the RPG-29 for all it's lethality is still best reserved for flank shots.  
 
 
This is true.  The irritation for me is that the T-90 is very much a late 90's piece of equipment, and it shows. Having to explain that it is not at all on the same level as a M1A2 SEP V2, or that the hardware mounted on it is last generation/sometimes not even as good as it's late 90's peers is something that's important to understanding the tank vs tank fights in CMBS.  It's not a bad tank, it's just not the same as a M1A2, or even a "almost as good as" M1A2.  It's catastrophic overmatch for the "might as well be 1989" Ukrainian designs, something fearsome against forces without much dedicated modern AT assets, but it is certainly something that is not a high performer in a armor fight vs US armor.  

The recon unit still cannot actually acquire the target for the firing platform.  And the level of visability you get at 5 KM will be entirely inadequate to ensure a hit on anywhere but "somewhere" on the target, assuming other variables remain in favor of missile hit.  The Abrams has proven very resistant to HEAT type rounds, and again when your target is "a blob" your odds in terms of frontage are most likely to be part of the tank that's fairly resistant to hits.
 
And of course, 5 KM sightlines are not at all common.  
 
The one vs one stuff is pretty silly.  But simply put the Abrams is better able to find targets, engage them accurately, and achieve first shot kills within most combat ranges.  The T-90 isn't again, a bad tank, it's just very clearly the best of 1999, stacked up against the various 2007-2014 era upgraded NATO tanks, which means it'll struggle to achieve results in situations where an Abrams, Leo or Challenger would likely succeed.
 
It will however beat the Leclerc, simply because Russian tanks are able to leave the garage for more than five minutes at a go.  

NATO ROE will likely be a lot less restrictive than folks are giving it credit for.  Some things might be on restricted target lists like, national treasures/things important to Ukraine's functionality as a country level industrial locations, but anything else would likely be fair game.   Even then the restricted sort of targets likely would be "do not bomb without confirmation of targets of military nature" vs "do not bomb, even if it's crawling with Russians!" sort of ROE.  In a full spectrum sort of conflict there's a much higher expectation of damage, and a much higher value on destruction of enemy forces.
 
Also worth noting that NATO would be in the Ukraine at the permission of the Ukrainian government, and likely with no small amount of popular support from ethnic Ukrainians (as the separatist movement is top to bottom ethnic Russian outside of the actual Russian passport holders within).  People will be upset the local church did not survive the fight, but they will be happier they're no longer about to become part of the people's republic of Russiastan or whatever it calls itself these days.  This underwrites a much more aggressive military targeting behavior.  

If you had to rank the world's 10 most capable airforces, 1-4 or so would simply be the USAF, 5 would be the USN, then maybe France and the UK, followed by the USMC, then maybe Russia and then some of the lesser NATO countries.
 
There's simply no reasonable challenge to the US military's air control abilities.  Combined with IADS, and hostile fighters there's a chance to keep the various US aviation forces out of your backyard, but the possibility of getting a flight of SU-25s to the target is right up there with snowballs in sulfur lakes survival odds.  
 
 
This.  From my end of things I tend to exclude red aviation, or strongly limit it because I think it's doubtful it'll get on station, or if Russia surges to attain situational air parity, it's going to be for targets more interesting than a tank company or two.  Conversely the USAF in a three month sort of war against a near peer threat is going to focus on air superiority, SEAD, and what high value targets it can hit without going into Russia, before shuffling some of those strike assets to CAS.  So the June fighting would see almost no CAS, July a fighter or two here or there, before August being CAS being fairly common.  

It's really something I think the SOF community will get the most mileage out of.  While drones are handy, they also have a pretty tell tale audio signature (think, do the Tribal regions in Pakistan get much air traffic?).  It's the sort of thing that a ground observer could call within a certain window, and get the same results with no warning except for the missile's terminal phase.  It's too expensive for massed battlefield use, and the reaction time is well suited to "Shiek Muhammed and Abu Abdul Mutleb are sitting down for tea and terrorism" sort of strikes, but less so "Three tanks in the open fire for effect!"
 
If they ever do include MRLS type weapons into the game, ATACMS would be interesting purely because it has been employed in a more conventional artillery role (largely because of COIN mind you), but offers the same sort of profile that a tactical Tomahawk would.  

As pointed out already:
 
1. The Stryker and LAV share a common ancestor in the form of the Mowag Piranha.  Both vehicles are built off of versions of that vehicles as license built by General Dynamics Land Division (Canada).
 
2. They are different generations however.  The USMC vehicles belong to the LAV-I generation of platforms, which is smaller and more lightly armored, while the Stryker is based on the LAV III which is better protected, but also much larger and loses the amphibious capabilities of earlier generations.
 
3. There are LAV III variants that mount the 25 MM, however when the Army was designing the Stryker units it was seeking firstly a vehicle that could mount an entire rifle squad in each vehicle without crossloading.  This would not be possible in the 25 MM armed Stryker models.  Further for fire support, the 105 MM equipped Mobile Gun System Stryker was to be allocated at a rate of three per rifle company.  In summery, by the Army's first go, the LAV III with autocannon wasn't enough transport, or gun to fill either of the potential roles.
 
4.  The postscript however is that the Mobile Gun System has proven deeply unpopular and has not lived up to advertising.  It's either too much gun for COIN, or not enough firepower and armor for full spectrum operations.  The number of MGSes has been reduced to just three per Battalion, and there's talk of procuring autocannon armed Strykers to replace the MGS at the Company level (either the cheap fix of 25 MM, or a larger turret mounting a 40 MM gun).

If you had to rank the world's 10 most capable airforces, 1-4 or so would simply be the USAF, 5 would be the USN, then maybe France and the UK, followed by the USMC, then maybe Russia and then some of the lesser NATO countries.
 
There's simply no reasonable challenge to the US military's air control abilities.  Combined with IADS, and hostile fighters there's a chance to keep the various US aviation forces out of your backyard, but the possibility of getting a flight of SU-25s to the target is right up there with snowballs in sulfur lakes survival odds.  
 
 
This.  From my end of things I tend to exclude red aviation, or strongly limit it because I think it's doubtful it'll get on station, or if Russia surges to attain situational air parity, it's going to be for targets more interesting than a tank company or two.  Conversely the USAF in a three month sort of war against a near peer threat is going to focus on air superiority, SEAD, and what high value targets it can hit without going into Russia, before shuffling some of those strike assets to CAS.  So the June fighting would see almost no CAS, July a fighter or two here or there, before August being CAS being fairly common.  

Russian optics, and computing are all largely derivative of western designs, or if entirely Russian origin tend to be significantly less capable compared to peer systems.  There's not much professional dispute of this reality.  
 
Re: Fire Control Systems
 
Fire control systems are not optics.  There's been fire control systems as long as there's been tanks.  If we're going to argue how long a country has been building tanks equals ensured capability, we are all rightly and truly screwed because the Brits and the French have been doing it for almost a 100 years.  
 
The key failing of Russian FCS type systems is largely in the electronics/computing.  Western tanks could take advantage of the various advances in computing, miniaturization, and somesuch to make FCSes that were far more robust, smaller, and more capable in terms of data input (see adjusting crosswind, gun tube temperature, and similar variables on Russian vs US tanks).  To this end the Russian inferiority in this sort of system makes however long the Russians have been building FCSes irrelevant, they simply are not as modern in key areas.
 
Additionally passive/active night vision is vastly inferior in terms of spotting targets at range.  It's why the US has moved to composite thermal-night vision type optics for infantry, conventional night vision is better for something like walking through a building at night, while thermal is much better at finding targets at range, which is to say thermals are the relevant optics for tanks vs other vision enhancement tools.
 
Nor am I underestimating it.  It's got reasonable anti-armor capabilities, good surviability compared to peer tanks, and the only real threats it faces are high tier NATO equipment like the M1, Leo 2, Challenger, or the most advanced ATGMs available.  It just isn't on the same level as much more advanced, much more expensive tanks.
 
Only it's the 120 MM gun that is so terrible that it represents the overwhelming majority of NATO tank cannons these days.  It's pretty handy.  Russian optics on the other hand represent the step up from things offered for sale to the police department, but don't compare to more modern systems.
 
This is certainly a factor. However the raw price is deceptive.  Many countries recieve either sharp discounts or have some sort of weirdo-trade deal with the vehicles.  The Australasian M1A1s came at a pretty sharp discount in exchange for other things (like increased basing rights for US troops, commitment to more joint training, several pallets of Fosters etc)
 
I seem to recall the Finnish F-18 deal involved a US agreement to buy some amount of reindeer meat.  You only really get into cash for tanks with the Russians.
 
This is not intended as an offense mind you.  Think of it more like, the only folks who really aren't able to use diplomacy to get discount tanks, are the sorts that could not possibly afford M1s or Challengers at sticker price.
 
 
The increasing complexity of military equipment almost demands you have a very sophisticated logistics and maintenance unit.  This is something professional armies are better able to leverage, as you retain a much higher number of these mechanics, and let me tell you, someone who's been fixing M1s/M2s for the last decade or so is a sight to behold (I had one diagnose an engine fault over the radio based on a crewman's description of the noise it was making).
 
You're almost safer with conscript/inexperienced tankers vs conscript/inexperienced maintainers.  
 
It also has a lot to do with the changing priorities of the west.  When the M1, Leo 2, and Challengers were all built, there was a distinct possibility of a large continental war in Europe within a few months of downward spiral relations.  The Dutch could reasonably expect to be up to their eyebrows in communists, and having tanks was a reasonable choice.  
 
Now?  It's debatable but the immediacy of the threat is gone, which makes it easier for politicians to make military cuts to make up for budget shortfalls/buy off the electorate with benefits.  
 
As the case is however, the M1, Leo 2, Challenger 2 all are still seeing current updates with a good chance that their respective services will be able to continue to upgrade them into the 2020's at the least.

The reason the Armata is a big deal is the potential of the T-72/90 series was more or less tapped out in the early 2000s.  The ability to upgrade them much further is limited (see the T-72B3's ambivilent reception, the T-90AM's still lagging pretty far behind expectations).  Of course I'm still doubtful we'll see an Armata on time and in service.  It's a heck of thing to be in the hands of Russian soldiers in 2016, and common service by 2017 with literally no idea of what it even looks like.  
 
I do have to wonder if it'll be like the various top shelf planes and rifles from the 90's, and we'll see two or three Armata battalions with the remainder operating the T-90/T-72 models. Seems more reasonable and the two tier thing is nothing new to the Russians.

I'm not sure!  Usually if it's not listed or available it's either OPSEC or a system not offered for sale elsewhere.  I try not to share anything I can't find in less than five minutes on google as then I assume it's not something I should default to sharing.  Either way the Thales system would be a pretty solid system for 1999, or if you're building tanks on a budget.  
 
 
This is deceptive.  The price of building something in America, by Americans, to American safety/union workplace standards etc would mean that if we built T-90s in the US, they would be much more expensive than the Russian T-90.  It's also worth comparing the ability to buy more than the actual price-point.  And to that end American has been able to afford several times as many M1A2s than Russia has been able to produce T-90s.
 
 
Armored vehicles all by their own nature of complexity tend to be fairly hard to maintain.  It's worth noting however the M1 is not especially hard to maintain, and the American system of maintenance has always allocated repair personnel to lower echelons (while still maintaining well fitted out rear repair areas).   More details:
 
a. The gas turbine engine while more fuel thirsty than most engines also has significantly less moving parts, and is actually fairly insensitive to lower quality fuels (basically if it'll burn and isn't too full of debris, the tank will run on it).  
 
b. The Abrams is very "plug and play" anything that cannot be readily fixed in the field can be pulled out as a module and replaced by field maintenance staff.  So while there's dedicated electronics repair staff, the tank doesn't have to actually go to them, and the matter of replacing even fairly complex systems if the part is available (and the amount of "bench stock" repairs in a war-footing unit is crazy) is capable of being accomplished by Company level personnel.
 
c. Each armored/mech infantry/armored cavalry type unit has a company level maintenance team of trained mechanics.  A tank has to be exceedingly broken before it gets sent to the rear
 
This question also ties back into the question of different capabilities.  The American supply system is amazingly robust, and efficient.  If there's one thing you can say about Americans, it's having more than enough fuel and supplies on hand is the norm by far.  US tank design can be more supply intensive for more performance because the US military can support supply intensive.  Historically the Russians have suffered in logistics, and their tanks are adjusted accordingly to be lower performing, but less supply intensive.
 
So to really tie these two points together, it's not best to compare economics one for one, but more of how well the system is adapted to the country it serves.
 
To that end the T-90 has proven expensive, and in many ways not enough of a tank for the money invested (see the focus on the T-72B3s, Armata programs over non-export T-90 upgrades). The US is quite happy with the M1 series.
 
 
Depends on the area of operations.  1 KM isn't a bad estimate in Europe.  If you're talking about someplace like, Korea then even shorter ranges may become the norm.  
 
 
You pick up the heat signature of whatever dust is kicked up. however thermal imaging still "sees" through dust and the like much better than the naked eye, you need a lot denser cloud of obscurantion before it effects the thermal image.  

Well, worth noting basically their charts (which are part of an advertisement mind you) are telling you that you'll have the ability to tell a T-90 from a M1 at 2 KM using the narrow field of view.  This is well short of the Abrams by a significant margin.  
 
 
 
This is a reasonable assumption.  Russian optics in general have never been well regarded, and if you look at after market upgrades for Russian systems, you'll find some of the most common upgrades are for the optics package.  To clarify, the CATHERINE-FC provided to the Russians is an upgrade for Russians, but it's a poorer version of a commercially available French optic.  
 
 
Re: FCS
 
Russia has a long time of developing FCSes, but historically they've lagged with the widening gap in both computing power, and historically poor integration (as an example I believe it's only recently that the FCS automatically accepted LRF returns, and until the mid-90's still required operator input of range).

Re: driver spotting

When I was a driver, gunnery was pretty boring. The only fun I got to have was hauling ass back to the ready line after we were done. So I got way into helping spot. Especially when the TC was busting .50. I don't know how table 8 s done now, but in my day the most difficult was Bravo 3 Swing, the dreaded widowmaker. PC, rpg team and troops with a very short time hack. There was a "fire, fire heat and adjust. Caliber fifty!" Command in it. If the TC did not drill the rpg team in the frst burst, you lose that one. Was happy to help.
 
I hate myself for never thinking to do this.
 

 
Very good point. Crew safety is very important. If you fire the main gun when the loader is in the way, he is at least crippled for life, at best. I agree that first round fired he would be out of the way. However, just for the record, I would never fire the main gun without a loud and clear UP!

I trained my guys to holler it at the very top of their lungs. Had a younger kid once who was still coming into his voice. Fun times. Lol

Thanks for the fun chats. I could talk tanks all day. Miss it a lot.

I'm not sure!  Usually if it's not listed or available it's either OPSEC or a system not offered for sale elsewhere.  I try not to share anything I can't find in less than five minutes on google as then I assume it's not something I should default to sharing.  Either way the Thales system would be a pretty solid system for 1999, or if you're building tanks on a budget.  
 
 
This is deceptive.  The price of building something in America, by Americans, to American safety/union workplace standards etc would mean that if we built T-90s in the US, they would be much more expensive than the Russian T-90.  It's also worth comparing the ability to buy more than the actual price-point.  And to that end American has been able to afford several times as many M1A2s than Russia has been able to produce T-90s.
 
 
Armored vehicles all by their own nature of complexity tend to be fairly hard to maintain.  It's worth noting however the M1 is not especially hard to maintain, and the American system of maintenance has always allocated repair personnel to lower echelons (while still maintaining well fitted out rear repair areas).   More details:
 
a. The gas turbine engine while more fuel thirsty than most engines also has significantly less moving parts, and is actually fairly insensitive to lower quality fuels (basically if it'll burn and isn't too full of debris, the tank will run on it).  
 
b. The Abrams is very "plug and play" anything that cannot be readily fixed in the field can be pulled out as a module and replaced by field maintenance staff.  So while there's dedicated electronics repair staff, the tank doesn't have to actually go to them, and the matter of replacing even fairly complex systems if the part is available (and the amount of "bench stock" repairs in a war-footing unit is crazy) is capable of being accomplished by Company level personnel.
 
c. Each armored/mech infantry/armored cavalry type unit has a company level maintenance team of trained mechanics.  A tank has to be exceedingly broken before it gets sent to the rear
 
This question also ties back into the question of different capabilities.  The American supply system is amazingly robust, and efficient.  If there's one thing you can say about Americans, it's having more than enough fuel and supplies on hand is the norm by far.  US tank design can be more supply intensive for more performance because the US military can support supply intensive.  Historically the Russians have suffered in logistics, and their tanks are adjusted accordingly to be lower performing, but less supply intensive.
 
So to really tie these two points together, it's not best to compare economics one for one, but more of how well the system is adapted to the country it serves.
 
To that end the T-90 has proven expensive, and in many ways not enough of a tank for the money invested (see the focus on the T-72B3s, Armata programs over non-export T-90 upgrades). The US is quite happy with the M1 series.
 
 
Depends on the area of operations.  1 KM isn't a bad estimate in Europe.  If you're talking about someplace like, Korea then even shorter ranges may become the norm.  
 
 
You pick up the heat signature of whatever dust is kicked up. however thermal imaging still "sees" through dust and the like much better than the naked eye, you need a lot denser cloud of obscurantion before it effects the thermal image.  

I wasn't even sure they came back after empty/landed.  IRL, it's a rapid turnaround on helicopters because they might be doing a touch and go at a FARP something within artillery range of the front line.  Fixed wing, they're likely flying all the way back to base and it'll  be a hot minute before they get turned around (like even a quick turnaround from my understanding might be 20-30 minutes if there's a spare pilot+flight time)
 
 
From my limited experience, the plane will still use missiles on the tanks, bombs on not tanks. 
 
 
If you're going into a quick battle, they're under the fortifications menu.  If you're going into someone's scenario, look for defensive position icons, the TRP will be a little red circle with an X in it.  Place them where the enemy is expected, and within a certain distance of the TRP artillery will be super-quick.
 
 
Artillery is useful in suppressing suspected MANPADs positions, as they're not really helpful in cover.  That said, I feel like the air defense should result in much less kills, and more aborted target runs.  In practice most SAM/AAA systems make the approach too dangerous to complete, vs simply murdering anything with wings within LOS.  

Pretty much.  at ranges like that, the first one to spot is going to be the one to walk away from it.  One of the things that's tricky about CMBS is it's hard to know who's looking at what/where and how much sensor quality is degrading spotting
 
 
Courtesy of my shelf of "I was once cool" (beer is provided for scale)
 

 
That's what's left of a training sabot after being shot through something in the front center.  It's not huge, but it's going to leave a mark on pretty much anything it touches (or picture something that sized going something like a few thousand meters a second touching anything mechanical).  

Now get an overhead drawing of anything that's not a tank, and start drawing straight lines through it from point of penetration to point of exit.  Feel free to include non-military targets such as Yugos, large bears, SUVs or other things you might really not be a fan of.
 
So in following those lines, try to find routes that:
 
a. Do not do major and irreparable damage to the vehicle given something sabot sized passing through
 
b. Lack anything that might might get excited by a sabot type round passing through it.
 
It's pretty hard.  On most IFVs you wind up intersecting the turret somehow which will always react poorly to a sabot sized chunk of metal going through it.  On many IFVs, any hit on the frontal slope is going to pass through the engine (if not the engine itself, then required engine support equipment.  A rear-flank shot might just kill most of the carried crew, but many IFVs store ammunition or have fuel cells in the rear of the vehicle, which will also react poorly to a sabot strike. 
 
The only vehicles that I feel legitimately might drive away from a sabot hit without being some manner of "kill" are trucks, simply because there's so much "not important' space that a round would just zip through.  

Panzer Crewman is pretty awesome too.  In terms of the A1 vs A2, depends on your model, but the decrease in engagement times results from the fact you've basically got two sets of GPS (Gunner's Primary Sights) in action with the CITV running.  Extra bonus at least in gunnery is the driver's thermal optics mean he can spot at least the obvious frontal targets (although if your driver is a lowspeed it's not much help).
 
I snagged the penetrator because some of my Platoon Sergeants were going to go dunnage hunting on range maintenance day, and they asked if they could borrow the grill off of my HMMWV's fan to use as a sift.  I told them they could, but jokingly "to bring me back something pretty"
 
So yeah they brought back a full set of sabot petals, the penetrator, the "cup" from a canister round and about a half dozen pellets.  Good guys.  
 
Re: Battlesight 
 
Battlesight for sabot is 1200 meters.  Think HEAT is 850?  Basically it's the max range at which no range input is required for the round to strike the target.  Lead is also pretty minimal at that range.  The 600 meters or so is, as someone pointed out a knife fight in a telephone booth.  
 
Re: Fire command
 
 
This too.  Technically you're always supposed to get an "up" from the loader, which lets you know he's clear of the gun and all safeties are off.  Conversely if it's the first round of the engagement and you're leaving cover, it's likely the loader is clear anyway.  

Pretty much.  at ranges like that, the first one to spot is going to be the one to walk away from it.  One of the things that's tricky about CMBS is it's hard to know who's looking at what/where and how much sensor quality is degrading spotting
 
 
Courtesy of my shelf of "I was once cool" (beer is provided for scale)
 

 
That's what's left of a training sabot after being shot through something in the front center.  It's not huge, but it's going to leave a mark on pretty much anything it touches (or picture something that sized going something like a few thousand meters a second touching anything mechanical).  

Now get an overhead drawing of anything that's not a tank, and start drawing straight lines through it from point of penetration to point of exit.  Feel free to include non-military targets such as Yugos, large bears, SUVs or other things you might really not be a fan of.
 
So in following those lines, try to find routes that:
 
a. Do not do major and irreparable damage to the vehicle given something sabot sized passing through
 
b. Lack anything that might might get excited by a sabot type round passing through it.
 
It's pretty hard.  On most IFVs you wind up intersecting the turret somehow which will always react poorly to a sabot sized chunk of metal going through it.  On many IFVs, any hit on the frontal slope is going to pass through the engine (if not the engine itself, then required engine support equipment.  A rear-flank shot might just kill most of the carried crew, but many IFVs store ammunition or have fuel cells in the rear of the vehicle, which will also react poorly to a sabot strike. 
 
The only vehicles that I feel legitimately might drive away from a sabot hit without being some manner of "kill" are trucks, simply because there's so much "not important' space that a round would just zip through.  

Pretty much.  at ranges like that, the first one to spot is going to be the one to walk away from it.  One of the things that's tricky about CMBS is it's hard to know who's looking at what/where and how much sensor quality is degrading spotting
 
 
Courtesy of my shelf of "I was once cool" (beer is provided for scale)
 

 
That's what's left of a training sabot after being shot through something in the front center.  It's not huge, but it's going to leave a mark on pretty much anything it touches (or picture something that sized going something like a few thousand meters a second touching anything mechanical).  

Now get an overhead drawing of anything that's not a tank, and start drawing straight lines through it from point of penetration to point of exit.  Feel free to include non-military targets such as Yugos, large bears, SUVs or other things you might really not be a fan of.
 
So in following those lines, try to find routes that:
 
a. Do not do major and irreparable damage to the vehicle given something sabot sized passing through
 
b. Lack anything that might might get excited by a sabot type round passing through it.
 
It's pretty hard.  On most IFVs you wind up intersecting the turret somehow which will always react poorly to a sabot sized chunk of metal going through it.  On many IFVs, any hit on the frontal slope is going to pass through the engine (if not the engine itself, then required engine support equipment.  A rear-flank shot might just kill most of the carried crew, but many IFVs store ammunition or have fuel cells in the rear of the vehicle, which will also react poorly to a sabot strike. 
 
The only vehicles that I feel legitimately might drive away from a sabot hit without being some manner of "kill" are trucks, simply because there's so much "not important' space that a round would just zip through.  

I am speaking as a military professional, former Cavalry Platoon Leader, Troop XO, Battalion and Squadron Planner, and Tank Company Commander when I say troops appearing through arkane majicks on your flank is not right.  
 
The "board" artificially conceals the nature of terrain and battlefield to the player.  If we consider the edges of the map to be something like say, Company or Battalion boundaries, I'll still have maps and graphics of those locations.  I'll also have the greater situational awareness coming off of the Battalion/Brigade Net in terms of what's happening around the battlefield.  Further I'll have an idea of what the higher mission is and what's going on to my flanks, and very likely someone else (even if I was the flank company, there's good to high odds the Battalion or Brigade scouts are screening us) will have either let me know to cover them (something closer to "and X Company (your company) represents the farthest left unit" vs "YOU ARE OUR FLANK CPT TIMMY IT ALL DEPENDS ON YOU!!!").  Further if I was the farthest flanking unit I'd sit down and look at the AO outside of my boundaries to see just what might influence my battlespace from the outside.
 
This is where scenario design becomes super important.  Bad scenarios just hit you on the flank and pull a Lucas in claiming I need to secure every thing ever because every direction could possibly hide an enemy tank company.  Good scenerios instead sit down and give you the complex terrain to look at and have to plan for. You want the player to think "those woods on my right look like they might hide enemy forces, or allow infantry to infiltrate into my AO without me seeing it.  I'm going to leave a section of 3rd PLT to ovewatch it", rather than in an open field suddenly there's a dozen BMPs.
 
Another even more interesting one would be to give you information to make reasonable choices in the briefing.  Example:  "Enemy reserves are located on OBJ Thresher to your east, and are expected to be committed once our main effort is identified.  S2 estimates they may use RTE Gold or RTE Black, located at A1 and A2 on your map, and have a response time of approximately 20 minutes" 
 
Or just leaving roads coming onto the map from the flanks, and making enemy forces appear from there, it's likely the enemy reserves arrives suddenly on a road.  It's doubtful they rapidly appear from rough or wooded terrain (if mounted).  
 
These are all reasonable ways for the wargamer to be forced to make choices concerning their flank security.  The scenario designer should view the player as a training audience, who should be rewarded for reasonable responses to stimuli.  Surprise flanks simply frustrate the player, and instead of encouraging him to make smart choices based on good observations and sound tactics, instead force him to play in the almost comical state in which you either accept losing a scenario and having to replay it because 3/101st Shock Tank Guards Battalion emerged from a tunnel network in an otherwise empty field, or expending 50-60% of your overall forces covering fields that are actually occupied just out of sight by your sister units, or something else requiring no overwatch.    
 
The player has to know what's on their flanks to make interesting and tactical choices about those flanks.  Tank Companies don't drive across the battlefield in big circles, guns pointed in 360 degrees in case the enemy appears FROM ANYWHERE.  It's imperative the scenario designer give the player some sort of situational awareness to let them play realistically.
 
And as a further textual wandering, enemy forces in games should have sort of...like a story to go with them.  They need a beginning.  How did they get to the battlefield, why they are there, what they hope to do.  Then a middle, what their plan is for the battlefield.  And then an end(s), what they hope to do if they're successful, or unsuccessful. 
 
Each one of these needs to make sense, and should reflect the same amount of knowledge as the player team has about the enemy.  The designer knows the blue player is going to enter from the NW corner of this open field.  Why would the red team know the exact spawn location of the blue player though? 
 
I'd suggest flawed, but realistic doctrinally sound enemy deployments are more interesting than playing against some enemy force led by insidious commanders with ESP who know all the faults and locations of the player forces.  

3-90.1 "Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team" is helpful too.  

That's entirely unfair.  You're forgetting burying your 1990's opposition in literal waves of the finest 1960's equipment, and shooting Corps level artillery at bushes that might be full of candy.

They did worse than that once.  They took the first paragraph of an article from Janes that amounted to "Soviet hardware was more lethal than we'd though, and 105 MM and early 80's ATGMs would have struggled against T-72s" and then glued it onto erotic fanfiction level "Everything NATO has is unable to damage Russian tanks" (including a "US Army Spokesman" who admitted total impotence in the face of Russian armor).  
 
It was pretty hilarious.
 
 
This is true, except for facts relating to the M113 GAVIN Airborne War Winner Tactical A+ warfighter battlebox.