Bydax

Yeah, we've already talked about it briefly. Honestly, previous plan for field trials and feedback/correction cycle to take 3-4 years (2016-2019/2020) was kinda too much IMO. Especially knowing how fast electronics age in our time. New field trials time-frame is "at least a year", which should still be enough. Rushing stuff due to being ordered to would indeed be catastrophic, however, I hope they understand that. Good thing is that most of the stuff is modular and common, like IFV turrets or chassis. Operating T-15, Kurg-25 IFV and Boomerang weapons should be identical, just as operating Kurg IFV or APC chassis, thus there'd be a lot of testing overlap, which is a good thing.
 
T-14s/T-15s being moved somewhere by rail:
 
http://otvaga2004.mybb.ru/viewtopic.php?id=1164&p=10#p562676

Something like this for RA:
 
(Ikalugin + myself)
 
From the VDV:
*Not counted -
-Training
-Education
-Post stations.
-RHBZ
-Organic formations within Brigade/Division/Regiment ORBAT without independent registration. Example: Force recon company within 810th Naval Infantry BDe.
 
- 7th grds. Air Assault Div.
>162nd ind. Recon Comp.
>108th Air Assault Reg.
>247th Air Assault Reg.
>1141st Artillery Reg.
>3rd SAM Reg.
>743rd ind. Comm. Bat.
>629th ind. Engineer Bat.
>1681th ind. Logistics Bat.
>32nd ind. Airlifted Medical Unit
>6th ind. Maintenance Bat.
- 76th grds. Air Assault Div.
>175th ind. Recon Comp.
>104th Air Assault Reg.
>234th Air Assault Reg.
>1140th Artillery Reg.
>4th SAM Reg.
>728th ind. Comm. Bat.
>656th ind. Engineer Bat.
>1682nd ind. Logistics Bat.
>3996th Airlifted Field hospital
>7th ind. Maintenance Bat.
 
- 98th Airborne Div.
>215th ind. Recon Comp.
>217th Air Deployed Reg.
>331st Air Deployed Reg.
>1065th Artillery Reg.
>5th SAM Reg.
>647 ind. Comm. Bat.
>661 ind. Engineer Bat.
>1683rd ind. Logistics Bat.
>5th ind. Maintenance Bat.
>36th ind. Airlifted Medical Unit
- 106th Airborne Div.
>173rd ind. Recon Comp.
>51st Air Deployed Reg.
>331st Air Deployed Reg.
>1182th Artillery Reg.
>1st SAM Reg.
>731st ind. Comm. Bat.
>388th ind. Engineer Bat.
>1060th ind. Logistics Bat.
>43rd ind. Maintenance Bat.
>39th ind. Airlifted Medical Unit
- 31st Air Assault ind. BDe.
>XXX ind. Recom Comp. (to be included in 2015)
>54th ind. Air Assault Bat.
>91st ind. Air Assault Bat.
>116th ind. Air Assault Bat.
>99th ind. Artillery Bat.
>38th ind. Comm Bat.
- 83rd Air Assault ind. BDe. (Special case, Far east deployment)
>XXX ind Recom Comp. (to be included in 2015)
>111th ind. Tank Bat.
>593rd ind. Air Assault Bat.
>635th ind. Air Assault Bat.
>654th ind. Air Assault Bat.
- 45th Special Purpose BDe. (Currently 45th independent Special purpose Regiment)
>904th ind. Special purpose Bat. (tentative)
>218th ind. Special purpose Bat. (tentative)
 
From the Ground Forces, note that VDV forces are often subordinate to the MDs, but I did not double count those:
---Western MD force, based on the 20th Army (note the forces in the North-West direction were not affected):
- 18th ind. sp. Mortar div (2S4).
- 19th ind. sp. Artillery div (2S7).
- 4th grds. Tnk Div.
- 2nd grds. Mrr. Div.
- 6th ind. Tnk BDe.
- 9th ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 288th Artillery BDe.
- 112nd Missile BDe.
- 448th Missile BDe.
- 53rd SAM BDe.
- 49th SAM BDe.
---Southern MD force, based on the MD troops minus the forces deployed abroad:
- 100th Recon BDe.
- 439th Roc. Artillery BDe.
- 33rd ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 34th ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 205th ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 8th ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 17th ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 18th ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 19th ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 20th ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 136th ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 1st Missile BDe.
- 291st Artillery BDe.
- 943rd Roc. Artillery Reg.
- 573rd Recon Artillery div.
- 67th SAM BDe.
- 10th Special Forces BDe.
- 22nd Special Forces BDe.
- 346 Special Forces BDe.
--- Central MD force, based around 2nd Army:
- 21st ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 15th ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 23rd ind. Mrr. BDe.
- 92nd Missile BDe.
- 385th Artillery BDe.
- 581st Recon Artillery div.
- 950th Roc. Artillery Reg.
- 297th SAM BDe.
- 3rd Special Forces BDe.
Black Sea Fleet, I don’t count the various units that would be used up for the immediate security of the peninsular (such as coastal defense units or the various independent battalions), note that the Black Sea Fleet is within the Southern MD, but I did not double count anything:
 
- 810th Naval Infantry BDe.
>Force Recon Company
>557th ind. Naval Infantry Bat.
>501st ind. Naval Infantry Bat.
>542nd ind. Naval Assault Bat.
>546th ind. Artillery Bat.
>547th ind. SAM Bat.
>160th ind. Engineer Bat.
>538th ind. Logistics Bat.
 
-382nd ind. Naval Infantry Bat.
 
Air Forces, note I don’t count here the Naval Aviation assets, but those would be noted later, I also do not include off theatre SAM units:
--- From 1st Air Defense and Air Force command, note I did not touch a lot of assets that would provide defensive capability in the north-west:
- 455th Mixed Reg.
- 14th Fighter Reg.
- 790th Fighter Reg.
- 379th Army Aviation Base.
- 549th Army Aviation Base.
- 15th Army Aviation BDe.
--- From the 4th Air Defense and Air Force command:
- 7th Air Defense BDe.
- 31st Fighter Reg.
- 3rd Mixed Reg.
- 960th Attack Reg.
- 368th Attack Reg.
- 559th Bomber Reg.
- 2nd ind. Recon sq.
- 393rd Army Aviation Base.
- 546th Army Aviation Base.
- 387th Army Aviation Base.
--- From the 2nd Air Defense and Air Force command:
- 6980th Air Force Base.
--- Strategic Aviation:
- 6950th base.
- 6952nd base.

Since the WW3-type scenario that ultimately leads to total obliteration of at least one participating side is now a rather remote prospect, Russian Armed Forces no longer have to be capable of winning a drawn-out total war against NATO, but to present credible threat of doing enough damage to make the option of initiating any kind of military action against Russia politically impossible for Western leaders, or highly impractical for the Chinese ones. Which is why, among other things, the conventional forces have to increase their capabilities to the maximum achievable technological level as long as the potential enemies to be deterred are doing the same. This is one side of the issue. On the other hand, actual possibility of participating in local and regional conflicts calls for steps to reduce political, psychological and socioeconomic costs of such involvement, which is answered, among many other things, by increased protection and survivability levels of the new generation of vehicles.

Combined, these considerations make introduction of the new platforms a worthwhile effort, however long and arduous it will prove to be.

The dog barking at a caravan analogy is getting stronger. In any case, they've pretty much have shown us everything except the various weapon modules.
 
One thing that I want to see is what MG will be mounted on Armata as com. gun. I bet it will be 12.7. 

Two in one day! 
 
I prepped and added my CMSF American book.
 
As you may have seen on this and other forums I am releasing my CM books for free.
 
This one is for the American forces. It is 63 pages detailing the equipment, formations, and support for the American forces of CMSF, including all modules (inc Marines).
 
Click the link in my sig. It is my hobby website, not a storefront.
 
More to follow... probably. I have books like this for just about every country in just about every CM game.... plus tons more.
 
Enjoy!
Mike

As you may have seen on this and other forums I am releasing my CM books for free.
 
This one is for the Syrian forces. It is pretty large, at 77 pages detailing the equipment, formations, and support for the Syrian forces of CMSF.
 
Click the link in my sig. It is my hobby website, not a storefront.
 
More to follow... probably. I have books like this for just about every country in just about every CM game.... plus tons more.
 
Enjoy!
Mike

Nicely done good sir! You have managed to summarise every single streotype and "thinking point" that is fed to us about Russia. I am a little dissapointed not to see any mention of Polonium or homophobia; but otherwise - you got it down to the T! Bravo!!

Would it help if I make the photos from parade myself?
 
There are already open 3d modeling efforts going on using availiable open source data.
 
If we are talking about combat capabilities - the gun is fairly well known (information about the round length, muzle energy is fairly availiable), what else? Mobility (general mass category and geometrical size, as well as engine power are known)? Protection (a tricky part, though this would be fairly obvious by the time parade comes)?

Kaburke61, this would be my last post to you until you care invest some time and brainpower to show me your basic understanding of the subject matter. I have already spent more than enough time on this board trying to show "the flip side of the coin" to those members that actually care to hear it and to process it as part of their analysis. I absolutely would not waste a spare second of my time trying to build out an argument to someone who does not care to show any knowledge nor appreciation of what is being discussed here. How about you show me some solid facts about "Putin-bots" spewing their propaganda on this board; and maybe then I will consider engaging you in a more meaningful conversation. Till then - "peaches and luv!" (as they say down here).

Do not give up on the flying tank just yet.
 
Yes, a few years ago it seemed that Defense Ministry under Serdyukov has finally gotten the upper hand over General Staff and Chief Auto-Armored Forces Directorate in its long struggle to kill T-80 in the name of standardization and fuel economy. All T-80s were slated to be put in reserve by 2015. However, the dwarves dug too greedily the replacement process was organized too hastily, and several units had T-80BVs replaced not with T-72B3s, but with regular old T-72Bs - a noticeable downgrade in terms of fire accuracy, mobility and serviceability. This resulted in a wave of formal and informal complaints from the troops. When Serdyukov was replaced by Shoigu, who is much more restrained and catious in his approaches, and who seemingly holds more respect for the soldiers' opinion, the process of T-80 replacement seemed to slow down or be halted altogether.
 
One indication is a recent interview with the deputy commander of the 4th guards Kantemirovskaya tank division, where he indicates that they are actively rearming with "T-80E" (likely a misspelling of T-80U-E1: surplus T-80UD turret gets a modified FCS with 2nd gen. "Plisa" gunner TI sight and is dropped into T-80BV hull with a modernized glacis (improved composite filaments structure + "Kontakt-5") and modified GTD-1250 gas turbine engine (turbochargeable to 1400-1500 hp)). Also, it seems (could not find official confirmations, but some people connected with tank repair plants were confirming it on several military forums) that 600 T-80BVs of the Eastern military district are slated for technical status repair (i.e. anything not functioning up to specifications will be repaired, but no complete overhaul) and minor modernization (so far the digital communications suite and improved engine were mentioned) - apparently this modification is called T-80BA.
 
My guess from all this is that MOD ultimately decided not to rush things, and replace T-80BV/BA only with superior performance T-72B3. As the T-72B service fleet upgrade is about halfway through, it should take about 2-3 years for production capacity for T-80 replacement to be available. As for the more advanced T-80U-E1 and T-80UA (T-80U with improved FCS with 2 gen. gunner TI sight (likely also "Plisa") and other upgrades), which are similar or superior to T-72B3, perhaps they would be left in service all the way until replacement by "Armata"-based vehicle.
 
The winds can change again, though, so we shall see. This and next year's exercises should prove quite informative.

Because they have no army, only volunteers consistently fight. The conscription efficiency was about 15%. Officers cadre is saturated with Russians and Russian sympathizers - neither HQ nor soldiers trust them. HQ itself is infiltrated. There are 8 mln ethnic Russians  in Ukraine, over 4 mln still living outside of Crimea or combat zone. There are millions of Ukrainians  who voted for Yanukovitch (elected according to all democratic standards) who all now are devoid of any democratic political representation (their parties/representatives declared illegal). Ukraine is far from being homogeneous, even not considering the frontline.
 
 
I disagree. With superior equippement, morale and command they can afford to limit loses and still meet political and military goals.
 
 
 
No. Further conscription attempts will put the country dangerously close to another rebellion, at least at some areas. People in Donbass enlist for separatist army willingly (and to be honest this is often the only way they can feed their families) and it is suspected that some oligarchs pay both sides for immunity. And there is always endless mecrcenary source in Russia.
 
 
 
Contrary. The inevitable fall of Debaltseve was an obvious fact to all sides of the agreement and bears no impact on its viability. And I think cease -fire is still probable. In long term there is only one side interested in prolonged war: USA - as the conflict makes whole Europe less competitive.
 
And there is Biden's son 'helping' big Ukrainian gas company....yeah
 
There is even a joke:
Q: "How long will USA fight Russia in Ukraine?" 
A: "to the last Ukrainian volunteer standing"

Hmm I am definitely not a Putin fan, but I don't see why it is so hard to admit it when the Ukrainians suffer a blow.
I mean you can have sympathies for the Ukrainians without letting it get in the way of an objective military assesment.
 
Basically when the separatists fail to take Debaltseve, they are useless and incompetent and weak.
When they seize the town, they are equally as hopeless and it somehow becomes a tour de force achieved by the Ukrainian military.
 
I don't know I am just thinking you maybe rate one side a bit too highly as far as military capabilities are concerned and the other side too poorly.

Another progress report:
 


 
Another question, tactical markings, yay or nay?
 
Example: http://i.piccy.info/i9/b8c123787bcaa4f484acfffc80f947e5/1421705561/24359/857457/6.jpg

Steve,

The conflict was initiated by the West, via sponsoring a take over in power by western/central areas of Ukraine, which could not out vote the eastern/southern areas of Ukraine. Same thing happened in 2004, as it did in 2014.
Previously, since before 2013 there has been an active ongoing public campaign to isolate Russia politically (by boycotting the Olympics, the Magnitsky process and so on). Hence Russia has been reacting to the western attacks, not attacking Ukraine as it may appear to you.
The roots of this conflict are within the resolution of the cold, where West assumed that Russia had no rights for national and security interests and thus ignored those. If not the actions by Yeltsin or the first maidan, the 2007 speech or the Georgian war were the waking calls that there is a need to respect Russian national and security interests.
However instead of seeking a good compromise, by providing the security guarantees to Russia, everything was done to threaten Russian security, including the expansion of NATO eastwards.
You could of course go and talk about the need to isolate evil Russia from the rest of the world, but the you have a right to express that view if you wish.

Note, Russia is not actually fighting a Cold war with the West at the moment, as we are free to acquire the critical consumer and industrial goods (and other things). It is a false sense that we are isolated economically and politically, an example of hybris on part of anyone who thinks so.

Now, onto the budget. The reason why we don't get a budget deficit due to falling oil prices is:
- because ruble also fell, which meant that we got the similar level of ruble budget income.
- the share of oil incomes is not as major as it is assumed.

Stuff about the budget deficit being shifted onto the large state owned corporations is simply not true - my father runs one (Rostelecom to be specific) and does not have any such issues.

So, to sum up, the sanctions and falling oil prices are not a good thing, but they are not doing critical damage to Russian economy as some appear to think.

While most of the **** is contained inside "Strategic and tactical realities in CMBS" thread (sorry OP), allow me to make a first thread of my own.   
 
This is a case-study about what is T-90MS with a bit of speculation of what T-90AM could be if it enters service. 
 
So, what what we know about T-90MS? General: -Mass 48+ tons.   T-90MS: Armament -2A45M-5  -Main gun linked PKT -22 rounds in the autoloader with increased protection  -10 round stowage bin with blowout panels -8 round internal storage   -PKT in T05BV-1 unmanned turret -Ability to use longer rounds in the autoloader   -Most recent rounds available:  3BM-48 “Svinets-1” APFSDS round (guaranteed 650mm KE at 0 at 2km); 3VOF-36 HE round (3.1kg of explosive); 3USh-3 “Ainet” AB round (500-400m radius at 9°pellet incidence) 3VBK-25 HEAT round (600mm HE at any range)  3UBK-20M “Invar-M” TGM round (850mm HE after ERA, 900mm HE without ERA at any range)   Breakdown of ammo storage, green is the relative positioning of the engine.    FCS Kalina.  No current information on sights is available, therefore I used available information on current export sights with comparable characteristics. I have Sosna-U, but I am currently searching for PK PAN commander sight, as soon as I find it, I will update the charts.   
-Integrated tank information system
-Integrated, automatic battalion-level CnC control system (with or without a plug-in to Constellation-2M)
-Friend or Foe target spotting;
-Hunter-Killer capability;
-Automatic target tracking capability;
-Digital image enhancing for both commander and gunner sights.
-Improved stabilizer that can handle 40°/sec.
-(tentative) 4 perimeter cameras that feed visuals to both driver and commander
-Agat-MDT Independent two-channel (TV + Thermal) commander’s panoramic sight with integrated laser rangefinder. Stabilisation accuracy of 1° min. Day channel sight view angles 1x magnification at 7°15’ x 27°40’ and 8x magnification at 6°10’x7°15’. Effective day “tank” target type acquisition in clear weather is up to 4km. Thermal channel with 320x256 matrix with digital image enhancing with 1x magnification at 2°10’x2°40. Effective night “tank” target type acquisition in any weather is up to 2.5km with. Laser rangefinder capable of calculating from 0.2 to 4km in automatic mode.  
  Approximate ranges and angles for commander:  
-Irbis-K two channel, twin-axis independently stabilized (Optical + Thermal) gunner’s sight with integrated laser rangefinder with a laser beam for TGM control. Stabilization inaccuracies no more than 50’’. Thermal channel at 4x288 with wide view angle of 6.8°x9.0° and centered view angle of 2.3°x3.0°. Capable of automatic range-finding, adjusting for weather and compensating for gun stabilization inaccuracies including gun canting and thermal bending. Soft-adjusting from 2.7x to 12x. Commander can also fire the gun in manual mode. Effective day and night all-weather range at 3.2km. Effective day range of target acquisition not less than current Sosna-U sights on T-72B3.
 
Approximate ranges and angles for gunner:

  -Digital ballistic calculator with a 32 channel exchange-booth, I estimate it’s built on Elbrus-4C CPU architecture: 65nm tech level with 4 cores at 800mHZ and 64 gFLOPS.
-Additional power-unit integrated to support emergency FCS operations.
 
Protection
-Relikt ERA on glacis, turret and sides.
-Protection increase estimates:
2 times for CE (~800mm RHA at 0 per block)< K-5 offers 1.9~2 times for CE
1.5 times for KE (~350mm RHA at 0 per block)< K-5 offers 1.2 times for KE
-BTVT estimates T90A at 800-830 versus KE and 1150-1350 versus CE. with K-5 for thickest turret parts. Please note - btvt is likely to underestimate the T90A performance due to strong anti tagil bias
-With relikt, those numbers would be 1000-1038 KE and 1150-1350 for CE on the thickest part of the turret over what K-5 can offer.
-Relikt is Estimated to dissipate >0.6 (60%) of KE Rod energy
-RPG “nets” on engine and rear (turret and chassis)
roof has a good slope, which increases both LOS thickness and ERA effectiveness.
 
Below is the approximate armoring breakdown for frontal projection.
R: ~1000-900mm KE O: ~890-660mm KE G: ~650->400mm KE W: Inert
 



 
Countermeasures
-Shtora system is present on T-90MS, however optical jammers are not included in the demo version we all have seen
-Both Arena and Afganit are possible. Arena is however an export system with Afganit geared towards RA use. Since there is no idication of how Afganit looks and performs, going with Arena is the only option for CMBS.
-That said, Arena-E  is also functional as demonstrated on RAE-2013 and is more compact than regular Arena.
-Kalina FCS supports TShU-1-2M automatic smoke launcher integration (currently present in CMBS I believe)  
 
Powertrain
-V-92S2F2 engine with 1130hp (23 hp/t)
-Assisted gear-changing (not fully automatic) transmission
-(tentative) chassis management system as a function of ITIS (CLICK as it's found on T-72B3M)
  What we anticipate from T-90MA (speculation)
Appart from Agat and Irbis sights, one basic change that begs the question is armament change. Re-gunning T-90AM from 2A46M-5 to 2A82 seems like a logical step because:
It is available and has been in development for nearly 25 years.
It fits the caliber, and weight requirements of T-90 platform.
The autoloader capable of longer rounds is installed in T-90MS.
Ready rounds have been declared (Grifel-1(2) APFSDS rounds/ Grifel-3 HE round) while 9M119 TGM series can be installed to work as well
2A82 can be married into the FCS with software adjustments thanks to ITIS.

What do we know about the 2A82? Not too much really, but plausible numbers for estimation.
Muzzle energy is claimed to be 1.2 to that of Rh120 L/55.
It is longer than 2A46M. How much can be estimated, however glancing over what’s available on the internet I’d think some 40~50cm or so.

Why wasn’t it present on the T-90MS? As product placement for the MS has been geared towards export, the 2A82 could not be positioned since it is prohibited from export.
What could prevent 2A82 from being placed on the T-90AM if such a thing goes into service?
Cost. Not that 2A82 costs is any more prohibitive than 2A45M-5, but the cost of manufacturing new ammo set might be.
Armata preferences. The reason T-90AM isn’t being looked for as a procurement item, is because the budget is being geared towards Armata series. If it goes to production alongside the estimated T-90AM, then spending preferences would not be in it’s favour.

Another interesting point is the CPU unit used for FCS. Elbrus series is progressing forwards, releasing 8 core version for tests earlier this year with a 16 core version planned for production in 2017-18. So are the thermal matrices. Currently 768x576 and 1280x960 are available, but haven’t been utilized in any complexes  
Sourcing:

Also, an amusing article:
http://periscope2.ru/2015/01/19/8298/

On the air war - this all depends on scenario. Ie what kind of presence does NATO (or specific NATO members) deploy? Because the proposed measures essentially imply direct and full Russia-NATO war, if not on Russian/NATO soil, which brings a lot of implications I don't like (such as nuclear dimension).
 
On the PRC - basically if before Ukraine Russia was thinking about staying sort of on the fence between the East and West, recent events have firmly pushed us east wards, de facto completing an alliance with the PRC. Such alliance is not only economical (currency swaps, energy and more importantly other industries deals) but also semi defensive in nature at the moment.
Morever attacking Russia directly in such situation would lead to en mass use of tactical nuclear weapons (~1000 weapons in the first wave), which would sort of defeat the point of China going north. Not that it needs to - the conditions for Chinese companies to do business there are good anyway, and who would ever wish to live in place like Yakutsk (except Russians ofc) anyway?

Some comments on the topic. I apologise in advance if you find this post too long or somewhat incoherent.
 
First of all, the Russian Armed Forces evolution post 1991 - the short version. Originally Russian Armed Forces derived from the Soviet ones and thus were an army made for a single and one purpose only - to fight a major mechanised war. Thus it was mostly made out of reserve (cadre) units, often with the older equipment internal MDs would be left with. However young Russian Federation could not sustain such Armed Forces, not if there were intended to have a given active component (as a lot of manpower was used up in cadre units), thus leading to transformation of the VDV (and a number of other units) into those elite forces mentioned by the Battlefront (the Admin), they have performed with mixed result in the first Chechen war, in the 080808 war. 
The 080808 war lead to the expansion of this "elite constant combat readiness" tag onto the entire armed forces, first creating the constant combat readiness brigades, beginning their rearmament (Armed Forces did not receive much of anything prior to the GPV2015). The second part of the reform (happening under Shoigu) is the expansion of those brigades into divisions, large combined arms exercises, ie Russian armed forces never lost the sight of fighting a major (regional on one front) war and have began preparations for such war before the Ukrainian events. A historic parallel could be made with WW2 events - the mechanised corps were disbanded and tnk brigades were formed, which later were expanded into new mechanised and tank corps. Thus talking about Russian Armed Forces being limited to the elite parts (which ones by the way?) is simply wrong in the post 2008 world.
A summary of those events (pre Shoigu) written by CAST could be found here:
http://www.cast.ru/files/book/NewArmy_sm.pdf
 
Secondly, the build up on Ukrainian border was of demonstrative nature (show of force, a deterrent and so on), and thus is not indicative of Russian capabilities to deploy such forces in that area. If anything Russian exercises some distance from the border have shown the capability to rapidly redeploy forces into the theatre, into the range of possible single leap manuever operations. Ie - Russian forces do not have to sit across the border looking scary to attack, they would attack from some space within the border, from movement, as to preclude identification of the time place and intent of the attack. That much should be obvious to any student of the Soviet (and by the extension Russian) way of war. 
 
Thirdly - onto the balance of forces. The factors one must account here are:
- shortage of weapons for the Ukrainian loyalists (they loose more than they could repair/produce, and currently the level of equipment is dropping severely as they pull out equipment that was not properly stored, much less properly maintained or upgraded in the past 25 years and send those items to the front line without critical parts such as radios. Unless there is some sort of massive aid to the Ukrainian loyalists they would be fighting on the unreliable (due to bad maintenance) 1970s vintage systems.
- shortage of trained men on both sides, the mobilisation you have mentioned would be that of essentially untrained (Ukrainian Armed Forces were hit even worse than Russian ones) or elderly (whose who may remember their Soviet training) men. While the separatist draw on the pool of Russian volunteers (who may have decent training due to the post 2008 reforms) and maintaining their size means that most of their troops would have combat experience and training, the expansion of Ukrainian Armed Forces (the kind you envisioned, though from past experience I would say that the new waves of mobilisation would fail) would lead to the majority of their troops not having anything but most basic training (the kind provided semi accidentally by more experienced troops) and poor morale (being forcefully conscripted out of their houses).
- complete dissaray of Ukrainian loyalists chain of command, not only are the troops micro managed from up high (the local sectoral and brigade command has very little authority about what they are doing), there are signs of double command (from the High Command and from the Command of Land Forces - later normally being purely admin body before the ambitions of the man in question took over his sense of duty) and this is Armed Forces alone (ie in reality there are more than 2 authorities in command of forces there, leading to poor operational security and troop command).
While one could argue that this overview is based on past experience (as recent as this winter actually) I see there no movement for improvement in the direction of improvement. Thus while the local commanders (battalion and below) may have some form of tactical experience, they have no successful experience of fighting war on the level above battalion, nor do they have experience of fighting a mobile war (those who did were cauldron'ed this summer).
- the efforts of Russia to equip and organise the separatist forces into new units (numbered brigades) and into operational level formations (corps) with unity of command on operational axis. While those efforts did meet some friction (recent events with "Batman" illustrate this) overall they are progressing forward, essentially bringing those forces under (essentially) direct Moscow command, eliminating any opposition or competition inside the separatists ranks. Those forces would provide a substantial threat to the Counter Terrorism Operation Forces as they would have superior or equal equipment, high morale (all are volunteers, vs forcibly conscripted Ukrainian troops).
- ultimate superiority of Russian Federation in air (both fixed and rotary wing), in operational level firepower (recon-strike complexes, recon-fire complexes, TBMs, anti missile SAMs such as the S300V4 and so on), in C3 (deployment of new command systems post 2008 through out the armed forces, especially above company), intelligence (ability to gain intel from Ukrainian HQs due to poor operational security, ability to locate and intercept unprotected communication means Ukrainian CTO Forces use and so on) and logistics (logistics are centralised, have organic rail road element and so on) and others.
 
As to the operations themselves. The likely scenario on strategic level in my opinion would:
- consists of advance on 4 separate operational axis.
- be conducted by 4 Combined Arms Armies (that is around 16 combat brigades and divisions), all of VDV troops, most of Specnas forces, the Black Sea Fleet.
- be supported by the (nearly) entire Russian Airforce and intelligence gathering means.
- be conducted from the posture of an exercise (in south-west of Russia and an exercise with Belarus), of the "readiness check" type, thus precluding any obvious and lengthy build up (which for some reason people assume for both Russian and Soviet scenarios).
- be supported by extensive under ground movement in the potentially pro Russian areas, as well as special forces operation.
- be supported with the newly formed separatist forces under direct Russian command, within the Russian chain of command (under the Army level HQ, hence corps designation vs army designation).
 
Such preparation would take less time than any extensive aid efforts by the US, weapons would take time to be delivered and more so to be trained with and pushed into service, there is a degree of political drag in decision making, this means that by the time the aid from US reaches the front lines the mobile phase of operation would be over.
 
The effect of the war on public - according to my media acquaintance Russia has essentially mobilised population at the moment, thus allowing for standard 30 percent losses of the first echelon troops (and more). 
 
as a p.s. - I think I really should work out this scenario with OOBs and what not. currently I got in contact with hind, I think we may work this one out at some point.
 
p.p.s. "cargo 200" and the owner of that resource - the lady shown above are completely mad and murder poor book characters, football team members and those from the university acceptance lists. I would strongly advise against using their materials as source information.

This view (that I am about to express) is hypo-theoretical only. It comes from my personal point of view, and open source information I could gather. I would try to keep this scenario going, if it is of interest to the local community.
 
First of all, what are the Russian (political) objectives in this conflict? To sum up - precluding Ukraine from joining NATO military-political block, precluding Ukraine from being a valid threat to Russia in the future, negating any claim Ukraine has on Crimea, to defend the interests of pro-Russian people of Ukraine.

(p.s. - I seriously doubt NATO intervention should Russia openly intervene in the conflict, not in the time scale I think it would happen in).
 
To accomplish this Russia requires a substantial buffer zone with friendly (or at least neutral) population, with sufficient economic power to sustain that region, at least partially, to destroy Ukrainian means of fighting war (ie it's armed forces and defence related industry). Such buffer zone would probably be in the form of the Pro-Yanukovich regions (could be seen from voting patterns here)


Hence from military perspective we have the objectives of:
- rapidly defeating the Counter Terrorist Operation Forces east of Dnepr.
- securing the designated territory, installing pro Russian regime there.

What is the balance of forces (I would expand this if requested)?
- Russia has a complete control of air and complete superiority in terms of reckon-strike complexes, intelligence gathering, superiority in quality of equipment and of troop control and command (above battalion).
- Russia currently arms and trains the separatist forces, organising their brigades into corps type structures, restructuring brigades up to mechanised standards.
- both parties (Ukrainian loyalists and Separatists) suffer from major corruption issues, both sides are primarily limited by the supplies of weapons in equipment when rising their military units, as well from manpower deficiency (currently separatists did not enact mobilisation, previous waves of mobilisation has proven to be inefficient for the loyalist forces). Thus any estimates of their forces must be made with utmost caution.

Due to the military-political situation, ie the ongoing Counter Terrorism Operation, poor intelligence (even with NATO support from means such as imint, humint, elint and so on), poor leadership, presence of real and present threat from separatist forces, I doubt that Ukrainian Counter Terrorism Operation Forces would be capable of sending any substantial force out of their area of operation before Russian Armed Forces strike or blow the bridges prior to such an attack.

What is the military geography of the region? The depth of operation is approx. 250km (from Russian jump of points next to the border to the Dnepr river line, objectives in Odessa would be achieved by forces out of Crimea - with amphib, airborne and land borne advances). This constitutes 1, maybe 2 days of advance. There are no valid obstacles before Dnepr, Dnepr itself would be crossed using pantoon bridges and amphib vehicles at points of convenience, providing the encirclement of any actually defended bridgeheads (which were not yet taken by the VDV forces). Pripyat marshes may appear to be a formidable obstacle (to a strike from the north), however they were crossed by Soviet forces in 1944. The road network is sufficient to allow bypassing all of major cities (which would be controlled by special forces, local separatists), the terrain is fairly open, allowing movement away from roads.

What is the required force, to enact the plan? 4 combined arms armies (southern MD, western MD, partially - central MD), VDV forces, Black Sea Fleet.

If so requested I could draw a more complete plan, with OOB for all sides, map of operations and so on. I hope you find this post of interest to you.
p.s. What I don't understand - where does NATO intervention come from? In the scenarios that I for see there is no time for NATO to respond to the developments (unless NATO forces attempt to mount an offensive after Russia has secured it's objectives, but this would be stupid in my opinion).
I would also suggest reading on:
- Bagartion, Vistula-Oder, Manchurian offensives (1944-1945), especially from the point of logistics.
- Reading the articles by the Office of Soviet Studies such as "The high roads of war" (or atleast I think that is what it was called).
- Reading "Red Army" by Ralph Peters if all else fails.

I am suprised there is no BM-21 for Ukraine, or Russia.
 
I am also surprised that there is 2S7 Mialka and no BM-30.
Especially now you can get Glossnass guided rounds for the 9A52-4 Tornado-S version of the BM-30.

Even though modern combat does punish staticness to a great extent it doesn't mean that you are always moving.
 
Your armored vehicles will not be moving constantly and it would be better off for them to be dug in than not. The way some of you are talking it sounds like these vehicles should always be moving.
 
An example of a perfectly good use of dug in tank positions:
 
You have a platoon of Mech. inf. in a deeply wooded area. You have some scouts at the edge of the woods providing observation and empty prepared positions along the edge of the woods. When the scouts spot enemy troops advancing your IFVs and infantry squads move from the safety of the deep woods to these prepared positions. They would now have 2-5 minutes of fighting time with an almost certain guarantee of not being engaged by indirect fire. You could even have secondary positions that you move to after a few minutes.
 
I also wouldn't use either Gulf War as a reason to condemn static defenses. Iraq was a perfect storm of conditions for a modern army to trounce a 3rd world one.
 
Mildly highjacking the thread. Will we see improved infantry fighting positions in the base game or any of the modules?
 
Reinforced houses, overhead cover, thermal cover, and more complex defenses in general would be nice to see. While Modern definitely doesn't favor sitting a squad in a trench all day. I don't think static fortifications are useless. Its just that the simple trench from Red Thunder looks more and more like a death trap.

The Khrizantema and Shturm are purposely built to remain out of sight whilst their firing post and sight remain visible. The vehicle would be a completely different shape and armoured differently had they been envisaged to operate in a different way.
This is quite a big problem.

Svinets-2 in production since 2013.
 
Russian:

The country is not running out of money.  The banker opportunists are taking advantage of a crisis to make a few billion Euro/USD.  While this is a bit larger than '08, the same thing happened then.  And happened before that...  I didn't panic then and I'm not panicking now.  This is nothing new in this country.