Vet 0369

The most probable “danger” to the U.S. for Ukraine is that the Federal Budget ends at 23:59 on September 30, 2023. Without a new budget already in place, the Congress will have to pass a number of Continuing Resolutions for the Executive Branch Departments to continue to operate. In this current Congress of basically two extremist groups of Legislators and Senators, with few moderates left on either side, based on my own past experiences, no budget will be passed until at least the end of December.

I would suggest that there is no such thing as an “ethnic” Russian or an “ethnic” Ukrainian or an “ethnic” Pole, or an “ethnic” anything for that matter. Everyone’s DNA is so diversified, that all you can tell is that the largest part is from a “generally current” population.
A much better LABEL would be “cultural” instead of “ethnic.”

I would suggest that there is no such thing as an “ethnic” Russian or an “ethnic” Ukrainian or an “ethnic” Pole, or an “ethnic” anything for that matter. Everyone’s DNA is so diversified, that all you can tell is that the largest part is from a “generally current” population.
A much better LABEL would be “cultural” instead of “ethnic.”

I would suggest that there is no such thing as an “ethnic” Russian or an “ethnic” Ukrainian or an “ethnic” Pole, or an “ethnic” anything for that matter. Everyone’s DNA is so diversified, that all you can tell is that the largest part is from a “generally current” population.
A much better LABEL would be “cultural” instead of “ethnic.”

I would suggest that there is no such thing as an “ethnic” Russian or an “ethnic” Ukrainian or an “ethnic” Pole, or an “ethnic” anything for that matter. Everyone’s DNA is so diversified, that all you can tell is that the largest part is from a “generally current” population.
A much better LABEL would be “cultural” instead of “ethnic.”

And, if the USMC felt it wouldn’t need long-range artillery, why would it need Tomahawks? I can guarantee that the USN will have a Task Force assigned to any Marine operation. The USN is there to support and protect any landing, as it has in every Marine landing during, and since WW II (except the opening phase of the Solomons when the Navy support ships were ordered out of the area due to fear of a Japanese Naval counterattack). The Navy will have Tomahawks if they are needed, and the Marines will “Seize and secure advanced naval bases” as they always have.
Marines like to refer to the Navy as their taxi drivers, but the Marines also work very hard to ensure the Navy has a parking space, gas station, and Quik-Mart available for it.

Well, it is said that militaries tend to train “to fight the last war.” Unless a Country is planning to fight a “new” type of war, e.g. Germany rebuilding it’s forces for combined arms (infantry, air, and armor), the upper echelons of any military will tend to be very conservative in it’s thinking. The current leaders of the U.S.M.C. and USN have shown what I consider to be excellent foresight to determine that the next U.S. regional conflict as the South China Seas, and realigning the U.S.M.C. assets by divesting itself of it’s armor and long-range artillery. I applaud the foresight of the Commandant.

Well, it is said that militaries tend to train “to fight the last war.” Unless a Country is planning to fight a “new” type of war, e.g. Germany rebuilding it’s forces for combined arms (infantry, air, and armor), the upper echelons of any military will tend to be very conservative in it’s thinking. The current leaders of the U.S.M.C. and USN have shown what I consider to be excellent foresight to determine that the next U.S. regional conflict as the South China Seas, and realigning the U.S.M.C. assets by divesting itself of it’s armor and long-range artillery. I applaud the foresight of the Commandant.

Well, it is said that militaries tend to train “to fight the last war.” Unless a Country is planning to fight a “new” type of war, e.g. Germany rebuilding it’s forces for combined arms (infantry, air, and armor), the upper echelons of any military will tend to be very conservative in it’s thinking. The current leaders of the U.S.M.C. and USN have shown what I consider to be excellent foresight to determine that the next U.S. regional conflict as the South China Seas, and realigning the U.S.M.C. assets by divesting itself of it’s armor and long-range artillery. I applaud the foresight of the Commandant.

Well, it is said that militaries tend to train “to fight the last war.” Unless a Country is planning to fight a “new” type of war, e.g. Germany rebuilding it’s forces for combined arms (infantry, air, and armor), the upper echelons of any military will tend to be very conservative in it’s thinking. The current leaders of the U.S.M.C. and USN have shown what I consider to be excellent foresight to determine that the next U.S. regional conflict as the South China Seas, and realigning the U.S.M.C. assets by divesting itself of it’s armor and long-range artillery. I applaud the foresight of the Commandant.

Of course they did. I would expect nothing less of the extremely professional and transparent Russian “investigations.”

Of course they did. I would expect nothing less of the extremely professional and transparent Russian “investigations.”

Of course they did. I would expect nothing less of the extremely professional and transparent Russian “investigations.”

Of course they did. I would expect nothing less of the extremely professional and transparent Russian “investigations.”

Of course they did. I would expect nothing less of the extremely professional and transparent Russian “investigations.”

This! To distill this whole thing down:
1) Remember our own history. In the American Revolution of 1775, a maximum of 33% of the population of the thirteen British Colonies even supported the Revolution. Of that one third that supported it, only about one-third of them  i.e. one ninth or 16.5 % of the entire population, actively supported it. And, there was a full 33% of the entire population that “actively” opposed it.
2) Always plan for the worse case scenario. This is something that for some reason, most military and political leaders do not do. If the Joint Staff War Colleges are teaching that leaders must do this, it is apparent that most leaders aren’t listening, maybe because they’re smarter than everyone else, otherwise, they wouldn’t be the leaders?

Ok, let’s use your facts then.  At 15% of the local population actively supporting annexation that is around 330,000 who appears to be solidly in the pro-Russian camp…in 2014.  It is a major leap of logic to assume that the dynamics of 2014 apply ten years later but after ten years of Russian rule it is safe bet that the area was “Russified” pretty intensely.
And then there is the very awkward question of “how much civil resistance did the Russian’s see when they took over the entire region?”  This is also a major indicator you are skipping over.
Here is the point most people miss on insurgencies, and you are doing it here as well - they are very often if not always a very small minority of the population.  If all 2.2 million Crimeans decide “nope” and take up active or violent resistance then Ukraine will not take back Crimea.  However, as you note and here I do agree, this is very unlikely.  But they don’t have to. The majority of civilians need only stay neutral or play both sides - here the nearly 68 percent who identify as Russia come into play.  A fraction of a fraction of the 15% who actively were onside need only take up arms and be supported by an outside power for this to constitute a major insurgency.  Say only 33,000 Crimeans get really riled up, hidden amongst a neutral population that really have no love or loyalty to either side, you have the conditions right there for a decades long problem.  It will be very much in Russia’s interest to make that happen, which is another major factor.
”Crap happens plan for the worst”.  Really?  Ok, once again let’s review the key factors that provide the fuel for insurgents, all that “happening crap” that we teach a joint war colleges:
- A cause.  Very often tied to identity, ethnicity or religion (often all three) and a belief in an idea of a political framework other than the one they are living under.  In simpler terms a certainty.  Is there a population in either of the occupied regions who are likely to have “a cause”?  Well 2014-2023 says “likely”. https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/conflict-ukraines-donbas-visual-explainer
- Failure in mechanism of change/representation.  Re-integration of these regions is going to be dicey in the extreme as it will mean re-enfranchisement of potentially hostile citizenry into a democratic process.  This was a major flash point in the Donbas pre-2014, perceived lack of representation and failures in representative governance.https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/attachments/Pepm351_Kudelia_Sept2014.pdf.  This situation boxes some people in to the point that violent resistance is the only agent of change.  So is there likely to be a portion of the Crimean population that is at risk of feeling dis-enfranchised after liberation?  Are they going to feel boxed in?
- Weak governance.  This is an area you have already admitted is a risk and frankly it will become a key battleground post-conflict.  If governance slips, corruption and old habits come into play then popular sentiment can swing pretty fast. Insurgencies thrive on poor governance and inequities, which they link immediately to their cause as the solutions for. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-choice-corruption-or-growth/
- Popular support.  This does not need to be active support, it can simply be passive.  Both you and our Ukrainian posters point to largely “neutral populace in these regions”, that is more than enough to set conditions for effective insurgencies.  They will play that neutrality and use money and other incentives to create transactional networks that allow them freedom of movement.  The other viable tactic is effectively staging over reaction from the “liberators” in order to push neutrality in their direction.  As has already been covered, this is a very likely condition in these regions.
- Repression.  Perceived or manufactured narratives, conditions of repression of populations are rich soil for insurgency.  You, and other posters have already leaned into mass deportations, which is going to look and feel pretty repressive in the regions.  This sort of stuff can split families and friends along “citizenship and true loyalty” lines.  As has also been noted Ukrainian security services are in high gear and will be very likely pushing hard to root out cells before they can metastasize.  Is there a likely perception of repression under these conditions?  Is there a vulnerable narrative that can be exploited?
- External support with interests.  Normally passive support by a neighbouring nation, safe havens and blind eyes (eg Taliban in Pakistan) is bad enough.  Active support at the levels Russia is likely to provide is something else.  This is a North Vietnam/Mujahideen situation.  Is this likely?  We already saw Russia do this for years in these regions.  Will Russia have an interest in making life a living hell for Ukraine in Crimea and Donbas?  Will they have means and opportunity?  Short of a complete collapse of Russia (and then we have a whole new set of problems), I suspect the answer is a hard “yes”.
That is not great risk calculus nor is it “hype”.  And in the “crap happens” camp of "no insurgency": “Solvyanks did not blow up, all the bad people will leave, those left are too lazy to do anything about it anyway and LNR/DPR and Russians suck.”
Ok, well let’s put this one down on record then because we are not likely to agree.  I believe that there is a high probability of civilian violent opposition to Ukrainian liberation in Crimea, and even though it will be a very small minority it will cause strategic effects. It will likely happen in the 1-5 years after liberation, faster if Ukraine gets too heavy handed.  To counter this will take significant effort not only by Ukraine but by it allies to ensure those conditions above are stamped out. This will come at significant cost and risk, and cannot be the piecemeal support we have seen from the West so far.  It will also take an epic reconciliation, reconstruction and enfranchisement effort on the part of the Ukrainian people as well as major reforms in Ukrainian government, some of which are facing off against generational internal cultures.  Can it be done? Yes.  Will it be done?  Unknown
You are on record as stating it is “unlikely”.  Let’s see where it lands.  The good news in all this is that if we get a chance to find out the region will have been retaken in the first place.

Holy Mackerel! WOW, great to hear from you! Hang in there and stay low and safe. I had just been wondering how you were doing.

Holy Mackerel! WOW, great to hear from you! Hang in there and stay low and safe. I had just been wondering how you were doing.

I agree with Haiduk and Steve that there won't be any pro-russian insurgency in Crimea in case of UKR troops going in hot. But, yes, it is going to be hard to govern, for sure. Something good to look forward to anyway. 
It is quite hard to predict how the events will unfold exactly from now on. That raid was definitely fun though, even if only symbolical.

Cue my post some hundreds of pages ago on how in 1973,  the U.S.M.C. ran mandatory classes that taught us that the majority of humanity doesn’t care who rules them as long as they have the necessary creature comforts such as food, water, shelter, and etc.
 
 

Cue my post some hundreds of pages ago on how in 1973,  the U.S.M.C. ran mandatory classes that taught us that the majority of humanity doesn’t care who rules them as long as they have the necessary creature comforts such as food, water, shelter, and etc.
 
 

Cue my post some hundreds of pages ago on how in 1973,  the U.S.M.C. ran mandatory classes that taught us that the majority of humanity doesn’t care who rules them as long as they have the necessary creature comforts such as food, water, shelter, and etc.
 
 

Cue my post some hundreds of pages ago on how in 1973,  the U.S.M.C. ran mandatory classes that taught us that the majority of humanity doesn’t care who rules them as long as they have the necessary creature comforts such as food, water, shelter, and etc.
 
 

It’s all about money! The African operations contributes Billions to the Russian government and Putin directly.