TrailApe

Warts’n’All, 18 platoon is based on an episode in Sydney Jary’s excellent book ’18 Platoon’. He was a platoon officer in the Somerset Light Infantry and fought in the bloody infantry battles of Normandy and beyond. It’s really well worth reading although it’s hard to get a hold of a copy. So 18 platoon is very much based on what actually happened. If you still under the impression that the Commonwealth troops were ‘sticky’ during the big Normandy battles, this one might revise your opinions. This books been out for ages but has been overlooked by many of the more ‘important’ authors who have moulded our current ‘truth’ about Normandy and WW2 in general. Sydney’s book has been revived a bit as the new generation of authors that have started publishing about Normandy are dipping into personal accounts from the ranks and are not just regurgitating secondary sources that are often taken from the higher ranks autobiographies. Makes you wonder why the likes of Hastings, D’Estes, Ryan et al didn’t do the same, as the word from the coal face is conspicuous by its absence in a lot of the older publications, although given that the average grunt in Normandy stood a good chance of getting killed and even if he didn’t, not many had the chance to keep a diary that would survive the extreme weather and enemy actions during 1944 and 1945, it’s perhaps understandable.

John, I’m certainly not an expert in the Airborne side of the house, I’ve never been a Para and never wanted to be one – the only time I will exit from a perfectly useable aircraft is when it’s stationary on the ground. I only became interessted in this thread as I knew Gunners were at Arnhem and that did not seem to mesh with your view of lightly equipped. Airborne forces are in effect Light Infantry (with attitude) and operate in that envelope. In the approach to the area of operations you would expect your Light Infantryman or Tom to be laden with kit. That picture you show with the Para with the ‘picnic’ kit is one version of ’37 Pattern webbing. He is wearing the smallpack, they were also equipped with a much larger ‘haversack’ which they would wear in marching order. So you march (or fly) to your area of interest carrying everything you need (plus squad supplies) then dump it at a secure point and reconfigure your kit. You cannot patrol or fight with 50-65lbs of kit on your back – well you can, but if the **** hits the fan you are in deep trouble. This process will be mirrored from a small patrol to a Division. The small patrol would leave a couple of men to guard the stores and act as a quick reaction force, the Airborne at Arnhem used the 1st Battalion of the Border Regiment who were brought in via Gliders with the rest of the heavy stuff. (There are a lot of ‘what if’ scenarios around the consequences of taking the Borderers along to the Bridge instead of guarding the Drop Zones.) So go in heavy, fight light. This is as old as the Romans and is still used today. If the powers that be ignore this rule and send troops straight into the assault laden down with kit it usually ends badly, a notable example being the Somme in 1916. As already mentioned further upstream in this thread, you could replace any of the Airborne units with those of the Arnhem Bridge defenders and you would have the same result – nobody was scaled to fight for longer than 5 days. It’s interesting in the last link you posted re the US Airborne that the following is mentioned (my bolds) Additionally in that article, while the troops are carrying ammo it’s obvious that most of their load is dropped separately in carts – which was standard practice by then for all of the Allied Airborne troops. So in my opinion, the British element of ‘MARKET’ were no less well provisioned than any other element, however they were the furthest flung and had to hold out for longer than anyone else, you can only get a pint into a pint pot (and if I wanted to be nationalistic here, I’ll note* that the British – Imperial – pint is bigger than the US version) and once it’s gone – it’s gone, no refills for Para’s. *I’ll also note that the litre is bigger than both – the Germans used litres.

Airborne Operations are all about compromise. What can be lifted for the initial drop and what resources are available for the follow on drops. In the case of the Arnhem jump, the first lift couldn’t take all of the resources so the initial drop was spread over two days. I’m sure if the Airborne lads had the resources they wanted they would have sent in a platoon of baristas supplied with three weeks’ worth of really good beans, or in the Brits case some of the better teas and a good supply of earthenware teapots and some fine bone china crockery to use in the consumption of the amber nectar. However given the fact that unlimited lift resources were not available they had to decide what to take and what to leave. Do you take a divisions worth of men and have two days’ worth of logistics or Brigade and a week’s worth of logistics? Will there be enough transport aircraft left to resupply? Will the weather effect the resupply (remember the great storms following D-Day and the subsequent shortages). Will there be anything left to resupply? – go in with too many stores and not enough boots and you won’t have any body left to use the ammo or accept the resupply. Now on one hand we have a bunch of soldiers who have been living and breathing airborne ops since 1942. They had absorbed the lessons learned from Crete in ’41 and started small with raids like Bruneval in early ’42. The dropped two battalions into Tunisia and funnily enough 2PARA (Lt Col John Frost – name ring a bell?) found itself cut off at Oudna, 50 miles behind enemy lines and had to fight its way back without resupply – no doubt a few lessons were learned there. Then there was Sicily, a Brigade size force this time. Then Operation Slapstick – a Division dropped at Taranto. Then Normandy, once again a Division dropped in. Operation Dragoon saw a Brigade going into Southern France to coincide with the Cobra breakout in Normandy. Then Arnhem. Now this is not an exhaustive list of all of the Airborne operations that the Brits were involved in, but just the major ones, just to indicate that this was not a new concept, they knew what they were about. So on one hand we have Mr Kettler and his extensive google skills (or whatever browser he prefers) and on the other we have a cell of highly experienced solders steeped in the lore of Airborne Operations. Every ounce, every pound, would have been sweated over and questioned. For example – the 17lbers – very effective a/t’s but very very heavy. Could you risk taking just 6lbers – still effective against almost all German armour and you can take more? The 17lbers are not really portable and need a universal carrier to drag them about, however 6lbers are much more portable and can get about using muscle power. They compromised and took some of each. Don’t tell me that this was a decision made lightly. Here’s an extract from the after action report from the 1st Battalion the Border Regiment, who were part of the air assault into the area. My bolds. Further into the report is a mention of the supply situation. Dastardly Huns! And Mr Kettler, 70 years after the event, is questioning the judgment of these men based on two wiki pictures and a film. Thank god he didn’t use Mr Attenborough’s cinematic interpretation of Mr Ryan’s book ‘A Bridge Too Far’ as no doubt he would have been asking whether the Brit Para’s really needed containers of berets being dropped in. If I was dropping tomorrow and had the choice of who would plan the jump I know who gets my vote. One last thought Bearing in mind they would have had PARACHUTES on their back to get there, where do you think they picked up the haversacks for their ‘picnic’ rations? Possibly from the tons of stores that were brought in with the gliders and the caches of small arms ammo dropped in alongside all of the transport and anti-tank guns? And these packs were probably NOT carrying any picnicking material but containing bullets and gin.

I think perhaps part of the problem is in the title. The title makes the assumption that the British Para’s WERE lightly equipped. Not ‘is this correct’? or ‘can anyone shed light on…’? but no – it’s opening gambit is that the British (and Polish presumably) dropped into Arnhem underequipped. Now if the post had been worded slightly different then perhaps there could have been more of a discussion. However, for my part, reading the title and the comments within the opening post there is more than a little hint of – 'gee the Brits were so stupid compared to our guys'. Bumbling Brits at it again eh? When you consider that the Brits had already been involved in deploying two big air operations (Tunisia then Sicily) and had been on the receiving end of another big air operation (Crete) it’s a bit of a huge assumption that they would not have any grasp of the ammunition scales and the need to pick up the slack if things went a bit awry. Yeah, Para smocks are noted for their ability to stuff 17lbers and 35 rounds of AP into their capacious pockets. Come on man – think a bit!

Crocodiles? (eventually?)

Stiff upper lips? Dunno - I've noticed that as well.

Ahhh - but what context is that? internet shortly, real time shortly, Geological epoc shortly Woman getting ready shortly????? Please note lack of whine or whinge in my post (although I am getting desperate)

Perhaps a few tweaks to increase artillery resources? In RL Normandy was dominated by artillery and the German defenders often speak of it's intensity.

From what I can gather they were used by 2nd Inf Division at Brest in August'44 - surely that's within the date paramaters for CM Normandy?

The phrase Dutch Courage predates Waterloo by many years. The phrase came from the English troops fighting in the Low Countries in the late 1600's - where gin was developed ands initially referred to the drink itself (not the effect). They brought this love of the drink home and it became popular in England, and in fact William III (who himself was Dutch) allowed unlicensed gin production in England and at the same time imposed a heavy duty on all imported spirits. Pretty shortly most of England was smacked off their tits on Gin.

I would think that any action after Operation Michael (21 March 1918) would be so similair to WW2 that the only difference would be the equipment. Loads of ebb and flow, Germans pouring forward one minute - heroic allied last stands like Manchester Hill, then the Allies pour forward using all arms tactics. The '100 Days' campaign at the end covers a similair period to Normandy, so it's not as if it would be out of the current timescales of CMX2. However prior to that CMX2 could be an ideal engine to simulate the trench raids and bitter struggles in no mans land by platoons and smaller units. Even in the big attacks, companies and platoons have as much relevance in WWI as in WWII (you could equally say Normandy was a Divisional/Corps struggle if you wanted to act Devils Advocate)

I'll call your Sherman and raise you a Churchill.

That's it in a nutshell. Those that do a bit of reading will come up against him time and time again whilst those that depend on the media as a primary source will never heard of him. In fact - and I'm not having a go at anybody here - people are ignorant of the fact that the British army did anything out in the east - apart from surrendeingr at Singapore. The news that they took on the Japanese army and gave them a hammering is often a suprise to a lot of people.

I don't know, you lot winging on about the younger generation and how the worlds going to hell in a handcart - you do realise that you are morphing into your parents don't you? I'm an oldish git (over 50) and I think the young folk nowadays are just as good as we were, if not better. And yes there are a lot of d1ckwads out there being total twonks, but I grew up in the era of Skinheads, and I'll take a bit of mild annoyance over somebody's musical tastes - but I must admit, I have noticed that those that play it LOUD have very little concept of what is good - I mean to say if you are going to play it loud, put something decent on like Sabbath, Zep or Free - over getting your head kicked in just because you don't belong to the 'Throckley Mad Crew' or the 'Longbenton Aggro Boys'. Lets face it, people are people and don't change much, the new generation will still go and make the same mistakes as the previous generation - and the previous generation will in turn carp on like THEIR elders used to. Did you know that there were fears that Television would be the death of conversation and prior to that, they worried about the spread of pianos and family singing - thinking it that a family grouped around a piano singing 'If you were the only girl in the world' would inhibit their ability to have knowledgeable conversations. What goes around comes around etc etc "It used to be all fields around here when I was a lad" (that was me that was) PS I'm with JonS on the Schroedinger round.

Bastables, whilst a lot of the comments on this thread is opinion, the British Army MMG Battalions in WW2 are an actual fact. The battalion associated with my neck of the woods, the Northumberland Fusiliers, were one such unit, so instead of being hard wired to 50 Inf Div like the DLI and The Green Howards they were attached to any number of divisions and served in France (with the Highland 51st Division), then N Africa, Italy and NW Europe (starting on Sword Beach and working their way through). The Chesires were a similair battalion.

Not wrong there my transatlantic cousin. When in reality we are all as mad as a box of gerbils!

Not only did Monty jave his detractors amongst the US, he also made some bad enemies on the Brit side - especially on the RAF side, one of the things that came out of that was an immense amount of neg-repping (to use a modern term) amongst the staff back in England, which cumulated in Churchill going out for a cup ot tea and a natter. Another item that came out of this infighting was the RAF was that phase map - anybody remember it? It had about 10 or a dozen gain lines against which Monty actaully stated he was going to achieve. Of course when the fighting became static for a while this was used to hit him about the head, and it also emerged in the Monty bashing years later. Apparently when all comes to all it was a document that was created by the airplanners, who obviously wanted some decent real estate to put in airfields, however it then became an established 'Monty said this' fact and caused no end of arguments later on. As rightly stated above, the only gain line Monty had forecasted was the Seine - and he was accurate with his estimate. Monty was an obnoxious little git, and I wonder how somebody like Bill Slim, who did wonders against the Japanese on a shoestring budget, would have handled commanding Overlord.

I don't think anybody would disagee with you on this Ryujin, , in fact there is evidence to suggest that these stress factors effected the ability for riflemen (automatic or single shot) to supress the target in a meaningful way before running out of ammo - have a look at the download that John Kettler provides in post 12 on the 'Fire Superiority & suppresion with CW squads'. (Although the one in post 14 from Fernando worked better) Of course it is modern research, and its not quite the same context as Normandy, and one of the assumptions they make is that a round has to come within a metre of the target to supress it, well when you consider the spread of experience of those involved in Normandy - from veterans of the Eastern Front and The North African campaigns to young lads that have never fired a rifle in anger, it makes you wonder if a metre would be enough in some circumstances or too much in others. So the inference would be that if you are out to suppress well trained, experienced and motivated troops, don't take a SMLE, don't take a Garand, take an armoured mobile pillbox that has at leat two medium machine guns(with oodles of ammo) and a larger calibre weapon for bunker busting. The allies had quite of few of these - Shermans. Or even better - all of the above with more armour and a flame thrower as well - the Croc. And of course indirect weapons have the ability to supress from long range, so the 'pucker factor' is not relevant. And the use of artillery is a constant factor in Normandy, so it's possible that the Allied headsheds knew of the problems inherint in small arms and suppression - after all most of them had fought in the Great War - and had already taken this into account.

COBRA fully deserves the attention given to it, but if it wasn't for the likes of the lesser known Canadian/British operations GREENLINE, POMEGRANATE, GOODWOOD, ATLANTIC and SPRING that went on during the days preceding it COBRA is unlikely to have been the success that it was. Here's the dates and the opposing Divisions GREENLINE 15th July 9th Pz Div. 10th Pz Div POMEGRANATE 16th July 2nd Pz Div, 10th SS Pz Div, 9th SS Pz Div GOODWOOD 18/20th July 1st SS Pz Div, 12th SS Pz Div, 101 SS Heavy Pz Battalion, 272nd Inf Div , 503rd SS Heavy Pz Battalion, 16th Luftwaffe Fd Div, 21st Pz Div,346th In Div, 711th In Div ATLANTIC 18/20th July 1st SS Pz Div, 12th SS Pz Div SPRING 25/28th July 9th SS Pz Div, 12th SS Pz Div COBRA 25/31st July 5th Fallschirmjager Div, 2nd Pz Div, Pz Lehr Div, 2nd SS Pz Div, 17th SS Pz Gd Div, 116th Pz Div,352nd Inf Div, 353rd In Div Tilly was part of Operation SPRING and there is evidence that for about 48 vital hours the Germans thought SPRING was the main effort in Normandy and drew their focus away from COBRA and the Pz divisions that were involved in COBRA mainly became evident after the 28th July. The one question I have is how come the CW operations all had crappy names? Greenline and Pomegranate? Now COBRA - you just know that's going to succeed! .

Is it not just a different way of getting to the same end? The aim is to supress the enemy until your infantry close with them. The CW forces tended to use more artillery than anyone else to suppress the enemy - and sometimes I get the impression that the Germans considered this unfair or even cowardly, REAL men shoot at each other and may the best man win. So use artillery for supression, but remember each CW battalion had a support company, in this support company would be mortars, 6lber AT guns and a carrier platoon - these assets can provide a good amount of firepower - and the bren carriers (which also have piats and 2" mortars) are more robust than jeeps. Additionally the CW battalion has four rifle companies, so there are more feet on the ground. And the whilst the MMG were kept at divisional level, they would be allocated out if it was considered necessary for the task on hand, a platoon of four vickers could put out a hell of weight of lead downstream, and because these MMG Battalions were supposed to be 'centres of excellence' in all things MMGish - they should be able to do all of the fancy indirect stuff that your average machine gunner might have been shown, but never practised. So whilst the individual platoons might seem weak in fire power, remember that the Company had organic fire elements and divisonal fire support that were on hand. As for the artillery - remember that the western allies had indirect fire support down to an art. Usually for a operation a Company would be allocated at least a battery of 25lbers in direct support - ie they were theirs for the duration of that mission and that would include the OP's from that battery operating with the Company CO. So back to the aim of suppressing - does it make any difference if the US team have more automatic rifles if the CW have different methods of doing so. The end result should be the same - whether its from x number of garand magazines fired or x number of 25lb shells landed.

Well Michael, I'll look at those books you have listed - although a quick look at the reviews on the first one you mentioned did not impress me - seemed as if the author had already made his mind up about the subject and was just trying to prove his point. However, I've got an open mind and I'm willing to take on new facts - although I baulk at ingrained perceptions such as "they were less than inspiring on offense " and "British infantry in general seems not to have been terribly effective in using their own weapons to gain objectives". And as for by god - damned by faint praise - as least as good as anybody else. Makes you wonder how they advanced around 700 miles by being so crap at the offensive and by defending -albeit as least as good as anybody else.... How did they manage it I wonder? prior arrangments with the Germans? "Hey lads - we'll form up in an infantry square over in that field and you come and attack us - we'll keep doing that all the way through France, Belgium, Holland and once we get across the Rhine we'll have a really big one - **** or bust - how's that?" Can't see it somehow. .

aaah yes, the CW infantry were rubbish mantra. Funnily enough in the few first hand accounts that were written from the British perspective luckily it seems that they didn't believe this themselves. Of course they did go up against most of the SS and armoured divisions that the Germans had in Normandy, and yes you will find that CM will usually give the SS some very high moral and training factors - for good reason. Could you provide me with the numerous instances where the "unsophisticated and hesitant" tactics are repeatedly shown that will back up your assertions? Obviously there will be examples where particular units did not perfom as well as they should - but this charge can be levelled at all of the Armies that were in Normandy at the time, so to single out the CW forces as a whole for this is unusual.

Those para's looked a right bunch of pansies. Or were they marigolds?

As mentioned above, Arty is an area weapon. 50 metres is not that much out - in fact even nowadays, once you get within 50 metres of the target during adjustment you then go to fire for effect (ie all the guns in the battery firing at the target). Only exception is registration shoots, which are a technical mission, and these go down to 25 metres. Safe splinter distance (without zone etc) for a modern 105mm shell is about 250 metres and I don't think the WW2 stuff would have been vastly inferior to this.

I think the point to remember is that the Western Allies didn't really bother to go mano a mano against the Tiger II's they just hit them with every weapon they had in the armoury and overan them. 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion turned up in Normandy, and whilst they did cause local problems, overall they did not effect the outcome by any appreciable amount. Some got mangled by heavy bombers, one got trapped in a shell hole, and one was rammed by a Sherman. WARNING - WIKI QUOTES So brown trouses time for the allied tankers that came up against them, but in the big picture they were not war winners by any means.