Rokko

In the case of Europe I'd say UKR is cut off not due to political will (or lack thereof), but lack of means. The last aid package from Germany mentioned 2500 artillery shells. That's one day of firing and this was a couple of weeks back. And last time I checked, UKR seems to be losing around 3 artillery guns, self-propelled and otherwise, every other week. Europe can't replace those. Shell production will eventually reach useful levels (although we don't know how many of those will actually end up in UKR hands), but I am afraid they will have run out of guns at that point.
 
From what we know, Russia is recruiting 20k (GUR estimate) to 35k (Medvedev bragging) men per month. Their losses are obviously high, but I'd guess given these numbers they are ultimately sustainable, not so for UKR it seems. And how many brigades were they able to smash against Avdiivka, one after the other? If they can keep this up, they'll whittle UKR down eventually this way, if they don't get a grip on their own issues.

To me this looks more like desparation than sound military logic. Why throw a specialist assault unit into the fray after only a couple months rest to fend off long looming disaster at the last moment (and lose the fortress in the process), why throw in the 47th (basically already spent) right after the failed counter-offensive, why is a single brigade (110th) required to hold out in Avdiivka for 1.5yrs of war and 4 months of sustained assaults? If things were okayish, the 110th would have been pulled back sometime in October, replaced by the 111th and maybe later bolstered by the 112th (or whatever), both rested and fresh from the Belorussian border. Instead, UKR is force to pull one act of desparation after another. It almost looks as if they just don't have any strategic reserves, at all.
The underlying issue, at least to me, seems to be that RU has been running circles around UKR in terms of force generation for basically all of 2023 and ongoing. They may use these forces inefficently, but are able have brigade after brigade mauled while storming some fortress town, while UKR is forced to send the same couple of fire brigade units from hot spot to hot spot. The fact that UKR is basically cut off from foreign assistance and is likely going to be for the foreseeable future does not help in this matter, but their force generation issues seem to be a largely internal problem.

In the case of Europe I'd say UKR is cut off not due to political will (or lack thereof), but lack of means. The last aid package from Germany mentioned 2500 artillery shells. That's one day of firing and this was a couple of weeks back. And last time I checked, UKR seems to be losing around 3 artillery guns, self-propelled and otherwise, every other week. Europe can't replace those. Shell production will eventually reach useful levels (although we don't know how many of those will actually end up in UKR hands), but I am afraid they will have run out of guns at that point.
 
From what we know, Russia is recruiting 20k (GUR estimate) to 35k (Medvedev bragging) men per month. Their losses are obviously high, but I'd guess given these numbers they are ultimately sustainable, not so for UKR it seems. And how many brigades were they able to smash against Avdiivka, one after the other? If they can keep this up, they'll whittle UKR down eventually this way, if they don't get a grip on their own issues.

To me this looks more like desparation than sound military logic. Why throw a specialist assault unit into the fray after only a couple months rest to fend off long looming disaster at the last moment (and lose the fortress in the process), why throw in the 47th (basically already spent) right after the failed counter-offensive, why is a single brigade (110th) required to hold out in Avdiivka for 1.5yrs of war and 4 months of sustained assaults? If things were okayish, the 110th would have been pulled back sometime in October, replaced by the 111th and maybe later bolstered by the 112th (or whatever), both rested and fresh from the Belorussian border. Instead, UKR is force to pull one act of desparation after another. It almost looks as if they just don't have any strategic reserves, at all.
The underlying issue, at least to me, seems to be that RU has been running circles around UKR in terms of force generation for basically all of 2023 and ongoing. They may use these forces inefficently, but are able have brigade after brigade mauled while storming some fortress town, while UKR is forced to send the same couple of fire brigade units from hot spot to hot spot. The fact that UKR is basically cut off from foreign assistance and is likely going to be for the foreseeable future does not help in this matter, but their force generation issues seem to be a largely internal problem.

To me this looks more like desparation than sound military logic. Why throw a specialist assault unit into the fray after only a couple months rest to fend off long looming disaster at the last moment (and lose the fortress in the process), why throw in the 47th (basically already spent) right after the failed counter-offensive, why is a single brigade (110th) required to hold out in Avdiivka for 1.5yrs of war and 4 months of sustained assaults? If things were okayish, the 110th would have been pulled back sometime in October, replaced by the 111th and maybe later bolstered by the 112th (or whatever), both rested and fresh from the Belorussian border. Instead, UKR is force to pull one act of desparation after another. It almost looks as if they just don't have any strategic reserves, at all.
The underlying issue, at least to me, seems to be that RU has been running circles around UKR in terms of force generation for basically all of 2023 and ongoing. They may use these forces inefficently, but are able have brigade after brigade mauled while storming some fortress town, while UKR is forced to send the same couple of fire brigade units from hot spot to hot spot. The fact that UKR is basically cut off from foreign assistance and is likely going to be for the foreseeable future does not help in this matter, but their force generation issues seem to be a largely internal problem.

Verdun is a small town with a population of 16k people, during WW1 it had less. The relative amount of forces present and their casulties over time make it important. Bakhmut was the biggest battle of this war on these scales. You may define success as trading the city and tens of thousand of the best soldiers for a bunch more convicts, I dont. And I doubt in any negotiation, convicts will play a role, cities will.
Now as for the long run implications - major US support and all the old war soviet EU stocks, + few whatever could be spared modern stuff the EU sent caused a stalemate. Now, US ends support and EU stocks are as empty as before. 
I dont say tank > drone.
My original point below the article was about "UA MIC" replaycing ALL the stuff. That includes SAM launchers, HMMWVS, shells, and so on. Every day I see Fundraisers to buy used unarmored cars for frontline MedEvac! So clearly, whatever there is it is not enough, now US cuts support and UA should just magically poof underground mass facilities to replace it all.
As for the need of tanks, IFVs, I say it is needed, for such a task, where a key defensive point cannot be taken by drones alone or where drones cannot even support properly. If the UA should ever be in a position to attack in such conditions, it needs vehicles, of all sorts.
As for drones, we can spin the same argument. russia is building assembly line factories way outside, these large facilities would be the focal point of any missile barrage, unless UA gets the SAM coverage to defend such facilities its unrealistic to expect more than hand soldering production in a shed or basement somewhere with parts ordered online or 3d printed with 300 euro retail printers. 
It is very significant in the defence of Avdiivka and was fought over very hard. As for Avdiivka, it is the entrance towards Donetsk, somewhat relevant no? Regardless, repeating "unsignificant" for every village, city that is lost is not a solution.
What UA needs and gets have been 2 different things for 2 years, I dont think that will change any time soon.
Are you seriously saying the US will actually build up a UA MIC? After republicans made Biden throw the towel and end support?? 
Besides claiming the 6+ mine thrawlers were going to breach 10km minebelts with drones every bush? All the kit that was needed.. and training that didnt include drones at all.. I remember you saying even a full nato suite of specialised vehicles would have a tough time breaching these lines. On top of the russian reserves, that turned out to be in the thousands while UA can count its working Leopards with 1 hand

Yes, its up to Europe now, because as I said, the US will not built a UA ((underground)) MIC to sustain this attrition war on the same level with russian MIC. 
Its a dumb talking point so their press conference is not just "youre on your own, but we support you in our hearts". 

Regarding the recent news about the death of Chinese citizen Zhao Rui, who participated in the Russian Army, renowned pro-Russian war correspondent Lu Yuguang has compiled and published the following article based on accounts from Zhao Rui's teammates.
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Sorry for the late reply, I rarely take part in the discussions in this thread due to time constraints and the fast moving nature of things, but didn't wan't to leave this thoughtful response unanswered.
I agree with this somewhat, the fighting in that region over the summer were clearly much less mechanized in nature and I think the (absolute) vehicle loss figures serve as a good indicator for this, as well. And indeed, assuming proportional relationship between vehicle and personell losses is just a guess, but we don't really have any better metric, do we. Every other piece of evidence is, at best anectodal.
I'd say its not so much taking absence of evidence as evidence of absence, but rather saying that there is simply not sufficient evidence backing the rather extraordinary claim that Ukraine somehow did actually really well during their offensive, destroying Russian reserves, inflicting casualties at desirable ratios and almost achieving a breakthrough into the operational rear.  Even if we ignore, that there is very little historical precedent for an attacking side inflicting higher casualties than they themselves suffer during an (failed) offensive against strong fortifications*. Although I suspect you'd be able to find some counter-examples, like Sevastopol 42, Kursk 43 (maybe, not sure) and perhaps some of the PTO island battles pre-Peleliu. But for the case Ukraine's 2023 summer offensive, the nature of the fighting and, ultimately, the fact that it failed I simply to not see this as a likely or plausible possibility. Grinding through mine belts and fortified tree lines for months on end with mainly light infantry, no air support and eventually having to give up after become simply too worn down to continue simply does not speak for any of the above claims.
BTW, one aspect we do have pretty good evidence off, are the unusually high losses of Russian artillery over the summer and, if I am not mistaken, the seemingly endless stream of videos showing 2S7s getting blown up by GMLRS and others started pretty much right after the offensive kicked off. But why then is there no (or rather so little) drone footage of slaughtered Russian counterattacks? I am not saying, they didn't happen at all, but rather that the Ukrainians probably overstated their significance/frequency and how destructive they were for the Russian forces involved.
Also, regarding Ukraine's (social) media policies and "media blackouts" in particular, I have a hunch that they have been rather pragmatic about it right from the start. When they are spanking the Russians we get lots of videos and when the going gets tough, e.g., during the Russian (early) summer offensive 2022, the early stage Kherson (counter-)offensive and now the big 2023 (UKR) summer offensive, very little gets released. I find this explanation more reasonable than a deliberate media blackout for certain operations that sort of wanes over time.
* Yes, arguments involving historical analogues are also not flawless.
I think I've seen this argument a couple of times here but I'm not sure why this would supposedly be the case. If I am not mistaken the argument was, that DPR guys would somehow mutiny, if they were deployed outside off their little faux-republic? If this is indeed the argument, I find it both highly illogical and refuted by the fact that these guys have been deployed all over the place many times before. D/LNR soldiers were left as expendable rear guard/cannon fodder during the first Kharkiv counter-offensive (the one in spring, when they retook Trostyanets), they manned the front line in Zaphorizia in fall of 2022 (as per Murz IIRC) and at least some of their more regular units (and probably Mobiks as well) bore the initial brunt of the 2023 summer offensive, at least in some places. There were some complaints by D/LNR soldiers rather early in the war about being deployed outside of Donetzk/Luhansk, but when do Russians not complain? And when has it lead to them not wanting to be sent into the meatgrinder?
I also (still) hope that at they will break at some point, eventually, but somehow I doubt that being sent to die outside of their particular region is going to be the catalyst for it. Besides, weren't the D/LNR armies officially integrated into the RuAF and, in fact, their "republics" into the RF? I'd assume this takes the wind out of their pathetic legalistic complaint videos and suffice for a couple of extra months of pointless meat assaults ...
If I am reading you right, this is basically the core of your argument. That UKR was close to achieving a localized collapse (which may be true for all we know) and that moving reserves from Luhansk/Donetzk in a timely manner would have been to difficult to pull of, logistically and/or in C2C terms. Given the institutional culture of lying and general incompetence in the Russian command that could also well be true. But ultimately, I think one only has to presume the tiniest capacity for realistic assessment of the state of their own troops for the Russian command to anticipate any upcoming crumbling of their lines and to move an extra brigade every other week and put the lid on the whole thing. This is different from the rapid fall 2022  (Kharkiv) counter-offensive, when there simply weren't any reserves anywhere and the front had to be thread-bare in many places for them to be able to grind through Donetzk. But that was before mobilization plus a comfy cushion of 20k+ well-paid meatsacks per month to plug whatever gap needs plugging.

This is precisely the point where my own impression is the exact opposite of yours. I'd really like to what you base this on, because I am pretty sure we all here have looked at the same footage and accounts and I distinctly do *not* remember seeing images of literal fields full of Russian corpses and entire armored columns smashed to bits like we saw during the last month. All I can think of are one or two clips of Russian infantry retreating on foot from this or that bombed out tiny village while getting a couple of cluster rounds on their heads. In fact, the few concrete sources, that we have access to, also indicate pretty much the exact opposite I'd argue. Personnel losses are basically impossible to reliably estimate from only OSINT sources and for vehicle losses, which are easier to track, the figures indicate at best a 1:1 loss ratio. Below is the only source I've seen so far that explicitly tries to track the losses during the southern offensive.
(The fighting around Bakhmut I find harder to judge since it has been, at least in my perception, almost entirely infantry centric.)
 
So give or take 500 armored vehicles lost by each time between June and October (when the intensity of the fighting decreased notably I'd say). Contrast that with ~220 vehicles lost by Russia in less than a month at Avdiivka, basically half of what they lost in the Zaporizhia direction, in a much shorter timeframe and a ridiculously lopsided fashion. I don't see that as comparable, at all.
https://x.com/naalsio26/status/172310590066203058
I find it incredible enough that Ukraine apparently has managed to kill/destroy Russians as efficiently as they did, all while assaulting the most heavily fortified positions one can think of, but to say that they came out ahead militarily almost borders on wishful thinking in my opinion.

This is precisely the point where my own impression is the exact opposite of yours. I'd really like to what you base this on, because I am pretty sure we all here have looked at the same footage and accounts and I distinctly do *not* remember seeing images of literal fields full of Russian corpses and entire armored columns smashed to bits like we saw during the last month. All I can think of are one or two clips of Russian infantry retreating on foot from this or that bombed out tiny village while getting a couple of cluster rounds on their heads. In fact, the few concrete sources, that we have access to, also indicate pretty much the exact opposite I'd argue. Personnel losses are basically impossible to reliably estimate from only OSINT sources and for vehicle losses, which are easier to track, the figures indicate at best a 1:1 loss ratio. Below is the only source I've seen so far that explicitly tries to track the losses during the southern offensive.
(The fighting around Bakhmut I find harder to judge since it has been, at least in my perception, almost entirely infantry centric.)
 
So give or take 500 armored vehicles lost by each time between June and October (when the intensity of the fighting decreased notably I'd say). Contrast that with ~220 vehicles lost by Russia in less than a month at Avdiivka, basically half of what they lost in the Zaporizhia direction, in a much shorter timeframe and a ridiculously lopsided fashion. I don't see that as comparable, at all.
https://x.com/naalsio26/status/172310590066203058
I find it incredible enough that Ukraine apparently has managed to kill/destroy Russians as efficiently as they did, all while assaulting the most heavily fortified positions one can think of, but to say that they came out ahead militarily almost borders on wishful thinking in my opinion.

This is precisely the point where my own impression is the exact opposite of yours. I'd really like to what you base this on, because I am pretty sure we all here have looked at the same footage and accounts and I distinctly do *not* remember seeing images of literal fields full of Russian corpses and entire armored columns smashed to bits like we saw during the last month. All I can think of are one or two clips of Russian infantry retreating on foot from this or that bombed out tiny village while getting a couple of cluster rounds on their heads. In fact, the few concrete sources, that we have access to, also indicate pretty much the exact opposite I'd argue. Personnel losses are basically impossible to reliably estimate from only OSINT sources and for vehicle losses, which are easier to track, the figures indicate at best a 1:1 loss ratio. Below is the only source I've seen so far that explicitly tries to track the losses during the southern offensive.
(The fighting around Bakhmut I find harder to judge since it has been, at least in my perception, almost entirely infantry centric.)
 
So give or take 500 armored vehicles lost by each time between June and October (when the intensity of the fighting decreased notably I'd say). Contrast that with ~220 vehicles lost by Russia in less than a month at Avdiivka, basically half of what they lost in the Zaporizhia direction, in a much shorter timeframe and a ridiculously lopsided fashion. I don't see that as comparable, at all.
https://x.com/naalsio26/status/172310590066203058
I find it incredible enough that Ukraine apparently has managed to kill/destroy Russians as efficiently as they did, all while assaulting the most heavily fortified positions one can think of, but to say that they came out ahead militarily almost borders on wishful thinking in my opinion.

This is Mashovets I presume? Where the hell does this guy get his information from that he can cite enemy single-digit precision personel numbers? He too has become a source I've lost some trust in over time, especially after he claimed in June or July already that the Russians had to throw most of their strategic reserves into the South to hold the line or some similar nonsense.
Saw this yesterday already and felt incredibly saddened. My wife was still pregnant when this tragedy occurred and now our daughter is taking her first steps, while lies dead besides his. Words can not describe how much I hate this war.

This is Mashovets I presume? Where the hell does this guy get his information from that he can cite enemy single-digit precision personel numbers? He too has become a source I've lost some trust in over time, especially after he claimed in June or July already that the Russians had to throw most of their strategic reserves into the South to hold the line or some similar nonsense.
Saw this yesterday already and felt incredibly saddened. My wife was still pregnant when this tragedy occurred and now our daughter is taking her first steps, while lies dead besides his. Words can not describe how much I hate this war.

This is Mashovets I presume? Where the hell does this guy get his information from that he can cite enemy single-digit precision personel numbers? He too has become a source I've lost some trust in over time, especially after he claimed in June or July already that the Russians had to throw most of their strategic reserves into the South to hold the line or some similar nonsense.
Saw this yesterday already and felt incredibly saddened. My wife was still pregnant when this tragedy occurred and now our daughter is taking her first steps, while lies dead besides his. Words can not describe how much I hate this war.

This is Mashovets I presume? Where the hell does this guy get his information from that he can cite enemy single-digit precision personel numbers? He too has become a source I've lost some trust in over time, especially after he claimed in June or July already that the Russians had to throw most of their strategic reserves into the South to hold the line or some similar nonsense.
Saw this yesterday already and felt incredibly saddened. My wife was still pregnant when this tragedy occurred and now our daughter is taking her first steps, while lies dead besides his. Words can not describe how much I hate this war.

This is Mashovets I presume? Where the hell does this guy get his information from that he can cite enemy single-digit precision personel numbers? He too has become a source I've lost some trust in over time, especially after he claimed in June or July already that the Russians had to throw most of their strategic reserves into the South to hold the line or some similar nonsense.
Saw this yesterday already and felt incredibly saddened. My wife was still pregnant when this tragedy occurred and now our daughter is taking her first steps, while lies dead besides his. Words can not describe how much I hate this war.

But still, how does he get a number like "1589 personel"? I can only assume that he a) made it up or b) took some official TOE and multiplied it with some estimated percentage, in which case giving a single-digit precision number is at least ... kind of unprofessional I guess?

This is Mashovets I presume? Where the hell does this guy get his information from that he can cite enemy single-digit precision personel numbers? He too has become a source I've lost some trust in over time, especially after he claimed in June or July already that the Russians had to throw most of their strategic reserves into the South to hold the line or some similar nonsense.
Saw this yesterday already and felt incredibly saddened. My wife was still pregnant when this tragedy occurred and now our daughter is taking her first steps, while lies dead besides his. Words can not describe how much I hate this war.

This is Mashovets I presume? Where the hell does this guy get his information from that he can cite enemy single-digit precision personel numbers? He too has become a source I've lost some trust in over time, especially after he claimed in June or July already that the Russians had to throw most of their strategic reserves into the South to hold the line or some similar nonsense.
Saw this yesterday already and felt incredibly saddened. My wife was still pregnant when this tragedy occurred and now our daughter is taking her first steps, while lies dead besides his. Words can not describe how much I hate this war.

This is another thought that has bothered me lately: We saw over the course of the summer that Ukraine is able to effectively organize and synchronize actions in a given sector on a company to batallion scale, but not really larger than that. This has been first noted (and criticized) by Kofman et al, I believe. So for every day of the offensive there are at most a couple of company/batallion sized engagements. The Russians are mobilizing between 20,000 (UA/OSINT estimates) to 35,000 (Russian claims) men every month, though. Under these circumstances, can attriting the RU army through offensive action ever even be realistic possibility?

This is another thought that has bothered me lately: We saw over the course of the summer that Ukraine is able to effectively organize and synchronize actions in a given sector on a company to batallion scale, but not really larger than that. This has been first noted (and criticized) by Kofman et al, I believe. So for every day of the offensive there are at most a couple of company/batallion sized engagements. The Russians are mobilizing between 20,000 (UA/OSINT estimates) to 35,000 (Russian claims) men every month, though. Under these circumstances, can attriting the RU army through offensive action ever even be realistic possibility?

Does anybody else find this infuriating?
Setting aside the possibility that these are just the usual anonymous blabbermouths with their own agenda talking or that this is deliberate disinformation, but wasn't NATO (or the US or whoever) pressuring Ukraine just a couple of weeks ago to abandon their "casualty aversity" and throw everything at Tokmak to achieve a breakthrough? And now Ukraine should be thrown under the bus because they are running out of men? That being said, it does make me uneasy that Ukraine was apparently forced to send a brigade that was heavily involved in the Southern offensive (the 47th) straight into Avdiivka to plug gaps. This does not seem to indicate an abundance of fresh available reserves.
 
 
And to pile on to the pessimism of these days some more, here's Tatarigami_UA criticizing General Syrski for his conduct around Bakhmut, both for holding it during the winter and for trying to retake it during the Summer.

This is another thought that has bothered me lately: We saw over the course of the summer that Ukraine is able to effectively organize and synchronize actions in a given sector on a company to batallion scale, but not really larger than that. This has been first noted (and criticized) by Kofman et al, I believe. So for every day of the offensive there are at most a couple of company/batallion sized engagements. The Russians are mobilizing between 20,000 (UA/OSINT estimates) to 35,000 (Russian claims) men every month, though. Under these circumstances, can attriting the RU army through offensive action ever even be realistic possibility?

Does anybody else find this infuriating?
Setting aside the possibility that these are just the usual anonymous blabbermouths with their own agenda talking or that this is deliberate disinformation, but wasn't NATO (or the US or whoever) pressuring Ukraine just a couple of weeks ago to abandon their "casualty aversity" and throw everything at Tokmak to achieve a breakthrough? And now Ukraine should be thrown under the bus because they are running out of men? That being said, it does make me uneasy that Ukraine was apparently forced to send a brigade that was heavily involved in the Southern offensive (the 47th) straight into Avdiivka to plug gaps. This does not seem to indicate an abundance of fresh available reserves.
 
 
And to pile on to the pessimism of these days some more, here's Tatarigami_UA criticizing General Syrski for his conduct around Bakhmut, both for holding it during the winter and for trying to retake it during the Summer.