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TrapOne

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Everything posted by TrapOne

  1. I am picturing early episodes of The Unit.
  2. The US Marine Corps is replacing the M249 SAW with the M27, an automatic rifle with a 30-round magazine. http://www.military.com/news/article/corps-to-replace-saw-with-automatic-rifle.html As best as I can gather, the Marines are attracted to the automatic rifle's greater accuracy and reduced ammunition expenditure. There were also concerns about the difficulty of employing the heavy SAW in urban environments.
  3. Re: secondary sources, see two papers available online: House, Jonathan. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/house/house.asp Wilson, John B. MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER. THE EVOLUTION OF DIVISIONS AND SEPARATE BRIGADES. http://www.history.army.mil/books/Lineage/M-F/index.htm
  4. Surely over-long supply lines are a good thing, on balance, a sign that the fight's going in your favor?
  5. I do have to say: I've gotten so used to command delays, over the course of 10+ years, that I unconsciously expect them in the current game.
  6. Why make the software do this? The game insists on role-playing by the user. It's built around that role-playing, to a far greater extent than most games. You already have the means to limit an isolated squad's actions, and with greater fidelity than a software solution would offer. Just imagine yourself in the squad leader's position: what would he do? What could he know about?
  7. My issue: I can't actually see the terrain, especially under poor lighting conditions. A broader issue: providing this information solely through color/hue causes serious usability problems for people with visual impairment.
  8. Perhaps a toggle to show/hide setup zones? I find that the setup zones are, indeed, uniformly visible. Often they're so visible that I can hardly see the terrain that I'm setting up on.
  9. I find the vehicle's representation, in the TD/Cavalry units, to be quite reasonable: a four-man HQ that also crews the vehicle. It's the "single vehicle" M20s that are less useful. Yes, you can get a BAR or sharpshooter team into the vehicle, but not a three-man unit like a scout team, FO, or platoon HQ.
  10. I'm curious about why the M20 requires a crew of four. There's one ring-mounted machine gun. It's a vehicle whose value is mainly as battle taxi and as command post, but with the big crew, there are only two seats available for passengers. Not many teams will fit into that space.
  11. It's not as if I'm asking for a Sanitary Co. or anything.
  12. I would love to see an Engineer Forestry Co. and Engineer Aviation Camouflage Bn. for purchase in QBs.
  13. I'm looking for a PBEM opponent for CMBN. At the moment, interested in attack QBs with large size forces on medium or large maps. Mixed forces. Happy to play either side. I'm fairly slow in ability to play files - maybe one turn a day, on average.
  14. In the US Army, mechanization of antitank systems didn't begin postwar. It started with the creation of the Tank Destroyer arm. The TD people thought of their destroyers as exactly that: highly mobile antitank guns. Curiously enough, I was just looking through that same report a moment ago. The document is Employment of Four Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO, written by a committee at the Armored School at Fort Knox, and published in 1950. The committee is made up of captains and majors in a course at the school. It examines TD organization, and then examines four battalions in action. One of these cases looks at the 704th TD Battalion, supporting the 4th Armored near Arracourt, on 19 September 1944. A platoon of the 704th rushed from the rear to cover an unguarded key position and, there, single-handedly halted a German attack, destroying fifteen enemy tanks, for the loss of three TDs (probably mobility or firepower kills rather than total losses). The authors had this to say about the importance of maneuverability: The conclusion of the entire report includes these thoughts: And also: We are talking more about mobility in an operational sense, during approach marches - about the ability to move across difficult terrain, and to pass through other units.
  15. I'm talking about actually cross-attaching companies and platoons, so that the attached units become subordinates of new higher headquarters. Standard practice across the various armies and, indeed, built in to the very organizational structure of American armored divisions. I don't want one tank platoon from an medium tank battalion that's mostly been deleted, swanning around alongside an armored infantry company from an entirely different battalion. The platoon ought to be part of that company, under the company HQ for purposes of command and control.
  16. As someone working on scenarios involving mechanized cavalry and TDs, on large maps and in task-organized groups, I've got some probably pretty unusual wishes: - Ability to purchase radio jeeps and MMG/radio jeeps as individual vehicles. - Ability to purchase some vehicles, like jeeps, without crews. - Ability to purchase mortar halftracks and trucks carrying mortar ammunition. - Reduce M20 scout car crew from four - the same as the Greyhound's - to one or two. It's not clear to me what these four men are even doing, since the M20 is only armed with a single machine gun. There are six seats in an M20 but right now, the crew occupies four of them, meaning that few kinds of teams will even fit on board. - Allow crews to dismount the machine gun on armed jeeps; that machine gun gave cavalry troops most of their firepower when operating in defensive roles. - Allow cross-attachment of platoons and companies, in order to allow correct modeling of command and control within task forces. It should be possible to have a medium tank company under the command of an armored infantry battalion, for instance.
  17. Alas, I haven't been able to purchase radio-equipped jeeps (or jeeps with both a machine gun and a radio) in the editor.
  18. Probably an Apple PowerBook G3 (Bronze Keyboard). CPU a G3 in the range of 400 MHz; something like 6 GB of hard drive space; probably equipped with a DVD player, which was pretty snazzy.
  19. I'm fascinated with tank destroyer and mechanized cavalry organizations. I'm planning scenarios showcasing those kinds of forces, especially in roles like screening, delaying actions, and pursuits. Terrain built after real places, but "typical" forces not based on any particular event. I've had an idea for a fictional Blue vs. Blue campaign, "Bear Flag Republic," about California Republic forces defending against Federal troops that want to bring a seceded state back into the Union. California troops would be an ad-hoc task force of experienced National Guard units and hurriedly raised, lightly trained and underequipped militia. Greyhounds and halftracks would be the Tigers of this battlefield; an extra BAR team would fill in for a platoon of medium machine guns. Really this was an idea I had around CMSF, but I never got around to it; I'm on a Mac and didn't want to set up Boot Camp.
  20. There are different ways of parcelling out the TD battalion - by platoons to individual line battalions; by companies to regiments or combat commands, or to a line battalion on the attack; or with some companies held by division. (TDs providing indirect fire support, for instance, seem to have worked together as companies or battalions.) All seem to have been in use by different formations at different times. I'm interested, mainly, in not seeing the TD platoon modeled as a group of four tank destroyers. There is a reconnaissance company in a TD bn, identical to the division's organic cavalry reconnaissance company. In other words, attaching a TD bn to a div doubles the division's reconnaissance assets. The accounts I've seen show the TD recce co. being used, most of the time, in the same economy-of-force, security, screening, and occasional reconnaissance roles that the cavalry performed.
  21. I'm struck by the organization of the tank destroyer platoon - in particular, by how it contains its own scouting and dismounted security element. According to doctrine and at least sometimes in practice, the platoon commander and staff sergeant rode jeeps or .50 cal armored cars, rather than the M10/M18/M36. How does CMBN model the platoon? Do we get dismounts? Where's the platoon commander? In North Africa, a TD platoon contained two gun sections, of two vehicles each; a security section; an antiaircraft section; and the platoon command element. The organization grows simpler as equipment improves and experience grows. The T/O&Es for 1944 [1] give each TD platoon two gun sections, and a platoon headquarters and security section. Each gun section consists of two M10s, M18, or M36s each, for a total of four gun vehicles in the platoon. It's the headquarters and security section that I'm interested in. The section includes the platoon commander and the platoon's senior NCO. The men ride in two M20 armored utility cars, equipped with radios and .50 cal. machine guns, and in a jeep, with a .30 cal. machine gun. The officer and eleven men in the section are armed mostly with rifles or carbines. Five of those enlisted soldiers are listed as "riflemen." TD manuals make it clear that the security element exists to provide local protection and a basic scouting and reconnaissance capability. It seems to have been common for TD men to dismount machine guns from vehicles, for added firepower in the defense. The T/O&Es suggest that the platoon commander was meant to ride an M20 or a jeep, not one of the TDs. A 1950 Armor School report reviews actions fought by four TD battalions, spending time looking at a platoon scale. One section, about the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion in Normandy, in Aug. 1944, says this: The "5 tank destroyers" looks like just a typo in the report. The TD platoon looks more and more like a fascinating little combined-arms organization. Contemporary accounts give the impression that TD soldiers thought of their machines as mobile guns rather than as fighting vehicles, something probably encouraged by training and by leaders coming from field artillery backgrounds. Even towed guns, when operated by tank destroyer units, get referred to as TDs. It all suggests a different way of thinking of firepower and the use of terrain, one very different from the armored force mentality. [1] War Department. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 18-27: Tank Destroyer Gun Company, Tank Destroyer Battalion, Self-Propelled. (Washington, DC, 15 March 1944) [2] Jackson, William F. et al. The Employment of Four Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO. (Fort Knox, Ky.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1950), 71.
  22. I would hesitate to describe the rout of overextended, green divisions and a cavalry screen as a notable feat of arms. You do realize that the regular American divisions on the flanks held their ground, grinding ineffectual German attacks to pieces, wrecking the opposing forces, and reducing the German advance to a pale mockery of the plan? largely because of the efforts of line infantry, artillery, TDs, and engineers? And you are aware that the defense of Bastonge started with regular old armored troops? Not just those elite paras?
  23. Would this be an appropriate time to enquire about the number of horse-drawn field kitchens that a medium-capacity wooden bridge can accommodate? Edit: I'm pretty sure that I joined the forum in 2001. I'm not some crazy person who does nothing but read archived threads about improbable vehicle combinations.
  24. What's the arrangement for keys to military vehicles, anyway?
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