Retributar

I '2nd' that Blashy!.

Messerschmitt Me-262 http://www.2worldwar2.com/me-262.htm Feb. 1945 - The night-fighter version of the Me-262 makes its debut. The small jet night fighter unit has just 10 aircraft, and it flies a total of just 70 sorties until the end of the war, but they shoot down 48 allied aircraft, including 43 Mosquitoes. March 1945 - JG7, the world's first jet fighter wing makes it debut, shooting down six american heavy bombers and two fighters for one Me-262 lost. Two weeks later, in the last big air combat over germany, Berlin is bombarded by 1200 american heavy bombers escorted by 14 fighter wings. Although terribly outnumbered, the Me-262 jets of JG7 shoot down 25 heavy bombers and five fighters. ------- The ME 262 was an exceptional interceptor...but, was also capable of shooting down fighters as well...even though it was not really suited as a fighter-plane.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/jul-aug/becker.htm The Role of Synthetic Fuel The United States is faced with an acute energy problem. Our dependence on imported petroleum, which accounts for half of the country’s consumption, has caused rising balance of payments deficits that weaken the dollar and contribute to inflation. More worrisome in the long run for the future of this country is the realization that eventually most oil deposits, both foreign and domestic, will be depleted. This grim specter is accompanied by a lack of control over foreign supplies, leaving us dependent on the goodwill and mercy of the oil-producing states. There are, of course, other sources from which energy can be derived, sources such as nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, solar and thermal power, and the like. But for the foreseeable future they either present many environmental threats or are not yet sufficiently developed to replace our dependence on foreign oil supplies. A sensible energy policy for the time being no doubt would rely on many different sources of energy until a more efficient, effective, and safe method has emerged. Such an approach will include the production of synthetic fuel derived from coal. This method was first effectively used by the Germans during World War II, so an examination of Germany’s situation at that time could be instructive. As a highly developed industrial state, Germany was dependent even in peacetime on external sources for an adequate supply of oil. Even though Germany’s 1938 oil consumption of little more than 44 million barrels was considerably less than Great Britain’s 76 million barrels, Russia’s 183 million barrels, and the one billion barrels used by the United States, in wartime Germany’s needs for an adequate supply of liquid fuel would be absolutely essential for successful military operations on the ground and, even more so, in the air.1 For Germany, it was precisely the outbreak of the war in 1939 and the concurrent termination of overseas imports that most endangered its ability to conduct mobile warfare. German oil supplies came from three different sources: imports of crude and finished petroleum products from abroad, production by domestic oil fields, and syntheses of petroleum products from coal. In 1938, of the total consumption of 44 million barrels, imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels or roughly 60 percent of the total supply. An additional 3.8 million barrels were imported overland from European sources (2.8 million barrels came from Romania alone), and another 3.8 million barrels were derived from domestic oil production. The remainder of the total, 9 million barrels, were produced synthetically. Although the total overseas imports were even higher in 1939 before the onset of the blockade in September (33 million barrels), this high proportion of overseas imports only indicated how precarious the fuel situation would become should Germany be cut off from them.2 At the outbreak of the war, Germany’s stockpiles of fuel consisted of a total of 15 million barrels. The campaigns in Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France added another 5 million barrels in booty, and imports from the Soviet Union accounted for 4 million barrels in 1940 and 1.6 million barrels in the first half of 1941. Yet a High Command study in May of 1941 noted that with monthly military requirements for 7.25 million barrels and imports and home production of only 5.35 million barrels, German stocks would be exhausted by August 1941. The 26 percent shortfall could only be made up with petroleum from Russia. The need to provide the lacking 1.9 million barrels per month and the urgency to gain possession of the Russian oil fields in the Caucasus mountains, together with Ukrainian grain and Donets coal, were thus prime elements in the German decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941.3 The smallest of the Russian oil fields at Maikop was captured in August 1942, and it was expected that the two remaining fields and refineries in Grozny and Baku also would fall into German hands. Had the German forces been able to capture these fields and hold them, Germany’s petroleum worries would have been over. Prior to the Russian campaign, Maikop produced 19 million barrels annually, Grozny 32 million barrels, and Baku 170 million barrels.4 Grozny and Baku, however, were never captured, and only Maikop yielded to German exploitation. As was the case in all areas of Russian production, the retreating forces had done a thorough job of destroying or dismantling the usable installations; consequently, the Germans had to start from scratch. In view of past experience with this type of Russian policy, such destruction was expected, and Field Marshal Hermann Göring’s staff had begun making the necessary preparations in advance. But a shortage of transport that was competing with military requirements, a shortage of drill equipment as well as drillers, and the absence of refining capacity at Maikop created such difficulties that when the German forces were compelled to withdraw from Maikop in January 1943 in order to avoid being cut off after the fall of Stalingrad, Germany had failed to obtain a single drop of Caucasian oil. Nevertheless, the Germans were able to extract about 4.7 million barrels from the Soviet Union, a quantity that they would have received anyway under the provisions of the friendship treaty of 1939.5 Even before the Russian prospects had come to naught, Romania had developed into Germany’s chief overland supplier of oil. From 2.8 million barrels in 1938, Romania’s exports to Germany increased to 13 million barrels by 1941,6 a level that was essentially maintained through 1942 and 1943.7 Although the exports were almost half of Romania’s total production, they were considerably less than the Germans expected. One reason for the shortfall was that the Romanian fields were being depleted. There were other reasons as well why the Romanians failed to increase their shipments. Foremost among these was Germany’s inability to make all of its promised deliveries of coal and other products to Romania. Furthermore, although Romania was allied with Germany, the Romanians wished to husband their country’s most valuable resources.8 Finally, the air raids on the Ploesti oil fields and refineries in August 1943 destroyed 50 percent of the Romanian refinery capacity. Aerial mining of the Danube River constituted an additional serious transportation impediment. Even so, Romanian deliveries amounted to 7 million barrels in the first half of 1944 and were not halted until additional raids on Ploesti had been flown in the late spring and summer of 1944.9 Even with the addition of the Romanian deliveries, overland oil imports after 1939 could not make up for the loss of overseas shipments. In order to become less dependent on outside sources, the Germans undertook a sizable expansion program of their own meager domestic oil pumping. Before the annexation of Austria in 1938, oil fields in Germany were concentrated in northwestern Germany. After 1938, the Austrian oil fields were available also, and the expansion of crude oil output was chiefly effected there. Primarily as a result of this expansion, Germany’s domestic output of crude oil increased from approximately 3.8 million barrels in 1938 to almost 12 million barrels in 1944.10 Yet the production of domestic crude oil never equaled in any way the levels attained by Germany’s other major supplier of oil, the synthetic fuel plants. Inasmuch as natural oil deposits in Germany were so few, long before the war efforts had been made to discover synthetic methods of producing gasoline and oil. In view of the country’s wealth of coal, it was logical to look in this direction for a solution. Both coal and petroleum are mixtures of hydrocarbons, and the problem was how best and most efficiently to isolate these elements from the coal and transmute them into oil. By the time Hitler became chancellor in 1933, four methods of achieving this were either available or in early stages of perfection. The first process produced benzol, a byproduct of coking. Benzol was used as a fuel in admixture with gasoline. The drawback to increased production of benzol was the fact that it was tied to the quantities of coke that were needed at any given time, and these in turn were determined by the production limits of crude iron. The second method produced a distillate from lignite coal. Brown or soft coal was gently heated, and the tars and oil were then extracted and distilled into fuel. The end product was of such low quality, however, that only 10 percent could be used as gasoline, with the remaining 90 percent useful only as heating oil and diesel fuel. A third formula, the Fischer-Tropsch process, was, at that time, still in the research and testing stage. Under this system, coal is compressed into gas which is mixed with hydrogen. By placing this mixture in contact ovens and adding certain catalysts, oil molecules are formed. Further treatment of this primary substance generates fuel, chiefly diesel oil. Coking and distillation extracted oils and tars from coal, and additional cracking refined them into gasoline. The Fischer-Tropsch process and a fourth method, the hydrogenation process, changed coal directly into gasoline. As coal is a hydrocarbon containing little hydrogen and gasoline is a hydrocarbon with a high hydrogen content, the problem consisted of attaching hydrogen molecules to coal, thereby liquefying it. This was the basis of the hydrogenation process, which required high temperatures and high pressures. By 1933, this method had been thoroughly tested and was ready for large-scale practical application. The advantage of the hydrogenation method was that as primary material it could use the tars from the distillation of both lignite and bituminous coal (although the distillation of the latter was not possible on a large scale until 1943) as well as lignite and bituminous coal directly.11 When the Germans in the 1920s first began considering other sources of fuel, they did so for three reasons. First, the blockade during World War I had taught them how dependent they were on imports of a myriad of essential raw materials and how vulnerable this dependence made them. Second, because of the lost war and the ensuing economic difficulties, Germany was short of hard foreign exchange required for the purchase of foreign oil. And third, rumors were rampant in the world that proven reserves were about to run out. This last worry disappeared with new finds, but the second motive in particular, shortage of foreign exchange, remained and grew under Hitler. It was also Hitler’s determination to make Germany independent from outside sources.12 Furthermore, Germany’s leadership increasingly was concerned with the requirements of a war economy, and after 1938 these concerns occupied a substantial position. Prior to this time, five hydrogenation plants had been constructed, one of which was based on bituminous coal treatment. This plant, Scholven, was located in the Ruhr area; the other four plants at Leuna, Böhlen, Magdeburg, and Zeitz were located in central Germany, adjacent to lignite deposits. The total output of the plants in 1937 was 4.8 million barrels of various grades of petroleum fuels.13 In October 1936, the first of several plans for increased oil production was formulated. It envisioned a production of 36 million barrels of petroleum fuels by October 1938.14 The plan was twice revised, in May and again in December 1937, but the changes did not involve an increase in projected production. They were concerned chiefly with changes in the output mix, allowing for a hefty quantity of aviation fuel, with other types of fuel being reduced.15 To accommodate this increased production, the plants at Scholven and Zeitz were to be expanded, and four new hydrogenation plants were to be erected at Gelsenkirchen, Welheim, and Wesseling in the Ruhr and at Pölitz near Stettin on the Baltic Sea. The scheduled construction time for these projects was 18 months, a goal that turned out to be rather unrealistic. Even more unrealistic were the completion dates assigned to twelve Fischer-Tropsch plants with relatively low production goals; they were to be finished by 1 April 1938. By 1945 only nine of them were operational; they reached their maximum capacity in 1943 with less than 2.8 million barrels.16 Production goals were altered again in the summer of 1938 when Göring set up a new program whose completion was to coincide with the completion of rearmament in 1942-43, in keeping with the plans revealed by Hitler in his November 1937 conference. Greater armaments required larger amounts of fuel, and the so-called Revised Economic Production Plan of 1938 reflected the new needs. Göring called for the production in 1942-43 of almost 88 million barrels of various types of fuels and lubricants. But it was not long before it was realized that a program of such dimensions would require construction steel quantities that simply were not available in an already straitened economy. After several further revisions, the final one of January 1939 called for a production in 1943 of 68 million barrels. The quantities for all fuels were reduced except aviation gasoline, which was to be produced at 100 percent of the amounts provided in Göring’s plan of 1938.17 It was aviation gasoline that played the crucial role in the hydrogenation plant construction program. By the early 1930s, automobile gasoline had an octane reading of 40 and aviation gasoline of 75-80. Aviation gasoline with such high octane numbers could only be refined through a process of distillation of high-grade petroleum. Germany’s domestic oil was not of this quality. Only the lead additive tetraethyl could raise the octane to a maximum of 87. The license for the production of this additive was acquired in 1935 from the American holder of the patents, but without high-grade oil even this additive was not very effective. Hydrogenation promised a way out. It allowed a gasoline with an octane reading of 60 to 72, and thus high antiknock properties, to be manufactured. With the aid of lead tetraethyl, the octane reading could be raised to 87. High octane gasoline was important, as its antiknock characteristics determined the compression ratio of an engine that used the fuel, and the compression ratio in turn determined the engine’s power.18 A breakthrough in gasoline production occurred in the United States in 1935 when it became technically possible to produce isooctane with a reading of 100 in large quantities. By 1939, both the American and English air forces had begun to use the improved gasoline, and their planes could then be equipped with correspondingly stronger engines. In Germany, also, a method had been discovered to manufacture such a high-test gasoline, but the process was much more complex, cumbersome, and expensive than the American method, which used different primary materials. Due to these difficulties in production, the Luftwaffe until the end of 1938 neglected to insist on the production of high-octane fuel. For this reason until 1945 the German Air Force had no fuel equal to that available in the English-speaking countries.19 How important the new aviation fuel was is demonstrated by the improved performance it made possible: 15 percent higher speed, a 1500-mile longer range for bombers, and an increased altitude of 10,000 feet. Göring attempted to make amends for the past neglect at the end of 1938 when he demanded that the 19 million barrels of aviation fuel included in the Revised Economic Production Plan be manufactured as high-test gasoline equivalent to the quality of isooctane.20 As it was, only two small test plants were in operation when the war broke out in 1939 with a total production of 63,000 barrels per year. The shortage of both steel and manpower had delayed the completion of the full construction program of hydrogenation plants. At the beginning of the war, seven plants were in operation, three were in advanced stages of construction, and two others were barely begun. With the exception of four plants for the production of high-octane aviation fuel, no other plants were established after September 1939.21 Even the completion of the plants under construction was not pushed as much as might have been possible. The delay resulted from the competition for essential raw materials, many of which needed to be channeled directly into armaments, and the optimistic forecasts by the High Command. With respect to the first reason, Germany’s armaments blanket was simply too thin when the war broke out and instead of broadening Germany’s armaments base it became necessary to supply the existing plants so that they could produce arms at an optimal rate.22 The second reason was based on Germany’s initial successes in the war. Estimated requirements for warfare proved to be highly inflated, and the booty acquired from the conquered countries caused stockpiles to be accumulated which, barring unforeseen circumstances, were regarded by the Armed Forces Economic Office as satisfactory through 1941.23 But the operations in Soviet Russia in 1941 and 1942 reduced stockpiles radically, and after the summer of 1942 the German armed forces and the German economy had to draw almost solely from direct production.24 When it was suggested that one of the meetings of the Central Planning Board be devoted to the fuel situation, Albert Speer cut the discussion short by stating: "We need only a very limited briefing. We know how bad the situation is."25 In fact, Speer was partially responsible for the grave fuel situation; soon after his appointment in February 1942 he had curtailed the overall construction program, including that of the hydrogenation plants. It seemed to him that because of the raw material shortages it was not practical to build plants that would be in operation only several years hence. Immediate needs had priority. Only toward the end of 1943 was an effort made once more to force the expansion of hydrogenation plants.26 Still, between 1938 and 1943, synthetic fuel output underwent a respectable growth from 10 million barrels to 36 million. The percentage of synthetic fuels compared to the yield from all sources grew from 22 percent to more than 50 percent by 1943. The total oil supplies available from all sources for the same period rose from 45 million barrels in 1938 to 71 million barrels in 1943.27 In spite of shortages and other difficulties, production and supply, although never reaching the amounts contemplated by Göring, presented no serious problems until the spring of 1944.28 This was accomplished by giving no claimant, including the armed forces, all of the fuel that he needed. A good example is the ruthless reduction in the allocation for civilian passenger cars. The only people permitted to operate a motor vehicle were doctors, midwives, policemen, and high government and party officials. Their total allocation was only 450,000 barrels per year. German agriculture was allotted 1.7 million barrels of fuel per year for 1941 and 1942. The farmers actually required more fuel in 1942 than in 1941 because so many horses had been requisitioned for the armed forces that it was necessary to operate more tractors. In the spring of 1942, the Agency for Generators was established to effectuate the conversion of vehicles from liquid to solid fuels.29 A conversion to such fuels as wood chips, anthracite coal, lignite coal, coke, gas, and peat moss was expected to yield substantial savings in gasoline. During 1942, the saving amounted to 5 million barrels, and in 1943 it reached 8.2 million barrels.30 Thousands of cars and trucks were converted and equipped with devices shaped like water heaters, which graced trunks and truck beds. Yet however great the savings were, they were insufficient in themselves to alter the perennial fuel shortage. In the autumn of 1942 there appeared to be only two ways in which fuel production could be enlarged. One was to secure the Russian oil fields, but as we have seen that expectation quickly evaporated; the other was to increase the number and output of hydrogenation plants. Such a plan was devised late in 1942, projecting an annual production of synthetic fuel of 60 million barrels by 1946.31 Yet when the effort was finally made toward the end of 1943, it was decidedly too late for any improvements. The onset of Allied air attacks on the hydrogenation plants in May 1944 foiled all expectations and sounded the death knell For the German war machine. The first massive raid was flown on 12 May 1944 and directed against five plants. Other raids followed successively and continued into the spring of 1945. The severity of the raids was immediately recognized by the Germans. Between 30 June 1944 and 19 January 1945, Albert Speer directed five memoranda to Hitler which left no doubt about the increasingly serious situation. Speer pointed out that the attacks in May and June had reduced the output of aviation fuel by 90 percent. It would require six to eight weeks to make minimal repairs to resume production, but unless the refineries were protected by all possible means, coverage of the most urgent requirements of the armed forces could no longer be assured. An unbridgeable gap would be opened that must perforce have tragic consequences.32 Continued attacks also negatively influenced the output of automotive gasoline, diesel fuel, Buna, and methanol, the last an essential ingredient in the production of powder and explosives. If, Speer warned, the attacks were sustained, production would sink further, the last remaining reserve stocks would be consumed, and the essential materials for the prosecution of a modern technological war would be lacking in the most important areas.33 In his final report, Speer noted that the undisturbed repair and operation of the plants were essential prerequisites for further supply, but the experience of recent months had shown that this was impossible under existing conditions.34 Behind Speer’s warnings was his awareness that once production of fuels was substantially curtailed, once reserves and the fuel in the distribution system were depleted, the Germans would be finished and the end could be predicted with almost mathematical accuracy.35 In a way, Speer was merely echoing the prophetic utterance of Field Marshal Erhard Milch from the summer of 1943: The hydrogenation plants are our most vulnerable spots; with them stands and falls our entire ability to wage war. Not only will planes no longer fly, but tanks and submarines also will stop running if the hydrogenation plants should actually be attacked.36 A perfect example of this was the amount of aviation fuel allotted to the training of pilots. Toward the last nine months of the war, they were sent into combat with only one-third of the training hours actually required.37 What was left of the hydrogenation plants after the war barely survived for a few more years, if only for the mundane purpose of refining imported crude oil. By 1964, the oil boom in full swing, the plants ceased to be competitive. The technological lead once enjoyed by Germany was assumed by South Africa. Determined not to be at the mercy of unfriendly oil-producing states, the South African government decided to rely on conversion of coal to gasoline. In April 1980 the Republic of South Africa began to operate the second of three Fischer-Tropsch plants. They are the largest and only commercial oil-from-coal refineries in the world, and by 1985 they will supply half of the country’s fuel needs.38 The Germans also are back in the game. A pilot plant for the liquefaction of coal is being constructed in the Ruhr, and on becoming operational in the spring of 1981 it will have a capacity for converting 75,000 tons of coal annually into 157,000 barrels of light and medium oil and liquid gas. Early in 1980 the West German government approved an ambitious program involving the construction of 14 large plants for the liquefaction and gasification of coal, requiring the investment of $7 billion by 1993. By 1986 the Germans expect to satisfy 10 percent of their current gasoline needs in this fashion.39 This, of course, is a hopeful sign for the United States. With respect to foreign exchange, dependence on others, and more than adequate coal deposits at home, there exist some remarkable similarities between the United States today and the Germany of the 1930s and 1940s when it comes to synthetic fuel production. It was the dearth of foreign exchange after World War I that motivated the Germans to search for alternative supplies of fuels; the current annual expenditure by the United States of $90 billion which alone creates our gigantic balance-of-payments deficit is a parallel phenomenon. While the dollar is still recognized and accepted as a principal currency—unlike the German mark after 1918—our huge payments for imported petroleum constitute a devastating hemorrhage of national substance, glut the foreign money markets with increasingly devalued dollars, and create inflation at home and indebtedness overseas. Just as Germany then and now was dependent on outside sources for its supply of liquid energy, so the United States today is forced to rely on foreign suppliers for approximately half its fuel needs. This dependence jeopardizes America’s ability to act free from intimidation and circumscription in matters of foreign policy. Economically, the latitude of OPEC to raise oil prices at will has immediate and, in the long run, intolerable implications for this country. However, the vast coal deposits in the United States afford this country an incomparably better opportunity to become largely energy-independent than Germany with its coal, beds had in the 1930s and 1940s or even now. In contrast to this country, Germany’s coal reserves are virtually depleted, and what is left is difficult and costly to extract. The price of a ton of coal in Germany currently is $100, compared to $25 per ton in the United States.40 Different methods need to be applied in producing synthetic fuels, depending on the type of raw material used and the end-product desired. Whatever scientific-technical approach will ultimately be deemed preferable, there is no doubt that from a purely technological point of view this country can assure itself of adequate supplies of fuel in relatively short order.41 The actual problem is not one of technology so much as one of political responsibility, courage, will, and wisdom on the part of the administration and the United States Congress. The approval of a $20 billion synthetic fuel program by the United States Congress is a first, cautious step in the right direction. Anyone who might be appalled at the sums which need to be invested—the $20 billion is only part of a total of $88 billion to be expended for this purpose—need only remind himself, however, that at the present time we spend more than that total amount every year for imported petroleum. A word of caution, though. The magnitude of the problem facing this country has another dimension that should not be underestimated. At the peak of their synthetic fuel production in 1943, when half of their economy and their armed forces ran on synthetic fuel, the Germans produced 36,212,400 barrels of fuel a year. At current rates of imported fuel alone, that quantity in this country would last all of four and one-half days! University of South Carolina

http://www.linksnorth.com/canada-history/canadaandworldwar2.html Canada and World War II: Within three months an entire division of the new Canadian Active Service Force had been transported to the United Kingdom, and an agreement had been announced for a British Commonwealth Air Training Plan to be centered in Canada. This project alone trained more than 131,000 aircrew personnel for the Commonwealth. Canada contributed 72,800 pilots, navigators, aerial gunners and bombardiers, and flight engineers. These Canadians saw service in almost every theater of war. The Royal Canadian Navy was increased from fewer than a dozen vessels to more than 400. It served primarily as an antisubmarine and convoy force in the North Atlantic. Some of its units were deployed from time to time as far away as the Mediterranean and the Pacific. The forces under the command of Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton were required to spend a long and frustrating period on vital guard duty in Britain throughout the period of greatest threat of German invasion. Elsewhere abroad, two Canadian battalions sent to Hong Kong in 1941 were overrun when the colony was captured by the Japanese at the end of that year. The first engagement of the enemy by Canadian forces based in England occurred in 1942 in a courageous, but terribly costly, commando-type raid against Dieppe. In the summer of 1943 Canadian troops were sent into action with the British in the successful assault against Sicily, whence they carried the campaign to the Italian mainland. Early in 1945 the Canadians were withdrawn from Italy to permit reunification of the Canadian Army in northwestern Europe. The climax of the war had already come, however, with the Normandy landings in June 1944, in which the Canadian Army played an important part. Instrumental in the capture of Caen, which followed, the Canadians won another major victory in the closing of the Falaise gap later the same summer. In the costly and difficult battle of the Scheldt estuary that autumn, the Canadians cleared the sea passage to Antwerp, already in Allied hands. In the bitter battle along the Hochwald Ridge in February 1945, Canadian losses were extremely heavy. This battle opened the final attack across the Rhine, which was a prelude to the unconditional surrender by Germany on May 7, 1945. All persons over 16 years of age were required to take part in a national registration for war service, and compulsory military service for home defense only was introduced. Prime Minister King had assured the nation that there would be no conscription for overseas duty. As the war wore on, however, it became increasingly clear that the government needed to be released from the commitment. King accomplished this by a national plebiscite. All the provinces except Quebec voted in favor of conscription for overseas service if necessary. In 1944, after the Normandy invasion, the drain on manpower became so severe that draftees were sent overseas for the first time as reinforcements for the troops in Europe. The losses in the war overseas were complemented by economic gains on the homefront. War productivity effectively ended the Great Depression and greatly increased the labor force. Canadian workers produced raw materials, farm products, and manufactured goods needed to fight the war; and this was all done in a volume unprecedented in Canadian history. Industrialization was thus rapidly advanced, through both investment of capital and striking advances in technology.

http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v1/v1n1/ww2space.htm Weird Science: German Military Spacecraft of World War 2 In its operation, the Antipodal Bomber was a hybrid of aircraft and orbital spacecraft. It was to take off from a special rocket sled running on a monorail. When it reached 1640 ft/sec, it would lift off and climb to operational altitude in a steep, near-ballistic trajectory. But the Silver Bird would shut down its engines before attaining orbital velocity. It would sink back to earth until it bounced off the upper edge of the atmosphere. The bomber would proceed to the target like a stone skipping over the surface of a pond. After dropping its weapons, it would continue on around the globe to its base. As near as we know, the Sänger aerospace plane got no closer to the hardware stage than the afore- mentioned wind-tunnel models. Germany's other notable manned space venture, on the other hand, was a member of the V2 rocket family. Many of its elements were actually tested using sub-scale, V2 components. The A9/A10 project was a two-stage, hypersonic, semi-ballistic manned bomber with a planned 3000-mile range. Taking the aerodynamics of the experimental, winged A4b version of the V2 for their starting point, the engineers at Germany's Peenemünde rocket center added a pressurized cockpit, landing gear, flaps, ailerons, elevators, and a turbojet sustainer engine. They planned to mount this A9 on a huge A10 booster, in essence a V2 grown to monstrous proportions. The A9/A10 composite would take off vertically. After staging, the A9 component would follow a ballistic trajectory to the edge of space, 210 miles up. It would then fall back to earth until, 750 miles from its base, at an altitude of about 30 miles, and at speeds of over 8000 mph, the wingborne portion of the flight began. The A9 would approach its target in a high-Mach, unpowered glide. Forty-five minutes into the mission, it would release its modest one-ton bomb load, start the turbojet, and turn for home. The most ambitious and, perhaps, delusional of the Nazi space schemes was a 1945 project for an orbital space station armed with a death ray, a huge space mirror. In 1929, Herman Oberth had proposed a potentially practical space station that served as the basis for the later project. But the 1945 station was to be one giant mirror fabricated entirely from metallic sodium. Over-sized V2 rockets were to carry the thing to its 1500-mile orbit in prefabricated sections. Here, Nazi spacemen would assemble it , using electricity provided by a system of solar-fired boilers and steam-driven dynamos. Breathable oxygen would come from pumpkins grown under flourescent light. When they were finished, the crew would steer the station over target nations, focus the sun's rays, and burn cities and boil reservoirs. The space station is patently ridiculous, even today. It is hard to say how practical either of the rocket plane schemes could have been either, given the state of the art in the 1940s and the ever-worsening shortages of rare metals and petrochemicals. The German engineers appear to have grossly underestimated the thermal loads on a winged re-entry vehicle. These would not be on the order of an Apollo capsule, but they would still pose a formidable problem. Stainless steel might not be up to the job and was hard to fabricate. Titanium was still in the future. Inconel and the nimonic alloys that made the X-15 possible were still a few years away. Even now, the only working aerospace plane, the Space Shuttle, has to have ceramic tiles over all highly heated surfaces. Propulsion would also be a problem. As the new masters of German science, the US and USSR, discovered in the 1950s, V2-type engines could not simply be scaled up in the manner planned for the A10. Sänger-style, single-stage-to-orbit systems are still no more than a dream after sixty years. Even if the A9/A10 or the Antipodal Bomber had been built and made to work, one wonders what it would all be for. A paltry ton of high explosive could hardly have a measurable effect on the war. It could never justify either program's staggering cost in money, raw materials, and industrial capacity. Some writers have suggested that one or both was an intended delivery vehicle for a Nazi nuclear weapon. But the Nazis had no hope of fielding an A-bomb by 1944 or 1945. In any case, it would be decades before nuclear weapons could be had in 2000-4000 lb packages (the Hiroshima and Nagasaki weapons weighed in at around 10,000 lbs each). The Nazi space program is thus best understood as little more than a self-indulgent delusion, one of many that occupied Germany's bunker-bound leadership and self-serving intelligentsia as disaster and defeat overtook the nation they professed to lead.

http://www.ww2modelmaker.com/articlepub/matwar.htm The " MATERIAL WAR"…………what shortage? 'Some thought on the myth' Many authors have in the past only glanced at the results of the 'Raw Material War' and its effects on the German arms industry. The designers and technical experts in Germany during World War Two faced many restrictions on their skills and ideas; one of the greatest challenges was the shortage of raw materials and production equipment. There were shortages of important metals such as copper, chrome, nickel, molybdenum and vanadium, shortages of rubber and mineral oils, all combined to greatly effect 'normal' manufacturing practice. To make up for this, huge efforts were made to develop alternative materials, treatments and process. Armour plate requires many additives to the base iron to produce the quality required for tank production. Plate production required carbon, manganese, silicon, molybdenum, chromium and nickel as well as a quantity of iron ore not found in quantity in Germany. Although available in the most, these materials often could not be processed quickly enough for 'total war' production requirements. In February 1943 Gobbel's gave his famous 'Total War' speech, which started (although never to the extent as in the USA/USSR and the United Kingdom) to expand the workforce with female workers. Production was more carefully controlled with the appointment of Albert Speer to the production ministry. Materials use was a constant high priority and he had a major positive influence on the companies and their methods, savings had to be made quickly, he achieved surprising success. The early experience of shortages of materials during the late thirties had taught the German buyers to establish large stockpiles of the required materials in their raw form. Pressure by the 'Allied' nations after the Versailles Treaty was disregarded and put aside by Adolf Hitler. Pressure was increased as the shock waves of German military expansion spread throughout the world. Suffering shortages as early as 1936, programmes under the larger than life Herman Goering, were soon established to increase both home production of raw materials as well as barter systems with Germanys own allies and neutral states such as Sweden and Switzerland. The four year plan introduced by Goering established iron ore supplies from Sweden as well as production materials such as ball bearings. Finland supplied ores; Switzerland had major financial interest and provided much of the foreign currency required in exchange for goods and gold. (Much use was made of gold and valuables removed from the concentration camp inmates/victims, the extent of this perverse trade is still being uncovered today!). The main external sources for Nazi Germany's industry of war were: (excluding allies) Switzerland, Spain, Turkey and Sweden. War and expansion brought in the production of the occupied countries, Polish and French minerals, and oils from the Balkans and iron ore from Norway; all were quickly established and stockpiled. Certain materials were available internally, the 'unlimited' availability of these assisted but, there was also the problems of processing the materials. Increasing allied heavy bombing of production and processing plants caused enormous difficulties to these very easily identified (from the air) industries. Production of finished materials would again start to slip even when stockpiles or ore deliveries were increasing. Aluminium Aluminium, vital in engines for example, was initially imported from Yugoslavia and Hungary in very large quantities, internal production increased but it was still was not enough so Germany expanded her own production facilities and mines still further. Scrap collection and recycling facilities were also added to production of raw aluminium, the programme was highly effective. The recycling programme produced half the quantity used by Germany in 1943. Aluminium Production in Germany -1939 -1944 (000's of tonnes, metric) 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Main Production 199 211 234 264 250 245 Recycled Production 48 65 98 108 145 150 Imports 7 47 51 50 37 60 TOTAL 254 323 381 422 432 455 Magnesium Magnesium requirements in Germany were generally satisfied from the ore deposits found internally. Home production satisfied nearly all requirements as well as allowing stocks to be increased. Magnesium production in Germany 1939-1944 (000's of tonnes) 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Production 13.5 16.4 27.8 32.7 44.4 44.6 Copper Although in very short supply, initial pre war stockpiles helped cover industry until new aluminium alloys could be developed as a substitute. Certain problems were caused and a number of advanced products could not be produced. Of prime interest was the dropping of the electric drives and transmissions for armoured vehicles. This seems a strange decision when you consider the production/consumption and stockpile figures. (The main 'Saver' of copper was the aircraft industry, which very successfully reduced its consumption whilst increasing production). Copper production in Germany 1939-1945 (000's of tonnes) 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Production/Import 194 92 43 243 330 233 Consumption 446 292 238 210 220 219 Stockpile 660 460 265 298 408 452 It would appear when taking Copper as an example that forward planning was at fault. It would of been possible for Germany to maintain production rates of copper products well into 1947 with the stockpiles and local production even if the imports had been cut off completely. Steel The production of high-grade steel was one of the major difficulties faced by Germany from the very early years of the Nazi government. The main suppliers of quality iron ore were as follows: Sweden 45% France 27% Spain 7% Norway 21% The importation of iron ore was a major problem with massive logistical challenges to overcome. Shipping was threatened and rail networks both lengthy and difficult. Soviet Baltic submarines and allied Atlantic blockades, surface fleet action and aircraft attacks on harbours all conspired to cause fluctuations in supplies to smelting works. Weapons such as tanks, guns and U-Boat production used over 70% of steel produced in Germany during the war. Steel production in Germany 1939-1945 (Million of tonnes) 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Production 22.9 26.1 31.8 32.9 34.6 28.5 5(?) Rubber Shortages of rubber in Germany were always a major problem. Supplies from imports very quickly dried up with the outbreak of war in 1939. British efforts to block supplies (and purchase massive amounts on the black market in a special operation by recruited criminal elements) were very effective both directly prior to Japans invasion of South East Asia and after via naval blockade. Imports restarted after Pearl Harbour by the use of submarine transports, these however were very small, and in 1943 for example only 7,000 tonnes arrived. Many products were produced as substitutes, Polyurethane for example was used as an insulator and in seals. 'Buna' the rubber substitute, was produced from coal in large amounts. Production of 'Buna' increased from 5,000 tonnes in 1939 to 117,000 tonnes in 1943. In 1944 Buna production (by reason of increased allied bombing attacks) had fallen to 104,000 tonnes. Due to the replacement material programme, i.e. the change to steel wheels, polyurethane etc. no great shortages were suffered (to effect production) however the quality of the 'chemical rubber' was poor. Chemical rubber (synthetic) was less resilient, suffered increased ware, broke up in severe cold and was difficult to glue/bond onto road wheels. Note: After 1943 all natural rubber imports ceased. Synthetic Buna and recycled products were the only available material. Note: Truck and car tyres proved difficult to produce in Buna. Plastic Material Mainly the German war industry produced very good quality plastics that could be used as replacements for rubber and most insulation tasks. Optic's remained in glass but vision blocks and periscopes used the modern plastics, often referred to as 'Panzer glass'. Polyurethane based, most of these materials preformed very well. No real important shortages were caused, those that were, only caused temporary delays. Note: Many of the production plants were captured early in 1945, thus shortages in early 1945 increased to critical levels. Production then collapsed completely and would have stopped all major vehicles and aircraft from being completed once stocks were used up. Base Metals Nickel (very rare), Molybdenum, vanadium and chrome (very rare) caused a few problems later in the war. Prior to September 1944 most supplies of the important imported metals, Nickel and Chromium were obtained from Finland (Nickel) and Turkey (chromium). After September 1944 these supplies ceased and industries had to use the stockpiles of ore. Dangerously low levels existed until some material was supplied by secret air supply. By January 1946 however German war industry production of products which demanded the use of these metals would of ceased, the stockpiles would of reduced to zero by that time and 'war' products such as barrels and automotives gears etc. would not of been manufactured. Gear wheels for example used poor quality materials that made them very unreliable, a classic example of this are transmissions for the Panzers and superchargers for aircraft. Mineral Oils Generally the light oils required in the manufacturing process were sufficiently replaced with other substances that allowed machining to be completed without too many problems. Supply of the new vehicles and their testing was heavily compromised from mid 1944 onwards due to the shortage of engine oils, gear oils and gasoline. Factories had to reduce their testing hours in attempts to conserve the precious liquid, many delays must have occurred, a massive drop in the quality of vehicles being delivered was also very evident. People and Skills During the post war years (up to 1938) there existed huge numbers of unemployed within Germany, recruitment into the skilled industries of the war machine caused few problems, infect it could be said that industry was still able to cherry pick the best. By 1939 however the supply of staff was starting to cause concern to the big factories of firms such as Daimler Benz, MHN, MAN and Henschel. Problems increased during 1941 due to the general mobilisation of the armed forces in all three arms, in fact with the call-ups increasing industry actually lost large numbers of skilled workers. With the advent of a greater take-up of personnel into the Wehrmacht the availability of skilled and non-skilled workers led to the involvement of female German nationals directly in production (still not permitted in 1943!), slave labour and deportations from occupied countries also increased vastly the labour pool. As an example, (using data from the aircraft industry which is more accurately recorded), Daimler-Benz Motoren recorded a fall from 57% skilled workers to 27% skilled between 1939 and 1943!. Henschel (aircraft plants) recorded even more dramatic fall of, 52% skilled in 1940 to 11% in 1943. These levels of skilled workers led to fundamental changes in the way the factories worked. Slave labour as well as Polish/Russian POW's continued to be used but in ever increasing numbers. Jewish concentration camp inmates were 'selected-out' for work parties or transfer to the many camps established near coal mines, ore mines as well as the foundries, mines, chemical plants and factories. The master of the slave labour system was Fritz Sauckel (Nazi card member No. 1395, one of the first!) the Reich Defence Commissioner with the 'special' post of Plenipotentiary for Labour Allocation. He first prevented the foreign pre-war workers from leaving Germany then set about with greater vigour to 'gather' even more from the occupied areas. Initially Fritz Sauckel attempted to encourage their 'employers' to treat his workers with kindness and humanity but with the Russian POW's and the Jews being processed into the system the treatment of these workers was generally disgusting. Being worked to death was a common fate for millions. Every industry was tainted by this crime, tank plants used armour plate and chemicals, many thousands died in these 'dirty' industries. Five million workers were used in Germany, many of them did not return home. Machine Tools “Very well developed but short of product”, the machine tool industry of Germany had struggled hard to re-establish itself as a world leader after World War I. Post war, many of these machines had been sold internationally to raise funds in foreign currency. With the re-armament programme developing so quickly and with a lead-time to delivery of about 1 year (up to 18 months/2 years for very specialist tools) German industry was now definitely struggling again to re-equip its production capability with these increased demands. Supplies in numbers during 1939-1943 were thought to of been good. Assumptions that little damage had been done to the home industries machines despite increased bombing, reported numbers of machine tools rose to higher levels then even the USA had on stock ! Many have assumed that as the number were quite high Germany must have been in a good position, this was NOT the case, production rates however did not rise for the larger machines. The design of an American machine for example, was far better than the German tool. The reason, US machine tools were more flexible. German tools however, often better designed for the specific task (or small group of tasks), were not often as multifunctional as the US machine; this restricted their use when a new design was introduced. The high turnover of designs and upgrading of weapon systems had not been expected in Germany and other western nations. Germany could not adjust like her massive industrial enemies in the USSR (basic technical skills/high volume approach) or the United States (high technical skills/high volume approach). Planned output of German produced machine tools was high but the productivity figures obtained were very low. (Again using the aircraft industry records). The capture of vast amounts of Russian machine tools (planned for by a special commission) did not happen as the complete factory would be evacuated or destroyed in a scorched-earth policy just prior to the arrival of German troops. Supply of such tools was very slow and even had the opposite effect on German production as they had great difficulties revamping them for internal use in Germanys own industries. Even when the new minister for production, Albert Speer, along with the very firm/positive support of Adolf Hitler, tried to decrease the levels of ‘production lead times’, it still did not climb above the 1 year/18 months period. Attempts to move production and manufacturing to remote sites created further difficulties and with large ‘heavy’ projects like the Panther and Tiger the Germans found that, little helped. These remote sites, although effective in avoiding the heavy bombings of the British Bomber command and the US 8th Air Force, did not greatly increase production of heavy weapons as transport difficulties to and from prevented supplies getting through. Mostly these sites were used for the ‘lighter’ industries producing aircraft and rockets. The general chaotic situation in Germany and the remaining 'occupied territories' conspired to delay production at every point in the chain. Factors directly effecting production were; 1.The continual loss of important component producers as the Allied and Soviet armies squeezed Germany. 2.Base material production factories bombed by US and British bombers 3.Short supply of high-grade steels. Over all, production would fall throughout German and its satellite industries as the war situation worsened; the prime two causes to effect the production and performances of their weapons was two fold, firstly the lack of good quality multi function machine tools in the required quantities and oil supplies as power and a basic material for critical components production. A selected list of Component suppliers for Panther tank production Sueddeutsche Argus-werke, Karlsrute - Brakes Ehrlich, Gotha - Cooling Fans, Turret Traverse Systems Karl Born, Aschersleben - Exhaust System Bosch, Stuttgart - Electrical I, Arnold, Freidensdorf - Fuel Tanks / Systems Dinger - Rear Idler + Gear box + Final Drive Housing Kercher Q Co. - Gearbox + Final Drive Housing Mecklenburg, Eisen-Werkes - Gearbox + Final Drive Housing Zahnradfabrik, Wald-werke - Gearbox Herman Fessal - Controls + Gearbox valves DDHV, Dortmund- Hoerder Huettenveran - Basic Hull Krupps - Weapons and Basic hull OD-Werkes - Hatches Worms Ruhrstahl AG - Hull Louvers + Rear Idler Luttfahrtgerate bau Arno Muller - MG Ball mount internal Arkett - Hull visor + MG Ball cover Maschinenfbk Dorst - Periscopes + Vision Blocks Richard Krahmer - Stowage bins (ammunition) Wilh Lenze - Seats Jos Muench - Crank starter system Bochumer - Drive sprockets (pre-machined) Witten-Annen Eisen-Werkes - Drive Sprockets (pre-machined) Aug Engels - Track and Track Pins Wegmann and Co. - Turret (complete) Hoesch AG. - Torson Bars Roechling GmbH - Torson Bars Maschinenfabrik Imp GmbH Ventilation Fans (interior) Diana Mashinenfabrik - Road Wheels

Im sorry you think its a joke thread... Bruce70...its not a joke thread. Please start at the beginning and look at all the postings...the reason for the posting should then become evident. Main theme of the posting is... ***ADVANCED & SECRET WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT*** Tiger's in North Afrika' : http://www.homepurchaseprogram.com/monster2.html [ December 13, 2004, 09:10 AM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

Many postings by many refer to loose as lose....not correct..."lose" means 'you lost' ......"loose" means 'not tight' ...otherwise im enjoying the conversations. One other thing...please leave an address for where you get your information...i usually like to check it out myself to verify and or to study further!. -------- Statistics of World War II Including the European and Pacific Theaters http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/timeline/statistics.htm COUNTRIES:___TOTAL DEATHS_____MILITARY / CIV DEATHS USSR-----------(10.4%) 20,600,000-------13,600,000 / 7,000,000 GERMANY--------(09.5%) 6,850,000--------3,250,000 / 3,600,000 POLAND----------(17.2%) 6,123,000----------123,000 / 6,000,000 JAPAN------------(02.7%) 2,000,000-------- YUGOSLAVIA----(10.9%) 1,706,000------- FRANCE------------(01.9%) 810,000----------340,000 / 470,000 GREECE------------(07.2%) 520,000------- UNITED STATES---(00.4%) 500,000----------500,000 AUSTRIA-----------(07.2%) 480,000------- ROMANIA----------(03.4%) 460,000------- HUNGARY----------(03.0%) 420,000------- ITALY--------------(00.9%) 410,000----------330,000 / 80,000 CZECHOSLOVAKIA(02.7%) 400,000------- GREAT BRITAIN---(00.8%) 388,000----------326,000 / 62,000 NETHERLANDS----(02.4%) 210,000----------198,000 / 12,000 BELGIUM------------(01.1%) 88,000-----------76,000 / 12,000 FINLAND------------(02.2%) 84,000------- AUSTRALIA---------(00.3%) 39,000------- CANADA------------(00.3%) 34,000------- [ July 26, 2004, 07:14 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

What about releasing a short-version demo for us when it can be done...say a 10 turn game?. This would not be like testing the full game like Beta-Testers do...but, would give us a chance to test and critique the product ourselves!. ---------- Also...what about contacting 3D-Model Mother > 'Gary J. Nemeth'...and have him make an into-clip or use this one for SC2...its brief and to the point... the War In Russia is where the real battle was!. CLICK-ON the Cannon-Barrel...it will take a minute to download before the Video plays!. http://www.3d-modelmother.com/Menu-2.htm [ July 25, 2004, 11:55 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

INFORMATION ON WW2: ***I hope this listing of Web-Sites can be useful.*** http://www.rcarmory.com/kit_huntingtiger.html#pictures http://www.tamiya.com/english/products/56010tiger/tiger.htm http://www.3d-modelmother.com/Menu-2.htm http://www.3d-modelmother.com/GALLERY.htm http://www.lostbattalion.com/FormationFocus/FF_9PZ.html http://www.geo-metricks.com/geo-shop/shop-htm/pck-24txplanes.htm http://www.generalissue.com/scenario/KG.htm http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/1975/g_tnkfra.htm http://www.sonnet.com/usr/aaron/ http://www.luft46.com/armament/abomb-2.html http://www.48specialmodels.com/en-seiten/e1about.html#about48 http://www.dataforce.net/~dish/index2.htm http://www.achtungpanzer.com/polcamp.htm http://www.achtungpanzer.com/panzer.htm http://www.achtungpanzer.com/pz9.htm#eseries http://members.tripod.com/George_Parada/armlk.htm http://www.achtungpanzer.com/pzcz.htm http://www.achtungpanzer.com/divis.htm http://www.achtungpanzer.com/tiger.htm http://www.achtungpanzer.com/panzer.htm http://www.geocities.com/firefly1002000/dakindx.html http://www.activevr.com/afv/ http://www.violations.org.uk/ http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWarmedforces.htm http://www.geocities.com/unicraftmodels/uniavail.htm http://www.aviation-art-hangar.com/tlitoolameav.html http://www.btinternet.com/~lee_mail/lancaster.html http://www.axishistory.com/ http://www.axishistory.com/ http://forum.axishistory.com/ http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/BARBAROS.html http://www.battlefront.co.nz/Magazine.asp?SectionID=36 http://worldwariihistory.info/WWII/Italy.html http://www.wwiivehicles.com/html/canada/index.htm http://www.mapleleafup.org/vehicles/index.html http://www.burlingtonnews.net/cigar.html http://www.comandosupremo.com/ http://www.wordiq.com/definition/German_missiles_of_WW2.html http://cosmos.oninetspeed.pt/dak/dak/germanarmyorganization.htm http://duesenjaeger.port5.com/index.htm http://www.earthstation1.com/Russian_WWII_Aircraft.html http://darbysrangers.tripod.com/id65.htm http://www.shockwaveproductions.net/firepower/manual/he162.htm http://members.tripod.com/fssflhg/ http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/bunker/3351/allweps/skink.html http://members.cox.net/johnahamill/armorfrench.html http://bcoy1cpb.pacdat.net/fssf.htm http://www.germanvtol.com/ http://www.thirdreich.net/German_A_Bomb.html http://www.worldwar2aces.com/ http://www.worldwar2aces.com/links.htm http://members.aol.com/Custermen85/Units/GermanOrg.htm#UnitHistory http://www.geocities.com/pzkfw5/German_Panzers.html http://www.onwar.com/tanks/germany/ http://www.naziufos.com/ http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/LRG/Secweap.htm http://www.2worldwar2.com/german-tanks.htm http://www.galactic-server.com/rune/vril6.html http://rhino.shef.ac.uk:3001/mr-home/hobbies/ger2.html http://www.theotherside.co.uk/tm-heritage/background/v1v2.htm http://www.luft46.com/gotha/gop60a.html http://gunpoint-3d.com/ http://www.flightjournal.com/plane_profiles/hurricane/hurricane.asp http://www.kotfsc.com/thunderbolt/he-162.htm http://battletanks.com/ http://www.warplaces.net/ http://www.galactic-server.net/rune/vril4.html http://www.geocities.com/firefly1002000/palms.html http://www.shockwaveproductions.com/firepower/ http://www.soc.mil/swcs/museum/images/1ssfcopy.jpg http://laesieworks.com/ifo/how/index.html http://hsfeatures.com/il2mir_1.htm http://web.quick.cz/iModeller/me263.htm http://www.geocities.com/bue02/index.html http://www.fiddlersgreen.net/AC/aircraft/Heinkel-Salamander/info/info.htm http://www.groups.sfahq.com/fssf/insignia.htm http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsItaly.htm http://www.geocities.com/MotorCity/7898/ http://tigger.cc.uic.edu/~rjensen/military.html http://www.ww2guide.com/jetrock.shtml http://www.luftwaffe.cz/index.html http://www.chez.com/barbarossa/kubp.htm http://users.swing.be/tanks.edito/edito/3405.html http://users.swing.be/tanks.tanks/complet/532.html http://membres.lycos.fr/rr0/NaziUFO.html http://www.battlefield.ru/misc/links.html http://www.warplaces.net/uklinks.htm http://tanks45.tripod.com/Jets45/ListOfJets/Jets45-JetList.htm http://www.luft46.com/ http://www.luft46.com/luftart.html http://members.aol.com/ItalyWW2/Luftwaffe.htm http://www.buforadio.com/ufofilespennsylvania/id22.html http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/ http://www.wwiirelics.com/luftwaffe3.htm http://www.reveil-des-marmottes.net/Aviation/Photos_20/Les_Photos.htm http://mapmachine.nationalgeographic.com/mapmachine/viewandcustomize.html?task=getMap&themeId=100&size=l&maplayers=Roads%20and%20Railroads%3A%3AT%7E%7EPlaces%3A%3AT%7E%7EPolitical% %2020Boundaries%3A%3AT&poilayers=Country%20Profile%3A%3AF&state=zoomBox&sext=6. http://www.mikekemble.com/ww2/aircraft.html http://www.lermuseum.org/ler/mh/wwii/homefront1939-40.html http://www.military.com/Resources/ResourceFileView?file=worldwarii_europe_maps_map47.htm http://www.armortek.co.uk/Links/ http://www.armortek.co.uk/index.html http://www.storm.webvis.net/omega32.html http://www.fiddlersgreen.net/aircraft/WWII/me-262/me262_info/m262_info.htm http://www.naziufos.com/NEWSCL/INDEX.HTM http://www.onwar.com/ http://open.thumbshots.org/Society/History/By_Time_Period/Twentieth_Century/Wars_and_Conflicts/World_War_II/Weapons_and_Equipment http://www.xs4all.nl/~gjlingen/ http://www.geocities.com/panzerfrontuk/TankProfilesSoviet.html http://www.homepurchaseprogram.com/monster2.html http://www.panzerdiesel.com/data/e/map.html?PHPSESSID=e805818c2554ef64262c16a5a44402b8 http://www.geocities.com/augusta/8172/panzerfaust2.htm#use http://www.panzerworld.net/ http://www.wwiivehicles.com/html/poland/7tp.html http://derela.republika.pl/armcarpl.htm http://www2.cc22.ne.jp/~harada/ http://www.preservedaxisaircraft.com/ http://www.fprado.com/armorsite/tiger1-01.htm http://www.battletanks.com/new_page_18.htm http://www.mark-1-tank.co.uk/ http://hometown.aol.com/rayeso/index.html/mainpage.html http://www.rcarmory.com/ http://www.redarmystudies.net/index_sort.htm http://www.luft46.com/rmart/lufartrm.html http://www.roboterkampf.com/htmlluft46/sanger.html http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Parthenon/3818/EASTBALT.HTM http://www.scalemodelindex.com/armor.htm http://www.geocities.com/schwerer_wehrmacht_schlepper/ http://www.rickard.karoo.net/articles/wars_wwII.html http://www.onwar.com/tanks/ http://laesieworks.com/ifo/libNEW/WW2/Haunebu.html http://laesieworks.com/ifo/libNEW/WW2/Vril.html http://www.worldwar.nl/secretweapons/secretgerman2.htm http://www.violations.dabsol.co.uk/secrets/secretspart1.htm http://home.wanadoo.nl/r.j.o/skyraider/links.htm http://homepage.eircom.net/~steven/sovarm.htm http://www.battlefield.ru/map.html http://www.stalingrad.by.ru/main.html http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Wray/wray.asp#ted http://www.stormbirds.com/project/index.html http://www.military.cz/panzer/index_en.htm http://www.tankmuseum.ru/p1.html http://members.aol.com/xbutchx/ http://www.thetankmaster.com/tanks.asp http://www.military.cz/panzer/index.htm http://www.military.cz/panzer/ http://tanxheaven.com/ http://members.tripod.com/~fingolfen/index.html http://www.v2rocket.com/start/start.html http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_CONT.HTM http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_11.htm http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_16.htm http://www.fprado.com/armorsite/main.html http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891/ http://members.aol.com/ItalyWW2/History.htm http://www.ww2.dk/ http://www.battlefield.ru/index.html http://www.kasprzyk.demon.co.uk/www/WW2.html http://www.tankmuseum.org/home.html http://www.tiger-tank.com/ http://www.uboat-bases.com/ http://www.x-plane.org/ http://www.467463raafsquadrons.com/Pages/TheLancaster.htm http://www.theyfly.com/ http://www.skalman.nu/third-reich/ http://www.skalman.nu/third-reich/links.htm http://www.thirdreich.net/index.html http://www.sturmtiger.de/ http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/1975/carristi.htm http://tiger1.info/ http://www.armortek.co.uk/tiger.html http://www.alanhamby.com/tiger.html http://www.chsk.com/steppenwolf/tigers.htm http://www.tigertank-h-e-181.com/ http://www.totse.com/en/fringe/fringe_science/nazi1.html http://www.geocities.com/unicraftmodels/unilinks.htm http://www.geocities.com/unicraftmodels/uniphot2.htm http://www.feldgrau.com/org.html http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm http://mapww2.narod.ru/ http://www.v2rocket.com/start/start.html http://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/newspapers/canadawar/munitions_e.html http://www.battlefield.ru/library/bookshelf/weapons/weapons7.html http://www.cs.net/panzer/index.htm http://www.historic-battles.com/ http://www.secretsofwar.com/ http://www.leibstandarte.uni.cc/ http://members.aol.com/TeacherNet/WWII.html#Secrets http://www.wwiild.com/advanced/index.html http://www.wwiild.com/advanced/cat2/sub2/sub1/index.html http://www.hq.wwiionline.com/links.shtml http://www.topedge.com/panels/ww2/na/frame.html http://users.senet.com.au/~mhyde/ww2_aircraft_russia.htm http://homepage.eircom.net/~steven/ http://www.wssob.com/ http://www.barnesreview.org/May_2002/WW2_/ww2_.html http://ww2armor.jexiste.fr/ http://www.ww2modelmaker.com/mg/ModelGerm.htm http://www.ww2modelmaker.com/whats_new.htm http://www.ww2modelmaker.com/articlepub/matwar.htm http://www.geocities.com/armysappersforward/kursk.htm http://www.think-aboutit.com/ufo/nazi_plans.html http://www.jagdtiger.de/ http://www.kampfpanzer.de/ [ July 26, 2004, 05:29 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

Again pzgndr ... i would myself for the most part follow the plan or outline for SC2...it is a good one and a practical one...i will not argue that. Where there is an opportunity to incorporate new elements into the game ... it should be considered as in other instances it has. Thats all we want...is as good a game as this lineage can produce under the present constraints. We...even though we are not programmers and developers...want this product to succeed as much as Hubert wants it too...we want a game that for its Genre' is ... 'A Cut Above The Crowd'.

All valid argument's pzgndr ...and so it should be that SC2 with a few more enhancement's should reflect your evidence and argument. However, there is something in some of us...that just love those nitty-gritty-micromanaging-details...we just do...it's an exhilaration in itself to study those intracracies...hoping to outdo or outperform history. For example i like to play 'IMPERIUM GALACTICA II - ALLIANCES' ( 5-Years Old Now and still selling for 34.95 and up on Amazon.com ) occasionally...and in that game...for instance...you build a Destroyer...then Research and build a Heavy-Destroyer...while upgunning and upgrading them throughout the game. Then later you build Corvette's and Heavy-Corvette's and repeat the process until you can afford to build BattleShips. Solarian Battleship: Tech Improvements available: Kra'Hen Cruiser: So instead of the game engine just building Generic-Warships for instellar combat...keeping all sides equal at the same time...therefore not allowing for technology differences. YOU decide where to put which and what upgrades and improvements into your equipment,or whether, ...instead to research the next level of ship-technology...hoping that if you do so, that you will not be attacked while preparations are ongoing for the next advanced ship to be researched...and then produced...it is facinating to watch it all unfold. While such a research and development and improvement cycle may not be practical for SC1 or SC2...its still fun to discuss it...and maybey someday...someone from this discussion forum will create a game incorporating some of the ideas that have been forwarded. HOI took a good stab at it ...but, had too many quirks in it to make the game truly believable. Even so...it was great fun to study and experiment with it...for me anyway. [ July 23, 2004, 08:17 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

All valid argument's----- POSTED IN ERROR-IGNORE!!!. [ July 23, 2004, 06:55 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

That's too much reading ev ...but...yes, i got the 'gist-of-it'...there was a manpower shortage...as well as fuel, aircraft...and other shortages. The Germans couldn't properly hold on to all that they had gained!. What we have here is a problem of biting off much more than can be chewed. If i was the Germans i would have tried to take 'MOSKAU'...but,upon the stiffining of Russian resistance...would have created a defensive arc from the NW to the East ...then concentrated most of my best formations to take out Sevestapol and the Caucasus Oil-Fields. It was no 'state-secret' that Germany was short of this precious resource...so then...whynot make it a primary target...instead of forking off into 3 directions?. The game will give you a few MPP's more for taking the Caucasus Oil-Fields, but not be able to really reflect just how important it's capture would have been or how much it could have assisted the German war-effort...that action alone in reality...could have decided the war!. [ July 23, 2004, 06:18 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

by Gerald L. Conroy ORGANIZATION AND TAKTIKA:...NOT...primarily NUMBERS. http://members.tripod.com/~Kekrops/Hellenistic_Files/Alexander_and_His_Army.html ---------------------------------------------- Quote - Napoleone' : Morale is as to numbers ... as three is to one!. A L E X A N D E R "The Great" (356 -323 B.C.) A L E X A N D R O S by Plutarch http://www.e-classics.com/ALEXANDER.htm & http://faq.macedonia.org/history/alexander.the.great.html#c BATTLE OF GRANICUS: Alexander began his war against Persia in the spring of 334 BC by crossing the Hellespont (modern Dardanelles) with an army of 35,000 Macedonians and 7,600 Greeks. The Persians had camped on the other side of the Granicus River to prevent Alexander from crossing. The Persian force numbered 20,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry, and their position was strong. The river was deep, and its banks were high. The task of assault seemed to be impossible, but Alexander immediately led thirteen squadrons of horsemen across under a shower of arrows. With frenzied persistence they managed to get up the muddy banks and close with the enemy. The Macedonian phalanx, meanwhile, had managed to get across the river and form up on the other side. The Persians could not stand up against their push, and soon the whole Persian army was running for their lives. The losses on the Persian side were 20,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, but Alexander lost only 34 men (others say 110-120). --------- BATTLE OF ISSUS: King Darius of Persia was on the way from Susa with an army of 600,000 men. Darius was in an equal hurry to get out of Issus(as Alexander was headed there), because when he saw the rough terrain, which made his cavalry useless, and split up his army, he realized that the Greeks could have the advantage. Before Darius could escape from his own trap, Alexander had arrived. Alexander personally commanded the right wing, which crushed the Persian left. Darius panicked and rode away, leaving behind his chariot, his bow, his shield, his mantle, his army, and 110,000 Persian casualties. The narrow field of battle allowed Alexander to defeat the Persians. Alexander was a master at ascertaining 'Terrain'...and how to make it work for him...as he has shown that time and time again. Also, he had little or no fear of numbers of the opposing army...and could easily spot/ascertain the weakeness in enemy postioning,...then, exploit it!. [ July 23, 2004, 04:56 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

You are correct ev ...,however had 'Paulus' had the Panzer forces that were stripped away from him and/or had he been allowed to retreat in good time and order as he requested...that disaster could have been avoided. He did request to retreat and have other forces assist in this effort...of course the request to retreat was rejected as Hitler thought that a rescue would take care of the problem. If you have looked at all in the posting 'Something I Hope WILL HAPPEN in SC2' http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=34;t=000295;p=1 ...you will see that the German's were a very busy bunch...concocting a plethora of new weapons...some of which if produced in sufficient numbers might/could have turned their fortunes around in the war. Numbers are not necessarily everything...as has been proven many times in history. Its Technology/Tactics/the unconventional & common sense that make or break a nation at war. [ July 23, 2004, 03:42 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

I think it's time for some 'EYE-CANDY!'....Take a look at these pictures!. Done by Japanese Artists from Hiroshima-Japan. http://www2.cc22.ne.jp/~harada/english/t_index_e.html [ December 13, 2004, 09:04 AM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

I dont think one needs to change SC2 at all. If someone is willing to get all the data for the major nations (Expeditiously)...then...all that needs doing is to then use that data to set up an option for players to select so that they can play a game using historical manpower levels...which would vary according to usage or non-usage or losses. If they don't like it ...they can restart the game as it is presently designed. This new feature can be play-tested out...and if it suck's...then it can be removed. The same could be done for Oil and Ore supplies...if there is any time to get that far. [ July 22, 2004, 10:53 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

German Ore: I can't find the passages i saw before that pointed out the deficiency of local German ore...maybey it wasn't the just the 'Ore' itself, but the other metals put into the steel?. I will post these web-sites in place of that to show that there was a problem with the steel for tanks. http://www.battlefield.ru/library/bookshelf/weapons/weapons7.html The live fire tests were conducted in the fall of 1944 at Kubinka, during the course of which the following results were obtained: "1. The quality of armor on the "Tiger-B" tank, in comparison with the armor on the "Tiger-I," and "Panther," tanks, as well as early production "Ferdinand" self-propelled gun, has sharply deteriorated. The first individual impacts caused cracks and spalling in the armor of the "Tiger-B" tank. Groups of shell impacts (3-4 shells) caused large-scale spalling and fractures in the armor. 2. Weak weld seams appeared characteristic of all hull and turret joints. Despite careful workmanship, the seams held up to shell impacts significantly worse than they did in analogous constructions on the "Tiger-I," and "Panther," tanks, as well as the "Ferdinand" self-propelled gun. During lab tests of the "Tiger-B" tank's armor, conducted at TsNII-48, it was noted that there had been an "evident gradual decline in the quantity of molybdenum (M) in the German T-VI and T-V tanks, and a complete absence in the T-VIB. The reason for replacing one element (M) with another (V, vanadium) must obviously be sought in the exhaustion of their on-hand reserves and the loss of those bases supplying Germany with molybdenum. Low malleability appears to be characteristic of the "Tiger-B's" armor. An advantage of domestic armor, as is well-known, is its high malleability; German armor has fewer alloys and is therefore significantly less malleably." ----------- http://www.laughtergenealogy.com/bin/histprof/misc/wwii.html The conquest of Denmark and Norway. "Valuable shipments of iron ore"... (MINE: Why so valuable if Germany had all the ore it needed...i think that their Ore was of insufficient quality.) from Sweden reached Germany by way of Norway's port of Narvik. Hitler feared British plans to cut off those shipments by laying explosives in Norway's coastal waters. In April 1940, German forces invaded Norway. They conquered Denmark on the way. Britain tried to help Norway, but Germany's airpower prevented many British ships and troops from reaching the country. Norway fell to the Germans in June 1940. "The conquest of Norway secured Germany's shipments of iron ore". Norway also provided bases for German submarines and aircraft. ------- http://www.eurotravelling.net/norway/narvik/narvik_history.htm Narvik - History "Great Britain, and Axis forces, headed by Germany, clashed fiercely to secure Narvik, which was a main shipping port for high-grade Swedish iron ore. The ore was a key element for the production of high-quality steel, and therefore critical to the armaments industries of both Great Britain and Germany".

Yes...the Germans had many Panzer Divisions...but also realize that nearly all of the tanks they had then were LIGHT-TANKS(Tinfoil-Tanks). it wasnt until large quantities of good quality metal was secured...were any qauntity of heavier tanks constructed. German ore was of low quality...even though they had lots of it...it wasn't suitable for Tank-Steel...better steel came from France, Sweden and Norway.

Passive Minor Allies: Sounds like another 'Great-Idea' Edwin P. The concept fits with the game,...it should add another 'touch of reality' to this abstract (rather than the recognizable representation of physical reality) wargame.

AIRBORNE LASER: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/abl.htm Think of it ... could the USAF Top Secret Nuclear Powered Flying Triangle (TR-3B) and the Airborne Laser marry-up to produce a Missile Deterence Weapon?. For now a Boeing 747 Jumbo-Jet will house this Laser...and if all goes as planned, a fleet of seven ABLs should be flying operational missions by 2008. The ABL (Airborne Laser) weapon system consists of a high-energy, chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL) mounted on a modified 747-400F (freighter) aircraft to shoot down theater ballistic missiles in their boost phase. A crew of four, including pilot and copilot, would be required to operate the airborne laser, which would patrol in pairs at high altitude, about 40,000 feet, flying in orbits over friendly territory, scanning the horizon for the plumes of rising missiles. Capable of autonomous operation, the ABL would acquire and track missiles in the boost phase of flight, illuminating the missile with a tracking laser beam while computers measure the distance and calculate its course and direction. After acquiring and locking onto the target, a second laser - with weapons-class strength - would fire a three- to five-second burst from a turret located in the 747's nose, destroying the missiles over the launch area. The Airborne Laser is a Major Defense Acquisition Program. After the Concept Design Phase is complete, the ABL will enter the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) Phase. The objective of the PDRR phase is to develop a cost effective, flexible airborne high energy laser system which provides a credible deterrent and lethal defensive capabilities against boosting theater ballistic missiles.

I think the solution should be this...based on Manpower and Material resources. You have only so much manpower in any country , the same with resources. This will prevent a country from generating forces it realistically couldn't generate. It will also determine which countries one needs to go after and in what order if that nation determines it needs the specific resources to create the force mix it want's. This is a more complicated way to do it...it can be simplified like we already have in SC1...although it's not nearly as interesting. Also when for example Germany takes over Czechloslovakia it incorporated the Czech tanks into its first line formations. Czech industry was also instantly utilized to feed new units for the Panzer Formations. [ July 21, 2004, 09:15 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

When i do find the .bmp files...what do i open them up with(Paint}?...or is there a better program to use for doing this. How do you select a single unit for Editing?. I tried using Photo-Deluxe2 . I isolated one image by using 'Square'...drew an outline around it ...then had the background deleted. This one image is so heavily 'blurred' (at 400% & 800% of original size)that i don't see how you could edit it. Even at 400% % 800% of original size the image is still quite small. Anyway...it look's like to me that unless a much better program than the one im using is used...this is going to be a job of Mammoth proportions to edit or create new units...at least for me!. [ July 18, 2004, 11:10 AM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

Thankyou for Replying pzgrdr ...please keep 'me/us all' posted...i have never created unit icons before...but, would like to give it a try...if it work's out for me ...i just might go crazy with it with more ideas for offshoot scenario ideas.