OBJ

In the case of Europe I'd say UKR is cut off not due to political will (or lack thereof), but lack of means. The last aid package from Germany mentioned 2500 artillery shells. That's one day of firing and this was a couple of weeks back. And last time I checked, UKR seems to be losing around 3 artillery guns, self-propelled and otherwise, every other week. Europe can't replace those. Shell production will eventually reach useful levels (although we don't know how many of those will actually end up in UKR hands), but I am afraid they will have run out of guns at that point.
 
From what we know, Russia is recruiting 20k (GUR estimate) to 35k (Medvedev bragging) men per month. Their losses are obviously high, but I'd guess given these numbers they are ultimately sustainable, not so for UKR it seems. And how many brigades were they able to smash against Avdiivka, one after the other? If they can keep this up, they'll whittle UKR down eventually this way, if they don't get a grip on their own issues.

To me this looks more like desparation than sound military logic. Why throw a specialist assault unit into the fray after only a couple months rest to fend off long looming disaster at the last moment (and lose the fortress in the process), why throw in the 47th (basically already spent) right after the failed counter-offensive, why is a single brigade (110th) required to hold out in Avdiivka for 1.5yrs of war and 4 months of sustained assaults? If things were okayish, the 110th would have been pulled back sometime in October, replaced by the 111th and maybe later bolstered by the 112th (or whatever), both rested and fresh from the Belorussian border. Instead, UKR is force to pull one act of desparation after another. It almost looks as if they just don't have any strategic reserves, at all.
The underlying issue, at least to me, seems to be that RU has been running circles around UKR in terms of force generation for basically all of 2023 and ongoing. They may use these forces inefficently, but are able have brigade after brigade mauled while storming some fortress town, while UKR is forced to send the same couple of fire brigade units from hot spot to hot spot. The fact that UKR is basically cut off from foreign assistance and is likely going to be for the foreseeable future does not help in this matter, but their force generation issues seem to be a largely internal problem.

re naval drones, US 'Replicator' initiative. 'Hellscape' thinking sounds encouraging.
https://news.usni.org/2024/02/14/navy-will-stand-up-lethal-drone-unit-later-this-year-first-replicator-usvs-picked
"The second squadron will focus on small USVs, building on the medium and large USVs that the Unmanned Surface Vessel Division ONE (USVDIV-1) has been experimenting with for the last two years, USNI News understands.
Last year, the Navy experimented with its medium and large USVs to operationalize test platforms with real units as the Pacific Fleet refines concepts for using unmanned systems.
Those concepts are set to inform the emerging “hellscape” concept that would use swarms of unmanned platforms to thwart a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, USNI News previously reported."

re naval drones, US 'Replicator' initiative. 'Hellscape' thinking sounds encouraging.
https://news.usni.org/2024/02/14/navy-will-stand-up-lethal-drone-unit-later-this-year-first-replicator-usvs-picked
"The second squadron will focus on small USVs, building on the medium and large USVs that the Unmanned Surface Vessel Division ONE (USVDIV-1) has been experimenting with for the last two years, USNI News understands.
Last year, the Navy experimented with its medium and large USVs to operationalize test platforms with real units as the Pacific Fleet refines concepts for using unmanned systems.
Those concepts are set to inform the emerging “hellscape” concept that would use swarms of unmanned platforms to thwart a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, USNI News previously reported."

re naval drones, US 'Replicator' initiative. 'Hellscape' thinking sounds encouraging.
https://news.usni.org/2024/02/14/navy-will-stand-up-lethal-drone-unit-later-this-year-first-replicator-usvs-picked
"The second squadron will focus on small USVs, building on the medium and large USVs that the Unmanned Surface Vessel Division ONE (USVDIV-1) has been experimenting with for the last two years, USNI News understands.
Last year, the Navy experimented with its medium and large USVs to operationalize test platforms with real units as the Pacific Fleet refines concepts for using unmanned systems.
Those concepts are set to inform the emerging “hellscape” concept that would use swarms of unmanned platforms to thwart a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, USNI News previously reported."

https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-develops-new-robotic-mini-tank/

At the risk of dragging in more historical analogies, what you describe sounds remarkably like the original torpedo boats when they first became a thing in the late C19th-early C20th which similarly scared many naval thinkers of the time. That's torpedo boats before the long, slow evolution into torpedo boat-destroyers...destroyers...something about the size of a cruiser like, say, a Type 45.
Whatever the white elephant type qualities of the aircraft carrier, British or otherwise, who fancies a bet that they end up as a means of conveying your swarm of UAVs into a lunch position where they can be unleashed on the other side's swarm of UAVs, or something.
 

They just got done swatting down a border bill that had everything they were asking for, because Trump needs that issue to run on to scare older white folks who live nowhere near a good Mexican restaurant. He has no other issue to really campaign for. 
The US mis leadership class, if willing to just allow a two bit conman to become dictator, proves that this system and those that defend it deserve every heap of scorn that radicals put on them.  
I'm not going to accept American Putinism, even if they win the election. I will not comply and I hope most of the civil service and military defies him and his thugs, openly and directly.
 
 

That may all very well be true, but I'd rather count on our own strength than on the weaknesses of our enemy. The Russians are no fools and so far more resourceful than the West expected. 
In that respect I agree with orange boy, rearming is key for NATO. Whatever the costs. The time of free riding is over. Let's hope we're not too late.

IMO most important parts:
"This has led to significant increases in production output. For example, Russia is delivering approximately 1,500 tanks to its forces per year along with approximately 3,000 armoured fighting vehicles of various types. Russian missile production has similarly increased. At the beginning of 2023, for instance, Russian production of Iskandr 9M723 ballistic missiles was six per month, with available missile stocks of 50 munitions."
"Of the tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles, for example, approximately 80% are not new production but are instead refurbished and modernised from Russian war stocks. The number of systems held in storage means that while Russia can maintain a consistent output through 2024, it will begin to find that vehicles require deeper refurbishment through 2025, and by 2026 it will have exhausted most of the available stocks."
"Perhaps the most serious limitation for Russia, however, is ammunition manufacture. In order to achieve its aspiration to make significant territorial gains in 2025, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has assessed an industrial requirement to manufacture or source approximately 4 million 152mm and 1.6 million 122mm artillery shells in 2024. Russian industry has reported to the MoD that it expects to increase 152mm production from around 1 million rounds in 2023 to 1.3 million rounds over the course of 2024, and to only produce 800,000 122mm rounds over the same period. Moreover, the Russian MoD does not believe it can significantly raise production in subsequent years,"
"This means that to properly resource the armed forces, Russia must – in the short term – further draw down its remaining 3 million rounds of stored ammunition, though much of this is in poor condition. To further compensate for shortages, Russia has signed supply and production contracts with Belarus, Iran, North Korea and Syria, with the latter only able to provide forged shell casings rather than complete shells. Although the injection of around 2 million 122mm rounds from North Korea will help Russia in 2024, it will not compensate for a significant shortfall in available 152mm"
"The Russian theory of victory is plausible if Ukraine's international partners fail to properly resource the AFU. However, if Ukraine's partners continue to provide sufficient ammunition and training support to the AFU to enable the blunting of Russian attacks in 2024, then Russia is unlikely to achieve significant gains in 2025. If Russia lacks the prospect of gains in 2025, given its inability to improve force quality for offensive operations, then it follows that it will struggle to force Kyiv to capitulate by 2026. Beyond 2026, attrition of systems will begin to materially degrade Russian combat power, while Russian industry could be disrupted sufficiently by that point, making Russia's prospects decline over time."

I am wondering if the fact that the guy has those tattoos and the fact he has a a black eye and nose knocked sideways are entirely coincidental.

Hey! The posts from me have been in response to you claiming a whiplash injury! As if “everyone* was saying the guardrails will hold if Trump takes over, and now hearing a number of us saying, there are good reasons to suggest they will not. No one is saying you must adopt certain opinions. Plain and simple not to ignore them as never having been expressed. To be clear, I am still glad for your faith in the USA! And far more than you, I hope you and the opinions  you are apparently endorsing “it can’t happen here”, are how things turn out. But for the love of Pete please don’t simply ignore, hope, dismiss, and then claim shock if things get even stickier down here than we have already experienced. The election is pretty much on a knife edge, and the future is unwritten. 

You *still* seem to be ignoring the rest of us here, who have been warning and pointing out developments, like debate rhetoric? Maybe better to understand that it is only human to filter out or dismiss what doesn’t fit your preferences. But heck, don’t take our word for it. Not sure where you obtain your political news but If you feel whiplashed, you definitely need to read more widely the massive reporting down there in the USA that has been a steady drumbeat about the end of democracy, the concerns about autocracy, the planning leaking from Trump’s team, the failure during four years to exact effective accountability, and the rock solid core support for not only Trump but for Trumpism despite everything. None of this guarantees the worst! But there darn sure has been a *consistent* substantive warning shout from the USA and a number of us here.  You do have to actually read them though. 
PS I’d appreciate you not putting words in our mouths and then mocking them. I never said “inevitable slide into civil war”. I suggest, point out, reference, and describe how what was unthinkable a few years ago *might* happen. But am NOT saying “inevitable”. And only you are saying an autocracy here would mean civil war. Doubtful, as many people wouldn’t either care, notice, or have any meaningful way to resist. As in the WashPost article I linked here a while ago. But read up in these for a start:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/20/us/politics/trump-rhetoric-fascism.html  https://time.com/6550686/trump-autocracy-dictator-polling/  https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/last-exit-trump-autocracy/616466/ https://www.businessinsider.com/ex-white-house-official-warns-of-a-us-autocracy-if-trump-wins-2nd-term-2021-11?op=1   
https://www.poynter.org/commentary/2023/how-to-report-trump-win-2024/ https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2023-10-08/donald-trump-republican-party-autocratic-movement-dissent 
There are countless more. All you have to do is look.
 

If he ignores a congressional declaration of war like that, it's treason 
 
Section 3.
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
 
The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.

Well in all fairness we did actually invade you once.  It doesn't help that you have universal health care which is so freakin anti American!

Just as important are the swing state voters, who in previous years voted for Bush and Obama and Trump and Biden. They have real domestic concerns- inflation, crime and the border- that are basically not being answered. These voters aren’t zealots, but they are unhappy.
Real income across most swing states is down compared to 2020, which is what would worry me most if I was Biden’s campaign team: https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/economics-is-pushing-us-swing-voters-pick-trump-2024-01-16/

Well that’s where Putin’s long winded interview comes in, which is a framing shifting narrative to slowly move the American voter away from seeing NATO as an inherent structure of American dominance to one of American overextension and waste in Russian sphere of influence.
Trump’s framing of the 2% gdp target is just one part of it. He’s long voiced disappointment and discontent with insufficient “protection money” attained from Europe. (At the end of the day, he has shown all the hallmarks of a dictator who believes the government serves at his word and its resources his to allocate and enjoy)I think this is actually something Putin with his mafia like structure of Russian government would be intimately familiar with and able to exploit and manage vs Trump. We have seen how this occurred via Ukraine, Trump seeking political dirt on Biden and leveraging aid to Ukraine for it. 

1. If you don't have enough information, so you move basically in the dark, your move is not bold, but  reckless.
 

Bold means you may take risks, but if your move fails, then you are still alive and you can still react.
Reckless means that if you gamble fails, then you are toast.
Rommel was usually bold. Hitler was reckless.

1. The tactical level always has an effect on the operational and strategic level. The EPR (The People's Army of the Republic during the Spanish Civil War) had some of the best generals in the Spanish army of the time. Their plans at an operational and strategic level were generally excellent and withouth a fault. The EPR received more and better material, some of it was very modern for the time and better than de German and Italian one.. What was missing from the EPR? The tactics to make those plans and new material work.
A house is built from the foundation. If your army does not work at the tactical level, you can have all the operational and strategic plans you want, which generally those plans at the operational and strategic level will not work as intended.
By the way, the Germans in 1918 had the tactics but not the means. Not everything is tactics. You also need the means to put tactics into practice.
2. The Ukrainians managed to carry out a Blitzkrieg-style operation in the Kharkov area, attacking at the Russian weakest point and exploiting the success operationally with an advance in that area that forced the Russians to abandon the part of the front closest to Kharkov and retreat to the Svatove line. There, I don't think there was much denial.
But if you then let the front stagnate for months, let the enemy reinforce itself with 300,000 men, plant millions of mines (no one has calculated how many mines Russia has left from the stock it had before the war and how many it can manufacture per month ) it is not strange that things change. The Ukrainians evidently made a superlative effort in 2022 that is to be admired, and they could not make a greater effort because we, their allies, have done nothing but procrastinate shipments of ammunition and material. That said, it seems to me that attacking the strongest points of the Russian lines and persisting in the offensive once it was clear that it had failed, as if we were in a 21st century Somme or Verdun, as did by Zaluzhnyi, is not the best idea. And staying hidden in the trenches playing to see who is the last one to survive a drone attack, praying that Putin's dictatorship magically falls apart, as you seems to advocate, doesn't seem like a good idea to me either.
3. I have not said that Russia has won by attrition. I have said that if we adopt an attrition-only strategy, Russia has a better chance of winning in the long run.
4. I'm sorry but I don't believe in corrosive warfare as the inevitable way to fight the war in Ukraine. Every war implies, of course, a wear and tear of one's own army, and of the enemy's army too. But reducing everything to a war of attrition shows an inability to leave the mental framework that fosters it and an extreme simplification of war: if I kill more than you, until you run out of soldiers, ammunition, resources and will, then I win. Therefore I need more bombs, more missiles and more grenades, until there is nothing left of the adversary. Which by the way, the enemy will do the same. Eye by eye, we will all go blind. It may be the only way to act in a nuclear war, but I don't think is the only option in a conventional one.
You say "If Ukraine goes this way they can, at worst, freeze this thing. A Korean Peninsula outcome is definitely a possibility, and frankly it is not a bad one." Everything indicates that this is the possibility. However, I would not like it if I were Ukrainian. What is clear is that if the Ukrainians dedicate themselves exclusively to fighting a war of attrition, the Korea Peninsula result is what they will get ...if they are lucky.
Rommel said that you must be bold, but you can never be reckless. It's exactly what I think. If you give up everything and sink into a war of attrition in Ukraine, you will not be reckless indeed, but what is also certain is that you will not be bold either.

I was speaking of the mental framework. In 1918, both sides found ways to breach a heavily defended entrenched enemy front and advance. That was not the case in 1915-1917 (Caporetto excepted). 

Infiltration tactics initially worked because small groups did not engage in fighting to take the strongpoints they found. They used tactics that could be defined as proto-blitzkrieg. They surpassed the strongpoints and it was the troops that followed them that faced those strongpoints, which at that moment they were defended by troops in positions that had been surpassed, with enemies in their rear and with communications cut off.
In Ukraine it seems that these groups do not really infiltrate, but rather take strong point by strong point without any idea of deep penetration and exploitation of the gap. I wouldn't call them true infiltration tactics, but small attacks which try to have a cumulative effect.

What I have said is that 1918, which had NOTHING to do with the previous period from 1915 to 1917, essentially saw a battle of tactics and ideas that broke the stalemate. The Germans introduced infiltration tactics and new ways of using artillery. The Allies countered them by introducing defense-in-depth tactics. Wherever Germans or Allies used the same tactics used in 1915-1917 (Caporetto excepted, which was a case of use of the new tactics), they repeated the disaster of the previous years.
What I have wanted to say all this time is that forming a strategy of attrition, fighting positionally until you are left with the last living soldier, seems to me to be a huge mistake. And I think Zelensky thinks the same.

This photo has never been explained, but this photo explains everything.

Well, I can't claim to be an expert in military history, world or any one nation's, or anyone's generals, but I do have the sense wars 'won' through exhaustion, tend to start up again as soon as one side or the other decides it is no longer exhausted. In the era of mobilized nation states, a ceasefire negotiated peace tends to leave the issues that caused the war in the first place unresolved. On the other hand, wars in which one side is utterly devastated, occupied and dictated a new form of government, those wars tend to be 'over,' the issues causing them being permanently removed.
So, if current fighting in Ukraine stops with a cease fire, possibly a negotiated 'peace,' show of hands, who here thinks that's the end of it, IF, what's left of Ukraine isn't brought into NATO and protected by article 5 before Russia reconstitutes? 
Do diametrically opposed political ideologies typically peacefully coexist for centuries, especially if they share a border? Is it worth differentiating between great power wars, minor power wars, minor power participation in great power wars and wars followed by a century or more in which the entire world geopolitical and technological situation changed?
Did the Allies really win WWI if they had to fight Germany/Axis in a much more destructive war 20 years later?
If NATO service chiefs are saying they need to be ready to fight Russia in 3-6 years, did the west really win the Cold War? Can a Cold War really be in the same conversation with a shooting war? Is deterrence the same as war? Is economic collapse without war the same as in a war?
I don't know but would guess the experts on any major power's national military history and past Generals are people having spent their professional lives (30+ years) making a career of it, in or out of uniform.
Again, I am no expert. I am interested in other's thoughts on above in relation to Ukraine.