Vanir Ausf B

War Gonzo reports some small Ukrainian advances in the south and near Bakhmut, and a Russian advance near Luhansk
https://t.me/wargonzo/13937
 

It's meant even coordinated operations between several different army "organisms" like BTGs already caused very big tense of command lines. If you add here different volunteers, units of other branches, aviation etc, all this multiplies chaos and collisions in command. If Soviet army had experience how to rule operations in which participated several armies, that now both UKR and RUS armies suffer big problems even with several brigades-level coordinations. 

Maybe a year ago I saw a stunning security-cam video of a couple that had a row with their bully-neighbor. After already months or years of tension, this argument was about the placement of garbage-containers.
After a few minutes of discussions, things heated up and yelling turned into screaming, anger into hate. Shoving became pushing and throwing of objects started. Neither the couple, nor the bully-neighbor showed any restraint.
Suddenly the bully walked away, back to his garage, but the woman from the couple kept screaming and throwing things, even when the bully disappeard in his garage. Where he picked up his assault rifle and then reappeared.
Well now.. instead of running away, or running for cover and calling the cops, that woman thought something like what you just wrote:
"We'll never know where the red line is unless we start inching toward it",
and like you she thought that being a little more agressive towards the bully would not escalate.
She walked, screaming and yelling, up to the bully with the gun and, how surprising, got shot. Not fatally wounded she tried to crawl away, and her husband ran towards her to help. But the bully oh so calmly shot both off 'm point blanc until his magazine was empty. Then he went into garage, reloaded, and blew his own brains out.
That woman found the red line by inching towards it..
 
 

KevinK,
The next sentences are from a few recent reactions you posted:
 
- "We can't let nuclear blackmail stand".
- "Putin's nuclear buster has to be challenged".
- "Who is afraid of nuclear escalation anyway".
 
And now you wrote that highlighted (by me) remark in the quoted post.
 
For starters, I am afraid of nuclear escalation. I even fear the use of just one, yes just one, nuke. Not because of my own safety, (A. The Netherlands isn't exactly a top-target for nukes and B. I'm old, and have lived a less than pleasant life so far, so if dying through a nuke comes next, so be it.), but of the EXCEPTIONAL HORROR a (load of) nukes creates for at least tens of thousands, but possibly hundreds of millions, of humans. (Not to mention flora, fauna, environment etc.)
The effect of nuclear bombs exceeds every other horrible thing we humans used against one another, by so much, that it cannot even be imagined what multiple nukes will do on the scale of gruesome.
Your reactions, and maybe I copied them out of context, seem to indicate to me that you either firmly belief that nukes won't be used (again), WHICH I THINK IS A DANGEROUSLY WRONG ASSUMPTION, or you seem to think that the use of nukes would be less dangerous for the world, then when Russia would defeat Ukraine.
Your remark about "not letting stand nuclear blackmail" baffles me, because the way I see it is that the world since 1945 (or 1949, when Stalin got his nukes) has been living in this constant state of "blackmail". Because possible mutual destruction is a form of two-sided blackmail, and I do not think it wise to disturb that, how ridiculous the situation may be.
Nuclear war is, to say it very euphemistically, not to be taken lightly, but some of your postings make me nervous and I wonder, do you realize what you are talking about?
 
( Sad disclaimer: For the ones that would assume that I am thinking that the Russians will defeat Ukraine, or assume that I would want the Russians to defeat Ukraine..
 I am absolutely sure Russia wil NOT defeat Ukraine and Russia should get the hell outta there.)
 
 

That's a terrific podcast but I did not remember Kofman saying that. After reading your post I went back and re-listened to his sections and he never mentions the UA needing better training, or anything else about UA training. Maybe it was Lee or Alperovitch? If you can find it give me the time stamp, please.
Kofman has been openly skeptical of the efficacy of western-style combined arms training for the UA since it's inception, so the idea that what the UA needs is more of it would be a rather un-Kofman thing to say no matter what his traveling companions may think. Here's something Kofman really did say about UA training by NATO forces back in December:
Understand US is trying to find ways to improve outcomes and reduce UA dependence on high rates of arty fire. Less attrition, more maneuver. Training to do combined arms at company/battalion level is good in and of itself, but it won’t necessarily solve this problem. I have no doubt UA can learn combined arms maneuver, and saw elements of this at Kharkiv. However, without USAF air superiority, US logistics, C4ISR, etc it’s a bit hard to ‘fight like Americans.’ How well would we do without airpower? More importantly, it misses that attrition is what enabled maneuver in UA offensives. Against a well prepared defense, with sufficient density of forces, it wasn’t nearly as successful and casualties were high. This is why Kherson was so difficult compared to Kharkiv/Lyman. UA way of war depends on fires, exploited by maneuver. It is a successor military to the Soviet military, which was arty centric, and in that respect is much closer to the Russian military than our own. You have to work with what has proven successful for your partners. Deep strike, precision, better ISR, can help improve UA performance. My bias is that I’m  wary of seeing a solution that implies trying to turn that military more into us. That said, there’s no easy answer here. The US is not optimized to support a protracted artillery-driven war in Europe. Folks can also judge for themselves, looking at the history how good we are at converting other militaries to ‘fighting more like Americans' https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1606637882994819072

Reading the Kaufman stuff what I'm getting from it is that Ukraine is doing a poor job of using their entire force to enable an attack. Now I might be off base but to me this sounds like the most generous position to take on their take.

So like Ukraine is sending forward a company to make an attack and that company is being supported by organic fires (maybe assigned higher level fires too). But what Ukraine isn't doing is making multiple company scale attacks across the near-front that are designed to support each other, with consideration for how they could all fit into a larger scale followup, with an operational fire/ISR plan designed to deny Russia the ability to react effectively to the attacks in that area of the near-front.
 
 
----
 
As an aside can we please stop this argument over actual NATO involvement in the war.

1. ITS NOT GOING TO HAPPEN

2. This whole argument started because someone was talking about a NATO naval attack. This is fan fiction.

There is some genuinely interesting new information coming out that we should be discussing. What we don't need is the thread polluted by fan fiction arguments about an imaginary NATO intervention. We can talk about it when that happens but until it does please keep any comments about it in your personal journal. This isn't a creative writing thread.
 

Not interested in online wins. Your original suggestion was unrealistic to the political realities of NATO as a coalition. It doesn't operate as a single organism, more like a distractable swarm.
For NATO to attack Russia (and with Naval warfare, things can escalate extremely quickly, so no such thing as a little attack in this context) would require an act so overtly aggressive that responding would be an easy sell to the home. It's not complicated - NATO is a defensive alliance, not offensive.
There would have to be clearly necessary reason that NATO should attack St. Petersburg, for a NATO force to actually attack St. Petersburg. Extraordinary situations requiring extraordinary solutions, etc.
For all that you're suggesting Ukraine is being bled dry to serve some Western Illumanti agenda, the simple fact stands - NATO is not at war with Russia. Ukraine is. Until we see a deliberate Russian attack across the NATO-RUSSIA border then we are still at peace, because there sure as heck will not be a NATO first strike, and we are not at war.

This whole narrative is getting out of hand here. Now don't get me wrong. I mean, sure, in principle this is kind of a proxy war. But IMHO you are inverting responsibilities and this is really where "Ukraine fights this war on our behalf/for us" (mind the discussion here some pages back about what the exact wording should be) breaks down. Let's not forget that it was Russia attacking Ukraine. Not Russia attacking NATO/the West or NATO/the West attacking Russia and of course not NATO/the West attacking Ukraine. The point? It is because Russia or Putin's regime decided to invade that Ukrainians are fighting and Ukrainians are dying. Not because we somehow made them fight or they were caught in the middle or something. Yes, in reality we quite likely sent Russia the signal that we wouldn't care enough to get involved and therefore indirectly encouraged Putin. But at the end of the day it was Putin & cronies who gave the order to invade, not any Western leader.
Now we did get involved, we do support Ukraine and we could possibly do more but we are not at war and since, see above, we are not responsible for Russian soldiers being in Ukraine, IMHO we are not obliged to enter this war. That doesn't mean we can't but since NATO wasn't attacked this is a decision every country has to make for itself. International law absolutely gives every country the right to support the defender of a war of aggression, also by military means. So if you feel your country should get involved more directly, call up your representative in congress or whatever and tell him/her. Nothing wrong with that. But we are democracies and other people have different opinions. Our leaders are not dictators and as long as there is no majority in favour of going to war it is not spineless or whatever for a leader or a government as a whole to not do so.
Note to everyone here: Maybe my perception here is a bit skewed but it seems to me we are seeing increasingly heated fights between... I don't know Hawks and Doves here? I really shouldn't presume to play the Upholder of Moral Standards here but I feel we should have a bit less "holier than thou" and "he that is not with me is against me" and stuff like that.

That's a terrific podcast but I did not remember Kofman saying that. After reading your post I went back and re-listened to his sections and he never mentions the UA needing better training, or anything else about UA training. Maybe it was Lee or Alperovitch? If you can find it give me the time stamp, please.
Kofman has been openly skeptical of the efficacy of western-style combined arms training for the UA since it's inception, so the idea that what the UA needs is more of it would be a rather un-Kofman thing to say no matter what his traveling companions may think. Here's something Kofman really did say about UA training by NATO forces back in December:
Understand US is trying to find ways to improve outcomes and reduce UA dependence on high rates of arty fire. Less attrition, more maneuver. Training to do combined arms at company/battalion level is good in and of itself, but it won’t necessarily solve this problem. I have no doubt UA can learn combined arms maneuver, and saw elements of this at Kharkiv. However, without USAF air superiority, US logistics, C4ISR, etc it’s a bit hard to ‘fight like Americans.’ How well would we do without airpower? More importantly, it misses that attrition is what enabled maneuver in UA offensives. Against a well prepared defense, with sufficient density of forces, it wasn’t nearly as successful and casualties were high. This is why Kherson was so difficult compared to Kharkiv/Lyman. UA way of war depends on fires, exploited by maneuver. It is a successor military to the Soviet military, which was arty centric, and in that respect is much closer to the Russian military than our own. You have to work with what has proven successful for your partners. Deep strike, precision, better ISR, can help improve UA performance. My bias is that I’m  wary of seeing a solution that implies trying to turn that military more into us. That said, there’s no easy answer here. The US is not optimized to support a protracted artillery-driven war in Europe. Folks can also judge for themselves, looking at the history how good we are at converting other militaries to ‘fighting more like Americans' https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1606637882994819072

Yeah, and this type of attack is so slow that Russians will expand their minefields and fortifications at least the same rate as Ukraine is advancing. Leading to never ending loop without breakthrough and exploitation. At least until force attrition breaks the cycle.

In my impression, that last sentence was a very important point for Kofman and Lee. They talked about this several times. Because of that even a succesful Ukrainian infantry attack successfully crossing a minefield and taking a position does not mean that the successful unit can be reinforced and supplied. Before it happens, the minefield, which is now at the back of new Ukrainian position, has to be cleared in the way suitable for vehicles. This also applies to medevac, which means that each casualty is carried by hand. This takes away several men from the front unit - the wounded plus up to 4 soldiers to carry him several hundred meters.
Russians also are aware of this, so as soon as the Ukrainians take a piece of land, there is an armoured counterattack because at that point the Ukrainians are going to be dismounted infantry only with portable AT weapons. 

some pointers:
At the start of the southern offensive, we saw the employment of multiples of single companies, not brigades Ukraine is limited in its ability in embodying larger formations in an integrated way. Limited by enablers, operational environment, and experience. Was to the idea of establishing new "western" brigades proven/disproven? another way to go would have been to reinforce the existing experienced units with new battalions. a lot of the progress in the south was made by the older experienced units jury is still out but already merits questioning was this the way to go? Eighter way it was worth trying Was the idea of trying to make Ukraine to fight like "us" proven? Ukraine's way of war has been attritional, using fires decisively that then enables moment. Most actions have been platoon/company level where Ukraine has excelled compared to Russians.  The argument has been the west does not have the ability to sustain this type of war. The question is does the west then have the ability to train and sustain Ukraine in the western way of war? This would mean the enablers the western way of war requires, starting with air supremacy. The answer seems to be no. might be better to improve Ukraine's ability to fight the way it is already fighting Ukraine uses tanks in almost the complete opposite way than the west in Ukraine's experience driving a company of tanks over a ridge is a sure way of losing a tank co. Tanks are used in infantry support or indirect fire roles. Mainly in pairs. Same on the Russian side at this point AT role is mainly done with ATGM infantry This is what Ukraine has learned and thinks what works for them Now: New brigades have been bloodied and are going through some changes. This is good Ukraine is adapting The fight is now mainly an attritional fight with platoon/company-level infantry attacks problem is this is unlikely to achieve breakthrough and exploitation Mine clearing capacities are in high demand like Nammo APOBS. Now main ways are bangalores or grappling hooks. These are slow and create tiny lanes and do not enable vehicle moment. Now ongoing attritional counter-battery fight seems interesting and promising for Ukraine. Still hard to judge from the outside Russia is saving most capabilities and ammo for large vehicle formations. This rationing is often confused with Russia lacking artillery. 

That's a terrific podcast but I did not remember Kofman saying that. After reading your post I went back and re-listened to his sections and he never mentions the UA needing better training, or anything else about UA training. Maybe it was Lee or Alperovitch? If you can find it give me the time stamp, please.
Kofman has been openly skeptical of the efficacy of western-style combined arms training for the UA since it's inception, so the idea that what the UA needs is more of it would be a rather un-Kofman thing to say no matter what his traveling companions may think. Here's something Kofman really did say about UA training by NATO forces back in December:
Understand US is trying to find ways to improve outcomes and reduce UA dependence on high rates of arty fire. Less attrition, more maneuver. Training to do combined arms at company/battalion level is good in and of itself, but it won’t necessarily solve this problem. I have no doubt UA can learn combined arms maneuver, and saw elements of this at Kharkiv. However, without USAF air superiority, US logistics, C4ISR, etc it’s a bit hard to ‘fight like Americans.’ How well would we do without airpower? More importantly, it misses that attrition is what enabled maneuver in UA offensives. Against a well prepared defense, with sufficient density of forces, it wasn’t nearly as successful and casualties were high. This is why Kherson was so difficult compared to Kharkiv/Lyman. UA way of war depends on fires, exploited by maneuver. It is a successor military to the Soviet military, which was arty centric, and in that respect is much closer to the Russian military than our own. You have to work with what has proven successful for your partners. Deep strike, precision, better ISR, can help improve UA performance. My bias is that I’m  wary of seeing a solution that implies trying to turn that military more into us. That said, there’s no easy answer here. The US is not optimized to support a protracted artillery-driven war in Europe. Folks can also judge for themselves, looking at the history how good we are at converting other militaries to ‘fighting more like Americans' https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1606637882994819072

That's a terrific podcast but I did not remember Kofman saying that. After reading your post I went back and re-listened to his sections and he never mentions the UA needing better training, or anything else about UA training. Maybe it was Lee or Alperovitch? If you can find it give me the time stamp, please.
Kofman has been openly skeptical of the efficacy of western-style combined arms training for the UA since it's inception, so the idea that what the UA needs is more of it would be a rather un-Kofman thing to say no matter what his traveling companions may think. Here's something Kofman really did say about UA training by NATO forces back in December:
Understand US is trying to find ways to improve outcomes and reduce UA dependence on high rates of arty fire. Less attrition, more maneuver. Training to do combined arms at company/battalion level is good in and of itself, but it won’t necessarily solve this problem. I have no doubt UA can learn combined arms maneuver, and saw elements of this at Kharkiv. However, without USAF air superiority, US logistics, C4ISR, etc it’s a bit hard to ‘fight like Americans.’ How well would we do without airpower? More importantly, it misses that attrition is what enabled maneuver in UA offensives. Against a well prepared defense, with sufficient density of forces, it wasn’t nearly as successful and casualties were high. This is why Kherson was so difficult compared to Kharkiv/Lyman. UA way of war depends on fires, exploited by maneuver. It is a successor military to the Soviet military, which was arty centric, and in that respect is much closer to the Russian military than our own. You have to work with what has proven successful for your partners. Deep strike, precision, better ISR, can help improve UA performance. My bias is that I’m  wary of seeing a solution that implies trying to turn that military more into us. That said, there’s no easy answer here. The US is not optimized to support a protracted artillery-driven war in Europe. Folks can also judge for themselves, looking at the history how good we are at converting other militaries to ‘fighting more like Americans' https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1606637882994819072

That's a terrific podcast but I did not remember Kofman saying that. After reading your post I went back and re-listened to his sections and he never mentions the UA needing better training, or anything else about UA training. Maybe it was Lee or Alperovitch? If you can find it give me the time stamp, please.
Kofman has been openly skeptical of the efficacy of western-style combined arms training for the UA since it's inception, so the idea that what the UA needs is more of it would be a rather un-Kofman thing to say no matter what his traveling companions may think. Here's something Kofman really did say about UA training by NATO forces back in December:
Understand US is trying to find ways to improve outcomes and reduce UA dependence on high rates of arty fire. Less attrition, more maneuver. Training to do combined arms at company/battalion level is good in and of itself, but it won’t necessarily solve this problem. I have no doubt UA can learn combined arms maneuver, and saw elements of this at Kharkiv. However, without USAF air superiority, US logistics, C4ISR, etc it’s a bit hard to ‘fight like Americans.’ How well would we do without airpower? More importantly, it misses that attrition is what enabled maneuver in UA offensives. Against a well prepared defense, with sufficient density of forces, it wasn’t nearly as successful and casualties were high. This is why Kherson was so difficult compared to Kharkiv/Lyman. UA way of war depends on fires, exploited by maneuver. It is a successor military to the Soviet military, which was arty centric, and in that respect is much closer to the Russian military than our own. You have to work with what has proven successful for your partners. Deep strike, precision, better ISR, can help improve UA performance. My bias is that I’m  wary of seeing a solution that implies trying to turn that military more into us. That said, there’s no easy answer here. The US is not optimized to support a protracted artillery-driven war in Europe. Folks can also judge for themselves, looking at the history how good we are at converting other militaries to ‘fighting more like Americans' https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1606637882994819072

That's a terrific podcast but I did not remember Kofman saying that. After reading your post I went back and re-listened to his sections and he never mentions the UA needing better training, or anything else about UA training. Maybe it was Lee or Alperovitch? If you can find it give me the time stamp, please.
Kofman has been openly skeptical of the efficacy of western-style combined arms training for the UA since it's inception, so the idea that what the UA needs is more of it would be a rather un-Kofman thing to say no matter what his traveling companions may think. Here's something Kofman really did say about UA training by NATO forces back in December:
Understand US is trying to find ways to improve outcomes and reduce UA dependence on high rates of arty fire. Less attrition, more maneuver. Training to do combined arms at company/battalion level is good in and of itself, but it won’t necessarily solve this problem. I have no doubt UA can learn combined arms maneuver, and saw elements of this at Kharkiv. However, without USAF air superiority, US logistics, C4ISR, etc it’s a bit hard to ‘fight like Americans.’ How well would we do without airpower? More importantly, it misses that attrition is what enabled maneuver in UA offensives. Against a well prepared defense, with sufficient density of forces, it wasn’t nearly as successful and casualties were high. This is why Kherson was so difficult compared to Kharkiv/Lyman. UA way of war depends on fires, exploited by maneuver. It is a successor military to the Soviet military, which was arty centric, and in that respect is much closer to the Russian military than our own. You have to work with what has proven successful for your partners. Deep strike, precision, better ISR, can help improve UA performance. My bias is that I’m  wary of seeing a solution that implies trying to turn that military more into us. That said, there’s no easy answer here. The US is not optimized to support a protracted artillery-driven war in Europe. Folks can also judge for themselves, looking at the history how good we are at converting other militaries to ‘fighting more like Americans' https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1606637882994819072

Someone should probably point out that the unpopular Kofman opinion getting kicked around didn't come from Kofman. It was written by Franz-Stefan Gady.

That's a terrific podcast but I did not remember Kofman saying that. After reading your post I went back and re-listened to his sections and he never mentions the UA needing better training, or anything else about UA training. Maybe it was Lee or Alperovitch? If you can find it give me the time stamp, please.
Kofman has been openly skeptical of the efficacy of western-style combined arms training for the UA since it's inception, so the idea that what the UA needs is more of it would be a rather un-Kofman thing to say no matter what his traveling companions may think. Here's something Kofman really did say about UA training by NATO forces back in December:
Understand US is trying to find ways to improve outcomes and reduce UA dependence on high rates of arty fire. Less attrition, more maneuver. Training to do combined arms at company/battalion level is good in and of itself, but it won’t necessarily solve this problem. I have no doubt UA can learn combined arms maneuver, and saw elements of this at Kharkiv. However, without USAF air superiority, US logistics, C4ISR, etc it’s a bit hard to ‘fight like Americans.’ How well would we do without airpower? More importantly, it misses that attrition is what enabled maneuver in UA offensives. Against a well prepared defense, with sufficient density of forces, it wasn’t nearly as successful and casualties were high. This is why Kherson was so difficult compared to Kharkiv/Lyman. UA way of war depends on fires, exploited by maneuver. It is a successor military to the Soviet military, which was arty centric, and in that respect is much closer to the Russian military than our own. You have to work with what has proven successful for your partners. Deep strike, precision, better ISR, can help improve UA performance. My bias is that I’m  wary of seeing a solution that implies trying to turn that military more into us. That said, there’s no easy answer here. The US is not optimized to support a protracted artillery-driven war in Europe. Folks can also judge for themselves, looking at the history how good we are at converting other militaries to ‘fighting more like Americans' https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1606637882994819072

Someone should probably point out that the unpopular Kofman opinion getting kicked around didn't come from Kofman. It was written by Franz-Stefan Gady.

Some Ukrainian progress south of Bakhmut, retaking the heights overlooking Klishchiivka:
 

Great general wrap-up of the situation according to Rob Lee, Michael Kofman, Konrad Muzyka "crew"
unroll the tweet(s): https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1681240456754077697.html
 

Update from Ukrainian deputy defense minister, Hanna Maliar:
https://t.me/annamaliar/938
 

 

Either Ghirkin really wants to walk out that window, or his faction is about to make a second coup attempt. I can't square the circle of what he is saying any other way. Says the Russian line in the south could fail anytime, and their are no reserves to speak of. and then he gets really depressed.
 
 

https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2789
 

Update on the F-16 timetable from Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba:
 
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/viyna-nato-vilnyuskyy-samit/32499810.html