Vanir Ausf B

I decided to create a new topic for this because "tool to set elevation in the editor" is no longer really a good description. Finally (from my perspective 😉) I managed to release version 2.0.0 of CMAutoEditor.

https://github.com/DerButschi/CMAutoEditor
Woah, Butschi, wait a minute CMAutoWhat? What the hell are you talking about? CMAutoEditor is a tool that takes "external" data, like elevation, and automates clicking in the CM scenario editor. This way it kind of works around "missing features" in the editor. Wouldn't it be nice to import something like a heat map instead of clicking elevations in the editor? Of course I can't change the editor but by letting CMAutoEditor do the clicking it does something similar.

 
Version 2 is really a major update as it now includes importing data from OpenStreetMap. This way you can basically use CMAutoEditor to create a whole map for you.
Still, feature creep and being overly ambitious is certain to kill such a small project so I had to triage what makes it into this release and what (maybe, provided there is enough interest on your side and enough time on my side) gets postponed to a later update.

The cut affecting most of you is that for this release only CMCW is really supported. The reason is that there are differences in what is in the scenario editor for each CM title. That means not only are there buttons at different positions but there are also different buildings, roads, flavour objects etc. which need to be programmed as a "profile". I intend to modify CMAutoEditor in a way that the community can help with that but I am not yet sure how best to do it. So, for now CMCW only. CMBS should work for everything but flavour objects.

Another thing I had to cut is support for Windows version older than Windows 10. I know, there are quite a few of you around who still field Windows 7. However, python is only supported up to version 3.7 on Windows 7 and a few of the libraries CMAutoEditor depends on require python 3.10. In addition, I don't have a farm of PCs idling at home where I can test different Windows version so I can really only develop for Windows 10. Sorry for that but maybe this doubles as a friendly reminder that nowadays Windows 7 is a security liability and you should upgrade to Windows 10 or 11. 😉
There is of course a long list of things I'd like to improve eventually and given that this is a rather complex piece of code the chances that it is free of bugs is close to zero. So, feel free to contact me here or on github if you find something!

Now, with all the caveats out of the way let's move on to the more pleasant stuff. 🙂 What's new in version 2? Well, of course OpenStreetMap data. You can import forests, rivers, roads, streams, railways, farmland, grassland, bushes, buildings and even bus stops, wayside crosses and much more. I improved the tools to import DGM data so that now arbitrary rectangles can be extracted. The information from this can be loaded into the OSM data converter so that you don't have to manually enter bounding boxes. (The geotiff tool is unfortunately among the things that didn't make it for this release so you are left with the previous capabilites). CMAutoEditor itself is now also much faster. Please note, that it may be too fast for what your PC can handle. If you experience "holes", e.g. when setting the elevation, that means the CM Editor is not responsive enough. I will make the parameters that determines the rate of clicking selectable from the GUI in a later update. Last but certainly not least there is a GUI for all the tools, so no more going to that evil shell, typing commands - kudos to @Dawntaker for supporting me with GUI making!

One more thing. I won't repeat the mistake and not have a manual or tutorial video ready at release: Since my previous tutorial video is now totally deprecated I am doing a new one. This time, instead of just telling you what the different features do, I'll do a step-by-step tutorial in four parts where I will create an actual map. This way I will certainly miss a few features but you should get a better feeling of how to actually use the tools in reality. Part 1 is finished already and it covers "installing" (i.e. downloading the .exe files) CMAutoEditor, installing other necessary tools, selecting a location for the map in map.army, finding and downloading elevation data, downloading OpenStreetMap data and getting historical aerial imagery and working with it. So, basically the boring stuff, some of you might say, but possibly the most important part. 😉
In the future I'd like to adapt CMAutoEditor to one of the WW2 titles, I think CMFB or CMRT would be best. Obviously present-day OpenStreetMap won't do for that. So, instead I'd like to make another tutorial showing how to use and old map or aerial image to make "OpenStreetMap data" from scratch and feed it into the CM scenario editor. Drawing polygons and tagging them is still - in my view - much more comfortable than clicking in the editor with some semi transparent overlay. So, if you have good material, go ahead and make a suggestion here. 😉
I hope you enjoy this new version of CMAutoEditor and the tutorial video(s)!

Yes, very sad video w/o Eng subs. It's alot of information about Wagners tactic in close fighting from "first hands"
 - Wagners are attacking continously, not with "human waves", but sending sqaud+ / platoon+ assault groups one by one with intervals in 40-50 minutes after failed attempt. Such assaults can last from several hours to several days without a break and almost all this time is a contact rifle/grenade fighting from 100 to 15..20 meters. This heavily exhausting for defenders psyhology (and this says the guy of extreme motivated unit, so what you can expect from usual UKR soldier of usual rifle battalion with his symbolic training?) Also these protracted assaults eat ammunition very fast, which create additional load on logistic and caused often jams of weapon, because soldiers, repelling endless attacks, often hadn't a time to maintain it properly. 
- Wagners usually try to attack in joint areas between units. Coordination between neighbours on their flanks always was weak place, because units often havn't clear sectors of responsibilities on their edges and when enemy attack, each unit usually thinks that developments in neighbours sector.
- Wagners often attack in the night or at least tried to sneak very close to positions, using features of terrain around Bakhmut - dense tree-palnts and bushes, multiple ravins ets. 
- if positions of enemies too close each from other, Wagners rare support their troops with artillery, but instead they have unlimited access to heavy infantry weapon support lilke mortars, AGS, SPG, HMGs. Often our positions are showered with AGS/ 82 mm mortar fire and while next salvo incoming and  UKR troops taking cover, in theese moment, assaulters make their decisive burst to trenches and try to seize it. 
- one of methods of Wagners spotting if drones are busy or not available - they send in the night groups of spotters (usually 2 mens) with one NV/thermal. They can sneak too close to our positions - even on 20-30 m and adjust arty/ mortar/ AGS fire. If group is eleminated, next one comes immediately. 
- despite Wagner commanders used "smart mob" tactic, controlling plan of attacks own "live pixeltruppen" via tabs with special soft, but anyway their movements also are formulaic. Soldier told assault groups, which changed each other always met in one point and some time had talks. Even after they were hit several times in this area, thet didn't change own routes. Likely commander decided this is shortest way to support tempo of pressure, and exactly this matter, not lives of convicts. 
- convicts really act like zombie, because they havn't way back without order or because of wound. Among goods of killed Wagners soldiers found some unknown pills, which probably are some drugs or psychotrops, which suppress fear and even some feels. Our soldiers told - Wagners can lay three hours on the cold ground and then to rise and attack. PS - among Russian TG talks about this told almost in open, that Wagners drink special "coctails", whith similar effect.     
 

While that is a very beautiful name, having deep cultural connotations with Polish history and culture, I cannot help but wonder how it sounds to English ears.

I can't say about all. What I see in twitter among militaries - many questions about price of Bakhmut defense, many of criticism on "stupid generals", but in whole there is no pessimism. "Price will be high but we will do our work".  
About "Kupol" - he wasn't enough pessimistic, he just told real things and real problems. It's discussionable - had it a right to tell about this in wartime or not. But anyway, as far as from times of USSR Ukrainian army inherited very bad things - "never say about problems" and "never bring bad news to upper chief".
Military journalist Yuriy Butusov several days ago touched this theme in own interview. And this is one of reasons, why UKR army has hard situation in Bakhmut. Because low-level commanders often didn't report about lost positions in time, because they are afraid to be "fu...d out" by battalion commander, battalion commander in own turn is afraid to be "fu...d out" by brigade comamnder, and brigade commander is afraid to be "fu...d out" by Operative Command HQ. As result higher HQs can get information from battlefield with big delay and can make wrong decisions (this also can get worse because of incompetence of officers). 
He told about soldier Oleksandr Matsiyevskyi, who was captured and shot out for "Slava Ukriani!" - his detachment was sent to take positions in tree-plant near Krasna Hora, which on map in HQ was pointed under our control, but indees was several days seized by Wagners. The same was with Soledar - soldiers, who abandoned positions + commanders, who afraid "to bring bad news" = encirclement. 
Butusov also told that recently in previous rotation, commander of 93rd mech.brigade was removed from command because "dared" to report to HQ about real situation and real problems. Most problematic chain, who still adhere to such "Soviet heritage" - middle-high level of commanders (Operative Command HQs, MoD, many brigade commanders)  
So, it's big luck, that this Soviet habits are developing in Russian army in many times brighter, than in our own... 

Some discussions a propos internal criticism sorrounding firing of one Ukrainian commander after his lack of belief in offensive capabilities of Ukrainian army this year. There seem to be part of Ukrainian offiicer corps that does not share rosy vision of offensive breaking into Melitopol- not enough trained troops, using insufficent equipment and with too many ammunition problems.
Perhaps @Haiduk could shed us more light on how people in UA see forthcoming spring/summer.
 

The video shows the fighter approaching from the rear (the drone's propeller is a pusher type).

The men have been fighting for more than a year now, and they say the Russians are evolving.
"They are learning, they are getting cleverer, and it really freaks me out," says Dwarf. "They send out a group - five morons taken from prison. They are shot, but the enemy sees where you are, walks around, and you are surrounded from behind."
Holm chimes in that Russia is now using drones armed with grenades more effectively. "We used to drop them and freak them out," he says. "Now they're dropping drone grenades on our positions."
 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64955537

Devastating judgement on state of affairs of german army:

But Högl said that even if some new equipment was on its way, in 2022 “not a cent had arrived from the special fund”. She added: “If we stayed at the current pace and the existing framework conditions, it would take about half a century before just the current infrastructure of the Bundeswehr was completely renovated.”
Germany’s military upgrade to take ‘half a century’ at current pace, says report | Financial Times (ft.com)
German military in worse shape than before Russia's invasion -official | Reuters

Here is other post of our soldier of 93rd brigade, who raised a flame about Bakhmut. Now he reposted FB article of other serviceman, who writes some things, which show us why Wagners have success in Bakhmut. And this is not only because thier flexible tactic + drone control of attacks + meat waves + unlimited arty and - many of our poor trained troops.
We have SEVERE lack of artillery support. Even "conscript" level troops can more stable if they have proper arty support. Wagners attack continuolsly with small groups from different directions. And if our the same small squads turn out face to face with Wagners w/o arty supoprt, thius quickly exhausts small-arms / RPG ammunition on our positions and this is also factor, which forces our troops to withdraw
Translation:
- 12th of March Russian T-90M was spotted in northern part of Zabakhmutka (eastern district of Bakhmut). Artillery stike was conducted, but because of lack of shell, howitzers could fire only several times and couldn't hit the target. Closese hit was in the roof of hose, where tank hide. But Russian crew paniced and abandoned the tank, hiding in other place.
- Information about tank were transmitted up be C2. At the evening some, probably arty spotters of brigade level or some drone recons communicated about T-90M question - they told they could hit this tank with "western wunderwaffe"
- further typical Soviet sh....t has begun
- 13th of MArch, when all plan of strike was agreed on lower levels (Russian tank still stands on the same place!),  "big bosses" of some HQ denied the strike because "western wunderwaffe" is too expencive and allowed to use only if target is firing or there is a threat of breakthrough. But your tank just abandoned, so no. 
- All day lower level chain has been proved that "wunderwaffe" is worth to be used on T-90M in 2.5 millions $. "Chiefs" gave permission.
- 14th of March. Russian tankers finished drink vodka in basement, sat in their tank again and changed position. Spotters handed over targeting directly to infantry and communicated them directly to brigade level arty. Howitzers made two shots, missed and... this is over - technical malfunction. Tank ran away.
And this is only top of iceberg! Russian units movie mostly free on 1-3 km from zero line! Not only infantry, but jeeps, armored vehicles etc. There was happen they moved Grad on 3,6 km to our positions, but several shots forced them took away. 
We know 75 % of Rusian positions, command centers of company/battalion levels, but we can't hit them! No ammo! Severe limits ! If work is permited we have limit in 5-7 shells, but this is in more "fat" days!  
As far as on 18th of Feb we were promised to solve shell problem for the week. Now 14th of March...

There is an interesting point hidden here: aside from the time window being looked at (Dec vs Jan vs Feb vs Mar, for example) over what geographic area is 1:1 being assessed? Within 100m of downtown Bakhmut would give you one answer, within 1km a different answer, and out to a 10km radius would be a different answer again.
To put that a slightly different way, 2 Platoon, of C Company IV Battalion could actually be experiencing 1:1 for a variety of reasons - terrain factors, log issues, leadership, quality of opposition, etc. However C Company as a whole would likely be suffering a different exchange ratio, and their battalion commander might consider himself barely engaged, while the Brigade commander is sleeping well at night because nothing interesting or alarming is going on.
In other other words; context matters, yo, and most of the discussion around exchange ratios are sorely lacking context.

Yet another Kofman interview.

He says that Ukraine is suffering losses around Bakmut due to more elite Wagner forces that attack at night using night vision, when Ukrainians are exhausted from fighting off the human wave attacks during the day.
 
 
 

It has been the hottest topic on the Polish military twitter. It probably follows from two sources, an increased number of UKR videos and tweets critical of the decisions concerning Bachmut and of the UKR command in general, as well as a research trip a few weeks ago by Franz-Stefan Gady, Konrad Muzyka, Rob Lee and yes, the bogeyman Kofman himself. This is extensively discussed in a podcast from last Friday in the  "War of the Rocks" series, in the paywalled section (I reluctantly started to pay for this stuff). They all seem in agreement that the level of casualties in Bachmut is high, Russians there are figthing well and Vuhledar is something completely else than is happening in Bachmut, whereas e.g. Kreminna is something else alltogether.  The Polish angle in this is Muzyka, who specifically came forward with the 1:1 ratio on Polish twitter.
The podcast also provides some details of the trip which to me are sufficient to disprove the angle, that this was just a publicity trip. E.g. the main source of their information is not visual inspection of the frontline, but meeting with their contacts and getting them to talk in a more extended and frank way, that is the case over the telephone or Signal. Gady and Muzyka did not even go to Bachmut itself, but elected to visit a replacement depot behind the lines. 
It is of course just my impression, but looking at what kind of arguments are put forward in favour and against, by whom and on what basis I find that the claim of 1:1 attrition ratio - specifically in the context of e.g. past two or three weeks, on the frontline between Krasnopopivka in the North to Krasne in the South - to be fully believable. 
To the contrary, the arguments referring to those huge 1:7 or 1:5 ratios seem to be just weaker, as they tend to be based on just "because Vuhledar, because zek rush and because Russian Orc stupid" general sentiment, or averaging out the casualty ratios in Bachmut area over a period of several months. Both are excessive generalisations, the first one obviously so, but the second is a fallacy as well. If the question is "whether to defend Bachmut now tenaciously or withdraw" the sunk costs and realised gains in the previous months do not matter. Just the prediction of the casualties going forward.
Now, the answer to the above question most recently presented by the Ukrainians is no longer attritional, but positional. UKR defends Bachmut because otherwise, the Russians will attack upwards and eliminate the salient from the north of Soledar to Kreminna. E.g. that is what Mashovets said the previous Monday on his Kanal5 programme. I am not sure about this one - if the RUS want to attack to the North, why do they need to take Bakhmut to the South? They took Soledar, which was closer to Bachmut than Krasnopopivka or Siversk.
 

who knew CMCW might become the game to depict 2023 fighting.  Leo 1 and T62s

UKR soldiers hide in the basement when Russian tank works at their building. 
Buildings in CM should have underground levels
 

Kofman gave a talk with a few PowerPoint slides looking back at why the Russian invasion plan failed. It was for a Canadian security conference. I find this to be fairly coherent presentation in which he doesn't try to predict the future.  The first part is a long introduction of Kofman, which I skipped. It was uploaded 3 days ago but I don't know when the conference occurred.
 

Latest Kofman podcast. Leaving aside issues with credibility of his analysis, they finally go into specifics of Ukrainian force generation, assessing it at two batalions a month of Western-trained troops (not sure if they can be viewed in the same category as soldiers lost at Bakhmut, though). Still barely started to listen, if somebody has more excerpts valid for topics we touched before on this board (pro/against) feel free to enumerate it there.