photon

The ability to double tap a particular spot on a ship with torpedoes is absolutely terrifying. What damage control regime could possibly deal with that? None.
The drones don't seem torpedo fast, so I wonder why the Russian ships aren't making better speed and zig-zagging all the time? Oh. Those Ropuchas have a maximum speed of 18 knots. That's not fast.

If I were Taiwan, I would start building 4 factories for these naval drones this week. They are shockingly effective.

Actually, I do think there's been some change. For the most part now we can conceive of an international order where competition is not always war. That was unthinkable in the ancient world. For example, in the Second Punic War the Romans suffered something like 10% combat casualties as a percentage of their total population. That would be like the United States losing 13 million soldiers in World War 2, excluding civilian casualties. Having successfully concluded their absolutely devastating war with Carthage, the Romans took a break of... zero years, immediately entering into wars in Cisalpine Gaul and Macedonia. For them, war was the default, and peace an aberration. We don't think that way anymore.

Amateur historian chiming in, so take it for what it's worth: yes with a but.
I'd suggest that there are two kinds of war, the second of which is relatively uncommon. I'd distinguish them based on what the victor gets at the end of the war.
The first kind of war is a war-for-things. The aggressor wants to take some things (which can be abstract things) from the defender. The victor gets to keep the things. For example, when the United States fought Mexico in the 1840s, that was a war for things. The victor kept Texas and California. Or the Roman conquest of Gaul: Caesar plundered everything that was not nailed down, and functionally annexed modern France to Roman rule. These are pretty common, and World War II was, from one side, a war for things: Germany wanted Lebensraum, Japan wanted the rich resources of the indo-pacific region (particularly oil). Note that I'm defining wars-for-things in terms of the spoils, not the rhetoric that surrounds the spoils. I'd note that modern war is so mind bogglingly destructive that rational actors have concluded that protracted war-for-things is a suckers game. There are no things you can get that are worth the destruction on the things you want!
The second kind, which is relatively rare, is a war-for-rules. The aggressor wants to impose (or maintain) a particular rule set on a collection of polities. The ancient examples of this would be Roman expansion in Italy (which ended with the defeated state bound into a treaty structure rather than obliterated) and the inter-Polis wars in Greece (which were by and large prestige competitions). The victor incorporates the defeated party into a particular rule-set. The objective is not to take things away from the defeated party.
We've also seen asymmetric combinations of the two. For example, Gulf War I. Iraq was fighting a war-for-things against Kuwait, but the Coalition was fighting a war-for-rules against Iraq (we did not annex Iraq at the end of the war, we said, "no annexing neighbors, bad Iraq").
So the war in Ukraine is a combination of these two. Russia is fighting a war-for-things against Ukraine. They are attempting to take the whole of Ukraine's territory, and stealing grain and people. Simultaneously, Russia is fighting a war-for-rules against the Status-quo Coalition. The rule change they're attempting to effect is a return to the "annexing-neighbors-is-ok" rule set that preceded WW2. Ukraine is fighting an existential war-for-things against Russia, and wins if they exist as an independent state at the end of the fighting. The Status-quo Coalition is fighting an existential war against Russia as well: the absolute lynchpin of the status quo is that annexing neighbors is not OK. If that rule falters, it will blow up the international order and allow a renegotiation of lots of the status quo by actors not enamored of the status quo (the Baltics, Taiwan, Africa, the Middle East, &c.). Victory of the Status-quo Coalition is deterrent: showing everyone that attempting to violate the international rule set is *just not worth it*.

Actually, I do think there's been some change. For the most part now we can conceive of an international order where competition is not always war. That was unthinkable in the ancient world. For example, in the Second Punic War the Romans suffered something like 10% combat casualties as a percentage of their total population. That would be like the United States losing 13 million soldiers in World War 2, excluding civilian casualties. Having successfully concluded their absolutely devastating war with Carthage, the Romans took a break of... zero years, immediately entering into wars in Cisalpine Gaul and Macedonia. For them, war was the default, and peace an aberration. We don't think that way anymore.

Amateur historian chiming in, so take it for what it's worth: yes with a but.
I'd suggest that there are two kinds of war, the second of which is relatively uncommon. I'd distinguish them based on what the victor gets at the end of the war.
The first kind of war is a war-for-things. The aggressor wants to take some things (which can be abstract things) from the defender. The victor gets to keep the things. For example, when the United States fought Mexico in the 1840s, that was a war for things. The victor kept Texas and California. Or the Roman conquest of Gaul: Caesar plundered everything that was not nailed down, and functionally annexed modern France to Roman rule. These are pretty common, and World War II was, from one side, a war for things: Germany wanted Lebensraum, Japan wanted the rich resources of the indo-pacific region (particularly oil). Note that I'm defining wars-for-things in terms of the spoils, not the rhetoric that surrounds the spoils. I'd note that modern war is so mind bogglingly destructive that rational actors have concluded that protracted war-for-things is a suckers game. There are no things you can get that are worth the destruction on the things you want!
The second kind, which is relatively rare, is a war-for-rules. The aggressor wants to impose (or maintain) a particular rule set on a collection of polities. The ancient examples of this would be Roman expansion in Italy (which ended with the defeated state bound into a treaty structure rather than obliterated) and the inter-Polis wars in Greece (which were by and large prestige competitions). The victor incorporates the defeated party into a particular rule-set. The objective is not to take things away from the defeated party.
We've also seen asymmetric combinations of the two. For example, Gulf War I. Iraq was fighting a war-for-things against Kuwait, but the Coalition was fighting a war-for-rules against Iraq (we did not annex Iraq at the end of the war, we said, "no annexing neighbors, bad Iraq").
So the war in Ukraine is a combination of these two. Russia is fighting a war-for-things against Ukraine. They are attempting to take the whole of Ukraine's territory, and stealing grain and people. Simultaneously, Russia is fighting a war-for-rules against the Status-quo Coalition. The rule change they're attempting to effect is a return to the "annexing-neighbors-is-ok" rule set that preceded WW2. Ukraine is fighting an existential war-for-things against Russia, and wins if they exist as an independent state at the end of the fighting. The Status-quo Coalition is fighting an existential war against Russia as well: the absolute lynchpin of the status quo is that annexing neighbors is not OK. If that rule falters, it will blow up the international order and allow a renegotiation of lots of the status quo by actors not enamored of the status quo (the Baltics, Taiwan, Africa, the Middle East, &c.). Victory of the Status-quo Coalition is deterrent: showing everyone that attempting to violate the international rule set is *just not worth it*.

Amateur historian chiming in, so take it for what it's worth: yes with a but.
I'd suggest that there are two kinds of war, the second of which is relatively uncommon. I'd distinguish them based on what the victor gets at the end of the war.
The first kind of war is a war-for-things. The aggressor wants to take some things (which can be abstract things) from the defender. The victor gets to keep the things. For example, when the United States fought Mexico in the 1840s, that was a war for things. The victor kept Texas and California. Or the Roman conquest of Gaul: Caesar plundered everything that was not nailed down, and functionally annexed modern France to Roman rule. These are pretty common, and World War II was, from one side, a war for things: Germany wanted Lebensraum, Japan wanted the rich resources of the indo-pacific region (particularly oil). Note that I'm defining wars-for-things in terms of the spoils, not the rhetoric that surrounds the spoils. I'd note that modern war is so mind bogglingly destructive that rational actors have concluded that protracted war-for-things is a suckers game. There are no things you can get that are worth the destruction on the things you want!
The second kind, which is relatively rare, is a war-for-rules. The aggressor wants to impose (or maintain) a particular rule set on a collection of polities. The ancient examples of this would be Roman expansion in Italy (which ended with the defeated state bound into a treaty structure rather than obliterated) and the inter-Polis wars in Greece (which were by and large prestige competitions). The victor incorporates the defeated party into a particular rule-set. The objective is not to take things away from the defeated party.
We've also seen asymmetric combinations of the two. For example, Gulf War I. Iraq was fighting a war-for-things against Kuwait, but the Coalition was fighting a war-for-rules against Iraq (we did not annex Iraq at the end of the war, we said, "no annexing neighbors, bad Iraq").
So the war in Ukraine is a combination of these two. Russia is fighting a war-for-things against Ukraine. They are attempting to take the whole of Ukraine's territory, and stealing grain and people. Simultaneously, Russia is fighting a war-for-rules against the Status-quo Coalition. The rule change they're attempting to effect is a return to the "annexing-neighbors-is-ok" rule set that preceded WW2. Ukraine is fighting an existential war-for-things against Russia, and wins if they exist as an independent state at the end of the fighting. The Status-quo Coalition is fighting an existential war against Russia as well: the absolute lynchpin of the status quo is that annexing neighbors is not OK. If that rule falters, it will blow up the international order and allow a renegotiation of lots of the status quo by actors not enamored of the status quo (the Baltics, Taiwan, Africa, the Middle East, &c.). Victory of the Status-quo Coalition is deterrent: showing everyone that attempting to violate the international rule set is *just not worth it*.

Put very simply, wars that achieve things by definition change prestige and hence rules. 

Amateur historian chiming in, so take it for what it's worth: yes with a but.
I'd suggest that there are two kinds of war, the second of which is relatively uncommon. I'd distinguish them based on what the victor gets at the end of the war.
The first kind of war is a war-for-things. The aggressor wants to take some things (which can be abstract things) from the defender. The victor gets to keep the things. For example, when the United States fought Mexico in the 1840s, that was a war for things. The victor kept Texas and California. Or the Roman conquest of Gaul: Caesar plundered everything that was not nailed down, and functionally annexed modern France to Roman rule. These are pretty common, and World War II was, from one side, a war for things: Germany wanted Lebensraum, Japan wanted the rich resources of the indo-pacific region (particularly oil). Note that I'm defining wars-for-things in terms of the spoils, not the rhetoric that surrounds the spoils. I'd note that modern war is so mind bogglingly destructive that rational actors have concluded that protracted war-for-things is a suckers game. There are no things you can get that are worth the destruction on the things you want!
The second kind, which is relatively rare, is a war-for-rules. The aggressor wants to impose (or maintain) a particular rule set on a collection of polities. The ancient examples of this would be Roman expansion in Italy (which ended with the defeated state bound into a treaty structure rather than obliterated) and the inter-Polis wars in Greece (which were by and large prestige competitions). The victor incorporates the defeated party into a particular rule-set. The objective is not to take things away from the defeated party.
We've also seen asymmetric combinations of the two. For example, Gulf War I. Iraq was fighting a war-for-things against Kuwait, but the Coalition was fighting a war-for-rules against Iraq (we did not annex Iraq at the end of the war, we said, "no annexing neighbors, bad Iraq").
So the war in Ukraine is a combination of these two. Russia is fighting a war-for-things against Ukraine. They are attempting to take the whole of Ukraine's territory, and stealing grain and people. Simultaneously, Russia is fighting a war-for-rules against the Status-quo Coalition. The rule change they're attempting to effect is a return to the "annexing-neighbors-is-ok" rule set that preceded WW2. Ukraine is fighting an existential war-for-things against Russia, and wins if they exist as an independent state at the end of the fighting. The Status-quo Coalition is fighting an existential war against Russia as well: the absolute lynchpin of the status quo is that annexing neighbors is not OK. If that rule falters, it will blow up the international order and allow a renegotiation of lots of the status quo by actors not enamored of the status quo (the Baltics, Taiwan, Africa, the Middle East, &c.). Victory of the Status-quo Coalition is deterrent: showing everyone that attempting to violate the international rule set is *just not worth it*.

Actually, I do think there's been some change. For the most part now we can conceive of an international order where competition is not always war. That was unthinkable in the ancient world. For example, in the Second Punic War the Romans suffered something like 10% combat casualties as a percentage of their total population. That would be like the United States losing 13 million soldiers in World War 2, excluding civilian casualties. Having successfully concluded their absolutely devastating war with Carthage, the Romans took a break of... zero years, immediately entering into wars in Cisalpine Gaul and Macedonia. For them, war was the default, and peace an aberration. We don't think that way anymore.

Amateur historian chiming in, so take it for what it's worth: yes with a but.
I'd suggest that there are two kinds of war, the second of which is relatively uncommon. I'd distinguish them based on what the victor gets at the end of the war.
The first kind of war is a war-for-things. The aggressor wants to take some things (which can be abstract things) from the defender. The victor gets to keep the things. For example, when the United States fought Mexico in the 1840s, that was a war for things. The victor kept Texas and California. Or the Roman conquest of Gaul: Caesar plundered everything that was not nailed down, and functionally annexed modern France to Roman rule. These are pretty common, and World War II was, from one side, a war for things: Germany wanted Lebensraum, Japan wanted the rich resources of the indo-pacific region (particularly oil). Note that I'm defining wars-for-things in terms of the spoils, not the rhetoric that surrounds the spoils. I'd note that modern war is so mind bogglingly destructive that rational actors have concluded that protracted war-for-things is a suckers game. There are no things you can get that are worth the destruction on the things you want!
The second kind, which is relatively rare, is a war-for-rules. The aggressor wants to impose (or maintain) a particular rule set on a collection of polities. The ancient examples of this would be Roman expansion in Italy (which ended with the defeated state bound into a treaty structure rather than obliterated) and the inter-Polis wars in Greece (which were by and large prestige competitions). The victor incorporates the defeated party into a particular rule-set. The objective is not to take things away from the defeated party.
We've also seen asymmetric combinations of the two. For example, Gulf War I. Iraq was fighting a war-for-things against Kuwait, but the Coalition was fighting a war-for-rules against Iraq (we did not annex Iraq at the end of the war, we said, "no annexing neighbors, bad Iraq").
So the war in Ukraine is a combination of these two. Russia is fighting a war-for-things against Ukraine. They are attempting to take the whole of Ukraine's territory, and stealing grain and people. Simultaneously, Russia is fighting a war-for-rules against the Status-quo Coalition. The rule change they're attempting to effect is a return to the "annexing-neighbors-is-ok" rule set that preceded WW2. Ukraine is fighting an existential war-for-things against Russia, and wins if they exist as an independent state at the end of the fighting. The Status-quo Coalition is fighting an existential war against Russia as well: the absolute lynchpin of the status quo is that annexing neighbors is not OK. If that rule falters, it will blow up the international order and allow a renegotiation of lots of the status quo by actors not enamored of the status quo (the Baltics, Taiwan, Africa, the Middle East, &c.). Victory of the Status-quo Coalition is deterrent: showing everyone that attempting to violate the international rule set is *just not worth it*.

Amateur historian chiming in, so take it for what it's worth: yes with a but.
I'd suggest that there are two kinds of war, the second of which is relatively uncommon. I'd distinguish them based on what the victor gets at the end of the war.
The first kind of war is a war-for-things. The aggressor wants to take some things (which can be abstract things) from the defender. The victor gets to keep the things. For example, when the United States fought Mexico in the 1840s, that was a war for things. The victor kept Texas and California. Or the Roman conquest of Gaul: Caesar plundered everything that was not nailed down, and functionally annexed modern France to Roman rule. These are pretty common, and World War II was, from one side, a war for things: Germany wanted Lebensraum, Japan wanted the rich resources of the indo-pacific region (particularly oil). Note that I'm defining wars-for-things in terms of the spoils, not the rhetoric that surrounds the spoils. I'd note that modern war is so mind bogglingly destructive that rational actors have concluded that protracted war-for-things is a suckers game. There are no things you can get that are worth the destruction on the things you want!
The second kind, which is relatively rare, is a war-for-rules. The aggressor wants to impose (or maintain) a particular rule set on a collection of polities. The ancient examples of this would be Roman expansion in Italy (which ended with the defeated state bound into a treaty structure rather than obliterated) and the inter-Polis wars in Greece (which were by and large prestige competitions). The victor incorporates the defeated party into a particular rule-set. The objective is not to take things away from the defeated party.
We've also seen asymmetric combinations of the two. For example, Gulf War I. Iraq was fighting a war-for-things against Kuwait, but the Coalition was fighting a war-for-rules against Iraq (we did not annex Iraq at the end of the war, we said, "no annexing neighbors, bad Iraq").
So the war in Ukraine is a combination of these two. Russia is fighting a war-for-things against Ukraine. They are attempting to take the whole of Ukraine's territory, and stealing grain and people. Simultaneously, Russia is fighting a war-for-rules against the Status-quo Coalition. The rule change they're attempting to effect is a return to the "annexing-neighbors-is-ok" rule set that preceded WW2. Ukraine is fighting an existential war-for-things against Russia, and wins if they exist as an independent state at the end of the fighting. The Status-quo Coalition is fighting an existential war against Russia as well: the absolute lynchpin of the status quo is that annexing neighbors is not OK. If that rule falters, it will blow up the international order and allow a renegotiation of lots of the status quo by actors not enamored of the status quo (the Baltics, Taiwan, Africa, the Middle East, &c.). Victory of the Status-quo Coalition is deterrent: showing everyone that attempting to violate the international rule set is *just not worth it*.

Amateur historian chiming in, so take it for what it's worth: yes with a but.
I'd suggest that there are two kinds of war, the second of which is relatively uncommon. I'd distinguish them based on what the victor gets at the end of the war.
The first kind of war is a war-for-things. The aggressor wants to take some things (which can be abstract things) from the defender. The victor gets to keep the things. For example, when the United States fought Mexico in the 1840s, that was a war for things. The victor kept Texas and California. Or the Roman conquest of Gaul: Caesar plundered everything that was not nailed down, and functionally annexed modern France to Roman rule. These are pretty common, and World War II was, from one side, a war for things: Germany wanted Lebensraum, Japan wanted the rich resources of the indo-pacific region (particularly oil). Note that I'm defining wars-for-things in terms of the spoils, not the rhetoric that surrounds the spoils. I'd note that modern war is so mind bogglingly destructive that rational actors have concluded that protracted war-for-things is a suckers game. There are no things you can get that are worth the destruction on the things you want!
The second kind, which is relatively rare, is a war-for-rules. The aggressor wants to impose (or maintain) a particular rule set on a collection of polities. The ancient examples of this would be Roman expansion in Italy (which ended with the defeated state bound into a treaty structure rather than obliterated) and the inter-Polis wars in Greece (which were by and large prestige competitions). The victor incorporates the defeated party into a particular rule-set. The objective is not to take things away from the defeated party.
We've also seen asymmetric combinations of the two. For example, Gulf War I. Iraq was fighting a war-for-things against Kuwait, but the Coalition was fighting a war-for-rules against Iraq (we did not annex Iraq at the end of the war, we said, "no annexing neighbors, bad Iraq").
So the war in Ukraine is a combination of these two. Russia is fighting a war-for-things against Ukraine. They are attempting to take the whole of Ukraine's territory, and stealing grain and people. Simultaneously, Russia is fighting a war-for-rules against the Status-quo Coalition. The rule change they're attempting to effect is a return to the "annexing-neighbors-is-ok" rule set that preceded WW2. Ukraine is fighting an existential war-for-things against Russia, and wins if they exist as an independent state at the end of the fighting. The Status-quo Coalition is fighting an existential war against Russia as well: the absolute lynchpin of the status quo is that annexing neighbors is not OK. If that rule falters, it will blow up the international order and allow a renegotiation of lots of the status quo by actors not enamored of the status quo (the Baltics, Taiwan, Africa, the Middle East, &c.). Victory of the Status-quo Coalition is deterrent: showing everyone that attempting to violate the international rule set is *just not worth it*.

I've been thinking a lot about this. The physics of the battles in Ukraine feel like amphibious assaults everywhere all the time. In an amphibious assault you've got an illuminated battlefield (the attacker is a finite quantity of very visible ships and the defender is tied to a linearish boundary that the attacker can observe from offshore at leisure before the assault). The attacker can mass fires from behind the line of contact, but will have difficulty advancing those fires as their beachhead is in a pocket surrounded by defender's fires.
But the precursor to a successful amphibious assault is the isolation of the beachhead from its LOC, either by naval blockade for islands or by tactical and strategic air for larger assaults. Those are both unavailable in Ukraine, so even a high-tempo high-casualty assault doesn't produce meaningful operational effects (unless you chain them together over and over in a way anathema to modern western sensibility).
It'd be interesting to look at the ratio of troop density to weapon-denial-range. I think CM does a nice job of simulating that. Playing the CMBO beta Last Defense, I learned quickly that American bazooka armed infantry projected an armor denial zone about 75 meters in all directions. So if you want an impermeable defense, you need something like a squad every 150 meters of frontage in whatever depth you think you need. The first time I played CMBS Into the Breach I thought I was totally screwed because I was used to that sort of frontage. Then I discovered Javelins and had to reconsider. I'd say a modern infantry squad can project that denial zone hundreds of meters if not a kilometer or more. So has the troop density changed relative to the size of the denial zone it can project?
edit: Also, what the heck with all the videos of IFVs and tanks engaging trenches at ranges I'd describe as "pants on head"? Why does that work? Are there lots of videos I'm not seeing of IFV's getting destroyed by infantry light AT as they approach?

I've been thinking a lot about this. The physics of the battles in Ukraine feel like amphibious assaults everywhere all the time. In an amphibious assault you've got an illuminated battlefield (the attacker is a finite quantity of very visible ships and the defender is tied to a linearish boundary that the attacker can observe from offshore at leisure before the assault). The attacker can mass fires from behind the line of contact, but will have difficulty advancing those fires as their beachhead is in a pocket surrounded by defender's fires.
But the precursor to a successful amphibious assault is the isolation of the beachhead from its LOC, either by naval blockade for islands or by tactical and strategic air for larger assaults. Those are both unavailable in Ukraine, so even a high-tempo high-casualty assault doesn't produce meaningful operational effects (unless you chain them together over and over in a way anathema to modern western sensibility).
It'd be interesting to look at the ratio of troop density to weapon-denial-range. I think CM does a nice job of simulating that. Playing the CMBO beta Last Defense, I learned quickly that American bazooka armed infantry projected an armor denial zone about 75 meters in all directions. So if you want an impermeable defense, you need something like a squad every 150 meters of frontage in whatever depth you think you need. The first time I played CMBS Into the Breach I thought I was totally screwed because I was used to that sort of frontage. Then I discovered Javelins and had to reconsider. I'd say a modern infantry squad can project that denial zone hundreds of meters if not a kilometer or more. So has the troop density changed relative to the size of the denial zone it can project?
edit: Also, what the heck with all the videos of IFVs and tanks engaging trenches at ranges I'd describe as "pants on head"? Why does that work? Are there lots of videos I'm not seeing of IFV's getting destroyed by infantry light AT as they approach?

I've been thinking a lot about this. The physics of the battles in Ukraine feel like amphibious assaults everywhere all the time. In an amphibious assault you've got an illuminated battlefield (the attacker is a finite quantity of very visible ships and the defender is tied to a linearish boundary that the attacker can observe from offshore at leisure before the assault). The attacker can mass fires from behind the line of contact, but will have difficulty advancing those fires as their beachhead is in a pocket surrounded by defender's fires.
But the precursor to a successful amphibious assault is the isolation of the beachhead from its LOC, either by naval blockade for islands or by tactical and strategic air for larger assaults. Those are both unavailable in Ukraine, so even a high-tempo high-casualty assault doesn't produce meaningful operational effects (unless you chain them together over and over in a way anathema to modern western sensibility).
It'd be interesting to look at the ratio of troop density to weapon-denial-range. I think CM does a nice job of simulating that. Playing the CMBO beta Last Defense, I learned quickly that American bazooka armed infantry projected an armor denial zone about 75 meters in all directions. So if you want an impermeable defense, you need something like a squad every 150 meters of frontage in whatever depth you think you need. The first time I played CMBS Into the Breach I thought I was totally screwed because I was used to that sort of frontage. Then I discovered Javelins and had to reconsider. I'd say a modern infantry squad can project that denial zone hundreds of meters if not a kilometer or more. So has the troop density changed relative to the size of the denial zone it can project?
edit: Also, what the heck with all the videos of IFVs and tanks engaging trenches at ranges I'd describe as "pants on head"? Why does that work? Are there lots of videos I'm not seeing of IFV's getting destroyed by infantry light AT as they approach?

I tell my students that militaries only really do three things:
- We carry out policy.
- We provide sound military advice to policy.
- We guarantee the policy making framework.
If you are doing anything else in uniform, you are heading towards a mutiny or coup. 
What we tend to forget is that #2 is absolutely critical to the integrity of the entire scheme.  And frankly we fail at it far too often. 

I've been thinking a lot about this. The physics of the battles in Ukraine feel like amphibious assaults everywhere all the time. In an amphibious assault you've got an illuminated battlefield (the attacker is a finite quantity of very visible ships and the defender is tied to a linearish boundary that the attacker can observe from offshore at leisure before the assault). The attacker can mass fires from behind the line of contact, but will have difficulty advancing those fires as their beachhead is in a pocket surrounded by defender's fires.
But the precursor to a successful amphibious assault is the isolation of the beachhead from its LOC, either by naval blockade for islands or by tactical and strategic air for larger assaults. Those are both unavailable in Ukraine, so even a high-tempo high-casualty assault doesn't produce meaningful operational effects (unless you chain them together over and over in a way anathema to modern western sensibility).
It'd be interesting to look at the ratio of troop density to weapon-denial-range. I think CM does a nice job of simulating that. Playing the CMBO beta Last Defense, I learned quickly that American bazooka armed infantry projected an armor denial zone about 75 meters in all directions. So if you want an impermeable defense, you need something like a squad every 150 meters of frontage in whatever depth you think you need. The first time I played CMBS Into the Breach I thought I was totally screwed because I was used to that sort of frontage. Then I discovered Javelins and had to reconsider. I'd say a modern infantry squad can project that denial zone hundreds of meters if not a kilometer or more. So has the troop density changed relative to the size of the denial zone it can project?
edit: Also, what the heck with all the videos of IFVs and tanks engaging trenches at ranges I'd describe as "pants on head"? Why does that work? Are there lots of videos I'm not seeing of IFV's getting destroyed by infantry light AT as they approach?

I've been thinking a lot about this. The physics of the battles in Ukraine feel like amphibious assaults everywhere all the time. In an amphibious assault you've got an illuminated battlefield (the attacker is a finite quantity of very visible ships and the defender is tied to a linearish boundary that the attacker can observe from offshore at leisure before the assault). The attacker can mass fires from behind the line of contact, but will have difficulty advancing those fires as their beachhead is in a pocket surrounded by defender's fires.
But the precursor to a successful amphibious assault is the isolation of the beachhead from its LOC, either by naval blockade for islands or by tactical and strategic air for larger assaults. Those are both unavailable in Ukraine, so even a high-tempo high-casualty assault doesn't produce meaningful operational effects (unless you chain them together over and over in a way anathema to modern western sensibility).
It'd be interesting to look at the ratio of troop density to weapon-denial-range. I think CM does a nice job of simulating that. Playing the CMBO beta Last Defense, I learned quickly that American bazooka armed infantry projected an armor denial zone about 75 meters in all directions. So if you want an impermeable defense, you need something like a squad every 150 meters of frontage in whatever depth you think you need. The first time I played CMBS Into the Breach I thought I was totally screwed because I was used to that sort of frontage. Then I discovered Javelins and had to reconsider. I'd say a modern infantry squad can project that denial zone hundreds of meters if not a kilometer or more. So has the troop density changed relative to the size of the denial zone it can project?
edit: Also, what the heck with all the videos of IFVs and tanks engaging trenches at ranges I'd describe as "pants on head"? Why does that work? Are there lots of videos I'm not seeing of IFV's getting destroyed by infantry light AT as they approach?

I've been thinking a lot about this. The physics of the battles in Ukraine feel like amphibious assaults everywhere all the time. In an amphibious assault you've got an illuminated battlefield (the attacker is a finite quantity of very visible ships and the defender is tied to a linearish boundary that the attacker can observe from offshore at leisure before the assault). The attacker can mass fires from behind the line of contact, but will have difficulty advancing those fires as their beachhead is in a pocket surrounded by defender's fires.
But the precursor to a successful amphibious assault is the isolation of the beachhead from its LOC, either by naval blockade for islands or by tactical and strategic air for larger assaults. Those are both unavailable in Ukraine, so even a high-tempo high-casualty assault doesn't produce meaningful operational effects (unless you chain them together over and over in a way anathema to modern western sensibility).
It'd be interesting to look at the ratio of troop density to weapon-denial-range. I think CM does a nice job of simulating that. Playing the CMBO beta Last Defense, I learned quickly that American bazooka armed infantry projected an armor denial zone about 75 meters in all directions. So if you want an impermeable defense, you need something like a squad every 150 meters of frontage in whatever depth you think you need. The first time I played CMBS Into the Breach I thought I was totally screwed because I was used to that sort of frontage. Then I discovered Javelins and had to reconsider. I'd say a modern infantry squad can project that denial zone hundreds of meters if not a kilometer or more. So has the troop density changed relative to the size of the denial zone it can project?
edit: Also, what the heck with all the videos of IFVs and tanks engaging trenches at ranges I'd describe as "pants on head"? Why does that work? Are there lots of videos I'm not seeing of IFV's getting destroyed by infantry light AT as they approach?

I've been thinking a lot about this. The physics of the battles in Ukraine feel like amphibious assaults everywhere all the time. In an amphibious assault you've got an illuminated battlefield (the attacker is a finite quantity of very visible ships and the defender is tied to a linearish boundary that the attacker can observe from offshore at leisure before the assault). The attacker can mass fires from behind the line of contact, but will have difficulty advancing those fires as their beachhead is in a pocket surrounded by defender's fires.
But the precursor to a successful amphibious assault is the isolation of the beachhead from its LOC, either by naval blockade for islands or by tactical and strategic air for larger assaults. Those are both unavailable in Ukraine, so even a high-tempo high-casualty assault doesn't produce meaningful operational effects (unless you chain them together over and over in a way anathema to modern western sensibility).
It'd be interesting to look at the ratio of troop density to weapon-denial-range. I think CM does a nice job of simulating that. Playing the CMBO beta Last Defense, I learned quickly that American bazooka armed infantry projected an armor denial zone about 75 meters in all directions. So if you want an impermeable defense, you need something like a squad every 150 meters of frontage in whatever depth you think you need. The first time I played CMBS Into the Breach I thought I was totally screwed because I was used to that sort of frontage. Then I discovered Javelins and had to reconsider. I'd say a modern infantry squad can project that denial zone hundreds of meters if not a kilometer or more. So has the troop density changed relative to the size of the denial zone it can project?
edit: Also, what the heck with all the videos of IFVs and tanks engaging trenches at ranges I'd describe as "pants on head"? Why does that work? Are there lots of videos I'm not seeing of IFV's getting destroyed by infantry light AT as they approach?

In passing, Martin Gilbert's The Somme: Heroism and Horror in the First World War does a really nice job of illustrating the detachment of the commanders from reality as the Somme progressed.

That's fair. I suppose what I've seen in this thread is that tactical assaults (mechanized or otherwise) get shredded by precision fires (either indirect, direct, or drone). So you can have a smallish node of defenders "controlling" a few kilometer deep (in all three dimensions) battle space. I suppose it's something porous like mutual denial. In every war you've had a pretty sharp demarcation between controlled area -> no man's land <- controlled area. In an ancient battle the denied area might be measured in single digit meters. In the American Civil War maybe a hundred meters. Now it seems like it has a weird shape that's kilometers deep (and wide), doesn't exist under 2,000 feet, and then starts again above 2,000 feet in a conical shape stretching back from the line of contact.
What would it look like to move from denial primacy to defensive primacy in your view?

One thing I've been thinking about is whether the transition to defensive primacy is uniform across scales. We've had wars where tactical, operational, and strategic primacy was divided. Here I'm wading beyond what I've read deeply about, so please correct me where I miss the mark.
So in the civil war, you had defensive primacy at the tactical level, but offensive primacy at the operational and strategic. Armies would maneuver operationally to force their adversary to attack them in a time and place where they could defend tactically and break the adversary (Chancellorsville, Gettysburg).
In WW1, you had attritional offensive primacy at the tactical level, but defensive primacy at the operational level: no one could translate tactical success into a breakthrough. I'm not sure about strategic primacy, but it seems to have been defensive?
In WW2 European warfare you had tactical offensive primacy (attackers could breach positions), operational offensive primacy (mass allowed breakouts), and strategic offensive primacy (attackers could take an hold strategic objectives) for most of the war in most theatres.
In WW2 Carrier warfare (1940-1943) you had tactical offensive primacy (deck strikes were essentially unstoppable), operational defensive primacy (carriers could raid, but not secure land based objectives), and strategic defensive primacy? The development of 3rd/5th Fleet in 1944 essentially flipped the first two. The advent of CICs and better flight detection meant that a carrier task force could interdict a strike group, and the development of the big blue blanket meant that a carrier task force could roll up on an island and secure it.
So we're headed to an era of what appears to be tactical defensive primacy and operational defensive primacy, and strategic (?) defensive primacy. The advent of an illuminated battlefield (like the radar based CIC) ensures tactical defensive primacy. Precision fires ensure operational defensive primacy. There's been talk here about something like the big blue blanket making operational offensive primacy possible, but that seems a year or two out.
Maybe the place for innovation now is at the strategic level. And at that level cumulative rather than sequential effects produce the most decision. So what can the west do to maximize the strategic options Ukraine has and minimize those of Russia? That seems like the question for the next year.

One thing I've been thinking about is whether the transition to defensive primacy is uniform across scales. We've had wars where tactical, operational, and strategic primacy was divided. Here I'm wading beyond what I've read deeply about, so please correct me where I miss the mark.
So in the civil war, you had defensive primacy at the tactical level, but offensive primacy at the operational and strategic. Armies would maneuver operationally to force their adversary to attack them in a time and place where they could defend tactically and break the adversary (Chancellorsville, Gettysburg).
In WW1, you had attritional offensive primacy at the tactical level, but defensive primacy at the operational level: no one could translate tactical success into a breakthrough. I'm not sure about strategic primacy, but it seems to have been defensive?
In WW2 European warfare you had tactical offensive primacy (attackers could breach positions), operational offensive primacy (mass allowed breakouts), and strategic offensive primacy (attackers could take an hold strategic objectives) for most of the war in most theatres.
In WW2 Carrier warfare (1940-1943) you had tactical offensive primacy (deck strikes were essentially unstoppable), operational defensive primacy (carriers could raid, but not secure land based objectives), and strategic defensive primacy? The development of 3rd/5th Fleet in 1944 essentially flipped the first two. The advent of CICs and better flight detection meant that a carrier task force could interdict a strike group, and the development of the big blue blanket meant that a carrier task force could roll up on an island and secure it.
So we're headed to an era of what appears to be tactical defensive primacy and operational defensive primacy, and strategic (?) defensive primacy. The advent of an illuminated battlefield (like the radar based CIC) ensures tactical defensive primacy. Precision fires ensure operational defensive primacy. There's been talk here about something like the big blue blanket making operational offensive primacy possible, but that seems a year or two out.
Maybe the place for innovation now is at the strategic level. And at that level cumulative rather than sequential effects produce the most decision. So what can the west do to maximize the strategic options Ukraine has and minimize those of Russia? That seems like the question for the next year.