LongLeftFlank

Without saying too much, let's just say I have rather good info on this robot and the company.  This particular company has zero interest in anything military.  Others will and hopefully will be used as LLF said above.  
And to the folks that think the end is nigh.  No, they are not about to take over the world.  It's a heckuva lot of work & effort & smart coding  just to get them to move boxes properly.  This is the current prototype, shown above & called Digit, and it's being used in warehouses for jobs that people don't like.  

Really appreciate the thoughts on this by @chrisl and all others after.
I just started looking but haven't found anything that looks like force structure or doctrine for massed use of drones. Maybe not surprisingly there does not yet seem to be a 'FM 7-7X, the Drone Platoon in the Attack.'
The impression you get is field practice in Ukraine is way ahead of published military thought. Maybe someone here knows the Ukrainian or Russian drone equivalent of JFC Fuller or Immelmann/Boelcke.
I might differ with others on AI. I think the integration of autonomous AI into conventional war kill chains in recon/strike complexes is inevitable given the advantages in response/decision cycle time.
I did find this interesting, thoughts on drone 'swarm tactics.' Author is an Italian Air Force Lieutenant attending USMC U.
https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/Expeditions-with-MCUP-digital-journal/A-New-Way-of-War/
 

Well interesting if one has an unhealthy tank lust.  This is what in the business we call a “heavily situated” estimate.  The author starts with the core conclusion that tanks are still viable on the modern battlefield and then goes about pulling anything and everything he can to try and prove it:
- reduction of combat power down to firepower, mobility and protection - which of course are also the core attributes of the tank.  When in fact modern military doctrine sees combat power in far broader terms.  Interestingly he does not apply his condensed framework (from circa 1993) to the main competitor to the tank, the modern UAS/ISR.  Unmanned systems have far higher mobility, at least equal firepower in disaggregated form, and higher protection through distributed mass.
- Oversubscription on tanks role in just about all operations other than war.  I know from first personal experience and follow on research that his deductions from both Bosnian ‘93 and Canadian Forces in Afghanistan that the employment of the tank was anything but “decisive”.  In fact their overall employments were problematic for many reasons on those sorts of operations.
- Assuming that the UAS/ISR game will be fought “how we fight it”.  EW offers the best possible defence right now; however, as we have discussed at length, full autonomy of these systems, even in the last 1000m largely negates EW counter-measures.  China is investing heavily in fully autonomous systems…this is where things are going.
- Biases analysis of ATGMs: “costly and heavy”….seriously…as compared to a tank?   He also fails to recognize the most dangerous part of modern ATGMs…range.  FFS he is making a Cold War argument that ATGMs need LOS “making operators vulnerable” - that argument 1) has not been proven in this war and 2) does not reflect where ATGM technology is going.  No mention of self-loitering munitions or NLOS systems, some with ranges nearing 100kms. [He cites a CBC interview as proof that tanks can still find and kill ATGMs - sure it can happen but as we have seen, not to the point as to reestablish conditions for offensive operations]
-Largely sidesteps the entire issue of logistics.  Reduces it down to recovery and maintenance.  The major problem with heavy logistics is that itself must be “heavy”.  Heavy formations consume obscene amounts of fuel and ammunition.  Spare parts and recovery are also issues but long LOCs of fuel and supply trucks are suicidal in this war.  Why…because the enemy can see them with operational ISR (no real mention of ISR realities either for that matter).  Once seen they can be interdicted and shot to pieces.  This is why “logistics” is a core combat function…none of the others work without it.
- I do like camo, decoy and deception discussion.  That has some solid ideas.
- UGV comparison is woefully tepid.  Appears to assume UGVs will simply be 1 for 1 tank replacements when they will likely take the cheap distributed path much like their air counterparts.  
Author really fails to see modern warfare as it is,  more for what he wants it to be.  The combination of UAS/ISR and PGM has been definitely “undeciding”.  It can translate into offensive warfare under the right conditions but it is largely about Denial.  These systems have denied heavy  of its major offensive attributes.  They have done so because they are able to see, fix and engage heavy systems well beyond the ranges that heavy can respond.  They do so through distributed mass.  Combined with Air Denial we have a condition where heavy is narrowly applicable to the modern battlefield.
He proposes a bunch of solutions pretty much as I expected - invest in the tank heavily to try and keep it viable.  What he fails to define is “what is the point of diminishing returns?”  When do we call it and go in another direction?  He makes glancing, and frankly disingenuous, attempts in a light/med analysis but never really asks the question: “Well what if heavy is dead?”  Hell I am not even sure traditional military mass is not dead, let alone heavy.
The unmanned/ISR/PGM complex are not enablers to traditional land battle, they have become deterministic.  The decisive force on the battlefield is  no longer heavy systems…it is the systems that undecided them.  I suspect our future lies in these spaces as “precision, distribution, unmanned” also become part of the combat power pantheon.  We will see counter-systems and “forward edge superiority” as concepts.  What happens to forces that can “take and hold ground” remains unclear.  Right now ATGM, UAS and PGM (artillery and self-loitering) along with dog-faced infantry appear to be the new combined arms.
But if I know the western military complex (and unfortunately I do), we will spend billions, maybe trillions trying to prove “it ain’t so”.  Finally, we need to pull our collective heads out of @sses and realize that this issue is so much larger than the freakin tank or heavy or even ground forces.  It applies across all domains.  We have billion dollar ships and air fleets that may be unable to control or create superiority.  I can see that from here.  They will be brought down by cheap and ubiquitous smart munitions of all types.  So while everyone is gawping and squawking about tanks, I am not even sure aircraft carriers will stand up in 20 years.  Cyber and nukes likely may be the only military forces that we can count on to keep doing what they were.  Start with a blank white board and go from there.
 

No matter how they dress it up, Putin wants half of Ukraine.  Basically everything east of the Dnipro.  Kharkiv?!  That is a major urban fight.  100k per year?  That is madness.
This kinda feels like the big sweeping red arrows from summer ‘22.  RA can lose 100k per year trying to take back single towns, let alone Kharkiv.
Whelp, not a lot of room to negotiate there.

OK, the longer you guys try to engage @kevinkin replacement and his Gish Gallop (look it up) blasts of overconfident yet entirely unsupported broad projectile vomits of 'alternative facts' the more unreadable this thread becomes.
If he really wants to be our good faith house contrarian, he needs to post credible third party information, then give his take, one or two points at a time and allow time for reubuttal.
Otherwise, this is just garden variety trolling.
...This is what happens when nobody posts information and just bloviates and emotes.

If I choose, I can get the tankie view over on NakedCapitalism, which is basically the same rubbish you're spouting here. You're done.

It doesn't help much, sadly, since others just keep quoting and arguing with him.
Look, there are tough questions to discuss here around actions Ukraine may need to make urgently if it is to stay in this war, much less 'win'. And there's a lot of room for differences of view on those.
But I for one am not about to waste time chasing down Carlson/tankie talking points at the bidding of some rando who argues at the level of a bright 17 year old off his meds. He brings less than nothing to this conversation.

OK, the longer you guys try to engage @kevinkin replacement and his Gish Gallop (look it up) blasts of overconfident yet entirely unsupported broad projectile vomits of 'alternative facts' the more unreadable this thread becomes.
If he really wants to be our good faith house contrarian, he needs to post credible third party information, then give his take, one or two points at a time and allow time for reubuttal.
Otherwise, this is just garden variety trolling.
...This is what happens when nobody posts information and just bloviates and emotes.

OK, the longer you guys try to engage @kevinkin replacement and his Gish Gallop (look it up) blasts of overconfident yet entirely unsupported broad projectile vomits of 'alternative facts' the more unreadable this thread becomes.
If he really wants to be our good faith house contrarian, he needs to post credible third party information, then give his take, one or two points at a time and allow time for reubuttal.
Otherwise, this is just garden variety trolling.
...This is what happens when nobody posts information and just bloviates and emotes.

OK, the longer you guys try to engage @kevinkin replacement and his Gish Gallop (look it up) blasts of overconfident yet entirely unsupported broad projectile vomits of 'alternative facts' the more unreadable this thread becomes.
If he really wants to be our good faith house contrarian, he needs to post credible third party information, then give his take, one or two points at a time and allow time for reubuttal.
Otherwise, this is just garden variety trolling.
...This is what happens when nobody posts information and just bloviates and emotes.

It is why BFC pays me so well....

Ok now you have my full attention.  So to answer your first question - no, it was a terrible idea but here we are.  We did not “push” Russia into anything - unless you subscribe to the John Kettler school of international policy.  They did fall into it.
I think what I find most offensive about your position now that is becoming clear is that somehow this entire war is Ukraines fault because they pissed off Russia.  So small powers should basically all fall in line to neighbouring greater powers and the freedoms and will of their peoples do not count?  This is where oversimplification get us.
We stationed western troops, including Canadians in the Baltics.  But we should back off because we wouldn’t want to make Russia angry.  Beyond your definitive tone you also appear to get pretty high on your own opinion.  Chinas status as a superpower is debatable:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/02/china-superpower-us-new-cold-war-rivalry-geopolitics/
 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-emergence-superpower
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2023/08/25/why-chinas-bid-to-become-a-superpower-is-doomed-to-failure/?sh=651d400d1d0e
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3936751-china-a-great-power-but-not-a-superpower/
So glad another expert could come and tell us how it really is.
 
 

Anyone else here think that UA should push another couple battalions across the Dnpro in a different spot, to keep stressing these overextended RU scratch forces and their inexperienced commands by forcing them to move around?
The Krynki bridgehead, which is now evidently 'contained' (all those covered entrenchments on drier ground across the highway), now seems to have served its military purpose and can be evacuated.

Whack a mole on the lower Dnpr....

As I continue to pore over frontline maps, I find myself looking not for 'defensible positions' like villes and tree lines, but for linear obstacles like this canal. With a nice deep, flat, open killing zone in front of it that Ukraine should be sowing like crazy with mines, plus RF sensors to triangulate and target their tactical drone controllers.  Invite 'em in, then kill em by the bushel. They can't go forward and won't be allowed back.

 

As I continue to pore over frontline maps, I find myself looking not for 'defensible positions' like villes and tree lines, but for linear obstacles like this canal. With a nice deep, flat, open killing zone in front of it that Ukraine should be sowing like crazy with mines, plus RF sensors to triangulate and target their tactical drone controllers.  Invite 'em in, then kill em by the bushel. They can't go forward and won't be allowed back.

 

Yeah, I wouldn't subscribe to "go tit for tat" either, I just have "seeing all electric substations and train conducting equipment near military installations and factories in Russia go up like napalm" on my Christmas list.
(also kill more Russian poultry just for hilarity, I want eggs to become the new currency on the Russian black market)

Take care, brother Haiduk!

Sorry, I can't think of Eggs without thinking of one of the 10 all time best war film sequences (epic B25 takeoff included)
*****
Drone bros in their hide. Note the 'US ARMY' patches on their parkas although I suspect these are made in Bangladesh....
 

Sorry, I can't think of Eggs without thinking of one of the 10 all time best war film sequences (epic B25 takeoff included)
*****
Drone bros in their hide. Note the 'US ARMY' patches on their parkas although I suspect these are made in Bangladesh....
 

It is not at all clear to me that Tanks/IFVs/mech anything is a thing going forward. it is absolutely clear to me that if they are they will have the ability to use drones to direct fire from their main armaments. And I don't mean by voice, I mean seamlessly passing targeting data.
 

Take care, brother Haiduk!

Extremely alarming news from the bridgehead at Krynoki from Mashovets. It looks like the Russians managed to create from the newly created airborne divisions a truly combat-ready unit capable of effectively storming positions.
The enemy is making significant efforts, regardless of losses, to push our units back into the river floodplain. He has been carrying out almost continuous attack and assault operations with the forces of the 104th Airborne Division for more than four days.
Units of its 328th and 337th air assault regiments are attacking the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in this settlement. both from the southwestern direction (from the Cossack Camps, along the coastal road, and through the forest located south of the village).
Next, it will be a little unusual, direct speech from my insider:
"The bridgehead now rests solely on mines. The air assault division began to drive directly into positions from the forest in an infantry fighting vehicle and land troops. There was a day when everyone thought that the bridgehead would be pushed into the water. And we were all urgently involved in mining in the rain. We flew in the rain because we had no choice. And the mines had been completed several weeks before, so a high percentage of explosions were required immediately.
All assaults stop at mines. They have been attacking continuously for four days, but we have stabilized the situation a little and they are not reaching our positions. In fact, it's hell here right now. In a week and a half, the Rashians lost up to 10 armored personnel carriers, up to 10 tanks and 20-25 infantry fighting vehicles. The forest and Krynki are littered with iron. But the meat storms continue. Today is the first day when the assault was limited to the 2nd armored personnel carrier. Unfortunately, our progress (meaning on the left bank) has been stopped..."
This is a direct speech from one of the commanders of the Ukrainian tactical units conducting combat operations on the left bank of the Dnieper. This was written yesterday, December 12th. That is, General Teplinsky did not lie.
He continues to launch his direct subordinates - units and subunits of the 104th Airborne Division (in his permanent position, he is the commander of the Russian airborne forces / airborne forces) into continuous attacks in the area of the village of Krynki, just to liquidate the Ukrainian bridgehead.
For those who forgot, I’ll remind you.
The 104th Airborne Assault Division belongs to the so-called “newly formed” (or “recreated”) divisions of the Russian Airborne Forces, deployed as part of the general process of deploying the enemy’s strategic reserves. From the beginning of its formation, it was called the 104th Airborne Division of the Mobilization Reserve and its composition included, to put it mildly, rather “strange” units and units, staffed by “mobilization units.”
But over time, the Russian command took the process of obtaining a more or less acceptable level of combat effectiveness for this formation more seriously. And during 2023, it acquired the features of a full-fledged airborne division, which, in fact, the 104th Airborne Division is now trying to demonstrate near Krinki, showing an “exorbitant” level of aggressiveness in attack/assault operations, despite the fact that it flies from our Marines to The answer is quite sensitive.

Deepening the 'denied zone' beyond, of all places, the 'shallow' Ukrainian infantry bridgehead at Krynki.


https://nitter.net/foosint
Don't forget the mines