LongLeftFlank

Branching out a post from my Ramadi thread into a separate topic. It's partly general interest, but will also include musings on how CM handles urban combat and urban terrain. I promise not to use the Ignore button lol.

Of course, in the fluid, entirely unpredictable environment of asymmetrical warfare, e.g., an entire wing of your 'planned' force can be stalled, pinned or even wiped out (Mosul!) by a well placed IED coming from any direction. Leaving the rest of the force to complete the planned op (and to cover the wounded duck too, as like as not). Ergo, subunit commanders handling 'worst cases' becomes the norm. No plan survives contact, punched in the mouf, etc. While a 'school solution' to a given tactical problem may actually be misleading, or an overly blunt instrument, given practical constraints of casualty avoidance and ROE.

Nice graphics? Yes. Realistic combat? Not based on those screenies... IMHO the best way to rejuvenate and enrich the engine for longtime players and newbs alike, without branching into shooter-like spec ops or obscure theatres, is to improve co-play (multiple players a side), and also allow AI for both sides (human commands a subunit inside a larger computer-run "war movie"). Neither of these seems totally alien to the existing game engine.

I'll save Erwin the trouble ?

Sorry mate, while we *greatly* appreciate your prompt playtesting, we aren't going to do fictional scenarios to order. Like Steven Biko, we write what we like. Spend a little time in the editor and you should be able to work up a very satisfying qb.

Yes, fighting up to a T junction is one of the most lethal MOUT problems you can face in RL* as well as CM life. Compound walls give you some protection vs shooters either side, but defilade along a street means only parked cars protect you. This attacker is paying the appropriate price for his incaution and lack of overwatch/ suppression. * I haven't personally tried it in RL, but I doubt I am wrong....

Be advised: Spies are not noncombatants. They will perform Medic duties and retrieve small arms and ammo from friendly casualties in the same spot, then begin fighting. Also, if cornered by enemy forces they will rout (!) and be removed.

The indifferntly trained and equipped Philippine Army 1st Division is facing those quandaries right at this moment, in Muslim majority Marawi city, Mindanao, where the takfiri "Maute" group has invaded and is busy in a brutal pogrom against Christian residents. Their intent of course is to invite army reprisal - accidental or otherwise - against non-radical Muslims, that will then (re)radicalize the MILF/MNLF militias who have negotiated quasi-official status in that area under the autonomy agreement. Most of the Muslim residents don't want any trouble, but also aren’t willing to shop the extremists to the army/police. With good reason because arrestees have a disturbing tendency to escape custody or simply be released, and then seek revenge on the 'rats'. So even though it isn't 'support' per se, they are allowing the Islamist fish to swim in the sea, to use Mao's analogy....

Been on the road this week, but hope to finalize WICKED WEDNESDAY this Ramadan weekend, insh'allah. In the meantime, this short piece is a bit wonkish, but does echo some of my own past observations that outside 'medieval' backwaters like A'stan, the focal point of modern (counter)insurgency today seems to be urban areas, not mountainous strongholds. Now can an insurgency with an urban poor/middle class base truly take power? Mao (and Ho) didn't think so, but Che Guevara did. And in a modern wired, mobile world are the distinctions between peasant and urban day labourer blurring? http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2017/05/23/the-future-of-war-is-in-cities-the-study-of-war-should-follow-suit/ Urban warfare necessitates decentralized, fast-paced, small-unit operations. And junior commanders capable of operating independently are essential.... [while] some of the non-state groups fighting in cities are increasingly using quasi-conventional military tactics and weapons such as antitank guided missiles and longer-range rockets, some of the most effective tools states employ in urban combat – such as Special Operation Forces and psychological warfare – resemble classic guerrilla tactics. True, rural insurgencies have not vanished altogether. But looking at today’s conflicts, it is no accident that the emblematic names that come to mind are those of cities like Aleppo, Homs, Mosul, Gaza, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Sana’a. As David Kilcullen urges, it is “time to drag ourselves – body and mind – out of the mountains.”

D'accord. Beaucoups "rues sans joie". Un jour....

I see now why you are expanding the battlespace. I had to do the same thing with my JOKER 3 map in 2010; the axes of advance (and resistance) were too constrained.

Just watched the new film "Siege of Jadotville". Not downright awful, though about what you'd expect in terms of historical and tactical accuracy (I expect the Katangese were pretty inept though). Seems like the Irish did quite well, all things considered. The real deal is recounted here: http://source.southdublinlibraries.ie/bitstream/10599/4927/2/The battle of Jadotville.pdf

Meh, this is largely another self hating white guilt rant of the kind that has made my Facebook pretty much unreadable.

... You saw what I did there. ? But if you separate the message from the messenger, that post, and many others of his, provides a lot of rich info and context for historically accurate scenario design. JCs thinking does tend to be very 'macroeconomic', sure (15k shells per km of front per day means this stonk should yield 2.33% casualties, otherwise BFC fix or sumfink), while there may be umpteen ways in which actual experience varied from the template, but not all of us here know the template.

A reading from the epistle of JasonC to the AfrikaKorps The word of the Jason.

A friend of mine was a CNN field producer and described the Libyan T55s being unable to traverse their turrets fast enough to hit the pickups.

I got a fair way into a rough and ready CMBN Dien Bien Phu mod set in 2012, but had to abandon the concept, since entrenchments don't provide sufficient cover to replicate positional warfare. Sounds like it's gotten even harder now with 4.0 infantry bailing out of holes.

This can all be approximated today in CMSF, or CMBN/CW for the 1950s, via creative modding/texture swapping and cherry picking of unit sets. For the wish list (not holding my breath), helpful adds would be (unarmoured) land rovers and mobile T54s. Also, Uncons in short sleeved T shirts and sandals or traditional 'man dress' a la CMA. Back port from the WWII games: 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifle, PPSh machine pistol, Mauser sniper rifle, Bren LMG, rifle grenades and molotovs (pre-RPG era), Willys jeep (unarmed and 50 cal), a couple of end of war British scout cars, E8 Sherman (76 and 90mm 'super'), T34/85, 75mm pack howitzer on map, Western troops without body armour.

The Sufiya rescue operation of Nov 2006 took place in a semi-rural area not on or near my map of downtown, so if it appeals to you by all means take a crack. On top of the IDA paper Daniel Bolger's "Why We Lost" contains some more good detail around LTC Ferry's relief thrust and the air and artillery strikes. "Three of the pickups blundered south, smacking into Ferry's lead tank. The M1 punched them to bits with 120mm main gun rounds. There wasn't much left of them or their AQI passengers."

Damn hippies! Get off my thread!

Yes, and while my service buddies are pretty hacked off about it, for a historian the Wikileaks 'nine liners' give a priceless day by day chrono of the tempo of insurgent action, counteraction, etc.

Brief update: a 'surge' in RL work has prevented any further progress on Ramadi, but I have had a chance here and there to do some further reading. Outstanding new histories on the Iraq War are now coming out (2016) and being declassified. They effectively debunk the earlier wave of personality cult narratives, e.g. "SEAL sniper teams won Ramadi single handed, killing the entire AQIZ chain of command with 700m head shots" or "Petraeus and MacFarland were the first US commanders ever to think of recruiting Sunni sheikhs and their clans to fight Al Qaeda." (MSM media btw was even more clueless on these developments; they had long before convinced themselves that all was lost, quagmire, Vietnam, etc. Sound familiar?) For those interested in this important period of US military history, the following pubs provide a huge amount of valuable background on the final phase of the Ramadi/Anbar campaign (2006 - 2007) and the background to the tribal uprisings against Zarqawi and his headchoppers. Dr. William Knarr, Col Alford (who lived a lot of this history!) and the team at IDA have done fantastic work. https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/JAWD/2016/P-5059V4A.ashx 1. The Sufiya uprising, where 1/9 Infantry crushed an al Qaeda attempt to make an example of the Abu Soda tribe by dragging their corpses behind pickups, Trojan war style. https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/JAWD/2016/P-5052V4.ashx 2. Operation Murfreesboro (2007), clearing out heavily mined south Ramadi neighborhoods block by block, in the heaviest US street fighting since Fallujah. www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=AD1001769 JSOU Report 15-4. Knarr: The 2005 Iraqi Sunni Awakening. Bigger picture perspective on the emerging conflicts between AQ and the Anbar tribes, and how USSF work planted the seeds.

I won't be able to look at your map until later mate, but welcome to the designer collective. If you want your force mounted in pickups (higher seating than humvees but a single bullet can knock them out) or in GAZ jeeps, go to Mission tab in the editor, select Data and then flip to RED vs RED. That will let you cherry pick from their force set for BLUE: vehicles, friendly civilians etc. If you get an unwanted unit HQ along with your specialist vehicles, you can label it a Reinforcement "group 7" and set that group arrival time for after the scenario ends.

[spits out beer laughing... Then slurps from table, cuz Scots/Irish/Breton]

By the way, shipping routes aren't pipelines. When Abu Sayyaf threatens the Sulu sea routes, they just sail into the Pacific. If bunker is expensive, they steam slower. Which raises another pretty big question: isn't most of that shipping volume going to and from China? (hint: yes) So they are gonna cut off all their Walmart trade for the sake of the Senkakus and Spratlys? I am pretty sure Shanghai and the entire coastal "belly" of China secedes at that point, maybe pledges allegiance to the Kuomintang ROC. And then you get your civil war. ? Anyway, I'm off back to Ramadi. Come visit sometime.