jasoncawley@ameritech.net

http://users.pandora.be/stalingrad/ You have to follow a number of links - Russian HQ, then high command on the one hand (not many there), and front commanders on the other hand (many more). They are small and black and white, but there are photos of many of the key Russian commanders. Note that the accuracy and quality of the information in the text at this sight, is in general quite poor, on technical military matters. Commander's bios, locations of units, orders of battle, particular memos - these are fine. Analysis of fighting, weapons, tactics, are at or below the "journalist" level.

There are only two periods I know of in the CMBO campaign, when the Germans had significant support from the Luftwaffe. During the Bulge fighting, ~600 fighters were committed to the battle, diverted from air defense duties. The attack was timed to coincide with bad weather, though, as the Allied air forces were superior, obviously. The Germans still got some CAS out of it, specifically in the fighting at St. Vith in mid December. And they got some support again between Dec. 25 and January 1, especially around Bastogne and points southeast of it (where 3rd Army attacked). January 1 was the last big effort day, and included a mass raid on Allied airbases around Liege. Ground support in this period would be mostly FW-190s. The second occasion was after the capture of the Remagen bridge. The Luftwaffe attacked in a determined fashion over the following week or so, and eventually dropped the span. Three pontoon bridges had been put in in the meantime, so this did not have a decisive effect. But through that whole period, German units fighting to contain or eliminate the bridgehead had some CAS support. This period also saw, incidentally, the first serious use of jet bombers, as a number of Ar-234s took part in the raids. Other than that, a German aircraft flying support was a rare sight indeed, in the west.

If you want post WW II examples of the same basic TD concept, as the U.S. and U.K. deployed them (rather than some uparmored German and Russian types), there are plenty of examples that are close. Improved TOW Vehicle AT LAV w/ TOW Hummers with TOW Luchs ATGM BRDM-AT M551 Sheridan And of course, the reason IFVs bother to carry ATGMs is to fufill the same function, in addition to their other roles - BMP, Brads (especially scout version), etc. They aren't M113s or BTRs, for a reason. Basic idea is to take any existing and common chassis, and put a high-powered, long-ranged AT weapon on it, mobile, without thick armor. The only reason these types aren't as heavy as WW II is that better missles allow light armor to carry such firepower, without needing e.g. a Marder's Pz II chassis or more just to carry a decent-sized gun. Incidentally, if you want to know the modern sort of weapon that ought to be keeping heavy tankers awake at nights, Bofors makes and will sell for export to anyone with hard currency, smart 120mm mortar HEAT rounds with passive IR terminal guidance. The seeker is smart enough to tell burning wrecks and decoys from live tanks and get a hit rate of about 50%. The angle of attack is straight down. The warhead will blowtorch through 2 feet of rolled homogeneous steel. The range is ~6 kilometers, indirect, fire and forget, nobody has to be able to see the target at all. They cost around 25 grand a pop and can be fired from any existing 120mm mortar in the world, which can fire from a wide variety of light vehicle mounts for shooting and scooting. All the usual rate of fire of simple mortars, and very little extra training needed for the crews. The U.S. has similar rounds. Like that helps. The point is, such whiz-bang toys are not going to stay in only U.S. or NATO shops. They are too cheap to make and getting cheaper all the time, and somebody will sell them. And resellers will sell them again, and by the third party it is "anybody with cash".

Still on the deployment of 120mm mortars question. I don't find, in practice, the pattern Olle suggests. I am aware that 120mm mortars were made part of TOE. But the lower-down use of the 81s, and the relatively absence in practice of 120's in the numbers the TOEs had, don't quite fit. First let me limited the universe I found detailed data about, on this subject. I am using other people's research to examine this question, and the case I have the data for is the Normandy fighting. Russia may be different, and other times likewise. And I have to further limit the data set, simply because detailed info about the mortars deployed is not available for every formation, and when it is available the level of detail varies from one to another formation. With those provisos, here is what I find. The standard deployment of the 81mm was 6 for the battalion, plus 2 per company, making 12 per battalion all told. Cases that *exceed* this number of mortars, are very rare. But engineers only have the 2 per company. And SPW mounted Panzergrenadiers, I find the same as the engineers - 2 per company, no battalion mortars. The motorised Pz Gdr battalions are like the leg infantry. Recon battalions are sometimes 2 each, sometimes like the leg infantry with both 2/company and 6/battalion. But then, the units fail to have their TOE of these mortars, most of the time. The only division I was able to confirm had *more* than the number you get with the above allocations, was the 3rd FJ. That was a large division, with 9 infantry battalions, plus 1 recon and 1 pioneer. It had 124 mortars, with up to 16 in particular battalions. This may just mean "square" companies and a larger battalion battery, 2x4 + 1x8. Or it may reflect 1 battery of 4x120mm at the battalion level, since the mortar numbers I saw for this unit do not specify caliber, just number of tubes. The regimental level does not have mortar companies in this division, incidentally. In the case of a line infantry division, the above allocation can mean up to 96x81mm in a division. (6 inf+recon+engineer=8 battalions, then 12 each). Only one infantry division had that many - the 352nd - and no panzer, that I found numbers on anyway. I found 2 mentions of 120mm mortars in Normany - 12 of them a kampegruppe formed from both PzGdr regiments of the 9th SS after those became somewhat depleted in action, with 12x120mm in support of the "doubled regiment(-)". And the 272nd infantry division lists 54 "medium" and 32 "heavy" mortars, and the last almost certainly means 120mm. The 716th infantry (static), had 33x50mm, 44x81mm in the battalions, and 29 mortars in independent ad hoc firing companies, which may have been 81mm or 120mm. In the cases where I did find numbers of the mortars in the mobile divisions - which I only found in about half the cases - the number of mortars was somewhat lower. Here are the mortars per division for the formations I found numbers on, ignoring the 50mm in the 716th as too small to matter. Other that the ones marked (*, ?) these are all 81mm - 3FJ-124, 16LW-54, 77th-45, 85th-76, 243rd-51, 265th(KG)-16, 272nd-86*, 275th-18, 277th-58, 326th-56, 371st-72, 352nd-96, 353rd-84, 709th-71?, 716th-73?, PzLehr-24, 9SS-78*, 12SS-70, 21Pz-6 (engineers), 17SS PzGdr-99 * - 120mm present ? - " may be present, unclear Some averages - average infantry division - 66 mortars. Average mobile division - 55 mortars. The range is wide, with ~1/5 divisions way below average (24 or less), and 1/6 way above it (96 or more). My purpose in giving this sort of data, is simply to impress how little TOEs can sometimes mean for particular items and particular formations, at this stage of the war, in the German army. There are a lot of ersatz substitute measures going on, and unit strengths vary considerably - even before combat, let alone after a month of so of it. The conclusions are that - 1 -*most* German infantry-type companies have 2x81mm, including armored, engineer, recon; 2 - many also try to have a 6x81mm battalion mortar section as well, mobile or leg though but not armored or engineer; but 3- there are not always enough for both roles, company and battalion, even of the 81mm; and next, 4- the 120mm is a rare bird compared to the quite-common 81s. Even the 81s aren't at TOE on any sort of uniform basis. For what it is worth.

The Germans did issue 81mm mortars at the comany scale. But they also retained 81mm mortars at the battalion level. The Germans never fielded 120mm mortars enough for its role in their TOEs, and it was mostly a regimental weapon when it was available. The Germans only made around 8500 120mm mortars, while they made 9 times that many of the 81mm variety. And the difference in ammunition produced shows an even wider gap in favor of the 81mm. In actual unit returns from Normandy, I have examined more than 15 divisions without finding a single 120mm mortar actually deployed. But the infantry divisions have up to 84 of the 81mm in some cases. The 120mm was probably more common on the Russian front, where the Russians were making extensive use of it (easily 5 times the scale of the Germans), and captured ammunition and weapons were probably more plentiful. It is also likely that the 120mm was more common in the middle period of the war, 1943 in particular. The reason being, little German ammo production for it, and eventually running out of captured Russian stocks after passing to the defensive.

"Stugs have no context in the Pz. Div until they start being a factor in replacements in late 1944" This is just plain false. Half of the mobile divisions in Normandy had 38-44 StuG in them, in June not in "late" '44. Only one of them was Pz Gdr, the 17th SS. The other 4 were SS Panzer divisions. Heer ones had 16 more, plus 40 captured French creatures. And the German army no more consisted of Panzer divisions, than their AFV fleet consisted of Panthers. The infantry divisions heavily dominated the force mix, and the only AFVs they had were the StuGs and Hezters and Marders, when they had any at all. But to give an idea of just how distorted is the picture being peddled here, in the cartoon of the fully armored Germans against the unarmored Russians, try this little exercise. Rate the Russian AFV fleet from top to bottom, do the same with the German, and then go down the list pairing off vehicles. You will not find the T-34s matched against Panthers. Ahead of the T-34/85s there are ~4k IS-2s, ~5k upgunned SUs (85mm and up), ~5k KVs, and ~5k ISUs. Which means one of those creatures for every Tiger II, Jadgtiger, Elephant, Jadgpanther, Tiger I, Panther, Jadgpanzer, and even Hezter, with 3000 to spare, and ignoring the fact that the Germans are also facing the Western Allies, altogether. (Incidentally, I'd put the Pz IV ahead of the Hezter, but who is counting? Either way they get to face KVs). With the leftovers added, the T-34/85s then get to match the Pz IVs, and the StuGs, and the Marders. The T-34/76, in nearly equal numbers to the above combined, and supplimented by some SU-76s, are left to go after PAK and FLAK. The lend lease tanks can go after the little 50mm ones. That is what the match up really is between the German and Russian fleets, not counting the western allies at all. Counting them, the Germans get to face the same match ups but with 2:1 odds against them down every rung of the scale, too.

A realise that it may help to explain a few mechanical, "game rule" issues related to ammo usage, in addition to the tactics comments. - units on "hide" won't fire until you tell them to stop hiding, unless an enemy comes very close to them. If they have already been spotted, they may be fired upon, though, and if so are likely to stop hiding and shoot back. - hiding units can target an ambush marker set by their platoon HQ, or set their own for AT weapons and many guns. They will shoot if someone gets close to the marker, but hold their fire otherwise. The "trigger" distance from the marker is about 20 yards. This is useful e.g. if you want to shoot if the enemy steps into the open, but not if he stays in cover. Put an ambush marker about 40-50 yards ahead of the treeline and hide. If he moves 20-30 yards into the open, opposite the marker, your men should fire. To cover a long line, you may need more than one HQ, tank, or gun to put down ambush markers - space them ~30 yards apart. - units won't fire when running. When they reach their destination they will stop, and then they may open up if they see anyone. But while running, they can't fire. MGs and mortars will not fire while moving. Units on "sneak" will usually finish their assigned move before firing, if they are not being fired upon, but they may open up at a close target, or if shot at. - you can add a "& hide" to the end of a move command, by entering the command normally, then "hide". The unit won't hide at the begining, but will instead complete the move and then hide right away. Used in junction with "run", you can effectively tell a unit not to shoot. But note - units on hide that are shot at, generally stop hiding and fire back. - you can stay on the near side of terrain obstacles to break LOS completely. This is often a good idea from time to time for other reasons, like to prevent the enemy from getting perfect intel about your units after a while. 30 yards back inside a treeline, behind a building rather than in it, behind a crest rather than on it. You can use this to "pick your shots". - don't use area fire with ordinary squads. They don't have the ammo for it, and will soon run out. Any unit firing with area fire will keep it up until out of ammo. Only use high ammo or high powered HE weapons for this, like MGs and tanks. Similarly, do not "recon by fire" at merely suspected locations, except with those types. I hope some of these help.

Both sensible comments. The biggest cause of low ammo is firing a lot at ranges that are too long. The second biggest is expecting the same sub-unit to carry successive attacks, e.g. as a "point", without rotating which unit gets that job. Most infantry has decent firepower at 100 yards. But the fellow making the point about foxholes is right, and the same goes for buildings - infantry needs to be quite close to seriously hurt troops in cover that good. It helps if a lot of heavier HE weapons suppress the defenders before you move too close, too. Your tanks, MGs, on-map guns when you have them, and off-map artillery, are the weapons you want to firefight with at long range. Infantry fire at ranges from around 150-250 yards is only effective at infantry in the open, and in the short run it will pin them rather than kill. Down around 100 yards, you can expect to seriously mess up troops in light cover (woods, brush, rubble, rough), before you run dry. But not the toughest targets. Check the "% exposed" numbers for the units you are shooting at, and compared the "firepower" numbers you are getting. If the % exposed in in the teens, you need to be nearly point-blank - the next building, or inside the same body of woods as the target. If it is in the 20s or 30s, look for firepower numbers with 3 digits (100+), for your full squads; half of that is OK for MGs. If you don't have firepower numbers that high, you aren't close enough yet to really break guys in cover that good. When you are shooting at men in the open, with % exposed numbers well above 50%, you can afford to shoot with firepower numbers around 50. Just some guidelines, to get a sense of what is going on. You have to gauge how close you need to be, by how hunkered down the target is. You will get a better sense of it soon, if you watch these numbers and your results. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-06-2001).]

"Gentlemen! You can't fight in here, this is the war room!"

"this does not pertain Stug's" Which is why it is the purest horsefeathers. Yes Panthers and Pz IVs were about equally numerous. So was their production, and I cited the figures that said so. But the StuGs were more common than either, and had the same gun and armor characteristics as the Pz IV, not the Panther. And this is not true of the types more heavily armored than the Panther, as though they would balance it. Upgunning made sense. It was indeed the right answer to uparmoring. And of course there was a gun-armor race. It is merely that even the armor war did not consist in, and was not decided by, that race. Why? Because only a modest fraction of any side's fleets were involved.

They didn't have them, and neither did the Russians. There were rifle grenades, and there were anti-tank rifles. The first rocket based infantry AT weapon was the U.S. bazooka. The Germans captured one in North Africa in 1942, copied the idea and gave it a bigger warhead. The result was the Schreck in 1943.

Peiper broke through, and then was cut up, in the very first phase of the battle. There was snow on the ground before Christmas, and the Germans were still attacking in some places into the 2nd week of January. That was after the main drive had failed, but they attacked to hold the salient open while troops withdrew (e.g. near Bastogne and southeast of it). Another scenario set in the Bulge is my lame effort, "Get the Guns". To entice players who want a challenge, I will state that to date, no one has done better as the Americans - against the AI - than a tactical German victory. Including me. (Yes, I may rebalance it later - but in the meantime, it is a challenge).

Most of your questions have been addressed. But you also asked about how mines get discovered. Daisy chain AT are discovered as soon as somebody has LOS to their location. Because of this, a good place for them is blocking a road (what they are best at doing), and just behind a dip in the road, or a ways beyond a crest. Of these the dip is the best, but either is decent. Anyone going fast enough can actually hit them. If they are going slow, they crawl to a stop either #1 just before a dip, which means on a rise, which means everybody and his brother can see them and nobody behind them can see those see-ers in turn (mu-hu-ha ha ha), or, about the same, he just climbed a little hill, and your guys up on the same level can see him, while his trailing friends can't see through the hill to where you are. They you whack 'em. Buried mines are discovered in two different ways. Your mines are discovered by other people when they walk in to them and blow up. Other people's mines, however... LOL. Can be spotted, if good quality infantry is standing next to the minefield and close to it, even if not actually in it. But this is pure chance, and not terribly common. High unit quality helps, and not moving helps, engineers help, and especially not running through a dense forest (aka the usual thing). If a platoon of veterans just happens to stop 20 meters in front of one of your minefields, and stands there for 2-3 minutes, they stand some chance of spotting the mines without walking into them. But mostly, mines are found "the hard way", by taking 1-3 casualties and noticing the ground is what is angry at you. Once found, engineers can remove minefields, *if* they still have their demo charges. They use them to blow lanes through the field. It takes them a few minutes, and is not easy for them to do if being shot at. Engineers can also remove daisy-chain AT mines without needing demo charges, and more quickly. To remove mines in either case, the engineers have to be within 25 yards of them, and not moving. (So it is a nice bonus if your defense set-up can kill anybody standing that close to them). Also, a minefield can be cleared by enough men passing through it - but this approach is not at all recommended, as usually a squad entering an AP field will take hits, be pinned, and often refuse to move further into them. Mines are very useful in CM, in my experience. But there are some pitfalls to their use. The biggest of these is the lone isolated 20x20 field in the middle of po-dunk. It it is unlike to "hit" anyone, and if it does, it will cause a few casualties, then people will walk around it for the rest of the game. Not a big effect for 10 points a pop. It is much better to use mines in longer chains, 80 meters wide to 200 meters wide. They are much more likely to "hit" someone. As a group, they are more likely to get a second or third set of "hits", when someone tries to go around them. And at least as important, they deny that ground and act as a "shield" for defenders behind them, in that area. Those defenders only have to worry about attack from 1-2 directions, not their whole front arc. And you can play all sorts of games with the attacker's response - whether he goes around to one side or splits, goes wide or makes a narrow hook, etc. Last, one idea that is invaluable, is a purely conceptual point that opens up a whole array of mine-related tactics. Think of artillery barrages as ways to "extend" minefields in any direction you want, for brief periods. So, here is a minefield 100 yards wide, and there is another. But there is this big gap between them. "Easy enough", says the attacker, and goes in. *Then* the mortars close the gap... [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-06-2001).]

When I am moving, I use a "wedge" for "traveling overwatch". One point squad is 50-100 yards ahead. The rest of the platoon is mostly in one line behind it, in a sort of inverted "T". Or in silly ASC graphics - _____S_____ __S_____S__ _____H_____ ___T___T___ S means a squad, H is the HQ. T's are teams, if there are some along - a zook and an MG for example. The point squad follows the rule of "run in the open, move in cover". The balance of the platoon usually moves, if contact is likely. This basically tells the point to not stop and fire if caught in the open, but instead just keep pushing until cover is reached. The rest of the platoon, however, is able to fire at any target spotted. To keep the point from getting too far ahead, I just keep the bounds a reasonable size. The point has usually stopped moving before the end of the turn. He then has a command delay to move off again, during which the rest of the platoon closes up. He thus winds up running across open fields, moving, halting, catching his breath and having a look around, etc. His distance from the platoon does bounce around. Sometimes the platoon with close up with him entirely, e.g. at the edge of some body of cover. Sometimes he will be clear across a wide field, but usually not. Will the point get shot sometimes without the rest of the platoon being able to reply immediately? Sure. Just "withdraw-run" him back to momma afterward, while the balance of the platoon moves to the nearest covered place that can see the shooter, and lights him up once they get there. In also helps to manipulate the "sides of cover" you are on. You want the point to be leaving cover to cross an open stretch, not too far ahead of the time your platoon will get to where he left from. Often that is when the main platoon reaches the near side, of the body of cover he is about to leave - if the body of cover in question is reasonably thin, that is. What happens if you get ambushed then, is the ambushers shoot the point, but soon afterward the whole platoon - which the ambushers couldn't see, masked by the cover, and who are therefore fine - comes to the wood line or crest line or whatever, and replies. The purpose of a point is not to avoid being shot at himself. It is to avoid the main body of the platoon being shot at, and to make sure anyone who messes up the point, pays for it in the following 2-5 minutes. Suppose I get hit from the right side, instead of the front. Then the right side squad just became the new "point". The HQ runs forward and to the left, the left squad moves rightward as necessary, the point can "right face" and back up a bit, and bingo, wedge is now oriented in a different direction. The key is that nobody at the edge that gets hit, has to maneuver at all to change the direction of the whole formation. So one squad getting pinned does not paralyze the platoon. No formation you can put the men in, will handle all events without adaptation. The idea of formations is to deal with whatever arises, by being flexible. You will have to move some guys to meet any threat that does crop up. That is OK. Just so long as you don't have to move everybody, and especially don't have to count on a guy who is pinned, to do something heroic. (You can count on him retreating - LOL). The firefight will take 2-3 minutes to develop. Then it will take another 2-3 minutes to resolve, sometimes more. You don't have to do everything at once.

A few numbers, but I doubt they are definitive. There are too many different kinds of ammo for both general weapon types. Part of this is a reprise of the wide range of 75mm types, debate. First the basic info. The typical 81mm mortar shell, counting its propellant, is around 7-8 lbs weight /3.5 kg. The most common German one, for which I found data most easily, had a bursting charge of 550 grams. Almost all the German 81mm ammo produced, seems to have been of this variety. In the U.S. army, there was a shorter ranged, heavier 81mm mortar bomb type made, and called "heavy HE" rather than light HE. But I have no idea how many of them were made, or used. They weighed 11 lbs instead of 7 lbs, and had a limited range, around 2.5km rather than 3.3km for the lighter standard (7-lb) HE. 75mm shells vary considerably, but the most common weight given for German 75mm *HE*, is 13 lbs, 6 kg. So it is a much heavier physical item. But the size of the bursting charge for German 75mm varies. The largest type is listed as 860 grams bursting charge, and that type was *capable* of being fired from, for instance, the L24, L43, and L48 guns on the Pz IV series (where I got the data). But that doesn't mean that is what they had. Another HE type for the L43 and L48 guns, had only a 454 gram bursting charge. A HEAT round for those types had a 524 gram charge. Other HEAT that could be fired from the L24 or the longer L43 and L48 had charges from 555 to 604 grams. Another fellow has cited the figure of 680 grams for at least one version of HE fired by the longer gun in the Panther, but I can't independently confirm that number. I am aware that HEAT is a relatively poor HE round. But were they so aware of the fact? That is, did HEAT get issued as a supposedly duel-purpose round? Seems possible. The Germans made 4 million HEAT rounds for high velocity 75mm, along with 5 million AP and 8 million standard HE. Production of HEAT for those guns trailed off in 1944, though, and ceased before 1945. What I most sincerely doubt, is the notion some seem to entertain as possible, that since a 860 gram HE round apparently existed for a range of German 75mm gun types, that must be what they always fired when firing HE. They made another with a 454 gram charge, and I haven't been able to find out how many of those, compared to the other type. But they certainly made 4 million HEAT, with smaller loads than the peak one, slightly more than the lesser one. What I suspect, is that the typical German 75mm HE actually had more like equal bursting power to their 81mm mortar bomb. The vanilla-designation Sprgr-34 had 5/6ths as much charge in it. The HEAT rounds had charges very close to it, but with the drawback of HEAT as an fragmentation generator. And we know for a fact they made millions of these rounds. The HE load figure cited by one fellow for the higher velocity Panther gun, had one ammo type 5/4 as high, and there is this Sprgr-KwK (34) with 3/2 as much. But I have seen no evidence these types were common, nor rare really. No one has given any production or field deliver numbers for any of the types, that I know of. Incidentally, the production figures for 75mm types I cited about (8m HE, 4m HEAT, 5m AP) do not include 4 million 75mm for mountain howitzers, nor 8 million 75mm for infantry guns, almost all of it HE. They were just for the higher velocity types, but they do include the towed PAK of course. Naturally, the HE charges for these mountain howitzers and the infantry guns could be quite different again, from the German tank gun figures. And they are the guns that are really being represented as an off map 75mm module. U.S. 75mm and similar types, also varies. The 76mm had a small bursting charge of 390 grams, while the slower 75mm short had a 690 gram bursting charge. That puts one of them 5/4ths the explosive of the German 81mm, the other 7/10ths. I have not been able to find the gram of HE for the pack howitzer, used in the U.S. airborne. I think that is basically the same gun as that on the M8 HMC. Those two are the likely sources of the 75mm artillery module for the U.S. side. If one believes that the 680-860 gram range is right for typical HE rounds from lower velocity tank guns, and if one just assumes that the figure for low velocity howitzers and infantry guns will be the same or higher, then it might seem sensible to rate 75mm as considerably higher blast than 81mm. But if the realistic range for most *fielded* ammo is more like ~500 grams, down some for U.S. 76mm, up some for U.S. short 75mm - with anything in the 860 gram range quite rare - then the picture reverses itself, rather. Other sources I have seen compare the effective radius of the 81mm with the 75mm, and call the comparison favorable. And some even claim for the 11 lb bombs, a favorable comparison with 105mm. I am inclined to doubt the latter in practice, from accounts I have read of the effects of the different weapon types. It may be that the 11 lb "heavy HE" were simply not used much, perhaps because troops disliked the extra load of carrying them, and the idea of being outranged by the enemy replies. Incidentally, off the subject really but simply because I found it out trying to answer your sensible question (which just a shell type can't do, without production figures for it as well), I noticed some interesting factoids about German shell production by type. The main morale is that 105mm was by far the most common artillery round fired, with the 81mm mortar a close second. Both of those are in the 100 million produced range (the 105s a bit more, the 81s a bit less). Next comes the 150mm howitzer, with 28 million produced, far more than you might think. For comparison, there are only 8 million 120mm mortar rounds made, and 5 million 150mm rockets, and 4 million rounds for 150mm SiG. And those are the *common* types of heavy artillery, after the "big three". There are barely more than 1 million of all heavier rockets combined, for instance. Basically, when a German unit called for fire, the company and battalion could support with 81mm. A real artillery battalion assigned to help could support with 105mm. Occasionally division would support with 150mm, or more rarely, some other more ad hoc form of supporting fire would be provided. That being a mix of 120mm, 150mm rockets, 150mm SiG, a grab bag remainder of much less common types. But another interesting fact is that the scale of the common indirect fire weapons (81mm, 105mm) is noticably higher than that for direct fire types. There you see ~25 million rounds 75mm, 2/3rds of it higher velocity types as opposed to infantry guns, and ~15 million 50mm. (The old Pz III fleet, and more mid-war 50mm PAK than people sometimes imagine). Anyway, just some numbers to digest. In substance, I do not think your intuition in the matter is off. The 75mm round is a physically much bigger and heavier object, but more of it is metal and less explosive. The size difference *does* balance the metal-to-pop edge of the mortar round, about, but it does not swamp it. I end with an incidental challenge contest for the ammo grogs. If anyone wants me to believe typical late-war German tank guns, fired HE shells with 860 grams burster, they have to find some *production* numbers for the appropriate round (Sprgr KwK (34)). Call me a skeptic. The truth is I am not an ammo grog at all, despite what this post might suggest. I am a force-mix grog - LOL. And I have noticed already a definite tendency, to assume that if the best whatsis designed or fielded is X, then the capabilities of X are the standard for all fielded forces. Without attention to the niggling little detail, of whether there was enough X to go 'round. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-06-2001).]

The problem with the idea Tiger states of buying 300-500 points of field fortifications, is that it ignores the impact this has on the size of the defending force and the ratio of defenders to attackers. I agree that field fortifications have to be bought in some numbers to have any effect. But the defensive plan Tiger outlined, is simply completely impractical on a defender's point budget. I will buy 1-3 AT mines and 8-10 AP mines, plus 1-3 TRPs, when using an infantry and gun defense, as the Germans. But that only costs 100-175 points, or 1/3rd the program he postulated. That is a difference of 1-2 defending infantry platoons, plus 3-4 light guns and/or an additional artillery module in support. And on the "business end", as far as I am concerned, I am getting most of the same fortification benefits he does. We both have enough AT mines for one narrow roadblock, nothing more. We both have enough mines to create a shielded main blocking position. The difference is that he has wire and MG bunkers for the flanks - or alternative, spaced out wire and mines across the front instead of in one "block" ahead of the main infantry position. Several more light guns, platoons for those flanks, and artillery to break up concentrations on them, works much better in my experience, than some thinly covered strands of wire. And the bunkers are useless. Half again the cost of HMG 42 teams, more easily spotted, and easily knocked out by any sort of direct HE fire. There is always some, in a fight with a defender's budget this big. Another way to look at this, is the effect on the odds match up. Fortification costs are deducted from the defenders "100%", while the attacker has "150%". If a defender spends 25% of his points on fortifications, he faces odds in combat units of 2:1 instead of 3:2. If he tries to spend 1/3 or 1/2 on them, the odds ratio rises to 5:2 or 3:1. When making such comparisons, count the weapon component of a bunker at the cost of the weapon in the bunker, and the bunker cost as the difference. (E.g. wooden bunker with MG - 45 points, about the same as an HMG - 28 points - bunker itself - ~17 points). I count TRPs as part of the cost spent on artillery support rather than as a "fortification". I do not think defenders can afford to face odds in fielded units of greater than 2:1. Yes, avoiding expensive AFVs helps, buying infantry or cheap guns instead. But if the attacker spends heavily on infantry and artillery, this will not come close to making up for 1/3 spent on fortifications. And it won't make up for 1/2 spent on fortifications even if the attacker buys a lot of armor, because the attacker has 3:1 odds in fielded forces to "play with", in that case. Because of this, the defender's budget for fortifications is pretty tightly limited. Spending more than 25% on that area, is not going to work. To reach the upper limits of Tiger's program within that kind of a constraint, however, the battle size would have to be 2000 points, 3000 points of attackers. The lower limits of the program he outlined, mean a 1200 point battle size, and 1800 points of attackers. That means several infantry companies with tanks, engineers, and artillery support. I don't think 2-3 MG bunkers and 200-300 yards of wire are going to do too much to stop them. I think wooden bunkers with MGs should cost only 30 points. The choice of a covered arc and inability to move and higher visibility, for overhead cover, seems to me at best an even trade. At the present much higher price for the bunker, I will take an HMG every time. I also, incidentally, think bunkers should be no easier to spot than guns, not as easy to spot as vehicles. If you look at the realistic defender's constraints above, I think it becomes pretty clear that the fortification budget is going to be limited. The fear of acres of layered wire if the price is too low, is misplaced. For defenders to sacrifice more than 1-2 platoons worth of defenders, they need to get defensive assets that truly deny ground, and sizeable areas of it. And few will pick wire over mines, when both cannot be had in ~200-300 yard quantities. If wire cost ~5-7 points, what you'd see more of is defenses covered by 100-200 yard long belts of wire, with 40-100 yard gaps between them. Some of these gaps would be mined, and some would be open as exit routes. The local odds against the defenders in troops, would be around 2:1 instead of 3:2, when such obstacle belts were present. If bunker prices were lowered to 3/4 to 2/3 the current prices, and made harder to spot, they would also be commonly encountered in such defenses. If someone thinks this is too hard for "attack" settings, then I suggest making wire cost 5 and bunkers 2/3rds to 3/4th the present prices, in assaults, at least. There is no doubt such fortified lines existed and were fought over - indeed, they were not particularly uncommon in the less mobile periods of the war (fall 44 e.g.).

The Germans get VG infantry, the cheapest type and almost pure SMG, in November. In October it is not yet available. Starting in December, the U.S. starts getting 1945 model infantry squads, with 2 BAR per squad. So it is just after an uptick in Germany infantry flexibility, firepower, and cheapness, and just before an uptick in U.S. infantry effectiveness. There is no marked effect on the vehicle vs. vehicle side of things.

The modern M-60 machinegun in U.S. and NATO service is based on the German MG 42. It was copied after the war and minor changes made, and eventually it was adopted as the standard light and medium MG type. They actually toned down the rate of fire on purpose, however, because the ammo consumption and frequency of barrel changes was so high. The M-60 is used as an LMG with a bipod on the end, and as an MMG with a tripod mount. The Browning .30 cal you saw was probably the same basic weapon as the U.S. WW II MMG, yes. Minor changes perhaps. That was also the standard vehicle mount MG in the U.S. army in WW II, along with the .50 cal - the coaxial and hull MGs of the tanks, for example, are basically the same gun. Browning made both the U.S. .30 cal and the U.S. .50 cal, in WW II and after. The M-60 did not replace the .30 cal Browning until Vietnam, and the Browning-designed .50 cal is still in service.

Weight of the ammo is certainly an issue for the .50 cal. Yes, you bring "all you can", but the amount you "can" is rather lower when the shells are much heavier each. Obviously, ammo weight is about the same for all the ~.30 cal varieties. As for the Vickers, I do consider it an HMG. It certainly was by weight - it was 20 lbs heavier with its tripod than an MG 42 with tripod. Its firepower is lower because its rate of fire is only 1/3rd that of the MG 42 (~500/minute rather than 1500/minute), but it still has around 2/3rds to 3/5ths the firepower, because it can fire longer bursts without overheating. The U.S. MMGs are air-cooled and middling rate of fire, without spare barrels, and get about half the firepower of the HMG 42, while the U.S. water-cooled .30 cal HMG is a sister of the Vickers. Incidentally, the lifetime of a MG 42 barrel was around 3500-4000 rounds, not 250. That is still only 140-160 seconds of burst firing, because the ROF was so high. That might mean 10-20 minutes of sustained firing, with ~5 2-3 second bursts per minute. In very heavy firing you could burn out a barrel in 5 minutes.

Are your reading the same thread I am? The one you've been writing on, you know? The one with the death traps and the blood hosed out and the "not better for the crews"? That is what Germany was putting almost all their tank crews in - eggshells with hammers. Are you reading the thread with the debate over 1 Panther or 5 T-34s or Shermans? And the failed tanks don't fight tanks doctrine, and the failed TD program, and the Panthers seen in *wargames* "decimating attacking hordes"? And the tanks do fight tanks is the purpose of Panthers and Tigers? Nowhere in that entire discussion has there been the barest hint, that the Germans were doing exactly the same thing and sending off almost all of their tankers in AFVs armored to resist shellfire and light ATGs and nothing further. So, where the Germans hosing out the StuGs to reuse them? And the Pz IVs? Or perhaps they all fell into Allied hands. Nor has their been any notice taken of the fact that it was not 1 Panther vs 5 T-34s, it was more like 1 Panther, 1 Pz IV, and 2 StuGs against 9 T-34s, 3 upgunned SU series TDs, 1 ISU-2, 2 Cromwell, 1 Firefly, 2 Sherman 76, 2 US TDs, and 5 Sherman 75. It was 4 to 1 *counting* all the StuGs and Pz IVs, which were 2/3rds of the German late-war fleet, being generous. Oh, how horrid to condemn so many poor serfs to death in their horrid, squalid little death trap, the T-34, or its poor relations the Sherman and Cromwell. No one ever died in a Pz IV or a StuG. ISUs and SU-100s and Sherman Fireflies and Jackson TDs, do not exist. Neither do Pz IVs and StuGs. The best operational AFV in the German late war fleet, produced in numbers large enough to even exist in the TOE of ordinary unit types, is compared to the plain vanilla run of the mill Allied AFVs. The conclusions drawn from the comparison have no relation to reality, because the fact that one is cream and the other milk, in similarly differentiated fleets, is simply not mentioned. It is noteworthy that the conclusion you drew from the eastern front loss figures, that the Germans were "still" killing Russian tanks 4 and 5 to 1 in 1945, was lined up with the purely hypothetical dream of 1 Panther or 5 T-34s. The clear implication was that the Germans were in Panthers, and were killing 5 T-34s for each tank lost with these losses on both sides occurred in tank to tank combat. Both parts of which are false. What the figures actually showed, as another fellow pointed out, was the both sides lost 80% of their new tanks available, in the same year they became available. This is not particularly surprising. Tanks are not, in fact, "durable goods" in a war, but a stock that requires a continual flow to be maintained. The Russians lost more AFVs in that year, because they made more to lose. The Germans lost just as high a portion of the ones they made. Which were, in fact, less armored on average, contrary to your death trap and hosing blood rhetoric. "But the Germans destroyed 3 to 1". With their tanks? No one has even begun to hint it. It has not been argued or even stated, and was contradicted already, in a learned but subdued fashion, by one other fellow on the thread already. Tanks smash up infantry formations. Infantry are equipped with PAK, heavy FLAK, mines, and of much lesser importance the Panzerfaust wielded by Hans, the ubermenschen-of-the-month in Tank-Killer magazine. How many? More heavy PAK and heavy FLAK than AFVs of all types. 6 times as many as Panthers, in fact. 2,800 anti-tank mines for every Panther. Any of those kill any Russian tanks, while they were attacking, do you think? Think the Germans lost as many of their tanks, to anti-tank mines, on the defensive? The Brits report the following causes of tank losses in Italy - 40% tanks or TDs (mostly the latter, incidentally), 15% towed gun, 15% "bazooka", 30% mines. They estimated 600 AT mines emplaced to KO one tank, but they were probably less effective than that outside Italy (hills -> passes, good for AT mines). I do not doubt in the least that Tigers and Panthers killed 3 and 5 to 1, maybe even on average. But that will not make the tank losses run at 3 or 5 to 1, not even within earshot of it. It only adds .75 to 1.25 (the ratio, times the portion of the fleet doing it, which is *small*), to whatever the other ~.75 of German AFVs did - and then all of that only times the portion of Allied AFV losses that were from tanks and TDs. If the Pz IVs and Stugs traded 1 for 1 on average, despite the odds they faced, then you'd have an overall AFV kill rate of 3:2 to 2:1, counting those lesser types. And that would only effect the 65%, or 50%, or 40% of Allied AFV losses, whatever it actually was, which were to German AFVs. Those 24,000 T-34s were going down to PAK and FLAK and StuG and Pz IVs - the hammers. And in return, they were destroying *Army Group South*, not just 8,000 German AFVs. As for my point about "periodically stiffened", the western Allies faced a total of less than 1000 AFVs that could stop a short 75mm round in Normandy. After they ate those (wasn't fun, but they ate 'em), there weren't any more in quantity until the Bulge and Alsace. And after the Bulge and Alsace, there weren't any more. The first month and a half, and another month and a half half-way through the campaign - only 1/4 of the time overall - the Allies faced significant numbers of uparmored AFVs. About 1000 at each "dose", with 1500-2000 "filler", in the form of hammer-wielding eggshells, added each time. If that isn't "occasionally stiffened", then what would be? As for the east front, it got a fair number of the heavier types to recover from Bagration, and later to hold off the jump to the German border in early 45. And at the other times, it didn't, and *collapsed*. If that isn't "occasional stiffening", then what would be? "But then, aren't you saying they *did* make a difference?" Of course they made a difference. But they were not the basic armor story in the war in this period. The basic story was, when they did show up, they still died, just like other tanks do in combat. Made a difference until they did, but that was a few months at most. And when they weren't there - and much of it, when they were - the war was a fight between T-34s and Shermans - vs a fleet of hammer wielding eggshells aka StuGs, PAK, and FLAK.

I agree, it wasn't their job. But a lot of them didn't know it - LOL. You know, Patton pontificated about tank guns, which he didn't know from his anatomy. Rommel did things like order an engineer *battalion* to attack an Indian infantry *division* dug in behind a 15 mile-long minefield - mounted in their *trucks*. This is not just "not my job", this is the "boss with ego that ignores reality" number. Plenty of commanders seem to have had it, one way or another. They were saved by their staffs and field officers, who mostly managed to figure out when to trust the strutting peacocks and even be inspired by them sometimes - and when to tell them to take a flying leap. Not a myth. Just real deal stuff.

No - the english term is "rate of fire", but I understood what you mean. The MG 42 had a much higher "cyclic" rate of fire, 1500/minute, vs. 850/minute for the MG 34. Most often either type was fired in bursts to prevent overheating, though, so this didn't make as much difference as you might imagine. Often it meant a 2 second burst from one, or a 3.5 second burst from the other. On vehicle mounts, the MG 34 also had access to more ammo without pauses for belt changes. The MG 42 also required more frequent barrel changes, another side effect of the high rate of fire. The main reason the MG 34s were still used, is simply they 350,000 of them had already been made. They were used on the vehicles because they weren't as sturdy in the field. They also cost twice as much to make as the simpler MG 42. Incidentally 415,00 MG 42s were produced, from '42 to 45, so the numbers available of the two types, were similar. Since some were undoubtedly lost of worn out, probably 1xMG34 to 2xMG42 was the ratio in the late war period covered by CMBO. A fine question by the way...

The Sidi Rezegh Battles, 1957. Best book on the actual tactics I've read. Some of them limited to the desert, most not. Not a lot of room for myth. Another useful source on the same period is Kriebel, who was on the staff of 15th Panzer. And just as an aside, has some choice things to say about Rommel's tactical ineptitude, and how everyone worked around it by just ignoring him when he ordered things that didn't make any sense. Operationally they swore by him, of course. One fellow mentioned that when generals write books you get a lot of "then these guys went here" and not much "human warmth". That is because human warmth is mostly given off by mythology and related piles of horsefeathers. Even the general's accounts are full of it, compared to the real deal. Colder than ice. Another fellow mentioned the U.S. official histories. They are solid, because they tell you what happened and include real levels of detail and confusion. But you have to filter out some boilerplate and the medal citations sprinkling the narrative to get a balanced view. But they want to know the truth enough to cite staff on both sides. The truth of the matter the only unvarnished view you will ever get of what really happened in any given case, is from the operations staff people on both sides. Professional historians only write things at all when they are grinding an ax or selling their brand of soap. Generals are all politicians, in other words professional liars. Most line veterans had no idea what was happening beyond what they could see. If you want to find out what happened, you have to go to the guys that planned it, and see what the heck they were trying to do.

Your instincts to preserve your forces are sound, particularly on the attack. Defenders often have to trade gun for tank, because if they do not they lose the gun, a platoon, and the objective. But usually attackers do not need to sacrifice units in roles they are not suited for. But there is a way to get the effect of your trade, and to increase the survivability of your guns to boot. You almost had it already, only one twist needs to be added to the recipe. Set the guns up on commanding terrain with wide fields of fire, just as you did. Then, instead of dueling on turn one, order them to *hide*. Next, wait for an occasion where you can do one of two things. Either a time when few enemy gun-armed dohickies are within LOS of your guns - or - a time when tons of enemy are within LOS of your guns and you can also spring tanks etc on them, or such a firefight is already in progress. Call the first "sniping" and the second "the mad minute". In sniping, you want to pick off 1-2 enemy while they are the only things in LOS. Then see if you take reply. You very well might, from a previously unseen enemy - since you have a wide LOS, many places can see you. If you take such fire, suppress the shooter (e.g. with arty) and if necessary try to move the gun. Smoke the shooter with e.g. a light mortar, if you have to. In the mad minute, the effect you want is for everybody to be shooting at once, including several of your previously unrevealed guns, from long range. The enemy is less likely to spot your guns firing. He is less likely to know which shooter got which hit. He is more likely to shoot at the closer targets. And you are more likely to finish off all the potential repliers, at one "go". Everything is as you did it when you got your 2 for 3 trade. Then just add completely flexibility about the decision when to open fire. I hope this is useful.

What makes an HMG42 team an H, not an L? - it is mounted on a heavy tripod with an elevating screw and locking levers. The gunner doesn't "aim" it, he nudges the locked barrel by tapping/slapping the side of it. - an NCO with a pair of binocs does all the "aiming", telling the gunner which way to nudge the barrel while he observes the "fall of shot" aka the dust it kicks up where it lands. - it has half a dozen spare barrels that can be replaced in 30 seconds when the first ones literally get hot enough to melt and warp. It comes with an asbestos glove and wrenches to change the barrel even when it is too hot to touch. - the ammo supply looks like an annual salary. One man is continually feeding the belt into the gun and watching for loose links, twists, and debris, to avoid jams. Another is linking belts together to feed through the gun in a continuous stream, without it ever "clearing". All of the above allow an HMG 42 to be fired more like an artillery piece, practically, with the trigger held down as long as necessary at times, and firing over any distance, not limited by the stability or aim or even the naked eyesight of the gunner. In CM, HMGs have the firepower of squads but they have it out to much greater ranges. They are most effective at ranges of 250-400 yards, where enemy infantry cannot effectively reply, and at troops in open ground. At such ranges, they have almost nothing to fear from reply fire, especially if they are in good cover themselves (like buildings, or wooded foxholes). It is hard for them to hit things in cover at that range. Such long range fire pins more than it kills, even in the open. But if 2 or more HMGs or similar weapons can hit a given open area, at ranges like that, they can often deny the ground to the enemy, by pinning or breaking those who try to cross it. If sustained for long periods, hits from such fire will add up, but the main effect is pinning and area-denial. As for one fellow's comment about running with LMGs, in case you hadn't noticed, squads run just fine in CM. Many of them have 2 LMGs in them. They also have more men to carry spare barrels and ammo belts. But seperate 2-man LMGs are for MG nests. If you want fast LMGs, buy motorized panzergrenadier squads, not LMG teams. LMGs are bipod weapons in CM, with limited ammo loads and also limited firepower. They are generally only effective against troops in open ground, closing streets, etc. And as 2-man teams, they are quite vunerable to short range fire by normal infantry. Their firepower "carries" better than rifles or SMGs. But at ~250 yards, it will produce a sniping, harassment effect only. The effective range for them is more like 100-150 yards, and at that range enemy infantry can reply with good effect. LMGs are mostly deception weapons, or suppliments to the infantry-range firepower of regular squads. The deception works by giving the enemy a inf? counter to look at and the distinctive sound of a squad automatic weapon. You have 4 men in the area, but he suspects a platoon. As suppliments to squads they can be useful but not very much. They are faster and easier to transport on vehicles than HMGs - 1 2-man team can be added to a squad on full squad carriers (tanks, halftracks, trucks). Normally, 1 HMG is better than 3 LMG, because the firepower is similar in close, greater at long range, and the gun can be kept in action longer despite a few losses. The LMGs aren't as easily suppressed, though, if in the open or something. So they may make sense on the attack in some cases. MMGs, the standard US MG type, are tripod mounted but with fewer extras and a lower ROF than heavies. In particular, the U.S. MGs did not change barrels easily, and this limited the gun to more like its sustained rate of fire (how fast it can be fired without unduly overheating). MMGs have about half the firepower of squads at normal infantry ranges, and more like the firepower of full squads at medium ranges, ~250 yards. Their main use is to suppliment the fire of ordinary infantry at such medium ranges. A couple of them can double the ranged firepower of an "overwatch" platoon, for example. They also have far more ammo than standard squads, so they can afford to chatter away every turn at longer range. Against enemies in cover, such ranged fire is mostly useful to suppress defenders and reduce the volume of return fire they put out. Alone, they are not very effective, as single squads can easily outshoot them at closer ranges (~100 yards). But in their intended purpose as suppliments to the ranged firepower of a platoon, the U.S. MMGs are fine weapons, and relatively speedy for an MG. You generally want at least 2 of them with the same platoon to have any serious tactical effect, though. Think of them as a "4th squad" for a ranged-firepower platoon. In game terms, the *dismounted*, .50 cal team is an HMG in some respects but not in others. It is very slow, even by MG team standards, because of its weight. It does not have a large ammo supply, for the same reason. Its firepower is above that of the MMG and its range is much better, and it can KO light armor (half-tracks and such. On defense some of these things help. On the downside, its relatively low rate of fire keeps its close-in firepower below that of an HMG 42 team, and low ammo can limit the total hits one can cause. On the attack, weight and low ammo are debilitating weaknesses, and ground .50 cals aren't very useful. (If you have a jeep, use it to carry them - that helps). Vehicle mounted ones are a somewhat similar story - good firepower, mobile, but limited ammo again. If you want .50 cal support on the attack, buy M-20 scout cars or M3A1 halftracks, not dismounted teams. Jeep MGs are speedy but too vunerable compared to the types mentioned. The British Vickers is a fine MG, with very high ammo. On defense or in towns it is a good choice. On the attack outside of towns, MMG carriers can be a better buy, as they are far more mobile and better protected. And unlike the U.S. 50-cal M-20, the MMG carriers have plenty of ammo. In my opinion, the best MG "buys" are the HMG 42, the U.S. MMG (but take 2 of 'em), and the British MMG Carrier.