jasoncawley@ameritech.net

Authorized division strengths were around 10-15k men, while typical actual strengths were more like 8-10k men. Burnt out formations could be as low as half of that. You must also understand, however, that only half of those - or less, perhaps 1/4 in some cases after long periods of fighting - are the actual "teeth" manpower numbers that appear on CM battlefields. As opposed to rear area troops, supply, artillery, signals, maintenance, yadda yadda. CM combats are fights at very close odds ratios and at very close ranges. Most fights in WW II were not of that character - they were lopsided affairs, locally, where one side had everything and the other side fought back feebly and then gave up, ran, surrendered, or were wiped out. Or situations in which numbers didn't help and defenders just picked men off at their leisure, from long range and without being in any serious danger themselves, until the attackers gave it up. Lots of areas of the front, there was either no fighting going on at any given time, or more commonly just occasional artillery shelling and small patrols. When the war is going to be decided by the breakthrough battle 50 miles away, there is not a high priority put on going and getting killed before its outcome is known. The formations involved typically turned over their entire combat strength once or twice in the course of the campaign, from D-Day until the end of the war. In the case of the U.S., about half of these losses were from combat and half were from sickness and other causes - like trenchfoot, frostbite, etc. By comparison, a typical CM engagement features losses on the order of 2/3rds on one side, and 1/3rds on the other. If which side each happened to were a coin-flip, that would imply the average soldier only saw two fights that intense in his whole period in combat. He either got wounded in one of them, or got trenchfoot between two of them, and that was his war. This does not mean he did not see plenty of other combats, he probably did. They just weren't fights pursued to such a bloody outcome by both sides, at such short ranges, and with such even odds. CM style fights did happen, they just aren't the only things going on. More like the worst ones. Some people, of course, faced more than their share of these. As an example, though, the 101st Airborne lost half its strength in Normandy, in about a month of combat before being pulled out of the line. This was high losses by any measure. But many CM players think nothing of taking losses that high, to their own little paratroop force, in one half-hour fight. The real participants did not mash into each other in such dicey, close encounters, with the abandon that CM players mash their digital images into each other. They consequently lived rather longer than the digital images do.

I don't think so. There are combat effectiveness calculations that yield the 1.5 ratio, but it does not mean that was the ratio of actual losses. It wasn't. The U.S. Army lost 435k in the whole ETO for the whole war, for instance, dead wounded and missing (the Air Force excluded), while the Germans lost more than that in Normandy alone (450k - nearly half of them PWs), in just 2 1/2 months. I think what is involved in the calculations, is an implied "correction" for odds. As in, look at what these folks did against 3:1 odds, and look at what these folks did against 2:1 odds, and it looks about the same. That implies greater combat effectiveness per person, yes. But it doesn't mean the guy with the smaller force (lower side of the odds ratio), didn't take higher losses in both cases, than the guy with the higher side. Basically the Germans took higher losses but did much better than you'd "expect" them too given the odds they faced. In cases were the U.S. and Brits were defending, they did not do as well when the odds were as steeply against them as they usually were for the Germans. That can meaningfully be called combat effectiveness. But it means no such simplistic thing, as that the Germans inflicted higher losses than they took. With the Russians they did (first year and a half included, when it was hugely lopsided in favor of the Germans), but not in the west. Even in Russia, the overall totals for military battle losses (not civilians, non-battle, etc) was not more then 2:1 for the whole war (same ratio as the populations, incidentally, or close to it), and it was dropping over the course of it as overall odds moved toward Russia. By mid 1944, the Russians often inflicted greater losses than they took (e.g. in Bagration). As for the reasons for the better German combat performance, there are certainly a number of reasons given, but just being on the defensive is not a convincing one. Defenders are often losing, and have large pieces of their army torn apart. And the Allies had definite advantages in supply and air power that went hand and hand with an attacking position. More convincing explanations are the following - 1. The scratch, reduced forces the Germans had to fight with, often had a much higher portion of heavy weapons to men, since the heavy weapons were closer to TOE than the rifle strength was. Heavy weapons have greater range, and fire from positions of greater safety, and thus deplete less rapidly in action. A unit in action for a long time will often see 50% rifle strength but 70-80% artillery strength, for example. Whereas the attacking Allied formation, recently "replaced", might have 90 and 95% of TOE. Thus the manpower odds may be ~2:1 while the weapons odds are only ~3:2. 2. The Germans had more combat experience, particularly the officer corps and the senior NCOs. They had been fighting, in many cases, for 3-5 years before encountering the Americans. The Brits had also been fighting as long, but with relatively small land forces until D-Day. While the privates in the German army in the west often had no more combat experience than the Allied men they faced, their officers generally did. While it is known that for the front-line private, combat performance for infantry peaks at a definite time not long after exposure to combat (2-4 months is the range), there is little doubt that officers and NCOs (at least the ones that do not "crack" or become casualties) benefit from length of experience. 3. In some cases, the Germans possessed definite technical advantages in weapons or doctrine. Compared to the western Allies, they had heavier tanks, as all CM players know. They also had the best MG in the world, the best anti-tank rockets, excellent AT and AA guns. While lapses from sound doctrine certainly hampered them at the strategic level, the field officers had been trained by those who invented mobile warfare techniques, and combined arms, flexible kampgruppes, etc were considerably better than the Allied standards, at least in the German mobile formations. Only the U.S. armored divisions had a similarly advanced doctrine, and there were only 6 of those in the Normandy fight and ~12 at the West-wall and Ardennes. 4. Another explanation often put forward, though the analysis of it is sketchier and harder to put a numerical factor on, is what goes in the literature by the name of "small unit cohesion". At the basic level, that just means the men of a company (or less) showing high loyalty and self-sacrifice to each other. And this can be traced to definite practices, not relegated to some alleged political or cultural point. For instance, German units were generally recruited from the same town or village. The men had in many cases known each other since childhood - although they often did not know their officers. In the U.S. Army, units were a hodge-podge from everywhere thrown together, just as Americans expect to function in any civilian job. U.S. units were kept in the line continually, while individual replacements filled out losses. German units fought until "spent", then were sent to the rear to refit, with new men again from some one place (the same or a new one). This practice may also have prevented "peaking" of combat performance after the 2-4 month period, better than new raw recruits thrown in with the burnt-out old hands, in the U.S. system. (The Brits were somewhat like the Germans in these regards, incidentally, but less so). It is hard to quantify the relative impacts of these sorts of factors. If one finds little evidence for the first three being meaningful, then one is thrown onto the mushier fourth, or others. Personally, I think the equipment advantages were balanced by technical Allied advantages in other areas, and above all by the comparatively dismal supply situation. I think the heavy weapons effect is definite and real, and may account for as much as half of the detected "combat effectiveness" difference. That part, in other words, is just counting the wrong beans (men, instead of heavy weapons). That still leaves a ~25% edge to be accounted for by the other two factors. I think the doctrine and experience differences account for some of that remainder, but probably not all of it. The rest goes to the recruitment and replacement factors and their cohesion effects. But it is noticable that these cohesion effects have something of an all-or-nothing quality. The men will fight better to save each other, but (at least against the western Allies, rather than Russians) once the situation was hopeless enough it would also council more surrenders. I mean, the men are fighting much more to literally save each other's lives, than to fufill any political purpose, and the standards of allowable and shameful would be focused much more within the small group, much less outside of it. Compared to the relative "corporate anonymity" of U.S. formations, I mean. Obviously, both factors are present in both cases. It is just a shading of weight between them, involved. U.S. soldiers fought to save each other and Germans fought to accomplish missions and win praise from superiors, of course. They just probably did these things in different amounts, because of "who they were hanging with". The Americans were "at the office", in terms of their associations with the men around them; the Germans were in their home "neighborhood". If that back-of-the-evelope anthropology-psychology makes any sense. Undoubtedly how the whole war was going (global morale) had a big impact on this. It is still striking that the largest U.S. formation that surrendered in the war was one regiment cut off in the Ardennes, while even before the final collapse, Germans surrendered in numbers orders of magnitude larger. They fought harder, but gave up more easily too. It was all or nothing. My thoughts on an old issue...

I should have said something about ambush marker ranges in that section. It depends on the weapon, but these are good rules of thumb - The ambush range for Panzerfausts is 25 meters, using the Platoon HQ to set the marker. Same for flamethrowers. The ambush range for Screcks, Bazooka, and PIATs is 50 meters. The ambush range for anti-infantry fire is 100 meters, again using Platoon HQs. The ambush range for light guns, heavy guns, mortars, and artillery FOs (TRPs) is anyplace they can see. For HMGs as well, using a weapons Plt HQ, for example. (Collectively, these are "heavy weapons" in infantry terms). Another place where the AI could use some rules of thumb about distance scales, is minefields. When mines are encountered, go around them not through them. The first try, go around 25-50 meters. But if you hit two, then do not keep trying little "hooks" around each 20x20 tile and running into the next one. Go wide around, 100-200 meters. Notice, the scales must vary by a factor of two - any predictable distance would lead to gapped enemy minefields seperated that far apart. I hope these are helpful.

You should buy CM. You are right that the AI is not a chess program; if you want a truly challenging opponent you will want to play humans. But that is true of every strategy game I know of except chess. (There may be decent AIs for checkers and bridge I suppose, but I don't know it from personal experience). CM has more depth of gameplay than any computer game I've seen, at least since "Stars!". I doubt you will regret it. All of that said, there are improvements possible in the CM AI, and I have some concrete suggestions to make about it. I know such changes are hard to code and I do not expect the moon. But I am also aware that many AI programming problems are related to the difficulty of reducing to rules of thumb, the tactics of good human players. And there is some danger, when such rules of thumb can be found, that following them too strictly may lead to exploitable predictability. Right now, I think the CM avoids the latter horn of the bull rather well. Its problems are not "doing the same thing" every time (some things, sure, but not many), but instead, not using some rules "rigidly enough", as it were. Or not having such rules available to adhere to or not. So I suggest some tactical rules of thumb, meant more to avoid mistakes than to achieve brilliance. #1 vehicles should avoid locations where other friendly vehicles have already been knocked out. These are often "kill sacks", under LOS from many capable enemy AT assets. #2 off-board artillery should be called for much sooner. Once a target is engaged, however, at most 1/2 the rounds in the module should be expended (1/3rd to 1/2 is a good target range), before shifting to a new target (either "adjust fire" or "cancel" if no adjust target is available). (Rockets are an exception - just fire the whole thing since the spread is too wide to "aim" anyway). The reason is that most of the enemy have left the area, or have already been hurt as much as the arty can hurt them. These days it is too common to see AI FOs delay fire until very late in the game, or to expend the whole module on a single gun position, or both. #3 The AI needs to make better use of initial pauses to maintain "station" and formations. HQs should pause once when their platoon moves out, for instance, lest their lower delay times push them out to a "point" position. Similarly, when attacking, a lead platoon can create a "point and overwatch" effect simply by pausing everyone but the front-center squad, once. The lead unit only will tend to draw fire on contact, while the rest can return it unsuppressed. One light-armored vehicle can do the same for a pair of tanks or heavy TDs. #4 platoons should be kept together (the AI mostly does a good job of this), but also used in support of each other. Vehicles should likewise be paired in support of each other. Mix it up as to whether both remain stationary to fire, both advance, or one does either to cover the other, fire and movement style. The key thing is to have them make these determinations but to keep them reasonable close to each other, but deployed side to side. Thus, if one in a pairing is farther forward, it should be more inclined to sit and fire - and vice versa for one farther back. The result should be more fire and movement "walking", and fewer piecemeal attacks in sequence along a single avenue of advance. I realize that one is hard to code perfectly, but it does not need to be perfect. #5 infantry under artillery fire, unless in heavy buildings, should withdraw-run to the nearest cover toward the rear, rather than trying to "ride out" a bombardment in place, or advance into the open with greater delays. Return after the bombardment. This one must have some "fuzzy" in it, to avoid becoming too predictable. But sitting under bombardment is both predictable and dumb. It would be better to be heavily weighted toward "smart", but not all the way (to leave some difficulty in prediction). #6 the location of enemy units should have more weight in choosing directions to attack, and the location of objectives less. It is a bit too easy to lure the AI onto flags without securing its flanks first. #7 when making unit purchases, pairs of vehicles of the same type are often more useful than singles of multiple types. They have a more pronounced battlefield effect in whatever particular direction. One Sherman 76mm, an M8, a halftrack, and an M-20, is a poor mix of vehicles. 2 Shermans and 2 halftracks, or 2 M-10s and 4 M-20s, or 2 Stuarts and 2 M-8s, are better mixes. Why is the first mix bad? One AP round destroys the heavy AT capability. The force can't carry enough infantry for the light armor to produce an "assault" effect. The main effect is multiple light-armored MGs, but way too much is paid to get this effect. Compare the last force - 4 light AT guns and 10 MGs on 4 speedy armored platforms. Or the middle one - 2 strong AT guns and 6 .50 cals. The first (Shermans and 'tracks) can carry an infantry platoon in assault, and has strong HE and MG firepower. The costs are the same, ~325 for each mix. In other words, don't take a little of everything, but pick one or two definite somethings and take enough of it to matter. Also, notice that realistic weapons mixes work better in the above examples. U.S. armor used Shermans and 'tracks; Tank Destroyers used TDs and light scout vehicles (M-20s, Jeep MGs etc); cavalry used light tanks and ACs (and jeeps BTW). #8 The AI needs training in setting ambush markers, using "hide", and deciding when to open fire. This is not easy to program, I know. Some rules of thumb may help, though - If you can't see an enemy but aren't going to move, then set an ambush marker if you can. Set it to a place where you have LOS and closest to any reports of enemy, or in default of those, near his edge of the map. Don't worry about it being in the wrong place. Just set a new one when you get a new sighting report. Weight toward existing ambush markers from other units, and set yours near them but not exactly on them. Treat TRPs the same. If you have an ambush marker set and aren't going to move, then count the number of friendly units that can see enemies, and the number of enemies that can be seen by somebody. As this number goes up, increase the propensity to drop the "hide" and fire. When one does so, every unit that can currently see an enemy should drop its "hide", so that all fire at once. If others are already firing (e.g. because of triggered ambush markers), drop yours too and fire, if you can see enemy. The multiple ambush markers, and placing them "dynamically" = anew as newer spotting reports come in, have a good chance of putting one of them in a spot that will be triggered. The linkage of firing to dropping of "hide" by others, will allow a "mass ambush", at least in the second minute. And the rule about many shooters seeing many enemies, leading to dropped "hide"s regardless of ambush markers, should prevent screwed up "hide" orders and ambush marker placement, from preventing the AI from firing. #9 dismounted teams slower than "fast" movement type, should ride rather than walk when vehicles are available and enemies have not yet been spotted. Vehicles carry such teams should avoid the center of wide open areas, and instead try to stay within 20-40 yards of some kind of cover, in case the teams have to dismount. The teams themselves should also avoid moving over wide areas of open ground, unless friendly units are in cover on both sides of the route. If you can't see a friendly unit in the cover you are moving toward (or near it), it is too soon to try to cross a wide area of open ground, if you are not "fast". Gaps of <50 meters you can ignore. This will produce an "overwatch" effect, as the heavy teams pause and cover faster units moving into cover farther ahead. And it will protect the teams themselves from being pinned or panicked in the open, where they can't reach cover quickly because of their heavy gear. It will also prevent dumb decisions like charging with an HMG 42 team, instead of a squad, increasing the life expectancy of flamethrower crews, etc. #10 Light guns (20mm FLAK, 81mm mortars, 75mm infantry guns, 40mm AA, 57mm ATGs, etc) should be set to fire at will on targets they can see. But heavy AT guns (75mm PAK and up) should be set to "hide" until they see enemy armor, and should not fire on enemy infantry (unless the range is so close the guns are threatened/discovered, or) unless they have already revealed themselves firing at other target types. In other words, heavy ATGs only drop "hide" to shoot armor. Let the lighter guns suppress infantry, kill light armor, and absorb artillery "counterbattery" fire. These days, an 88mm FLAK battery will too often and too easily reveal itself to a scouting infantry platoon. Some of these will be harder to try to impliment that others. (I haven't written code in a long time, so I am not the best judge of such things). But I think they would markedly improve the existing CM AI. Which incidentally, already does some things quite well, lest I leave the wrong impression. Those are my concrete AI suggestions, for what they are worth...

Gee Michael, we are being really slow today, what? LOL. Yes they count twice, as dead and as not exited. Read the manual, and you see that they also count twice if they *do* exit ("2-3 times purchase cost"). Live and exited, and dead and not exited, basically balance each other. Live and on the map is an intermediary condition, and it gives the *defender* some points, for that item. Items marked as "should exit", *should* exit - not "may". And units so designated are weighted heavily in the victory determination, about twice as much as ordinary casualties. The mission for one side is to exit those units, and for the other side it is to stop those units. If half die and half exit, then that will be drawish, because both sides have half-accomplished their main mission. To win, the exiter must exit *most* of his "should exit" units, alive. For designers, the issue is simple. The exiter should only be required to exit a portion of his force, preferably those with the most combat power, e.g. his AFVs or whatever. Unless you want to require him to blow through a roadblock type position without serious delay or serious losses - then you could require exit of everyone. Someone with an "exit" victory condition, conceptually, needs those assets at *another fight* which is taking place beyond the map - or to start such a fight. The designated units are worth more, because their value (in CM terms) will be multiplied if they succeed in being present at multiple fights in sequence. This is part of the whole mobile warfare idea. A tank fights with the value of one infantry platoon (say) in fight A, but then lives and proceeds to fight B, and lives and proceeds to fight C, and by the end of that, it has delivered a combat value of its cost 3 times over. It is "in three scenarios". If the defenders in battle A kill it, they do not just get it out of *their* hair. They save the guys in fight B and C from having to face it the same day, too. They can also accomplish that part of it, without destroying the tank, if they stop it and keep it from getting to the later fights. That is what exit-type VCs are set up to reflect, the way CM has laid them down. It is a perfectly sensible approach. Designers just have to know it beforehand when setting up scenarios using such VCs. And since other games have made single scenarios with exit conditions of an entirely different character, care must be exercised in translating VCs from some other system to CM.

Kampgruppen? Here are some that appear in an operation I am in the middle of designing (the unit involved is 2nd Panzer if anyone wants to know). There are six of them, three "elements" of the main force, and three levels of reserves to suppliment them. The basic structure of the overall force (much bigger than a QB) is a Panzer company, a Pz Gdr company, and a Pioneer company, supported by the fires of two battalions of artillery. With attachments. Elements of these make up the various pieces of the main column, and the reserve. The force structure of the lead part of the column, element #1, is an Armored Recce platoon, Panzer platoon, and Pz Gdrs, with 105mm support. Its mission is recon in force. Its equipment in detail, regulars unless noted, is - 2 Pz IIL 1 SPW-251/9 (75mm) 4 SPW-251/1 (MG) HQ+3 Arm. PzGdr squad+1 Scheck (veterans) (that was the armed recce) 4 Pz IVH (1 veteran) HQ+3 Mot. PzGdr squad 1 105mm FO 1280 pts The portion of the column are basic fighters - a Panzer platoon, 2 Pz Gdr platoons, a 37mm FLAK vehicle to protect the center of the column, and 81mm and 105mm FOs. Or in detail - 4 Pz IVH (1 veteran) HQ+3 Mot. PzGdr Squad+1 Schreck 4 SPW-251/1 (MG) HQ+3 Mot. PzGdr Squad 37mm FLAK vehicle 105mm FO 81mm FO 1230 points The third or tail part of the main column, contains the supporting heavy weapons of the PzGdr company, a platoon of armored pioneers, supporting 20mm (foot) and 75mm (halftrack), and a 150mm FO. They dig things out or provide various kinds of fire support. In detail, their equipment is - 2 SPW-251/9 (75mm) 8 SPW-251/1 (MG) 2 20mm FLAK HQ (wpns) 2 81mm Mortar 4 HMG HQ+3 Pioneer Squad 2 Flamethrower 150mm FO 2 Trucks (spare) 1200 pts That is the main column, in 32 vehicles, with each element around 10, and thus individually small enough to deploy pretty fast. Additional tanks, infantry, and artillery support are held out of the fight initially, but can be released to support the main force. The first and simplest of these (battalion-level reserve) is a Panzer platoon plus a platoon of Pioneers, with their company's mortars. 4 Pz IVH (1 veteran) 2 SPW-251/1 (MG) HQ+4 Pioneer Squad 2 Flamethrower 1 HMG 1 Schreck 2 81mm Mortar 920 pts The second, at the "regimental" level, is like the previous but with the Panther platoon, 20mm FLAK instead of mortars, and the last (3rd) 105mm FO. Or in detail - 4 Panther (1 Veteran) 2 SPW-251/1 (MG) HQ+4 Pioneer Squad 2 Flamethrower 1 HMG 1 Schreck 2 20mm FLAK 105mm FO 1350 pts The last reserve, at the "division" level, is meant to represent the intervention of division-level assets in the battle, and is expected only in the event of a counterattack or some such. The intervening units are the divisional AT battalion (a Jadgpanzer platoon), and the division's heavy artillery (150's). This one is not meant to fight alone, but to suppliment one or more of the others. (The same can be said for the 3rd, Hvy Wpns element of the main force BTW). 3 Jadgpanzer IV w/skirt 1 SPW-251/1 (MG) carrying - 2 150mm FO 776 pts. Incidentally, one can use the halves of the last force to represent division-level AT or Arty support, only one not both, for around the same 360-pt cost (if you have a spare FO vehicle that is - it costs a little extra for the 'track too). You could actually use the "main column" force in a large enough standard battle, if the defender had 2500 points and you were attacking e.g. But forces this size are really meant for operations, not QBs. The individual pieces, though, mixed and matched, would give realistic pieces of a Kampgruppe. Incidentally, though, the realism of the above force does mean some drawbacks from a gamey perspective. There are a number of flamethrowers, and lots of halftracks, that are probably overpriced in CM right now. And the force is long on realistic German armor, short on impenetrable front plates. It does have them though. If the business gets nasty enough the Panthers are turned loose in a bunch to stop it - not parcelled out in 1s and 2s with mostly-infantry forces. That Panther "gruppe" is only 1350 points, and that is using pioneers for the infantry. If you are going to use them, use them. Take four even in a smallish battle and don't monkey around. Obviously all of these forces are meant for the attack, and by Panzer troops. Things are different when defending or using infantry troops. But I hope this gives an idea of what a battalion-level Kampgruppe actually was, what its pieces were, and how they were supposed to work.

#1, read the manual, page 100-101. "exited units, generally worth 2-3 times the purchase value (note: units eligible for exit that do not exit score points for the enemy)". Or just set up any scenario with an exit victory condition, and advance to the last turn. You will see the guy who was supposed to exit forces lose, without a shot fired. I've designed a couple scenarios that use exit VCs ("The Fire Brigade", and "Get the Guns"), so understanding this point was rather important. In "Fire Brigade", only certain items matter for exit - which, you can play it and find out, it is double-blind - LOL. In Get the Guns, the U.S. player has to try to exit 4x105mm towed howitzers from his own map edge, before German raiders destroy them. (Or after the raiders are beaten, if you stand and fight - your call). #2, a big reason designers don't make scenarios without *any* flags, is that solo play is still the most common way of playing, for time reasons. And the AI orients on flags. Without flags, it hardly has a clue what to do. But I sometimes design scenarios without *many* flags, and keep the flags I do put in, the small 100-pt ones (worth only a vanilla tank or infantry platoon apiece). That lets the AI have something to move on, and still leaves losses or exit conditions the overwhelming factors in victory. #3 I am aware of the problem caused by a long screen name. But some of you people seem to think I can change it at will, and I can't. There is no provision for changing screen names on the CM forums. And re-registering does not work, because the software then thinks "that email addie is already spoken for". The only way to change a username is for the CM ops, to delete the whole record and then start over. I have asked them to do so in my case, recently, but it has not happened yet. Incidentally, I think the part of the registration screen that says "username can be up to 25 characters", should not say that, because it isn't true, in practice. At the time I picked it, I hadn't the slightest idea where it would appear, or if it would appear, let alone any notion that it would not "wrap", or would change the size of any CM displayed "record" fields. But as they say, SNAFU.

On the example of D-Day, BTW, I think you have a rather clouded picture and it isn't much of an example. First, it was the single most important "objective" in the war for the Allies, because their wouldn't be a war if they didn't get ashore. There is always another way with most land-based objectives. Second, the highest losses reached about 1/3rd of the attacking unit, worse in parts of the first wave of course. And these losses were considered so bad they almost called it off at Omaha. The units that did reach the bluff were those that hadn't taken losses too high. The places that took 2/3rd and 3/4th losses in the first wave, were stopped at the water's edge. Third, the defending German force, the 352 Infantry division, was practically destroyed on D-Day. It was left with no more than 2 battalions of effectives. More of the U.S. losses were KIA, and more of the German losses were PWs, which of course makes a huge difference in human terms. But the reduction in military strength on both sides, was about even, even at Omaha, which was the worst of the 6 beaches. That is what attacker's odds and all the support was supposed to do, and it did.

No, I do not support you on this point. Losing all of your armor to take a dinky flag 400 yards away is a formula for losing the whole war. You've got 500 miles to go, you so get to do that 2000 times - and then you get to do it along perhaps 100 miles of front (out of way more than that total). Think you can afford to lose a platoon of tanks, or even a pair of them, 200,000 times? The USA, UK, and USSR combined made about 250,000 AFVs for the whole war. A small flag is small to reflect its value. It is worth, not all your armor, but *1* tank, or *1* platoon of infantry (about). A large flag is worth 2.5 of these things, but not three. If your losses *equal* your opponent's, then having a little more of the important real estate can break the tie - slightly. With attacker odds, you should be able to crush the smaller defending force, or lever it off of the objective to stay alive, and either of these things without getting killed. I Incidentally, I also suggest you play your next 3 games as a defender, at 2 vs 3 odds. Then you can pretend, if you still want to, that the attacker losing more than the defender and not taking all the flags is not a defensive success.

I doubt CM is off on this subject, much or at all, based on the unit histories. The Pz IV was part of the German force that *conquered* France 4-5 years previously. Yes, the gun had been upgraded, and minor improvements made to the chassis and armor. But this is an *old* tank by 1944. Second, I have never read in unit histories a single account of bouncing frustration after achieving hits against the Pz IV, with any gun above the British 2 lber. You do hear about 2-lber rounds failing to kill Pz IVs, e.g. in North Africa. It is generally at range, and from the front or "angled" approaches. The U.S. 37mm AT (E.g. Stuarts and M-8s) should be similar, and in my CM experience it is. These light guns usually need side hits. The next couple paragraphs are about CM data. The only exception is the turret front, which is more weakly armored than the front hull. The 2 lber and 37mm can penetrate the turret front if the range is close (as it usually is in CM - <600-800 yards is fine). These guns will get through the side, but will bounce off the front hull. With the 40mm AA, the penetration is not as high as with the ATs, and the turret front of the Pz IV is only vunerable at ~250 yards or so. The 57mm and 6-lb ATGs can't penetrate the hull front unless the range is close, <500 yards. Again, it usually is in CM. And the Sherman 75mm can have problems with the front hull armor at ranges of about 1000 yards, or somewhat closer in an "angled approach". Piats and zooks have the punch to get through any part of the tank, but the variability of HEAT penetration with the impact angle can change this. Front hull penetrations require reasonably "flat", straight hits. I've personally seen a Pz IV bounce 5 zook rounds, from upper hull and even turret front (though that is lucky). Third, data has previously been cited on this board about a British survey of number of hits vs. number of kills on various AFVs in Normandy. These means looking over the wrecks and counting holes, etc. The Pz IV actually had a lower ratio of hits per kill than Shermans, about 1.3 vs. 1.6. But that difference may reflect second "making sure" shots. It still contrasts sharply with the ~4-5 figure for Panthers and the even higher number for Tigers. Remember that the U.S. practically had an all short-75 weapons mix in Normandy, and the Brits had no more than 1 17-lb per 3 of those. The ranges were, however, generally fairly close. The conclusion is that the Sherman's 75mm had no difficulty defeating the Pz IVs armor in practice, from turret hits, side shots, or moderately range (<1 kilometer). This is not in the least surprising. No Allied tank fielded a tank gun of that AT ability at the time the Pz IV was originally designed. The few 75mm armed tanks in the early-war Allied fleets, were even shorter 75/18s and similar types, meant for HE use - incidentally, the same sort of gun the Pz. IV itself originally mounted. (In CM you find those in gun-armed HTs, Germans and U.S.). It is still a fine tank, better than the Sherman in a number of respects. Its gun is more powerful. Coupled with generally weaker Allied armor, this lets it kill just about any Allied tank. Ask any Allied tanker if that isn't a valuable attribute! It also has a lower profile than the Sherman. It has a somewhat smaller, but still ample, HE load, and 2 MGs. But in most respects it is fully equal to a Sherman 76mm - which incidentally costs 4/3rds as much. (For what? A faster turret? 4/3rds?!) Anyone dissing it should play the Allies for a while, to improve your tanker skills and learn to walk, instead of hobbling on the front-armor crutch. You will quickly realize what a pack of these can do when you try the Germans again. Using proper team tactics ("wingmen", infantry "eyes", etc), the Pz IV is a fine tank. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 02-28-2001).]

The way exit points work in CM, is the *defender* gets the points if that unit does *not* exit, and the *attacker* gets the point if it does. In a case where the attacker exits half of the force designated as "should exit", the victory will turn on losses and flags on both side. But the exit/didn't exit points are very heavily weighted, so a large victory generally requires exit of more than half the designated units. It is quite common for the defender to win the VCs, even while the attacker nukes his force and forces a passage - if he gets "reduced" in force strength doing so. The conceptual issue for scenario designers is about use of the "should exit" setting. It does *not* mean the attacker gets extra points for exiting that unit, but can do so or not as he likes. If it dies or stays on the map, it counts as dead several times over for victory. The best way to deal with this is to not designate the *entire* attacking force with "should exit". If you give a "should exit" designation to the *tanks*, for example, the outcome of the fighting part of the engagement will be more directly reflected in the overall result. This allows the attacker to expend some of his force, or to leave some of it on the map mopping up or holding the corridor open. I hope this helps.

So, you are probably now wondering, "what the heck does all of that mean, in terms of German units present in CM terms?" - LOL. Of course I don't know. But I can give it an educated guess. The initial morning attack was probably made by a Pz Gdr company, probably motorized and fighting dismounted, supported by 81mm mortars and a mixed tank platoon. That is, something like this - 1-2 Panther 2-4 Pz IV Co + 4 Plt HQ 9 Motorized Pz Gdr Sqd 4 HMG 2 81mm mortar 1 81mm mortar FO These advanced on the town from the east. Either one of these infantry platoons, or perhaps a fourth platoon (but probably not a whole second company), got over the river far south and came up the western bank, from the south. This force took out 2 of the defending tanks but did not establish more than a foothold in the town, is my sense of the reports. They lost 1-3 of their tanks, including at least one Panther to the U.S. Jackson. In the mid to late morning, there was a lull. The U.S. sent wounded and trains away safely. The German tanks had pulled back out of the town, but the infantry probably still had some buildings, with a heads down no-man's land a few buildings wide, probably. The Germans were relatively inactive, because the initial failure was being assessed, reported, etc, and because a hot running fight against a larger U.S. was in progress to the northeast. Sometime around noon, the Germans probably tried again. I would guess the force this time was at most 2 companies of Pz Gdr, including at least one in halftracks / the armored variety. They were probably supported by 1-2 platoons of Pz IVs, meaning around 8 tanks. 0-2 Panthers this time, as the tank duel with CCR would probably seem a more important place for them. Tanks ventured into the streets to support the Pz Gdrs with HE against the U.S. in the buildings, and the zooks got a few of them, as did the 37mm (AA or ATG). There was no heavy artillery support this time - histories always record such things. The mortars from the morning were out of ammo, and heavier guns probably were not far enough forward. The tank guns substituted. This attack is the one that took half the buildings on the east bank, but was stopped short of the bridge by "a storm of fire". How did the Germans have the impression of a "storm of fire?" There was one surviving Sherman and the Jackson may still have been there, but that would not account for it. No artillery was being used, and light mortars weren't available until night. There are two key factors in the history. It is stated that "bazookas and MGs were distributed for a close in defense of the town". This location was a stores and trains sort of depot for CCR 3rd Armored division. It is distinctly possible they had crates of the things. Your history may provide more info, but I would assume many 30 cal and 50 cal MGs, as well as numerous bazooka teams, on the U.S. side. The other factor is probably the AA guns. Those 40mm Bofors are hellish weapons against infantry. They were probably sighted to cover the bridge area, and the result was that the German infantry could get to the edge of their "LOS footprint", but not into it. The German tanks that were lost, may have been trying to get LOS to them, and passed close enough to zook teams trying to do so that they got taken out. I doubt very much any Tigers were used. The tanks called that, were probably Pz IVs. The transposition, IV to VI, is easy enough to make, and inexperienced troops called every boxy-looking German tank they saw, a Tiger. While they obviously fought superbly, I doubt the trains and signals people from CCR rear echelon were all that experienced fighting German tanks. So it would be an understandable mistake. Why didn't the Germans use Panthers more, when the mix of U.S. AT weapons was long on things that might kill a Pz IV, but short on things that could kill a Panther? The U.S. had 2x75mm on Shermans, 2x40mm AA, 2x37mm on Stuart and gun, loads of zooks, and all of 1x90mm on a Jackson. But the Germans did not know this. They only knew that they spearheaded the initial "armor forward" morning "coup-de-main" attempt, with a Panther (or two), and it was promptly and completely knocked out by a large-caliber ATG. So they led with infantry after that. Also, in the afternoon, the Panthers were in heavier "demand" facing the tanks of CCR on the heights toward Soy, than against the brave hodge-podge crew defending Hotten. Also, it may be that the "heavy tanks", as opposed to just "tanks", mentioned in your history, refers to the number of Panthers used. That is, perhaps there were 4 Panthers and ~8-12 Panzer IVs involved all day. That would fit some aspects of German practices pretty well. And from the standpoint of knocking them out, the defenders would be quite right to call them "heavy tanks". As for the question, "what would sub for this", my guess is another 40mm AA. There were 37mm AA being used. But if you are sure it was an AT gun, then use a 57mm and be sure you don't give it any "T" ammo. There is a difference of course, but it as close as you are going to get to a true 37mm ATG dismounted (= same gun as the Stuart or M-8). My guesses. Check them against your histories and see if they fit before you buy them all the way - LOL. I hope this helps. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 02-27-2001).]

See the section entitled "The 3d Armored Division Is Checked, 21-23 December" on this page - http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_16.htm Down through the part at the top of page 385 where it says - "So the night ended. During its course the 560th Volks Grenadier Division had made a smooth and unperceived relief of the 116th Panzer Division. At dawn the grenadiers held an irregular front reaching from the Ourthe River east to the Baraque de Fraiture crossroads athwart the Liege-Bastogne highway. This sector from river to highway now formed the center of the LVIII Panzer Corps with the 2d SS Panzer Division moving in on the east and the 116th Panzer Division circling to form the western wing beyond the Ourthe." This was one of the wildest critical passages in the whole Bulge campaign. Basically what happened was a "non-meeting engagement" (I'll explain in a second), followed by a hasty defense of a bridge. The Germans attacked sharply and made progress, but did not eliminate resistence. They then pulled back to pursue what looked, at the time, like a less defended line of advance, although that is turn was rapidly changing, as it later fell out. The unit engaged on the German side was the forward kampgruppe of the 116th Panzer division (Kampgruppe Bayer), but nothing remotely like all of it. The basic force on the U.S. side was elements of CCR, 3rd Armored division - but numerous very small units added to the defense, including units from the rest of 3rd Armored, and on the flanks units from 2 different U.S. divisions, the 82nd Airborne and the 84th Infantry. I will explain a little context because things are moving pretty fast at this time and can be hard to follow. Peiper had earlier broken out and bypassed St. Vith. He is the northern thrust. The 58th Panzer Corps (which includes the 116th Pz) had broken out a bit later and farther south. St. Vith was still holding out between the two penetrations, essentially. When Peiper broke through, the north side of the Bulge forms, as the American troops on that side do a "right face", now facing south, along Peiper's flank and line of communication. Farther forward=east, Elsenborn ridge is holding, then this new south-facing line is being stretched out westward. On that "face", the 82nd airborne ties in with its "left hand", so to speak. Then the 3rd Armored holds the 82nd's "right hand", and tries to continue the line south, across the expanding face of the Bulge, toward Bastogne. Some elements of 3rd Armored, plus the 82nd, and the infantry to their left, isolated and cut up Peiper's incursion. At that point, Peiper had those forces on three sides of him, and St. Vith holding out to his left rear. When his kamgruppe is destroyed, the threat it that area subsides, and part of 3rd armored is freed up again. So far so good. But then St. Vith collapses. You might say both sides "exchanged" their pocketed troops. All of this is by way of explaining, that 3rd Armored was hardly in this sector just before. But it was being repositioned. And the Germans ran into and part-way through it at the first contact. That is the part I meant when I said there was a "non-meeting engagement". Two task forces of 3rd Armored, TF Orr and TF Hogan, advanced down two parallel roads towards the Germans, and at the same time, without either knowing about it, the main column of KG Bayer passed along a road parallel to these two, right smack between them, in the other freaking direction. Put your left forefinger between the 1st and 2nd figures of your right hand, and you get the idea. Your left hand's forefinger is KG Bayer. Your right middle finger is TF Hogan. Your right forefinger is TF Orr. The knuckle of your right middle finger, is Hotten and the location of your fight with the engineers. See the picture? Soy, incidentally, is where your right forefinger's knuckle is. TF Hogan was cut off by this advance (wiggle your "saluting" finger). The advance was not immediately directed at Hotten, but between Hotten and Soy. Soy was the HQ location of CCR, 3rd Armored. Why does all this matter? In order to understand what the various pieces of KG Bayer were doing that day, and trying to accomplish. On their left rear there is this cut-off TF. On their right rear, turning to face them, is another TF, this one not cut off. On their right front is the HQ of CCR, which soon becomes a nest of tanks trying to deal with them. On their left front, is the village of Hotten, with an appetizing intact class-70 (tons) wooden bridge, defended by a few engineers, a couple hundred rear area service troops, 1 Stuart, 2 Shermans, 2 40mm AA, and this 37mm AT gun. In addition, early in the fight, 1 Jackson TD "appeared from nowhere" on the side of the river nearest the Germans, and played a key role. 4 or 5 tanks were reported in the (morning) attack to have come especially close. These used woods for cover and made it right to the eastern edge of town, and knocked out both tanks (Sherm + Stuart) on that side of the river, rapidly. At least one was a Panther, and was knocked out in turn by a direct hit from the Jackson on the other side of the river. The Jackson may or may not have gotten another one. 1 more was credited to the 37mm AT gun, and 2-3 others to bazookas. There were more tanks in the afternoon, not just the initial 4-5 however. And the zooks probably got some of their kills in the afternoon fighting. German infantry made it into the buildings on the near side of the river, but did not reach the bridge. MGs, rifles, and zooks stopped them (the German commander called it "a hailstorm of fire"). Incidentally, the fight opened with German mortar and MG fire. 2 platoons from the 84th division reach the defenders late in the afternoon to help out, from the west. But they reported that when they got there, the German infantry was pulling out of town and getting back into their halftracks as though the fight was over. KG Bayer was engaged in a larger fight. It was trying to hold the high ground between Soy and Hotten. CCR was counterattacking from that direction, and the Germans were lighting them up from the heights outside the town (east). Around 2 in the afternoon, the last German tanks in the town area pulled out to join those on these heights. Otherwise put, Bayer was flanking Hotten from its eastern side, but in doing so he exposed his own eastern flank to CCR, and took flanking fire from its tanks. He fought these from the heights east of Hotten. The early morning attack had tried to seize the town and especially the bridge rapidly, but had failed. In the afternoon, only the elements the Germans could spare from other tasks were put into the fight, while the bulk of the forward elements were facing east to fight CCR. And smaller elements were screening TF Hogan, and later the same day the 560th Volsgrenadiers faced TF Orr. Back to your hands, because this can be confusing. The forward part of KG Bayer is the panzer regiment and one Pz Gdr regiment. Part of that Pz Gdr regiment was left to screen "Hogan", the cut off one. Call that the inside of your left forefinger near the knuckle. And by afternoon, "Orr" is screened by leading elements of the 560 VG, marching up in 116th Pz's "wake". That is the outside of your left forefinger near the knuckle. These two are holding open a corridor, down which the panzer regiment and most of 1 Pz Gdr regiment pass. The second Pz Gdr regiment follows behind them, but is not engaged up front. Later that night, TF Hogan tried to get out and unluckily ran smack into this second Pz Gdr regiment, though - so it did have a job of sorts to do, holding open the line of communications. Call that the first joint of your left forefinger, counting away from the knuckle. So what is up at the pointy end? The panzer regiment, and most of a Pz Gdr regiment. The German commander's initial plan was to ignore flank security for the sake of mass, push this force right between Soy and Hotten where the high ground was, and then turn left and take Hotten. Then he'd have a bridge and a hole, and it would be off to the races. But he had two big problems - the bridge did not fall to a quick coup-de-main in the morning, and he took heavy fire from his right flank, the CCR position. He faced the bulk of his KG right to meet this threat, and from the high ground he punished CCR rather badly that day. He sent some of his Pz Gdr (probably a battalion or less, since some were back screening "Hogan" and some were with the tanks on the heights) to try to take the place again, but it did not happen. Units from the 84th came up from the west to help the Hotten defenders by late afternoon. The CCR counter-attackers at Soy got reinforced by 1 battalion of the 82nd Airborne by evening, too - and were immediately put into a night attack toward Hotten over unfamiliar ground, which failed dismally. Meanwhile, CCA, 3rd Armored was coming up in the rear to provide a reserve. All of this made continuing the attack look rather harder on the German side. The bypassed TF Hogan had not been reduced, and a short infantry attack on it was driven off. But most of all, the German commander heard that 2nd Panzer, farther south, had successfully seized a bridge over the same river. It threatened to turn the left flank of this whole area. He therefore decided to pull his lead KG out of the cul-de-sac or salient made the previous day, and redeploy the division to advance behind and to the right of 2nd Panzer. So units of the 560th VG infantry division relieved the forward units of 116th Panzer that night, on the heights between Soy and Hotten in particular, which the Germans still held. 116th Panzer passed out of this area of the battle, stepping back, sidestepping left, and then advancing again. The next day, the U.S. tried to attack the German position on the heights, but they had no greater success against the VG with their PAKs, than they had the previous day against the tanks of 116th Pz. I hope some of this is vaguely comprehensible - LOL. I close with a quote from the official history at the site mentioned above. With some of my comments included in brackets, here is the key portion for your affair - "The town of Hotton (about ten miles northwest of La Roche) is built astride the main channel of the Ourthe at a point where the valley widens. Here a series of roads converge to cross the river and proceed on the west bank to the more important junction center at Marche from which roads radiate in all directions. In the center of Hotton the river was spanned at this time by a class 70 two-way wooden bridge. In the buildings east of the river were installed about two hundred men from the service detachments of the division and CCR headquarters. There were, in addition, one light and one medium tank. On the west bank at the bridge exit a platoon of the 51st Engineer Battalion (Capt. Preston C. Hodges) was deployed, reinforced by two 40-mm. antitank guns [sic - sounds like AA - either that or it means Brit 2-lbers, which seems unlikely. AA is a natural right beside a depot and a bridge, is it not?], a 37mm. antitank gun [was that actually AA too? Donno], and a Sherman tank. A squad of engineers guarded a footbridge at Hampteau, two thousand yards south. Page 379 At dawn mortar and small arms fire suddenly gave notice of the enemy. Despite casualties and confusion a defense was hastily set up by the executive officer of the 23d Armored Engineer Battalion (Maj. Jack W. Fickessen), engineer trucks were driven out to block the roads, and bazookas and machine guns were distributed for a close-in defense of the town. Taking advantage of the woods that came right up to the eastern edge of Hotton, four or five enemy tanks rumbled forward to lead the assault. The two American tanks east of the river were knocked out at once; but on the opposite bank a 90-mm. tank destroyer "appeared from nowhere," got a direct hit on a Panther and perhaps a second German as well. The enemy infantry were able to take about half the buildings on the near bank but were checked short of the bridge by the rifles, bazookas, and machine guns in the hands of men on both banks of the river. (A "hailstorm of fire," say the Germans.) The engineer squad guarding the footbridge south of Hotton was overrun, apparently by Germans wearing American uniforms, but fortunately this bridge could bear no vehicles. By the middle of the morning the defenders, now recovered from their initial surprise, were holding their own and the vehicles in the town were evacuated to the north along with most of the medical personnel and ambulances. Two or three more German tanks were destroyed by bazookas (one was even chalked up to the account of the 37-mm. antitank gun). For some reason the enemy had not thrown all of his tanks into the battle at once, a fortunate circumstance. [see above discussion] By 1400 the tanks still in town joined those on the hill east of Hotton against the counterattack which Colonel Howze had launched along the Soy road. About this time Howze was able to get a small group of tanks and infantry around to the north of the attackers and into Hotton, redressing the balance somewhat [notice this reinforcement, around 2 PM. The town does not seem in danger of falling after this point]. As yet it was impossible to bring any friendly artillery to bear, and the foot troops continued to rely largely on their own weapons for the rest of the day. General Rose, as already indicated, had at his immediate disposal a very limited reserve. Although he had ordered Howze to counterattack with the entire force of the Combat Command Reserve it became apparent as day wore on that this would be insufficient. The ground over which the counterattack from Soy had to move gave every advantage to the Germans. Maneuver was restricted by the cuts through which ran the Hotton road, by a stream bordering the road on the south, and by the *German position atop the nose of the hill between the two towns* [that is where all the German tanks were, natch] which gave observation and fire over the barren ground to the north. Since General Rose had been promised the use of a battalion from the 517th Parachute Infantry, he decided to hold up the drive from Soy until it arrived. Also it appeared that the defenders of Hotton would shortly be reinforced by part of the leading RCT of the 84th Infantry Division, moving via Marche under orders from Ridgway to secure the Ourthe River line south of Hotton. This help was slow in coming. As early as 0900 the 51st Engineer Battalion commander had asked the 84th to send aid to Hotton but the staff of the latter seem to have taken rather skeptically reports of the enemy strength in- Page 380 volved. Two platoons finally arrived in Hotton late in the afternoon but by this time the German infantry were leaving the town and loading into their half-tracks as if the fight were over [note - this was probably an hour or two after the CCR force reached Hotten from the north. The German gave up before the 84th's men arrived, it appears]. Through the night American mortars in Hotton laid down a defensive barrage of illuminating shell and high explosives, but the enemy made no move to return to the assault. The commander of the 116th Panzer Division, as well as General Manteuffel, would later pay tribute to "the bravery of the American engineers" at Hotton. They had reason for this acknowledgment (in which they could have included signal and service troops, unknown gun and tank crews) because the failure to secure the Hotton bridge was decisive in the future history of the LVIII Panzer Corps. Credit must also go to the Combat Command Reserve at Soy *whose fire, as the enemy acknowledged, caught Kampfgruppe Bayer in the flank* and checkmated its single-minded employment against Hotton. Finally, a share in the successful defense of the Hotton bridge should be assigned those elements of the three 3d Armored task forces which, on the 21st, had engaged the bulk of the 116th Panzer Division and 560th Volks Grenadier Division and prevented a wholesale advance into the Hotton sector." [Cf my points about the wild confusion of the "non-meeting engagement"] I hope this is interesting. A fun little puzzle indeed...

If you want realistic (no "super-tanks" please, you said) then buy 1 veteran and 3 regular Pz. IVs. Costs only 500 points. 8 MGs with tons of ammo, and ~200 rounds of 75mm HE (twice as much of both, as 2 vet Panthers which cost the same). Turrets to switch rapidly from target to target. The vanilla guns are still good enough to kill most Allied AFVs from any angle (only heavy Churchills and Pershings excepted). Carries one complete platoon of infantry, or alternately can carry all the slow foot teams of a typical infantry company. Then just remember to have infantry scout for them, the same as the Allies have to do, so you don't get ambushed to easily or without making the ambushers pay. Only risk one in an advance, until you find that area is clear. Two on overwatch, including the vet, most of the time.

HTs are vastly overpriced. Your 4 HTs standing off cost almost as much as 100 rounds of 105mm to drop on their heads, or 2 Shermans or Pz IVs with about as many MGs and 100-150 rounds of 75mm HE to boot. The only thing one gets in return is transport for 4 squads (and the tanks give transport for 2). And that transport is not exactly safe. HMGs will not take out tanks, but I've seen them KO halftracks. HTs should cost about as much as infantry squads, or a little less, so that halftrack mounted infantry costs twice as much as foot guys. That means more like 30-35 points apiece, not 45-50. Soft-skin transport, incidentally, should be even cheaper. Nobody buys trucks these days, but if they were ~15 points people might buy them to carry heavy weapons and such. The firepower and armor portions of nearly everything in the "vehicle" screen are underweighted, and the cost of transport ability overweighted, in my opinion.

Yes, there are improved rounds made for the .50 cal these days. But the figures I gave are for standard ball ammo, not special AP penetrators like "SLAP" rounds and such. Upmarket .50 cal rounds will penetrate the Soviet Hind helo, and this mattered in Afghanistan. But the basic story with ball ammo hasn't changed. The other fellow's figure of 28mm penetration compared to the NATO figure of 30mm is about right. The tales of moving heavy objects with packaged .50 cal fire are somewhat overblown, but not entirely so. If you imagine all the bullets from a 3 second burst from 8x50 cal, as on a P-47 Thunderbolt, ricocheting off a target (which imparts more momentum than penetrating and stopping, which in turn imparts more than passing clean through), then you get the following momentum transfer. 8 guns x ~8 rounds per second x 3 seconds = 192 rounds. 2800 fps and 15700 J energy implies ball weight of ~21 grams, so that is 4 kg of slugs hitting the target (about 9 pounds of ammo). The momentum transfer from an "inelastic" collision / ricochet, can vary from = the impact momentum to twice that (for right angle, and straight-back ricochets respectively). Call that very roughly 1.5 times, as an upper bound. Ignore the reduction in velocity from the muzzle. Then 5170 kg*m/s of momentum will be imparted to the target. That is enough to make a car "run", or a truck "walk". Although, with such soft-skin vehicles, many of the rounds would pass straight through and thus not impart all of their momentum to the struck vehicle. A 12 metric ton Puma would be left moving about 1 mph away from the direction of the burst. Incidentally, you can tell these numbers have to be roughly right, because it is possible to fire a single .50 cal from a jeep, without flipping the vehicle. All the arrival momentum has an "equal and opposite" departure momentum, except the 1.5 times "ricochet factor", which results from changing the direction of the bullet, and can thus exceed the momentum to change it from "standing still" to "going that-a-way". The recoil of one .50 cal is thus on the order of ~145 kg*m/s (5170 as above/8 guns/1.5*ricochet/3 seconds). If you could fire one for a solid minute (you can't, it'd over-heat and besides you have to change belts), then you could get a jeep going about 20 mph just from the recoil. Might substitute a long burst / full belt for a faulty clutch to get to 1st gear - LOL. I hope this is amusing.

Totally Hollywood. Did occasional tankers too green to even know what their vehicles were for, occasionally confuse them with earth-moving machinery? Sure. And they broke sprocket wheels, threw whole treads, smashed "shoes" and track-sections. Did they sometimes drive into buildings thinking they would knock them down? Yes, and they discovered the phenomenon of the "cellar", and that housebuilders do not build floors to carry 30 ton tanks. I am reminded of an old war movie about Russian cossacks, where one big man while roaring drunk lifts his own horse, and afterward shouts "who but Ivan could carry his horse?" To which the quiet reply is, "who but an idiot would want to?" If you want to break something, use the freaking gun, you nit-wit. That's what the darn thing is for. Believe me, it is a lot harder to get out of the way of a shell doing 750 m/s, than a tank doing 10 m/s. And you will not immobilize your tank, either.

The basic rule is "run in open, move in cover". But you have to be sensible. If the enemy is lining the actual treeline, then you need them suppressed and "cowering" (prone figures) to try it at all. Your men will not move *onto* "up" and firing enemies, and if they stop in open ground in front them them, "running" in place, they won't shoot back either. That way lies sorrow. What you want to do is move to bits of cover between or next to or just ahead of, enemy forces, but not right on top of them. 10 meters away, preferably. You can move to move like right on top of enemies that are prone from being broken or pinned, but if you fire is cut off by a smoke volley, some of them migth recover in the meantime. So ~5-10 meters away is safer. You aren't going to win a close-range firefight while you are in the open and he isn't. But if your closest guys are already into cover, next to the enemy, then some guys lagging back in the open can be OK. Because the defenders will be shooting at the closer guys, who are in cover. When the rear "line" is at a "move" pace, they will fire and get to the cover, both. Remember that the whole idea is to have a firefight at close range, but with mostly even terms for each unit. Which means you have to be in the same cover he is, more or less. Unless he is "down" (pinned or broken), that is going to be necessary to win, even with odds. Broken defenders can be charged more "recklessly", with excellent results, obviously.

When you want them motorized, buy 4 trucks per platoon. 2-man teams can be added to trucks with a full squad in them, free, so that will handle LMGs, Screcks, flamethrowers, and FOs. Put up to 1 HMG per platoon in the truck with the HQ. If you are working with tanks, one platoon can ride on them, in the same fashion as above. If you want to depict a mobile column, that is the realistic way to do it. Trucks cost a fair amount in CM, though, without being too useful in combat. So if you are designing a scenario, it is a good idea to ignore the cost of the trucks when thinking about force sizes and play balance. If you don't need to cross long distances on roads, then just take enough trucks to carry your HMGs and 81mm mortars and such. You can put two in the same truck. The leg infantry is fast enough on the small time-and-distance scale of most CM fights, but added transport definitely helps with these slower items. You generally do not want more trucks than this in QBs, since the points can buy more combat power in other ways. Conceptually, the faster leg guys have "de-bused" before entering the map. Naturally, 20mm FLAK or 75mm infantry guns can also be carried (a 20mm FLAK will even fit with an HQ in the same truck). So, e.g., say you are representing a motorized Pz Gdr company supported by a platoon of Pz IVs. Then you might take (1300 points as regulars) - Motorized Pz Gdr company 4 Pz IV H 1 105mm FO 1 Screck 1 SPW 250/9 75mm halftrack 3 trucks. (or change the arty to 120mm mortars, change the HT to an armored car, or skip it to add extra screcks, trade the HT for 2x vet tank crews, whatever). And load the units as follows - Pz IV w/ 1st platoon HQ, HMG Pz IV w/ 1/1 squad, FO Pz IV w/ 2/1 squad, schreck Pz IV w/ 3/1 squad Truck w/ weapons platoon HQ, HMG Truck w/ HMG, 81mm mortar Truck w/ HMG, 81mm mortar The other two platoons on foot, along with the company HQ. That is 1300 points. If you bought 8 more trucks you could motorize the whole force, but that is 200 more points for vehicles without guns, which is excessive in a QB. It would be fine in a scenario, though. I hope this helps.

Except, when you try to delete a rifle team, the whole squad goes with it. In my experience anyway. Use platoons with only 2 squads in them, or 1 squad and an MG team or two, to represent depleted formations. You can set them up in split up teams, too, as long as you use 2 or 4 of them. You can also represent low levels of "depletion" by removing harder-to-move weapons teams, which is realistic. E.g. many U.S. companies didn't bring their .50 cal into combat, or brought only 2 mortars. You can represent fewer officers by buying teams rather than units for weapons, etc. 2 mortars but with extra ammo (~60 rounds apiece) was even a smart "field mod" for them, incidentally. The remaining men in the mortar units were put on ammo details, to carry the extras and to run and get more. Since they ran out so fast, this was a smart idea. Units started doing it in the Italian campaign, though not all. Thus, a real world U.S. rifle company might have - CO HQ 3 PLT HQ 3, 2, 2 Squads 2 MMG 3 Zook 2 60mm mortar w/ extra ammo. That is 128 men rather than the TOE of 163, or ~80%. If you want them even more depleted, you can take just 2 rifle platoon, 2 MMGs, 2 Zooks, 2 mortars, and then delete 1 squad from each platoon. Then you are only 80 men, ~50% of TOE. This is more realistic than deleting 35 riflemen or team ammo-handlers, 1-3 per team, while leaving every officer and heavy weapon and BAR in the company operational, and fully supplied with ammo. Which is what tweaking the men-per-team would do.

Use "move". Don't use "run". Run means "don't shoot until you get here". Move is slow enough for a longish engagement time as you pass an enemy unit, and the men can fire. Works for me...

Well, mine is ongoing with nine players. Everyone has completed the first two fights and the third has been sent to everyone, as of today. The first was sent on the 15th, and we are doing about a game a week. The players write up regular AARs and I conclude each "round" with a lessons-learned report based on them and the range of performance seen. The fights are still small, but slowly getting larger. Everyone is Americans, infantry-division forces - there is no way I could run two different "story lines" at once. The fights are against the AI. I just set up the German forces, then you use "stick to scenario defaults" (and full fog of war, obviously) for them, set up your own as you see fit within your assigned zones. To give other would-be campaign runners a sense of the work, for the 3rd scenario I had 5 different .cmb files for the nine players. Each required only minor tweaking to represent the proper forces present, based on how that commander had done to date. I keep track of everyone's performance in each fight, and some of its experience effects, etc in a master text file that also serves as a contacts "rolladex" with email addies and such. I can't take a number of new players at this time. But I planned on 10 players and one has dropped out, it seems, never sending back a result from the first fight. So if you can play the first couple of fights lickity-split, and give me AARs for them, I may be able to catch you up, still - but just you. To do this, you need to send me an email with your email address spelled out in the body of the note, and stating your intention. Just having your addie on the header is not enough - put it in the file, typed out. Then we will have to do the back and forth quite quickly for the first couple of fights, so that you can finish the 3rd scenario around the same time as the others. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 02-26-2001).]

NATO currently rates the penetration of the .50 cal at ~30mm of rolled steel at ranges from point-blank to about 200 yards. That is enough to penetrate most modern IFVs (the Bradley has 40mm front armor to prevent precisely this). The Puma and the whole PSW 231 series is based on the same chassis used for the SPW-251 series of halftracks, using wheels instead. The side and rear armor of German armored cars is no thicker than on halftracks, although the engine may provide a bit more protection in the rear facing. The *front* armor of a Puma is only 30mm, at the edge of what a .50 cal can punch through. .50 cals can penetrate German halftrack armor at just about any range, any angle, just somewhat less likely at long range from the front. Pumas are not tanks. And the .50 cal, as everyone has already said, was designed to kill light vehicles, from aircraft to halftracks. There is certainly no need for that monster-sized bullet to deal with soft human targets.

Discussing Marders, here is a useful tip. When you take them, buy the Marder II variety, not the Marder III. It cost 6 points more. But for those wee 6 points, you get about 3 times the HE ammo load. Yes, Marders are primarily for AT work. But after you kill the enemy tanks, you want some tactical pay-off from doing so (besides just not having his tanks in your hair). And 6 rounds of HE, which is all you will get with the Marder III, just doesn't make an impression. It is not a high priority, but the small extra cost brings a "duel purpose" mobile gun, and that can be handy.

OK, U.S. - LOL. I won't go through all the different force sizes. But I will give a 1000 point force "template" for meeting engagements or attacks as the U.S., in "vanilla" form. The force is assumed to be a combined arms team from a U.S. infantry division. Armor forces, airborne, etc, are all somewhat different. Start with the core - a rifle company and 81mm mortar FO. That is 630 pts as regulars. Then add some of the following to round out the force (pick only one of the first three to stay within budget) - Tank support, 200-250 pts - 2 Shermans or TDs. Don't take single tanks. Take either 2 TDs of the same model, or two Shermans, only one (or none) 76mm. A pair of TDs is the cheapest way to get decent anti-tank capability, and is realistic enough. The vanilla M-10s were the most common, though. Artillery support, 115-330 pts - 3 levels here. Level 1 is to trade the 81mm for 105mm, level 2 is to add 105mm instead, and level 3 is 2x105mm, no 81mm. These are realistic levels of support. Engineer support, 205-250 pts - add one engineer platoon, regular or veteran quality. Cavalry platoon, 115-145 pts - 1 M-8 plus 2 Jeep MG or M-20. The M-8 can be regular or veteran. MG Halftracks, 90-185 pts - 2-4 M3A1 halftracks. Transport your slower teams and add MG firepower. Quality, 120 pts - upgrade rifle company to veterans. Quantity, 120-150 pts - add a 4th rifle platoon. For the higher price, the 4th platoon (only) can be raised to vets. Extra teams, 50-150 pts - take 3-8 MMGs and Zooks, regular or veteran. Mix the types for the type of mission you expect. These are realistic add ons, assigned from the battalion weapons company. Motor pool, 50-150 points - take 2-6 unarmored vehicles, Jeep MG, Jeep, or Truck. Use them to carry your slower teams, to scout, or for support in the case of the Jeep MGs. Round out the price to your 100 mark with extra zooks or MMGs or Jeeps. You will be able to afford one expensive form of support and 1-2 of the others. If you skip the most expensive types of support, you can take several of the others. I do recommend added zooks whenever you do not have tank support, though, unless you know from the scenario the enemy can't have armor. So, e.g., I might pick tank support and take 2 M-10s, then pick quantity with a 4th rifle platoon as veterans, plus one zook. Or 2 Shermans, then add a cavalry platoon = 1 M-8 + 2 M-20. If I expect to be fighting infantry in the woods, I might take artillery support (total = 81mm + 105mm), quantity (+1 rifle platoon), and 2 added MMGs. For larger forces you can use much the same idea, but you will generally want a full platoon of tanks - 4 TDs or 5 Shermans with 1-2 of the Shermans 76mm variety. A 4th infantry platoon, rifle or engineer, becomes practically a requirement if the battle is large enough (1500-2000 range e.g.). Sometimes you will want a second full company (e.g. you are attacking and the defender force size is in the 1500 range). And you will want to take the upgraded artillery. It is realistic to have up to 3x105mm (an artillery battalion, which was the basic "shooting" unit size) and 1x81mm in support of an attacking team. This is harder to afford in CM, because the powerful 105mm modules cost so much. They come with enough ammo that 2 of them can stand in for a full artillery battalion reasonably well. A fine question.