jasoncawley@ameritech.net

And thus, the Mannheim Tanker, without admitting the slightest possible error in his previous charges about what I must have assumed, retires a little ungracefully from the field. Adieu good sir. It was a pleasure, and you were one of the very few brave enough to actually state a claim that could be falsified. One drop more of courage, and you'd overflow, admit the trivial mistake, and there would be no field to retire from, but perfect amity.

To Peter, and Michael, and German-Boy, and Londoner - None of your did your homework assignment. I am so dissappointed, I thought you would perform wonders. But once again, everybody is too darn smart to need to do homework assignments. The paragraph in question was stated once, pointed out a second time, repeated verbatim in quotes a third time, and then after that didn't work, assigned as homework, and none of you wrote it done. The first sentence of the paragraph was, and I quote - "It is doubtless vain to parcel out the various contributions, but it would go something like this." Am I quoting Mr. Dorosh? No. Am I quoting PeterNZ? No. Am I making up some new reaction, long after the fact? No. I am quoting my own opening line in the very same paragraph that set you all off. Mr. Dorosh accused me of a pretence of exactness. This may have reflected his heartfelt view than numbers are always out of place in history. But all of you (many honorable exceptions to be sure - thanks Croda, among others) simply assumed that the charge was just, that I had in fact made such exact claims. And I simply never did. And you were so happy crusading against numbers in history, that you never bothered to go back and see that I hadn't, despite my repeatedly calling it to people's attention. And every time I disputed some less defensible claim - as the claims that I had made a mathematical error, or that I was talking about casualties, or that my conclusion did not follow because not all factors had been accounted for, or that I had assumed all the factors named were equal - every time I responded to these unfounded criticisms, you all assumed that I must be crusading for the exactitude of 1/5th. Or something. Just what you were pretending I was saying, is a little vague you see, since I hadn't said it in the first place. Some of you made the principled argument that numbers should be banned from history, or are only allowable if they are exact. tss was a little more careful and restricted himself to the lesser claim, "exact enough" or some such fudge. And I defended putting wide ranges of numbers on things. I defending making true deductions, even when the horrid little crawly things, numbers, are involved. But I did not pretend any exactness in doing so. Instead, Mr. Dorosh pretended that I had so pretended, and then criticised me for it. And the rest of you just went right along with that charge, like a ton of bricks, without looking to see if it was true. I have thus been in the position of having half a dozen would-be dons screeching at me that "it is doubtless vain to parcel out the various contributions", without being aware that I already said so. Indeed, portending every sort of real life and professional doom, and lack of credibility, and obvious foolishness, for not saying - what I had already said. And no matter how many times I instructed you to go look for yourselves, and react to my actual statements (instead of Mr. Dorosh's unflattering mischaracterization of them), you all ignored the request, and went blithly on, laboring under the comforting illusion that it could never have entered my head to see or say such a thing, without the help of your enlightened flagellations. You even had the help of people like Terence and Croda coming along, assuring you that you had missed the point. You seemed a little mollified, as long as your point should prevail and the accursed heathen who threatened it were duly chastised. But it never occurred to you that the accursed heathen - said it first.

Once more into the breech my friends. Mannheim Tanker, with a plea that my posts are too long to read, and Ace, with the excuse that he just arrived and hasn't read what I've written, each repeat the argument that I must have assumed I had exhausted all the factors, otherwise my math doesn't follow. Sorry, I didn't make any such assumption, and the math still follows. I would only need that assumption - or the related one Mannheim Tanker talked about earlier, that each of the factors was equal in size - if I wanted to deduce from them, an *equality*, rather than an inequality. But I didn't need those assumptions, and I didn't make them, and the conclusion still follows. I was preserving the truth of a "less than" statement. You can do more things when that is the claim being made, than when claiming an equality. There can be as many factors as you like. They can have any relative sizes you like. So long as 4 of them are greater than the sniper one, the less than 1/5th conclusion, still follows. It is just math. See the proof in my long previous post if you need every step justified from the axioms of arithmetic. The objections of others will be addressed seperately, in order to keep this post short enough to be read by Mannheim Tanker and Ace.

Well, I am gald to see a few people at least wrestling with the numbers, but still disappointed that everyone doing so is only trying to show they are pointless. You sorta have to try to get the intervening terms believable. And no, there is no pretence involved that each intervening term will be anything like exact, but errors in one estimate may offset errors the other way in another later factor. The whole thing will simple serve as a check, eliminating hypotheses of excessive effectiveness, by forcing them to imply more results than can be seen historically. When anyone settles on a chain they think leaves the faust effective enough, I can then make them look again by applying the same sort of reasoning and scale of figures to other small arms. The resulting implication of huge intermediary loss figures would be, that the late war German infantry, instead of all having SMGs, had to fight with pocket knives because so few rifles had actually reached them, through the roving bands of uber-partisans and what not. But we haven't gotten that far. My comment about how rare partisan attacks were inside Germany, which several people seem to have missed the point of, was based on the time when most of these things were fielded. The faust 30 was out longer, yes, but the production rate was not as high in the earlier period. Most of the fausts come out in the last year of the war, and the last 7 months they are more abundant still. For partisans to have gotten 25% of the things, they'd have to have gotten nearly all of those made before the retreat to the German borders. Which they obviously didn't. wwb-99's experience tallies with my own, and is part of what is behind my concern here. Contrary to one fellow's assumption that I am after one fixed goal and bending data at will, I am after a realistic level of faust effectiveness. When the man with no name suggested an improvement to the -30 alone, and explained why he thought it was needed, I readily assented. But you see, I use the German infantry a lot. And I know the later fausts are quite effective, just as wwb-99 states. And if you gave me big accuracy increases or doubled ranges or both, then I'd run the board with the things. I know that is too big a change, independent of any of the production number stuff. Notice the cross check of the small arms. Say, in order to justify high hit rates for the things, you need only minute fractions of them to reach the front (A). And suppose, to make the late war squad types at all believable, you need almost all the better weapons to reach the front (. Then you are left arguing that the intermediary processes squashed all the fausts and spared all the MPs. What do A and B have in common? Both inflate German infantry effectiveness in CM. I am more sympathetic to other explanations or added terms offered here. Shooting dead tanks, for instance, not because of all-at-once 60-1 overkill, but because the platoon isn't sure it is dead unless it is burning. That is quite believable - much more believable than the partisan and all overrun and quartermaster tall tales. As for the (alleged) 1-8 penetrations by RPGs in 'Nam, I seriously doubt fausts were that ineffective when they connected. Why? Because if so, I'd expect many run-o-the-mill tankers to have tales of the 25 faust hits they survived. Just from the size of the populations and that hit-kill ratio. While occasional tales of the 1 close call are common enough, such "run" stories aren't. Now, not trying to be generous on any factor to show something, here is the sort of real picture I find plausible. Tanks killed. Some say 16k, some say 30k. I'll call it 25k. Portion of these killed in the early war by rifle grenades, or mid-war by the ~1 million hand mines, I think is small. Call the remainder 23k. Partitioning there between schrecks and fausts, I think the fausts were more effective merely because they were in more places tactically, making a faust round better than a schreck round. A Schreck lanucher, though, is a less common item and with better range I think it would be more effective. If I take the mean between "as good as a schreck round" and "as good as a schreck launcher", that'd be a factor of 2.45 on either side. Then there are 2.3 times as many fausts as schreck rounds, net of non-delivered ones and leftovers in March etc. This all leads me to believe that the schrecks got about 1/6, or 4k. That leaves 19k kills for the fausts themselves. 4.4m delivered and not returned. Training, 4m left. Since they are delivered, and most of them are later war, I don't think the "intercepted by partisans" story is worth much. 3.9m. But destroyed in depots, bombed, overrun, I think probably happened. Most of the weapons were pushed out to the troops - e.g. in March 45, only 10% of those left were in armories rather than unit hands - but units get overrun too. Higher figures I don't consider credible, because of such items as the small arms cross-check. So I will call this - 1/3rd, leaving 2.6m. Please note that I've already got 1.4m not fired, and other factors later will add to it, so don't go telling me I am claiming all were fired. Lets do an intermediary cross-check. Say ~200 divisions, ~1200 battalions, ~3600 companies, ~10800 platoons, are operational. I think that is a conservative estimate, since there were more divisions later on, though quite a few of them understrength. Understand I mean the organization slot, not the individual men within it, who are turning over regularly. Say 4-5 are present in the average platoon, as in CM. Then what frequency is implied by my 2.6m figure, or in other words, how often can that many platoons be refitted with new fausts? 48 to 60 times per platoon-slot. That is pretty close to "once a week", allowing for some tapering off of number and frequency in the early part of the series. The figure is believable to me. How often are they being used against non armor? I got one fellow more or less agreeing that the 5-10 range is probably right, and I think it is. And I am including rarer uses like bobby-traps, attempts to use them against infantry that fail because the guy gets shot, etc. The point is to seperate off a fraction actually being attempted for the doctrinal purpose, engaging enemy armor. I will say 1 out of 7.4 which leaves a round 350,000. 5 and 10 give 260k and 520k respectively, so alternative guesses here will not be grossly off. How many of those who made the attempt, got KOed before they got their shot off? I'll say half. Remembering that if anyone else picks the thing up to try again, in the same battle or afterward, then it wouldn't count in this category, I think that is an amply allowance. Notice, I've got quite a bit of unfired ones by now. So I've got 175,000 living shooters at tanks, and I've got 19,000 dead tanks at the other end. How many fausts per tank? If only 1/8 penetrated, then sure they could be wonder-hitters. CM would have it all backwards, and they'd be flying all over the place but not killing anything, despite hitting everything. I don't think this can be right, for reasons I already gave. The lucky tankers are nowhere in evidence. Jumping ahead slightly to deal with what I think is a minor issue, I will allow ~15% of the portion that hit (whatever that is, we'll get to it below), to not kill, because they are duds or because they glanced. That will cover a lot of "survived the faust hit" stories (singular), incidentally. 150k left. Now I've got overkill and chance to hit left. I think single fausts from ambush were pretty common, because I've read of a number of such. But there might be instances of firing off a platoon's worth into the same tank, to "light" it. The range of overkill, it seems to me, should be 2-2.5 per kill, or roughly half what a platoon is expected to have, and twice what was really needed. I've got 60-75k "engagements" left. That leaves the to hit calculation at 25%-32%, or 1/4 to 1/3. That is a little better than my previous estimate but in the same general range. The fellow who wanted higher accuracies might consider it acceptable or might not. I would. Can we from this conclude that the hit prob at stated effective range is those figures? No. It would be lower at those ranges, and higher in closer. Suppose it is 15% at stated "effective", and 50% at half that. Fire a couple times at effective range and once at close range, and you are in the right ballpark. Then we still have to remember the man with no name's stricture, that we should add a bit to the range to reflect running, compensate for omni-spotting, and give the -30 a chance. Ok, sir, fine by me - for the 30 though. What model of the engagement and accuracy envelopes are we left with? % to hit Weapon 20 - 40 - 60 - 80 - 100 F-30 35 10 F-60 50 35 15 F-100 65 50 35 25 15 When the range is at the distance for the 35% numbers in the table, the chance of the squad firing the weapon should be high (~3/4 say). If you want to fire still closer, you'd use hide and a platoon ambush marker. Engagements at 40, 60, and 80-100 yards with the respective weapons, would be possible, especially unsuppressed and with a clear LOS. I'd suggest an engagement chance at such distances of around 1/4th, so that if a target lingers at such distances it would be shot at, but momentary "snapshots" would have to be closer. For what it is worth.

This post is responds to many. The primary addressee is marked in each section, but all are welcome to twiddle away their hours on it. To - PeterNZ How many times do I have to tell you ninnies that there is no "R" in my last name? Next, PeterNZ conflates numerical with exact. He needs to go back to Chem 101 and learn what a significant digit is. If someone says "pi is 3, give or take 2", then there is no pretence of exactitude. But there is certainly a numerical basis. Next, he gives me the option of having meant "entirely meaningless" or "more insight than historical study". Since my statements have logical content, they are not entirely meaningless. Since they are based precisely on insight from historical study, the second is something of a non-sequitor. Undoubtedly, that slippery relation "more than", that is giving him so much trouble, caught him out again. It is also noteworthy that his rhetorical dicotomy is wide enough to drive a truck through. Couldn't a number provide less insight than an alternative, rather than more, and still not be meaningless? Leaving aside the actual case, equality. Which is obviously the actual case, because "historical study" is what I was and am doing in the matter. And what you and the chorus are missing in this debate, is how hysterically comical the pompous math haters among you look. I don't need your respect, kind sirs, to wash my dishes. And I surely don't need it to check my math when I divide by five. Next, PeterNZ pleads that numbers only be invoked, like wayward olympian deities I suppose, when whatever they say cannot be "concluded through simple reading". It is like a Barbie commercial - "math is hard." Dividing by five bothers; reading is preferred. Next PeterNZ engages in the always amusing pastime of guessing the personal habits of his interlocutor. No, sir, I don't use Excel. If the math is hard - not divide by five, I mean *hard*, then I use mathematica. If it is easy, I use what nature gave me. For some tedious but simply in betweens I use an HP-35 (no, I can't get more than 1-2 significant digits of a 15 year amortization stream in my head). But I immediately wish to reassure PeterNZ, that no such esoteric and magical aids were involved, in the present case. I actually divided 1 by 5, in my head. If he tries it sometime, he may realize that he needn't resort to a spreadsheet to accomplish the same daring feat. In fact, he may find that the notation does positively all of the work for him, via that little "/" key - 1/5. Next, PeterNZ worries over my academic future and relates his impressions of certain tea-rooms. I can only say that the University of Chicago is not exactly predisposed to ridicule the attempt to be numerical. Just a few nobel prizes from that, just a few. I am sure your tea room denizens would just laugh like mad hatters, at the idea of putting a numerical value on a contingent claim (the very idea!) Don't worry, we won't disturb your tea. Chicago boys will be too busy. Next Peter trips over himself by getting too academic all at once, and speaks about my variables. What variables are those exactly? I constrained exactly one variable. I let any number of others be anything you please. And I made four, count 'em four, direct judgements, that no one disputes. Twas all I needed for the simply claim I made. As for the qualifications he wishes I made, why he thinks that certain genuflecting pieties of his academic environment are dictates of reason, is a mystery I simply do not want to know the answer to. Then there is the pathetic argument from respectability. As in, "don't tell me I am naked, I am the bleeding emperor!" Thus all of his heartful pleas to acknowledge that truly he is Herr Doctor Professor and everyone is so bright here they could light my desk lamp by looking at it. Which may all be perfectly true, but doesn't not justify critizing anyone for dividing an inequality by five. In fact, as a little thought experiment, much like his street crossing, I propose the following word picture question. Imagine a vast conclave of learned professors, grave bishops, honorable senators, impressive general officers with shoulders squarer than a proposition in Euclid, all trying to shout down at a running-nosed boy of 7 who insists to them that 2 times 5 is 10. Where is the humorous error in this picture? There is no authority for them to appeal to; the plane is simply reason. But PeterNZ thinks of the decorous processes of debate, as a sort of social ritual, in which the fact that criticism is felt and offered, is all that is needed to ensure a craven compliance and kowtowing. Even if the criticism is so beside the point, that a child can see it. His poor students, what if they are right? LOL. But he has a last great faith - that surely, somewhere, a valid criticism must exist. And since there must be, somewhere, a valid criticism - and since, in addition, criticism has been offered - why, surely, as plain as a pikestaff, the particular criticisms that have been offered must be valid! If someone had honestly disagreed, he might well have said, "actually, I doubt the artillery on the east bank of the volga mattered a tuppeny darn", and stated his reasons. If adequate, they would nudge my upper bound higher. Or, another fellow, convinced that snipers are purely an invention of Hollywood and mattered not a jot or tittle, might have come along and spun out his additional comparisons, supporting each with strong historical cases, until he had accumulated an impressive pile of 51 factors, each of which he could argue with complete assurance, was obviously more important than snipers were in the battle. If actually attempted, and if (a very hard condition) every one of his intermediary arguments for his new 47 factors were clear as day, then he would have succeeded in nudging my lower bound, very slightly lower. Doubtless additional modes would be possible. But what all would have in common, is (1) they would actually be facing the question, in the sense of making claims about the battle and trying to delimit the true figure and (2) they would not instead dispute that dividing an inequality by five preserves the truth of propositions, then lapse into spouting that nothing is certain, under heaven. Next, we come to the Mannheim Tanker, who has correctly noticed that I ignored his previous musing about how he wasn't insulting my intelligence and such like. He evidently thinks it is easier to take someone seriously when they are disputing the proposition that dividing an inequality by five preserved the truth of propositions, than when they are "ranting", by which apparently he means correcting the mistaken criticisms of others, and or jocular commentary in general. I assure him that I do not have an impression if he means to, or does not mean to, insult or praise, Queen Victoria. It will come as shocking news I am sure, but it never entered my head to care, one way or another. And I have no desire to be credible to him or to anyone else. My arguments stand on their own feet, or fall on their own faces, and I intrude neither of mine. But Mannheim Tanker is worried, that perhaps I might not learn adequately, to take criticism from others. Doubtless it would be useful training, to take seriously those who criticise dividing an inequality by five. I mean, if you can take that sort of criticism seriously, then you can take any sort of criticism seriously, no? However, I think that my long and involved replies to every "not getting it" response in this thread, shows a patience and a diligence that will serve me in good stead in real life. It is always better to be amused by foolish attacks, than moved by them. And if Mannheim Tanker thinks there is criticism of sloppiness in halcyon academia, I welcome him to spend a single year in the field of finance. But later, he does state his substantive case in so many words. I quote it, because this is delicious "To do so would require quatifying every other factor as well. You can't selectively choose just a few". He obviously believes this. And he goes further, adding to the point and showing the analysis he has obviously made - "There is no basis (at least no evidence that anyone has provided) that the five factors given are equally weighted". In other words, his substantive criticism rests on the claim that my conclusion only follows if (1) the factors I named are all equally weighted and (2) all factors have been listed and their weights duly assigned. He then thinks that he has detected an error in simple math, and relates it to statistics 101. Therefore, he is directly claiming before all the world, that my conclusion only follows if the five factors were equal and exhaustive. He can't tell an inequality from an equality. You all learned about them in 6th or 7th grade, but perhaps because he is analysing on his feet and not writing it down, he thinks "less than 1/5" is the same as "equals 1/5". Because otherwise, his criticism is itself without merit, as I will (painfully, slowly, in detail, justifying each step as in a freshmen calc class) show. Relative weights mean partitioning a single total into a number of factors. Let there be n total factors. n can be any finite number, >= 5. To each n, assign a positive real number, W. That is, W(i) >= 0 for all i, i = 1 to n. Then the set of w(n) 's all together, can be said to be relative weights, if they sum to 1. That is, Sum [ k=1 to k=n, W(k) ] = 1. To see this, imagine you have absolute quantities and they sum to G. Then divide each of the W's by G. The whole series will now sum to 1, while the ratios between the Ws remains unchanged. Such a "normalized sum" is what the term "relative weight" means. The "relative" simply means the total has been "normalized". Now, given any set of relative weights, I add some additional facts to be used in the reasoning. These are new propositions, independently given as data. There exists an S in the series n, and others in the series A, B, C, D, such that - W(S) < W(A); W(S) < W(; W(S) < W©; W(S) < W(D); W(S) > 0 OK? Those are my additional facts. I have nowhere assumed that A, B, C, D, S exhaust the series n. I have no where made any assumptions about the relative magnitudes of the difference W(i)s, except the fact that they are positive real numbers (follows from the definition of a "relative weight"), and the data provide, that these particular 4 are each greater than W(S). Let X = 1 - W(S) - W(A) - W ( - W © - W (D) (equation 1) That is, X is the sum of all the weights besides the 5 about which the data give relations. Since each of those remaining factors is >= 0, so is their sum. (Notice - if n = 5, then X strictly equals zero. But this is not necessary). Whole sum = X + W (S) + W (A) + W ( + W © + W (D) property of addition Whole sum - W(S) = X + W (A) + W ( + W © + W (D) subtract W(S) both sides Whole sum - 2 W(S) > X + W ( + W © + W (D) use datum 1, prop. of subtraction whole sum - 3 W(S) > X + W © + W (D) use datum 2, prop. of sub. Whole sum - 4 W(S) > X + W (D) use datum 3, " " Whole sum - 5 W(S) > X use datum 4, " " Whole sum - X > 5 W (S) prop. of add, sub. 1 - X > 5 W (S) def. of relative weight. W (S) + W (A) + W ( + W © + W (D) > 5 W (S) equation 1, prop. of add, sub. 1 > 5 W (S) def. of relative weight. 1/5 > W (S) prop. of division. As was to be demonstrated. No assumptions made about equality of the size of the factors. No assumptions made about the exhaustiveness of the list of factors. All you have to know, is what operations are truth-preserving in an inequality. Which you were supposed to have learned before grade school algebra. You can subtract inequalities - as long as the larger subtracted amount comes from the smaller side of the inequality - and preserve the truth of the inequality. Nothing else is needed, except knowing how to divide by 5. He then recommends sticking to abstractions. Well, if you are going to make math mistakes in your head in criticism of others, that blatant, and pretend they are the ones being stubborn about it, then I suggest you are doing a little too much abstracting, and not enough careful reasoning, yourself. If you had "stuck to abstractions", instead of saying that the < 1/5th conclusion didn't follow unless the factors were equally weighted, it is true you might not have made this mistake. But I am prefer you making it, and stating it, because the least little something, that makes enough of a claim that it can be shown to be wrong, is worth a hundred pages of sophistic twaddle that can't be. As for Mr. Dorosh, I accept his apology heartily. I just don't know what he is apologizing for. Especially since it seems to have been followed by further "digs". If you don't find my sign off quips amusing, you might rent a sense of humor. Terence seems to be the one of the few who has understood me perfectly, and I thank him for that. I agree that this thread has been hysterical. I have certainly found its denizens straight men of the highest caliber. (Highest - there is an implict number thing again). tss graciously acknowledges that my upper bound was at least sound. He then proves he didn't quite follow the logic exactly by pretending the subject being addressed was cause of casualties, supposedly broken out numerically. It is funny that he then goes on about assumptions. What he ought to have traced, is the logical reduction of proposition to proposition in my chain of reasoning. Spefifically, I showed that if each of four named causes was more important to the German victory than snipers were, then the snipers' relative weight in the victory was less than 1/5th. But I did not simply assume the others were more important. I argued it, claimed it, by referrence to the historical narrative I provided. And no one has contradicted those "greater than" importance claims. The reason they haven't, is they are true. True premises are good places to start reasoning from. It even helps if you start from true statements that are clear enough (in this case, from the history) that they are not in dispute. There was, in fact, nothing "hazy" about my assumptions. tss probably thought so, because he was expecting some casualty count game or something - pace his previous slip on this question of the subject being addressed. My assumptions, at the risk of beating a pulp of a former horse, were - (1) the artillery on the east bank did more for the victory than the snipers did (2) the house-to-house fighting of large bodies of regular infantry did more for the victory than the snipers did (3) the attack on the flanks did more for the victory than the snipers did (4) the bad decisions by the German high command, especially about not leaving the pocket, made more of a difference than the snipers did. Each is a proposition, it may be disputed. Each makes a definite claim about the relative importance of two factors. tss may regard them as "hazy", because they are mere rankings, this greater than that, rather than pretended, more precious numbers or something. (Notice, I wind up taking all the bric-bats for supposedly doing that, when it is others who are assuming it as some sort of ideal or something, not me). It may interest people to know, that in economic theory it is quite generally recognized that only rank-order valuations are actually made by humans, when valuing economic goods. All the precise exchange ratios and value relationships of the market, emerge from the results of simple chains of this more than that, to which no finer ratios can be imputed, at the level of preferrences. Every actual choice is an opportunity cost trade, and higher value only means a "greater than" judgement applied between the two sides. Yet this is quite enough fodder to get the econ-math machine moving. To all - I have to do all of this grunt work to clear the ground. None of it is what I actually came to say. I came to broaden Londener's homework assignment to the rest of you, since it seems the hint or invitation was not taken. Here is your mission, gentlemen. 1. Locate the paragraph in my first post that got down to numbers, and thereby set everybody off. 2. Find the first sentence of the paragraph in question. 3. Read it. 4. Think about the nature of the debate here so far. 5. In writing your next response, copy and paste the sentence in question, as the first line of your response, and put it in quotes. 6. Direct your initial comments to this sentence, and your reaction to it. 7. Explain what you have been doing since that sentence was first posted. I breathlessly await your efforts. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-22-2001).]

The mix of tanks to infantry in German Heer Panzer forces would generally be about 2 platoons of tanks to 1 company of infantry. Pretty tank heavy in other words. Sometimes it would be only 1 platoon of tanks, and sometimes you'd have a company of each, even more tank-heavy. In the SS formations, it could be somewhat more infantry heavy, but the same ballpark. (They had 2 extra infantry battalions per division, but also larger tank platoons). I've given examples of realistic German force mixes before, in any cares to search for them. The suppliment to the basic tank and infantry platoons came in the form of "heavy weapons", meaning gun-armed halftracks, flakwagens, on defense PAK and FLAK, infantry guns, mortars and HMGs. The German infantry on the defense would use lots of such heavy weapons, plus minefields, to suppliment the infantry. Like, 2-4x75mm PAK or 88mm FLAK, 2-4x20mm FLAK, 1-2x75mm Inf-Gun, 2x81mm mortar, 10 AP minefields. Instead of tanks, you see, these seperated and dug in guns would do the long range shooting. Earth and sandbags as armor plate. Occasionally they might have 2-3 Marders, StuGs, or Hetzers, as mobile AT guns in effect, or halftracks mounting 75mm infantry guns (SPW-251/9) - but the towed guns were much more common on the defense. In addition, they'd have the infantry company or more, and 81mm support, sometimes additional artillery too. Anything up to, and including, 150mm caliber. When attacking, the same tri-part force structure (direct fire hvy wpns-infantry-artillery), but now StuGs are the heavy weapons component. A few 81mm mortars or HMGs, carried on the StuGs or on trucks, might suppliment the infantry. But mostly, the StuGs do everything the assorted guns did on defense. The StuGs would be in groups fo 3 or 4, occasionally 1-2 added StuH-105mm in addition. Heavier artillery support, 105mm, 120mm, 150mm. More infantry, and 1/3-4 of them slightly better quality than the rest. (E.g. buy a company of regulars, add 1 platoon of vets). One of the added platoons might be Fusilier (that's the "foot" scouts) or pioneer (the engineers). The armor forces are different in that the tanks are meant to carry more of the burden. More of the weapons are self-propelled. Instead of ~4 infantry platoons, 1 StuG platoon, and supporting artillery, it'd be more like 2 tank platoons, 2 infantry platoons, and 1 "platoon" of the "extras". What would the extras be? Armored recon, in might be 2-3 armored cars, Lnyx, or gun-armed halftracks (total), plus a platoon of Pz Gdrs in halftracks. Or it might be an armored Pioneer platoon. Or it might be a 37mm Flakwagen and 2 SPW-251/9 75mm infantry gun halftracks. Or a pair of Marders, or self-propelled guns used for direct fire (Hummels E.g.). Can you use tanks in smaller groups, in pairs? Sure. But avoid single vehicles, unless they are in the "other junk" category. (Like a flakwagen, or a flame-halftrack). The only common mix of AFVs at the CM scale of things, would be sometimes a platoon or pair of Panthers and another platoon of Pz IVs. Otherwise, have just one "main", "heavy" type, and mix it with lighter, special purpose stuff. A thing to understand here is that the Pz Gdrs do not want to fight a mostly infantry engagement, with the tanks just supporting them. They will if they have to, but it is not the way they want things to go. They want the tanks to break the enemy. They keep enemy infantry away from the tanks, and scout for them. After the enemy is broken up, they can finish off the pockets of resistence left, sure. It is not an infantry assault with tank support. It is more like a tank assault, with infantry protection. And the tanks don't assault by running right up to things, but by getting close enough to see them and then blowing the crap out of them. Then they crawl close enough to see the next one. I hope this is helpful. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-22-2001).]

Col Deadmarsh kicked us off saying - "There doesn't seem to be any glaring disparity between a unit's assets and it's price". Sure there are. Pure tank to tank fighting ability is cheap in CM, and many dubious benefits of other kinds are overpriced. Does anyone think 2 Stuarts have the same fighting ability as a Tiger I? The Tiger Is gun will kill just about anything. Its armor will bounce most rounds from the front, and common types from the sides. The Stuarts need close flank shots to kill ordinary things. Why do they cost the same? 6 MGs vs. 2 MGs, perhaps. Earth-shattering benefits like that. Or, a Pz IVs main gun is as powerful as the main gun of a Sherman 76. Neither's armor will stop common enemy AT rounds. The Sherman costs 4/3rds as much. Or, for the same price, you can get a Sherman with a much weaker gun. What do you get in return? 1 MG. A few extra HE shells. Big items like that. A Sherman 75mm costs basically the same as a Jadgpanzer. The sloped JgdPz armor will bounce common AP rounds. Its gun will kill almost all Allied vehicle from the front. The Sherman will not bounce any common AP round. It can kill only a few types from the front, and all but a few - not from the front but - from the side. What is the return payoff? Extra MGs, more HE rounds, a turret. Or, a Brit Firefly costs about the same as a U.S. Sherman 76. But its gun is far more powerful. The better gun you get for being British, not for paying for it. Or, compare the upgrade even the Brits are offered, to by a Firefly. They get a gun that will kill most things. So the cost jumps dramatically, compared to a 75mm Sherman. Now, over the the German side, consider upgrading a Pz IV to a Tiger I. You get a gun that kills everything, so a similar jump is surely in order. But you also get armor that stops most common AP rounds, for not much added cost. The jumps are about the same size. It is not just pro-German. It does have that effect, simply because the Germans have lots of tank-fighting ability "on offer", and since that is underpriced, they can buy the bargain stuff in boatloads. But the same issue is found on the other side, in the TD vs. tank match ups. A Hellcat costs less than a Sherman 75mm. In return, it gets a much more powerful gun, likely access to T ammo that makes it a truly useful gun, and much higher speed. What is given up? A roof. Some MGs. A lot of HE shells. Those things are valued as much as the gun, actually more than the gun. It is even more extreme with the Achilles. If the Germans are going to take 2 Panthers 2 Tiger IIs, then sure the Allies can react. Just take 4-5 tank destroyers. But if they took Shermans instead they'd toast. Automatic weapons for infantry are similarly underpriced. If you compare infantry types, number of men, and small arms carried, you will find that SMGs cost the same as rifles. SMGs fight much better than rifles. Therefore, any infantry type with more automatic weapons will give more bag for the buck, including all sides paratroops, and special German types. There are also glaring cases the other way, of items to avoid paying for. The Germans can be 2 halftracks and get 15mm-8mm armor and 2 MGs. Or they can buy a Pz IV with better armor, 2 MGs, and an excellent gun. What are the HTs paying for? 2 Sqd passengers instead of 1. Whoppie! Or, for the price of 2 flamethrowers you can have 3 HMG teams. The HMGs have up to 155 fp at close range, or 465 for all three, and 50-100 at long ranges. They also have 95 ammo apiece and 18 men, with no loss of firepower until 6 are taken out. The FTs have 18 ammo (12 for the allies, for the same cost), a maximum range of 45m, and are lost altogether for losses than would not silence 1 MG. In return they get 200 blast if a team lives long enough to fire, which they usually don't. Or, a 20mm FLAK costs 3/4ths as much as an HMG, kills better and torches light armor too. The trade-off? 4 men vs. 6 and slower. Everybody learns about these discrepencies. Then they just buy more of the items that are bargains. Tank fighting power is cheap, so people buy a lot of it. Ability to kill infantry with tanks is overpriced, so it is not often a heavy investment. FTs may be neat, and HTs realistic too, but they will bring ruin if too many are bought, so they aren't. Vanilla Shermans and Pz IVs and StuGs are not so cheap that people willingly but them without a gentlemen's agreement beforehand, over the types with better guns or armor. What German commander buys vanilla "rifle '44" infantry? Some prefer SMGs, and some Panzergrenadiers, SS, FJ, or Sturmkompanies - the 2 LMG per squad varieties. Nobody wants 1 LMG and 2 SMG, the rest rifles. Yet 1 LMG 2 SMG would be an improvement in small arms for an average Allied squad. Or take the -1 minute reaction time for mortars. Comparing HE power of other artillery types, it is clear this benefit is free. Thus the preference for the 4.2" and 120mm mortars, for example. The prices may be "close enough". But claiming there are no discrepencies between price and combat power is simply not borne out by the facts. And as long as such exist (and some will, even if you tweak these), then there will be an incentive to ignore history and cherry pick the force. I like picking forces, because I want to see how certain weapons' mixes might work out, tactically. And if no pretence of history is desired by the other fellow, then I don't care about any of these things, nor about winning, very much. The moral is simple that there is room for gentlemen's agreements about what forces to allow in the mix, to avoid some of the pitfalls of the patchy price system, without giving up all abililty to choose one's force to fit one's preferred tactics. There is nothing nonsensical about it. There is a real issue, however minor it may be to you, and people have developed ways of handling it. Leave 'em alone.

On the subject of Tigers in the Ardennes, who had them, which types, etc. The following site gives detailed info on the particular heavy tank formations. http://chsk.com/steppenwolf/tigers.htm In the Bulge, the 506th (Heer) had 4 companies, 3 with Tiger II and 1 with Tiger I, each 14 tanks. Plus 3 Tiger II in the HQ section. The 4th company was inherited from an old "fire brigade" formation, KG Hummel (CO of the company). Incidentally, I made a scenario named "the Fire Brigade" based on the actions of formations exactly like Hummel's; check it out at the scenario depot. The whole battalion was commanded by Major Lange until January '45, then by Hautmann Heiligenstadt. From battle reports on the U.S. side, I believe these were heavily engaged in the fighting east and southeast of Bastogne from Christmas to mid January. Some Tiger IIs were, anyway, and these fit the bill in terms of units present. There were a number of posthumous medals associated with them. The 501st (SS), previously the 101st, had the usual 3 companies, total 45 Tiger IIs. At least one source claims it was commanded by Osbf. Westernhagen - I don't claim to know. This was the 1st SS Pz Corps Tiger battalion and at least part was attached to Peiper's KG. They stayed in the Ardennes until late January. They reported 13 total losses in combat, with 18 operational and 13 under repair, sometime in late December - presumably after Peiper's KG came back without their vehicles. This is consistent with 1 company KOed, another damaged or broken down, the 3rd OK. Specific U.S. reports claim 4 Tiger IIs, 8 other "heavy tanks" of unspecified type, KOed in action before Peiper's withdrawl. It was common to assign the Tigers by company or platoon to sub-formations, and probably Peiper's KG (the armor of 1SS) had, and lost, 1/3rd of the battalion. The other Pz division in the corps would have another, with the last in reserve - is my guess. 502, previously 102, would by TOE have been with the 2nd SS Pz Corps. But in fact it was refitting in Germany, having lost all its tanks in the retreat from Falaise way back in September. They did not draw their first replacement Tiger IIs until February, and did not see action again until late March, on the eastern front. 301 (special) had 27 Tiger I, with the number operational ranging from 12 to 21 in December. They were used as control vehicles for ~60 BIV "Goliath", in Army Group B. Those are the old Pz I chassis used as remote controlled vehicles to place 1000-lb demo charges. They probably had a company of them able to support at any given time, I'd bet mainly to blow roadblocks. Why thick armor for that job? To deal with ATGs, I suspect. Older versions of these formations used StuGs. So, overall, that means 90 Tiger II and 41 Tiger I, less than some less-detailed estimates I've seen. Many historians have probably just assumed that everywhere a Tiger battalion was "supposed" to be, organizationally, there was one and it was really there, but that is not so. Incidentally, I can't help remarking on one comment made earlier in the thread, where one fellow expressed the opinion that a certain fad for Tigers plus FJ infantry was "gamey". Those gamey Germans. In the Bulge attack, the 3FJ division was supposed to follow up behind 1SS, and 1 company of them rode on some of the KGs tanks. From the above and other sources, it seems those amounted to ~14+ Tiger II, ~40-50 Panther, ~40-50 Pz IV. They also had a dozen flakwagens, a battery of 105mm, a battalion of infantry in halftracks, another battalion of armored recon, and a small group of engineers. That was the forward or mobile group. Neither the wheeled Pz Gdrs of 1SS nor the leg infantry of 3FJ, managed to keep up. With no one keeping the road open behind the tanks, they were cut off, surrounded, ran out of fuel, and were abandoned after a few days.

83% of the Russian light tank fleet had 45mm guns. 17% had 20mm, the T-60s, used as scouts for T-34s and KV-1s, in exactly the same doctrinal role as the German Pz IIs, at the same time period.

Great data Joe Private. Fits my sense of things pretty well too. Be careful, though, if you mention a number, someone might run screaming from the forum in stark terror at the violation of the metaphysical uncertainty of all things. Most of the heavies were indeed in independent battalions. Most of those battalions were also in the east. See my previous post for the exceptions.

To answer the rest of your question, I can give some back o' envelope dice rolls to give a sense of how common various things would be. The Allies were fighting German infantry formations (say 1-4, vs. 5-6 Panzer). Infantry would rarely have AFV support, perhaps 1/6 of the time. And it would then usually be StuGs, mebe 1/6 Jdgpanzer, 1/6 Hezter or Marder, 4/6 StuG. When fighting Panzer divisions, they would hit armor most of the time, perhaps 5/6. (The rest would be Pz Gdr infantry, recon light armor, "mech", etc). If you want an idea of the frequency of the types when fighting Panzer division AFVs, you might roll 2d6 - 2-3 StuGs 4 Jdg Pzs 5-7 Pz IVs 8-10 Panthers 11-12 Tigers Sometimes the types for the German Panzer divisions would be mixed, but above the platoon level. Meaning, usually 4 of a type (or 3 for StuGs/Jgdpz). So, if you've already bought 4 of an item, you can roll again for the next platoon, provide you are going to buy 4 of that type too. I hope this helps.

The Panther is definitely more common, by about a factor of 5 in overall numbers. The Germans made 1350 Tiger Is in WW II, used a few of them in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy, and lots of them on the Russian front. There were a few of Tiger units in Normandy, with in total around 125 vehicles. There are also a few around Arnhem in Operation Market-Garden, in the Aachen-Hurtgen area, and a few companies roving as "fire brigades" to seal off penetrations elsewhere along the line. We are talking <50 in each of those cases. In the counterattacks Dec-44 and Jan-45 in the Ardennes and Alsace, there were a number of Tigers again, but most of them actually Tiger IIs by then. Perhaps 60 Tiger Is in Ardennes and <50 in Alsace, if that many. Jadgtigers were also used in Alsace, ~35 of them. I hope this helps.

P.S. - "oh no! There is a numeral there! Run for your lives!" In joke.

OK, here is my CM "operationalization" (what a word) of my previous theory about the ATRs. The idea is to simulate the low kills per penetration. Model the ATR as a 2 man team with medium speed, or fast but easily tiring, like the Panzerschreck. Give it 25 ammo, each representing a number of shots, and have it fire like an infantry weapon or MG, around 4 times a turn, plus or minus for skill. Each of these "shots" represents a handful, much like MG "shots" represent a handful of bursts. Check to see if the range and armor allows penetrations to be possible. Then roll on the appropriate table below (instead of the normal hit/penetration stuff). No penetration, roll 1d100 1 - weapon is disabled 2 - the crew is "shocked" 3-4 - a *bog* result 5-100 - no effect. With penetration, roll 1d100 1-2 - vehicle abandoned 3-5 - 1 crew casualty and shocked 6-7 - weapon disabled 8-10 - immobilized 11-13 - shocked 14-16 - bog result 17-100 - no effect Some might think the chances low. But consider, in the case of the penetration, if the firing is kept up for 1 turn by 1 ATR, then the cumulative chance of doing something is 50%. 1 - (1 - .16) ^ 4. Even without penetration the cumulative chance of causing some damage is 15%. If 3 ATRs shoot up the same target for 2 minutes, they have a 5/8ths chance of doing something to the target even without being able to penetrate it. The chance that a target survives such treatment if the rounds can get through is tiny, 1.5%. If the effectiveness seems too low when penetrations are possible, then expand the numbers somewhat, for that case. For example, if the "table" runs up to 30, with 4-6% chances for each result listed, then the cumulative chance of damage is 76%, in 1 minute of firing, by 1 ATR. There is essentially no chance a vehicle would survive a couple of minutes of fire by several ATRs, if penetration is possible. The tactical result would put the emphasis in the right place, it seems to me. If the ATRs can be suppressed and their firing halted before they have time to blaze away, then the danger from them is not enourmous. But if they can plink away in relatively safety, for a decent period and especially with several doing it, then the target's chances aren't very good. Also, if a tank gets immobilized and has its weapon KOed, then it should be abandoned (or most of the time). And if the effect rolled is duplicated, then drop it to the next down, raising the severity as it were. Incidentally, I think it would be neat to have the sense of facing the "thousand cuts", as vehicles suffered minor effects over and over until they've had it. Comments?

I am always somewhat amused by the "woefully inadequate light tank" sort of statement. In case anybody forgot, the Germans were using Pz(38), Pz IIs, and Pz IIIs with 37mm guns, well into 1942. None of these tanks had a main armament as capable as the 45mm/L46 ATG on most of the Russian light tank fleet. The Russian light tank gun could hole any German tank at ranges up to 1 km, until the Tiger came out. Incidentally, Pz III production switched to the 50mm/L42 in 1941 (a similar gun), and to the long 50mm only in 1942 (definitely a better one). In the course of 1942, the Germans uparmored their tanks and switched the Pz IV to a long 75mm. At that point, they were matching the T-34/76, basically (and the gun was better). Also in 1942 and into 1943, the Germans gradually uparmored their III and IV chassis AFVs - but only the front, really. Once the Germans uparmored the IIIs and IVs, the Russian light tanks and small towed ATGs (same 45mm caliber) could still hole most of the German fleet, but now only at ranges of about 500 yards, unless using special APCR ammo. Against the heavier late-war armor (E.g. Pz IVG) they needed flank shots. The flanks of the Germans StuGs and Pz IVs could still be penetrated at 1 km using standard ammo. The Panther was of course invunerable to these small guns from the front. From side and rear they needed to be close, around 500 yards again. Some of the Russian lights used 20mm, the same as the Pz II. That was only useful against the Pz II, halftracks, and armored cars. The reverse was also true, of course, since those German types had the same sort of armament (a few 37mm on platoon-leader gun halftracks). The Russians made 6000 of this type, the T-60, during the war, all of them during 1941 and 1942. They were used to scout for KV and T-34 companies in independent tank battalions. The Germans used Pz IIs for the same purpose, in the same period. For comparison, the Russians fielded 28,000 light tanks armed with 45mm, including the pre-war T-26 and fast BT series, and the T-70, which replaced the T-60s covered above. The T-70s were built until the fall of '43, by which time all the chassis were switched over to SU-76 SP guns. So 82% of the Russian *light* tank force was armed as well as the Pz III was, until the J model. They were all lightly armored, about like a Pz II, and they had speeds in the 30mph range. The BT series could run on the road wheels for road movement at 1.5 to 2 times that speed, to act as armored cars when desired. As with all light armor, they were eggshells against AT weapons, but in the early war period they were well enough armed to kill German medium tanks, as well as lights. The lighter German armor was not well enough armed to kill Russian medium tanks, as the 20mm on the Pz II, and the 37mm on the Pz(38) and early Pz III models could not kill KVs and T-34s. Indeed, the German mediums needed flank shots against the Russian mediums. The Russian tank forces in the early war certainly had problems, especially with doctrine, crew skill, insufficient radios, and small turrets. But "woefully inadequate light tanks", is a silly statement. In tank fighting gun&armor terms, they were better than the German light tanks and strong enough to be useful against the German mediums.

OK, I have a theory. The information presented here has been valuable, and has revised a few of my previous views. I have put together a tactical picture of some of the strengths, weaknesses, and uses of the weapon. I present them for general comment. There seems to be pretty general agreement about the penetrating power. On the order of 30mm at 100m, dropping to 25mm at 500m. While shots beyond that might be possible, with a non-automatic weapon and often moving targets, hits would probably become rare. What do these penetrating numbers mean, for the tanks they faced in the early war period? Basically, it means they would not penetrate the front of a Pz III or Pz IV, unless they got lucky. But sides of any German AFV of the period, and fronts of the Pz II, armored cars, and halftracks, they could punch holes in. If every penetration killed the target then that would be an enourmously effective weapon and we'd have heard a lot more about the wonders of it, and the trail of dead tanks it left. Instead, everybody who had a decent rocket AT weapons ditched them from HEAT rounds. Why? I submit that the reason has to be the low amount of damage typically done by a single penetration, by one round. The Russian manual someone helpfully provided, stresses firing at vunerable areas of the tank, not in terms of areas with less armor, but in terms of places the bullet may do some effective damage when it penetrates. A useful comparison was suggested by another fellow, a 50 cal. The energy of the ATR round is higher, by about a factor of 2 in his figures. But a 50 cal fires 8 rounds a second, not 8-16 rounds a minute. The Russian manual suggested firing 5-10 rounds from one location, before moving to another. That represents around 30 seconds of fire at max ROF. A 50 cal would deliver the same impact energy in a 1-2 second burst. So the basic problem would seem to be getting a weapon that can indeed punch small holes, to add up to a dead tank, despite delivering an order of magnitude less energy per unit time. And having surmized this, then a couple of things come into focus. First, the combat reports of the hits on particular spots. The vision block idea, and the main gun idea. Second, if you look at the manual on the site the fellow provided, the doctrine is to shoot from sides when possible. And the vunerable spots include - drive sprocket, fuel cells, engine. For halftracks, the spot to shoot for in the engine. Last,the concluding section is a somewhat sketchy bit about working with submachinegunners, grenade throwers, and molotov cocktail teams. What is that about? And it says, "if halted, disable the weapons first". Here is my theory. The ATRs are suppose to fire with a view to getting a *mobility kill*. They shoot the drive sprocket, or they puncture the fuel and perhaps ignite it (though diesel burns poorly), certainly make it leak. They punch random holes through the engine block. If anyone knows anything about engine blocks, they are almost solid metal themselves, and telling someone to fire at them as "vunerable" means a definite focus on a mobility kill. The benefit is simply that it is a complicated thing that needs most of its parts in the right place to work. So suppose the ATRs have light up the flanks of a tank for 10-40 hits, and the thing has holes in its side and is leaking fuel, and the engine is leaking oil, and seizing, etc. Kerchunk, kerchunk, bahhhhaaa. Stalled out tank. Right? What is the next thing it says. "If halted, disable the weapons first". First? It is already halted. My thesis here - the manual means, *before* trying to tackle it with the molotovs etc. See the idea? First you stop it. The plan is to KO it with a close assault. But first, bang that hull MG, smash that sight, so they don't kill the close assaulters. The ATRs are doing this, maybe grenades or grenade-bundles are helping too by this point. The manual suggests that MGs fire at the vision slits. Get 'em hunkered down in that tank, in other words, blind and stopped and weapons not all there. They were already leaking fuel and oil. Somebody gets close enough to throw the gas-bomb, or the grenade-bundle. Whoosh, up she goes. And the submachinegunners are there to get the guys that bail out. Now, that is the tactical doctrine I am seeing in that last section. That is what puts together the sorts of vunerable spots listed, with the idea of working as part of a team with SMGs and grenade and molotov men. The main role of the ATR in the whole piece, is to *stop* the beastie. Then the infantry can go after it with a will. This would also, to me, fit with the general fact that most abandoned these weapons. I mean, if an infanryman could have a gun that reliably killed tanks outright from the flank at 500 yards, why would anyone want a bazooka or panzerschreck instead? These probably didn't kill tanks outright, then. The point is, that on this theory the ATRs could indeed disable tanks, but it was a relatively slow process. Take 5 or 10 shots - then switch positions, it says. So 5-10 shots, with a number of hits, are not taking the thing out immediately, are they? I mean, you have to worry about it firing back, and switch positions. Not bang, it went in, tank is history. More like bangs repeated for 30 seconds, and maybe she is mobility dead. Or maybe you need to keep it up for another 30 seconds and punch a few more holes in her, before something essential breaks. Make any sense?

Londener, go back and read what I said. The first paragraph that set off Mr. Dorosh. You will not find the slightest bit of what you now claim is there. Go look. Mr. Dorosh pretended it was there. You bought it, because you only noticed heat, instead of paying any attention to what I said. As an exercise, locate the first sentence of the paragraph in which I got down to numbers. Read it. The 2nd poster in the thread asked for a relative weight. Not me. All you silly self-important fellows are mad at the question, and pretend it cannot be answered. None of the supposed pretence of exactitude you declaim against was ever mentioned at all. "Less than", and a wide range, is not a pretence of exactitude. But go read it, you may learn something. Incidentally, not one person on this thread has alleged that the truth about the fellow's question lies outside the range I suggested. Some "pretence of exactitude". It'd pass for a "conventional wisdom" on that basis alone. In case anyone doesn't know why Mr. Dorosh is being such a silly person on the subject, it is because he has an axe to grind in another thread. He wants to ignore numbers so he can invent changes to CM mechanics to suit his whims about favoring certain sides, without justifying them. To say nothing of other reasons. Oh, and you can all take a flying amorous embrace at a rotating breakfast pastry.

Veterans were used as cadres, not as sturmbattalions, in the late war. I did count 5 PF per platoon, and said so. Not per squad. Find me any WW II study on tanks KOed by fausts that shows 60 fausts being fired at each one simultaneously and I'll eat a wool ski cap. Stop making tendentious arguments and answer the bleeding question - what change are you advocating? Do you think you'd have a prayer with Allied armor against my German infantry after the change? Would you be willing to have your recommendation depend on being able to beat my German infantry with your Allied armor, and your rules for German infantry AT effectiveness? In finance, there is something called "making a market". You know that someone is giving you his honest assessment of the just price of something, if he will take either side of the trade. In this case, a benefit to the German infantry's AT ability is proposed. Will you take either side of the changed situation you propose?

To the man with no name - So, if say the faust 30 acted more like a faust 40, or say was commonly fired at 20 yards, that would suffice? I'd go for that, certainly. No problem, because it does not make any large change in the overall kill score I'd expect.

Oh, and to all my critics - kiss my grits.

More factors makes it worse. They cannot make the snipers more important. And I threw in a factor of ten, to allow both for the enumerated factors being substantially larger, and for other factors, when I said "1/50 is probably more like it". Why do you nimnuts insist on deliberately misinterpreting every number presented to you as though it meant the opposite of what it does? Less than 1/5th does not mean "certainly at least 1/5th". < and > are not the same keys on your keyboard. Go back to grade school and relearn what they mean. Moreover, do you actually mean to claim before all the world that you know that cigarette availability had more of an impact on the battle than snipers did? No. You are merely being tendentious. But you do not dispute, because you cannot dispute, that the factors I named were more important. Because they were. Enough so, that it is beyond argument, and anyone maintaining the contrary is making a fool of himself, like certain movie producers. 35 "probably less thans" do not add up to any deduction, as e.g. .0004 + .0005 + .0002 etc need not exceed say .18. But 4 "more thans" do add up, to the deduction of "less than 1/5th". If you can be certain that a factor you name is another "more than", then you can refine the estimate, from less than 1/5th to less than 1/6th or 1/8th, as you name more such factors that you know are more important. But this you have not done. Why? Because you are not trying to constrain the effectiveness of snipers at Stalingrad, i.e. you are not trying to answer the bleeding question. This is known as arguing in bad faith.

I want guns in buildings. I want light guns even on the upper floors of buildings (check the transport class - 6 or less would be OK upstairs). As for bunkers, I don't want them in buildings, but I do want them to be as hard to spot as guns are now, not as easy to spot as vehicles. They were not houses, and they were well covered with earth and foliage. At the moment, it is ridiculously easy for tanks to spot and KO every sort of gun and fort position. Guns in buildings, and harder to see bunkers, would do a lot to realistically improve defender's fighting chances. And yes, placing guns in buildings was common. In rubble too. Right now, the only "flexible" form of cover that defenders have, is the foxhole, which is simply not historical. Overhead cover of one kind or another was not a rariety in prepared defenses, and it is in CM. I'd also like to see bunkers or blockhouses (bunkers without firing apertures, effectively) that units can move into or out of. Not guns, but infantry and MG units. These too were common in prepared defenses, used to ride out artillery fire for example.

I think the Brits were right to worry about the pilots. The Brits did have good fighter production, and the result of it was that there force was maintaining size through the battle. Some ups and down, certainly. The German force was not, it was declining. That appeared an episodic thing to the Brits, because more of the German air force, percentage wise, was committed later on than on "Eagle Day" (start of large scale raids). But there is an effect of high loss rates being made good by a superior production rate. The pilot experience level was going down. Yes, the Germans had fewer pilots per plane, perhaps, but that didn't mean much because their force wasn't manning a surge of new plane production filling the gaps. The Germans had fewer escorts later on, not worse pilots for them. Incidentally, the losses to the German bombers were not trivial. Unlike the late war fight over Germany, fighter armament was comparatively primitive in 1940. The Brit fighters had 8x.303 cal MG each, firing essentially rifle bullets. And because of that, to take down the German bombers they usually needed to sit on their tail. That is where bombers can shoot back effectively. See, later on, the bombers over Germany were heavily enough defending that tail attacks were extremely dangerous for the fighter, and they were generally avoided because of it. They instead attacked from the front, or high angles from the side, with monster closing speeds and crossing angle rates. This was designed to maximize the advantage of a small fast target vs. a large on that wasn't maneuvering much. Plain enough. But for that to work, brief bursts of fire had to be able to seriously hurt the target. That meant cannons - 20mm and 30mm AA cannons. The British fighters didn't have cannons until after the Battle of Britain, when later model Hurcs and Spits were out. A long story with a short moral. The Brit fighters had to make their firing passes from behind because of their light armament, and that meant the bombers could shoot back reasonably well. The race was whether the Germans would run out of planes, or the greener British replacement flyers would lose the air combat skills needed to keep winning. Needless to say the Germans lost that race. In part because the were being outproduced, in part because even the green British pilots proved pretty tough in practice.

No, I am not assuming that every faust made was used. No I am not assuming that every faust used was fired at an AFV. Put your own numbers on the likelihood for a faust to pause either hurdle. Personally, I'd put the first factor around 1/2 and the second factor between 1/5 and 1/10. Choose your own. Germanboy, you didn't put in any numbers, and if you try, you will see that the intermediary ones are not believable if you want to arrive at your ending conculsions. The point of modeling, rather than data mining, is that each variable is assessed for its believability, on its own. That is the cross check on the believability of the conclusion. If you require me to believe that the QM kept 99% of the fausts in his sock drawer, in order to arrive at the result, then I know immediately why that model of the factors is wrong. Jeff, I am the one who has been maintaining from the get-go that fausts' limited range meant that they were not very effective tank killers but were quite effective at maintaining the security of German infantry on the field. Read my own posts in this thread, or others, and you will hear me saying that over and over. To the fellow talking about 15 yard sprints, I know perfectly well than the 9 men are not arranged in a perfect 20 by 20 foot box. And to the fellow suggesting upward accuracy revisions, I know perfectly well that increased accuracies would improve the kill rate of CM fausts. What both of you are assuming rather than arguing, is that CM faust effectiveness is too low, so that some upward adjustment in that effectiveness is in order. Yes, modeling a 15 yard sprint forward as an abstraction might serve as a model for such an effectiveness increase. But that doesn't in the least show that one is required, which is the point in dispute. There are a number of ways to revise faust effectiveness upward and have the rationale for it be tactically believable. The question is whether the *result* would be tactically and strategically believable, in terms of the resulting pile of scrap metal. Next to Germanboy's attempt at a joke. The problem you see is we know some of these things. Your QM, rejects, leftovers in depots in March '45, etc suffices to drop the 7.7m rounds constructed to 4.4m, which incidentally excludes faulty rounds, which you mentioned later. Training, the highest estimate anyone has alleged as believable on its own is "even hundreds of thousands", so drop it to 4m. Partisan ambushes between German and the German border were rather rare, but I will be absurdly generous and assume they got 10% of the things, leaving 3.6m. Spoilage I will left be a factor of 2 since one fellow seemed to think a lot of that one, even though the 5/plt in CM only have to last them 1 week, leaving 1.8m. Then I will allow another whopping factor of 2 for battle damage to a simply tube, leaving 900,000. Then I will let 9 out of 10 faust be fired at non-AFVs, leaving 90,000. fired at AFVs. Then I will take the highest figure ever offered for tanks KO'ed by the things and round it upward, and that is 30,000, which is only 1/3rd your required number, meaning an average final accuracy of 33%. Maximum. You are left defending such propositions as "no, really, partisans destroyed 70% of all faust production with their daring guerilla raids inside Germany from the fall of 1944 to the spring of 1945." If you want to support absurd conclusions, you have to make absurd intermediary claims, one that everyone and his brother can see are false. But if you want every link to be believable, then you will not arrive at high kill chances for fausts actually used. In fact, in the above chain, it is entirely possible the number of dead AFVs is overestimated by a factor of 2 (e.g., the Germans only claim 16000), and likewise entirely possible that the portion fired at AFVs is underestimated by a similar factor (which still leaves, not an assumption that all fausts were fired at AFVs, but that *1 out of 5* was). And if those are regarded as more believable, then you will get not 100%, nor 33%, but 8% hits when one was fired. What do I conclude from that? That every factor in the above chain is right to within 1%? No. I conclude that the probably accuracy of the average fired faust was somewhere in the range of 8% to 33%. Or 20% plus or minus 10%. From which I also conclude that their primary tactical result on the battlefield was to make German infantry relatively safe from near approach by Allied AFVs, as I have already stated repeatedly. And I furthermore assert that they already perform this function in CM. Allied tanks do not like to get close to German infantry, in my experience, because it is risky. German infantry does not have built in anti-tank capability strong enough to charge across the board, with default levels of terrain cover, and annihiliate all Allied armor in their path. Let us look at Paul's proposed accuracy percentages and others' proposed "short run" models and see which of these two effects they would have. Start with both. For regularly Paul suggests 30% accuracy at stated range, rising to 60 for elites, so I will assume 40% for veterans. So the hit chance is to be 30-40 at state range, or 1/3rd. If they run too, that then becomes 115 meters in 1945, 75 meters in late 44. These are comparable to the accuracies screcks currently get at those ranges. So the proposal amounts to saying, every German squad should have built in schreck, with the rounds per platoon the same as one launcher has now. Compared to a schreck, here is what they would have. 3-6 distributed launchers instead of 1, much harder to suppress. 4-10 man counters instead of 2, much harder to KO. Fast movement with little tiring, vs. fast for about 1 move maximum. These advantages, I submit, would make them more effective than a single schreck. 2 schrecks is about right - those would have a bit more ammo, but fewer shooters and more easily KOed etc. The proposal therefore amounts, approximately and in terms of the increased AT effect involved, to keeping the game as it is now but with 2 extra free schreck teams per German infantry platoon. In some ways it would be a larger change that that, i.e. more favorable. Typical German platoons cost 93-155 pts, or call it 125 average, some smaller and some larger, some regular and some veteran. Schrecks cost 23 as regulars, 28 as vets, call it 25. The proposal would then add about 40% to the point value of German infantry. But someone will rightfully note that from this we must deduct the value of the current fausts. How much is that? Say they kill within 35 meters vs. the 95 meters of the existing schrecks and new fausts. They have 37% of the range and 14% of the covered area, so they are probably worth about 1/4 as much. So the increase may be only around 25-30%, in point value terms. Now, at last I arrive at a proposition that can be examined against facts and the judgments of each. Does anything think that at present, German infantry in CM is ineffective by 3/4 or 4/5ths, compared to Allied infantry costing the same? Is there anyone who would offer to never play the Germans again, if this change would be made, for the sake of realism? Does anyone think that at present, it is necessary to buy 2-3 panzerschrecks per platoon of German infantry, in order to have adequate AT ability and to defend the infantry's local ground? Is there anyone here willing to take a force of allied armor, at least half his points spent on tanks, vs. my German infantry in a meeting engagement, and I get 2 free schreck teams per platoon? If not, then just what exactly are people arguing for? Please state it clearly.

No, even if it is already falling, unless it is light pop-gun stuff and you are in great cover, run like heck. Yes, you are more vunerable to each shell when you are moving. But you get clear of the blast area quite fast, and not many shells fall in that period of time. The effect of still being in good cover, compared to running, is on the order of 2:1. But 2:1 for 15 seconds, is better than 1:1 for 2 minutes, 'cause two minutes is 8 times as long. What will usually happen, is one of your units will get a shell going off nearby while trying to run, break, and go to ground. The others will get clear, sometimes with a lost man each, and usually needing to rally too, from "caution" or sometimes worse. The guys that hit the deck, will sometimes be ground to powder, or so thoroughly broken as to become useless. Other times the shells will happen not to be too close to them, and they will resume their run and get clear, but after losing half the guys or so. The usual result when you run, therefore, is the loss of a squad, sometimes less than a squad, with a reduced platoon able to function again in a couple of minutes. Sometimes it will be worse, sure, and you will be left with half a platoon 5 minutes on. But when you don't run, unless it is light stuff, the usual result is everybody broken, everybody half-squaded. It takes a long time to recover, and the unit cannot really hold the spot despite remaining on it. In fact, they are exquisitely vunerable to a charge right when the barrage ends, which is up to the enemy and unknown to you. I'd far rather have a functioning near-platoon 200 yards to the rear, able to maneuver forward or to a flank of the original position the moment the barrage lifts, than a vunerable set of broken wrecks right in the path of the enemy's planned attack, at the same moment in time. Try it. You may be surprised how well the men hold up when they run, compared to trying to ride it out in their holes. Obviously, the longer the barrage the better "run" works, compared to sit still.