jasoncawley@ameritech.net

The item you are asking about is the 128mm PAK 80. 150 of them were built, most in 1944, 30 of them in 1945. That compares to 77 Jadgtigers built all told, by the way. For both together, they Germans produced 27,000 rounds of AP and 86,000 rounds of HE. That is about 500 rounds per gun, roughly 1/4 AP and 3/4 HE. Incidentally, 128mm is just 5 inches. The German navy used a number of 5 inch gun mounts. Far more 128mm = 5 inch FLAK were built for the Luftwaffe - 1130 of them all told, most of them in 1943 and 1944. These were not the same item, though, only about half the length of the PAK version. 2 of these earlier and shorter FLAK guns, were even mounted on SP chassis to work as tank destroyers, but the idea was not followed up. Not enough ammo and low ROF were probably the reasons, making the 88mm a better bet. I am not sure whether those or the naval guns were the basis for the later heavy PAK idea. Incidentally, the Allied fleets carried hundreds of 5" guns, most of them duel-purpose AA or for ground targets, which are similar to the German 128mm FLAK. The 5 inch rockets being fired by the Typhoons and Thunderbolts are also the same caliber.

Basically, the CM cost numbers weight numbers rather heavily. The U.S. squads are 12 men. That standard German squad is 9 men, and the VG squads are only 8. Motorized Panzer Grenadiers cost about the same as U.S. infantry, and get 10 man squads. More men means a greater ability to take hits and still continue the mission. It also helps significantly in close combat, inside of grenade range and especially hand to hand (<10 meters). Another minor factor is the U.S. rifles are significantly better than German rifles, especially at close range. In return, the Germans get a better squad automatic weapon in the LMG-42, compared to the BAR. If they buy the more expensive types, they pay as much per squad as the U.S. but get 2 LMGs. If they use the VGs, they get only 2 LMGs per platoon but 23 SMGs. There really isn't any question that the SMG is a better personal weapon in CM terms. The Germans also get panzerfausts rather than rifle grenades, a much more useful weapon. So, the real answer to your question is that number of men is fully priced, while better weapons are bargains. The paratroop infantry on both sides is underpriced for the same reason. Buying smaller squads with better weapons therefore winds uo giving more bang for the same buck. Number of men per squad *does* matter, and just comparing the number of units, or platoons, is not sensible. A 28 or 31 man platoon is not the same item as a 40 man platoon. Personally, I would like to see the following changes made to the small arms ratings, weapons mixes, and costs. They are all definitely "tweaks". #1 Add a 2nd SMG to the standard U.S. and British squads. Sten guns, grease guns (M3), and thompsons had a way of surviving battles and appearing in a new owner's hands. This single realistic measure would raise the close FP of the Allied squads around 15%, for a trivial reduction in their FP at 250 yards or more. Since the Allied squads are already overpaying for numbers, while the Germans get bargains on better weapons, this would increase balance. #2 Currently, only the VG Hvy SMG squads sacrifice some per-weapon firepower to reflect the fact that the MG-42 is really a 2-man weapon. Adjust the other German squads, to reflect the lowest FP weapon present. E.g. with 2 LMGs present and at least 2 rifles in the squad, the FP of the MG-42s would be 87-80-54-34. Right now, the firepower from the second member of the team is effectively being counted twice, in the other German squad types. This slightly overstates the firepower of squads with 2 LMG. #3 Perhaps raise the price of the VG SMG platoon a smidgen. If SMGs cost about .25-.33 more points each throughout the infantry types, it would give about the right effect. #4 Squad types with access to demo charges should cost +1 point for every demo charge they can be expected to have. Rifle grenades should give an expected cost around .25 higher per. Faust-30s should be 1/3rd, faust-60s 2/3rds, and faust-100 should add +1 to the price for each item expected. Let the randomness of number available work the same as now. But raise the unit prices by the appropriate amounts. Arguably, those are still underpriced. But some payment for good special weapons is in order. This change would make German infantry marginally more expensive as the war goes on and the fausts improve, and also slightly raise the price of everyone's engineers, U.S. paratroops, etc at all times. My suggestions on infantry "balance" tweaks...

Basically, the CM cost numbers weight numbers rather heavily. The U.S. squads are 12 men. That standard German squad is 9 men, and the VG squads are only 8. Motorized Panzer Grenadiers cost about the same as U.S. infantry, and get 10 man squads. More men means a greater ability to take hits and still continue the mission. It also helps significantly in close combat, inside of grenade range and especially hand to hand (<10 meters). Another minor factor is the U.S. rifles are significantly better than German rifles, especially at close range. In return, the Germans get a better squad automatic weapon in the LMG-42, compared to the BAR. If they buy the more expensive types, they pay as much per squad as the U.S. but get 2 LMGs. If they use the VGs, they get only 2 LMGs per platoon but 23 SMGs. There really isn't any question that the SMG is a better personal weapon in CM terms. The Germans also get panzerfausts rather than rifle grenades, a much more useful weapon. So, the real answer to your question is that number of men is fully priced, while better weapons are bargains. The paratroop infantry on both sides is underpriced for the same reason. Buying smaller squads with better weapons therefore winds uo giving more bang for the same buck. Number of men per squad *does* matter, and just comparing the number of units, or platoons, is not sensible. A 28 or 31 man platoon is not the same item as a 40 man platoon. Personally, I would like to see the following changes made to the small arms ratings, weapons mixes, and costs. They are all definitely "tweaks". #1 Add a 2nd SMG to the standard U.S. and British squads. Sten guns, grease guns (M3), and thompsons had a way of surviving battles and appearing in a new owner's hands. This single realistic measure would raise the close FP of the Allied squads around 15%, for a trivial reduction in their FP at 250 yards or more. Since the Allied squads are already overpaying for numbers, while the Germans get bargains on better weapons, this would increase balance. #2 Currently, only the VG Hvy SMG squads sacrifice some per-weapon firepower to reflect the fact that the MG-42 is really a 2-man weapon. Adjust the other German squads, to reflect the lowest FP weapon present. E.g. with 2 LMGs present and at least 2 rifles in the squad, the FP of the MG-42s would be 87-80-54-34. Right now, the firepower from the second member of the team is effectively being counted twice, in the other German squad types. This slightly overstates the firepower of squads with 2 LMG. #3 Perhaps raise the price of the VG SMG platoon a smidgen. If SMGs cost about .25-.33 more points each throughout the infantry types, it would give about the right effect. #4 Squad types with access to demo charges should cost +1 point for every demo charge they can be expected to have. Rifle grenades should give an expected cost around .25 higher per. Faust-30s should be 1/3rd, faust-60s 2/3rds, and faust-100 should add +1 to the price for each item expected. Let the randomness of number available work the same as now. But raise the unit prices by the appropriate amounts. Arguably, those are still underpriced. But some payment for good special weapons is in order. This change would make German infantry marginally more expensive as the war goes on and the fausts improve, and also slightly raise the price of everyone's engineers, U.S. paratroops, etc at all times. My suggestions on infantry "balance" tweaks...

It wasn't an attempt at an insult. Some people may enjoy providing interesting splatter movies to psychopathetic strangers. After all, first-person-shooters sell very well, including multiplayer versions. As you managed to gather, that is not my cup of tea. It is obviously some people's.

Priority #1 - use historically believable forces in realistic ways Priority #2 - preserve my force Priority #3 - kill the enemy Priority #4 - fufill the mission objectives stated in the briefing, in my own sense of things Priority #5 - win the game, according to CM victory calculations Nowhere - provide interesting "splatter" movies to psychopathetic strangers. One man's opinion...

About Normandy - "I would estimate most Divisions were hovering around 50% Panzer strength by mid August". I don't think so. An actual enumeration based on the German returns gives only 300 operational AFV by around August 7. And 2500 AFV were sent to Normandy all told. The attrition took place in the fights with the British, gradually elsewhere, and during the immediate breakout fighting from ~26 July to August 7. By the time of Falaise, the German AFV fleet was already "double reduced" (two "steps" in rank). Typical Panzer divisions had around 30 running AFV by the first week in August. 116th Pz, which was the reserve and not committed until the breakout, had 1/4 to 1/3rd of the running AFVs remaining. Incidentally, in one 6-day period from the breakout until early August, U.S. 2nd Armored division fought components of ten German division, half of them mobile ones, and scored heavily with little loss itself. The breakout, not Falaise, was the collapse point. The German AFV fleet was already thinned. Then the previously unscathed U.S. armor divisions hit the front with ~1500 AFV. More AFVs were thrown into the Mortain fiasco. Between them, these two causes left little to be lost in the Falaise fight. Falaise destroyed the soft vehicles and the artillery and the rear area troops, and cut up the infantry. But the tanks were already gone; that indeed is what made Falaise possible. Another fellow seems to think I just assumed that T-34s are scoring 1:1 or 1:2 vs. Pz IVs and StuGs because they are similar vehicles or something, and then gives one anecdotal report and refers to tactics and doctrine, etc. I am not assuming it, I am deducing it. There are not enough dead Russian tanks to go around, for these vehicle types to have scored high kill ratios on average. Suppose the vanilla German types are scoring 3 to 1. Presumably the heavy types, Panther and up, are doing better. Say they are scoring 6 to 1. Two thirds of the German fleet is in the first category, and 1/3rd is in the second, so those two assumptions acount for 4 times the size of the German fleet. Problem - that is all the dead Russian tanks. It leaves nothing for the PAK and the mines and the fausts. For 1943-1944, we can basically discount the mechanical failures on both sides. Since the longevity of an AFV in combat was about the same, the portion of mechanical failures was probably about the same. The effect of weeding these out, is just to "amplify" the effect of the PAK and mines and such, since those simpler items do not break down (or in anything like the same numbers as tanks). But the PAKs cannot be discounted. The whole Russian AFV "bag" cannot be parceled out to the German AFV fleet alone. The Germans deployed more PAK and heavy FLAK than AFVs, with the two numbers close enough to call it 1 and 1. So half of the "hammers" are missing in the above allocation of losses between German AFV types. And the Russians were indeed directing their armor at the German infantry formations. Moreover, the Germans had excellent PAK and FLAK, a good doctrine on using them, and we know the Russian armor doctrine was particularly susceptible to these guns, because of limited armor-artillery cooperation. There is every reason to think that these accounted for a large portion of the dead Russian AFVs. Perhaps not half (despite being half the "hammers), but something on the order of 1/4. Well, then work it out. 100 Russians die to 25 PAK and 25 AFV. PAK get 1:1, 75 left. 8 of the AFV are Panther or better. Are they scoring no higher than the Pz IVs and the StuGs, despite the endless reports of their uber-effectiveness? I don't think so. If they score 5 each on average, that is 40 and leaves 35 for 17 vanilla AFVs Therefore, 2:1 is an upper bound on the possible effectiveness of the vanilla German types, like the Pz IV and the StuG. And that leaves nothing to the mines. Yes, mines are meant to channel enemies, but 21 million AT mines is more than just some channeling. I mentioned the losses in Italy. Undoubtedly, mines are more effective in mountains and valleys than on the open steppe. But to give an idea, ~10% of Russian AFVs to this cause would mean ~1000 mines planted for one that goes off. That is not a high claim. The truth could be half that or half-again, but it is the right ballpark. With the infantry AT weapons, the story is somewhat different. They probably accounted for very few dead Russian AFVs through 1943. In 1944 the portion was rising, as a flood of more effective fausts reached the front. Some estimates for the late war put 25% of losses down to this cause. If you count the people who got tank-killer medals, for instance, you will find 14,000 of them, and I doubt many of those awards were collected in 1941 and 42. Notice that 14,000 still means that only about 1/500 deployed fausts, ignoring those still on-hand in March '45, accounted for a tank. If you allocate 8k of those to 43-44 Russian front, that is ~20% of the kills. I happen to think that is too high, for various reasons. But *between* them, the mines and the AT weapons - 28 million items - probably accounted for ~1/5th of the losses in the 43-44 period. And that changes the above loss allocation picture. Now we've got 100 tanks, 5-10 by mines and 10-15 by infantry AT, 80 left. 25 PAK take out 25, leaves 55. 8 Panther or better get 4 each is 32, leaves 23. Which implies 4:3 kill ratios for the StuGs and the Pz IVs. Maybe it is 5:3 (~28), with only 4:5 for the PAK and FLAK (20). But any reasonable allocation, will leave the kill ratio for the 2/3rds of the German AFV fleet that is "vanilla", between 1:1 and 2:1. In particular, claims that the vanilla AFVs got scores above 2:1 are incompatible with claims that the Panther and other "up-armored" types, outperformed them by any meaningful amount. If the up-armored AFVs were getting multiple kills in the "ace" range (~5), then the vanilla ones were not getting 2:1. All weapons cannot be above average.

The long story part is that only the Sec State said it, and he said something more or less like it, and it was not clear whether the NKs had already made the decision to attack, or whether they even needed or asked for a green light from Stalin, etc. The point of my "long story" comment, is that despite all the twists and turns of the scholarly histories on the subject since, the surface impression that you describe, was indeed what happened. What is the part about philosophers making simple things complex? LOL. As for the "never saw a NK" comment, the NKs were beaten by the end of 1950. UN forces made it all the way to the Chinese border. Then the Chinese intervened, and knocked us back out of North Korea again. By mid 1951 they had been stopped too, and the front mostly stabilized. The war continued for another year and a half while both sides talked at the conference table. From about November 1950 on, the communist forces were overwhelmingly Chinese, with only modest NK forces supplimenting them. Incidentally, some of the NKs in the original push, were Korean nationals who had fought in the war in China or Manchuria, in the Communist army, during WW II. And they did have some Chinese officers, even in the summer of 1950. But Chinese troops as such, came in on a moderate scale in November, and after the UN (foolishly) kept going anyway, intervened in force in December 1950.

"Pz Gdrs are better", "can't take hits", "firing at 100m is a waste" - these are the arguments people advance against VG-SMGs. But they only show an evaluation limited to addition, and unaware of the two-fer nature of price, and they do not pay attention to the vagaries of CM ammo. When you have a cheaper price, you get more of the item. That means more firepower, and more defensive, staying power too. Motorized Pz Gdr platoon cost 4/3rds what SMG platoons do. Which means in return for three of them, you can have either 4 SMG platoons, or 3 SMG platoons and 4 HMG-42 teams. The costs are 387 or 471 for the Pz Gdrs as regulars and veterans respectively, vs. 372/466 for 4 SMG platoons, and 391/478 for 3 SMG platoons plus 4 HMG-42 teams. The Mot. Pz Gdr gives 102 men. The others give 112 men (4 platoons) or 108 men (w/MGs). So much for the pretended extra staying power of 2 more men per squad. The firepower of Mot. Pz Gdrs are 250 yards is 79. The firepower of SMGs at 100 yards is 72. Even ignoring that there are more of the latter, if firing with SMGs at 100 yards is pointless, then so is firing at 250 yards with Mot. Pz Gdrs. But better firepower at that range is the only reason to prefer the Pz Gdrs. The ratios of firepower of the forces with the same cost, at the various ranges, are as follows. 4 SMG/3 PG - 1.54/.85/.42/.42 3SMG+4HMGs/3 PG - 1.42/.99/.74/.87 The firepower up close is much higher with the SMGs, by about half-again. At ~80-100 yards, the firepower is about the same with either option. The PGs give better firepower beyond that, especially in the 250 yard range and against pure SMG without MG support. The real trade you are making when you take PGs, is better firepower at long range (from those 6 LMGs vs. 2 LMGs in the VG SMG platoon), in return for less firepower in close, and marginally lower staying power (total men). In addition, though, the ammo characteristics favor the VGs, and heavily so. When HMGs are taken, they obviously provide far more ammo, enough to shoot at range without it being wasteful. But the PGs get 40 shots. At 250 yards, they are basically just firing the 2 LMGs, but *all* the squads can't afford to do that for long, if you want to have ammo for close-in shooting. The VGs can fire just the Hvy SMG squads at that range, and/or HMGs, so they are getting the long-ranged firepower figures in the above tables by shooting with only 1/3 to 1/2 of their units. That works better with overwatch, and it works better in terms of retaining ammo for the high expenditure, close-up fights. There is another important consideration. The PGs firepower ratio at range is good, but that occurs with an absolute firepower that is far lower than the short ranges at which the SMGs excel. And this interacts with the ammo considerations. I will explain. Assume the Hvy SMG and PG squads fire their 40 shots at a breakdown of ranges 15-15-10. The SMGs fire theirs at ranges split 20-20-0, with HQs the same. Assume the HMGs get off 60 of their 95 shots, with ranges split 10-20-30. Call this the "total potential fire" = TPF; obviously units hit will reduce it and not all units will expend their ammo, but it allows comparison. Then TPFs in thousands are - PG - 37.0+21.6+7.1 = 65.7 Pure SMG - 68.3+21.4+1.9 = 91.6 SMG+HMG - 57.4+26.1+10.7 = 94.2 You can tweak the assumptions if you like, but the basic story will remain the same. The PGs cannot *both* exploit their ranged fp edge, and still have the ammo to get anywhere near what the SMGs can do up close. The PGs are only superior at ranges above 100 yards, and only to the pure SMG. And this superiority occurs at exactly the place where the overall scale of the firepower is *lowest*, and at ranges where it is wasteful to expend too much ammo. The contribution of this edge to TPF is thus quite low, around 1/6th the scale of the SMG edge on the other (short) end of the range scale, with the ammo-use breakdown I estimated. So even vs. pure SMG, it only makes sense to prefer the PGs if you think you aren't going to get that many close-range shots. To me, that is akin to saying, "the PGs are better infantry, in cases where your infantry is ineffective and useless, because it fails to close with the enemy or vice versa." And even this edge, the PGs do not have against the SMG - HMG blend. The pure firepower ratios give an edge to the PGs at range in that comparison, ~4/3rds at 250 yards (the .74 figure in the earlier table). But this firepower is not realistically available, because the PGs do not have the ammo to blaze away contentedly at 250 yards, while the HMGs *do*. As the TPF numbers above suggest, the SMG+HMG blend can achieve higher firepower at all ranges, with realistic ammo contraints taken into account. I only counted the HMGs for 60 shots, not 95. Low cost is a two-fer. It gives defensive depth in units, and more firepower for the cheaper choice than single-squad comparisons say. The SMGs *can* afford to firefight at 100 yards, because there are more of them to do it and they can expend more of their ammo loads at those ranges, since 2/3rds of the squads never fire at longer ranges. Individually, one can look at 132 fp at 100 yards from a 10-man PG squad, vs. 72 fp at 100 yards from an 8-man SMG squad. It looks like no contest, that the PGs are 50% better at offense and defense combined. But the SMG platoons also have 1xHvy SMG, and they cost 3/4ths as much so they can afford greater numbers or HMG support, and they don't waste as much ammo at longer range plinking with 2 LMGs. What are the PGs actually better at? They move their LMGs fast, while HMG teams are slow. So they can get long-ranged firepower onto a position more rapidly. The SMGs move close-range firepower quickly, but not their medium range firepower. If you need to quickly occupy a position, from which you will need to dish out long-ranged fire - e.g. to cover open ground beyond an objective, not just to protect the shooters but also flanking open ground areas, say - then the PGs are ideal. The VGs would have to clear the objective, and then wait for HMGs to make their way forward. Even this edge can be reduced by timely "StuG-taxi" service for HMGs, but it is the one place the PGs stand out. They may also be more forgiving of mistakes in employment, or flexible to changes in plans. Because they pack the various forms of firepower into fewer, larger units with all-around capabilities and speed, snafus from the wrong weapon in the wrong place are much easier to avoid. Properly handled to use the "depackaged" capabilities, the SMGs still rock, and if you want ranged firepower buy the excellent HMG-42 teams to suppliment them.

I find this discussion rather strange. Someone is actually objecting to his opponent retreating live men off the map, when he wins? Um, if you insist on controlling both sides, play with yourself, sir. Your enemy is no more obligated to stand in front of you, than he is to run his tanks out into the open within 50 yards of your zook teams. He is an *opponent*. His job is to do things that you *don't like" or that make your job of killing him harder, not easier. "Yeah, but not running away". Why the heck not? "Cause I wanna splatter all his pixels when I push through on the left". And he is supposed to not give a darn whether his pixels are all splattered? "Just saying beforehand how I like to play". Fine by me. Your bed to lie in. You just won't ever count me among your opponents. I don't quite understand why a human opponent is needed in the exercise, frankly. Just command both sides and splatter all the pixels you please.

The part I think you may be missing, or underrating the importance of, is that the Russians are not just losing tanks out of their larger fleet, *to* the German tanks. They are also losing them to PAK, and mines, and mechanical failure, and in the late war to fausts. There is no question the Russians are losing a lot of tanks. And in terms of doctrine, we know they did not include artillery in the combine arms mix, in a close coordination, moment by moment way. We know they were still using tank-heavy formations too much, without enough support from towed guns and infantry, into 1943. And from particular incidents and the way things went on other fronts where similar doctrinal mistakes were committed, we can make some definite statements about the probably effects of those weaknesses. They probably lost tanks in larger numbers when they lost them. You find this in all the "tank fleet", cavalry-related formations. E.g. the Brits in North Africa or even Goodwood, or the first U.S. attempts in Tunisia. And we can add, that German PAK ought to have scored particularly well, since the Russian tanks did not have the same ability to call down arty on them flexibly, as say the Germans had in North Africa. All true. But what is causing the German tank losses, and what is causing the Russian tank losses? PAK doubtless got some of the German ones, but not many after mid 1943. The Germans weren't attacking very much, so they would not hit many of them. The Germans, on the other hand, deployed as many or more PAK and heavy FLAK as AFVs in the whole war. Similarly, AT mines probably killed few German AFVs after 1942, or at all really. But the Germans deployed 21 million AT mines in WW II, which is 100 for every Allied AFV, east or west. In Italy, the Brits say 30% of their tank losses were to mines. The Germans also deployed millions of effective infantry AT weapons, though obviously of limited range. The Germans probably lost some tanks to such causes in 1942, when the weapons were still primitive, and maybe some in 1943. But few, comparatively. And the other big cause of tank losses is simply mechanical failure. This can be increased by tough action certainly. It can be pushed by doctrine that strives driving until the tanks "give", which is probably dumb in most cases though not in all. But the largest single determinant of this category, is simply going to be how many tanks are being operated, since some fraction of them will always break. When the wastage rates are the same, and most of the German losses are to mechanical failure or to Russian AFVs, while the Russian losses are spread over those two plus PAK, AT mines, and infantry AT weapons, I sincerely doubt the "tank exchange ratio" means anything like what it purports to mean. It does not mean that in AFV combat, the typical German tanker was an "ace" by the time he was KO'ed. Incidentally, I do not doubt in the least that the better German tanks ran up scores akin to those ratios, on average. But that is only a modest portion of the "fleet". The rest of the fleet were probably getting kill ratios between 1 to 1 and 2 to 1. And the PAK likewise. And the mines some. Etc. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-10-2001).]

Am I sure? No, of course I am not sure. I never fired the thing, let alone counted the rounds with a stop-watch. One source gave 1500/minute. C'est tout. Could be that the 1200/minute figure is more accurate. How would I know which was, and which wasn't? LOL. But what is 5 rounds a second more or less, on top of ~20. Any way you slice it, "high".

Ah, you plinkers at range at the SMGs, don't you know that is only an invitation to "skulking"? They just slink to the backside of their cover and break LOS. You wanna come rush into their cover, now that the open ground in front of them looks so clear? Good luck. As for attacking, two main methods. On the one hand covered routes, and on the other suppression by artillery, tanks, and HMGs. Run them right into the enemy cover positions the moment a barrage lifts, for example. Everything you really need (squad) infantry for, they are good at. All the things other infantry types are better at, are jobs really meant for non-infantry arms or teams (FOs, MGs, tanks, etc). At 80-100 yards, the firepower is fine, and squad infantry fire at men in cover beyond that range, is usually an ineffective waste of ammo. If you want to block areas of open ground a long way off, use an HMG.

One fellow said the first U.S. tanks in Korea were the M-24s Chaffees, and that is correct. But they did not have much occasion to clash with T-34s. About the only exception is the 24th Infantry division's fight, which I will cover below. Another fellow said that a few mines could cover the roads, and notes how heavily fortified the place is today. True on both counts. But there wasn't a single AT mine in the country when the NK attacked. The first to reach the country were hastily built in Japan and arrived at Pusan on 18 July (3000 of them). The same fellow speculates that the NKs didn't "commit" too much armor because of the terrain. Well, actually the NKs committed every tank they had, they just only had 150 of them, plus 120 SU-76s. And they got very few replacements, essentially just vehicles sent forward from maintenance, perhaps 20 all told. If you meant the Russians didn't give them more because of the terrain, it is possible. But I doubt it. One armored division against none probably seemed like plenty. And the NK crews proved not terribly well trained in armored warfare. They were good infantry fighters. And the Russians did not expect the U.S. to defend the place (long story, but well established as true). The ROKs alone would have (or, did) collapsed before 150 T-34s, so the Russian aid decisions were perfectly sensible. Another fellow explains the clear "tankable" western corridor, and that too is correct. From the border to south of the capital, the NKs were able to "blitz", with the tanks punching holes and the infantry marching through them and mopping up. There are a series of locations at which eastern turns can be made, to eventually reach Pusan in the far southeast corner of the penisula. These turn-offs can reached from the open western plain. But Pusan cannot. The longest route around the coast is the lowest ground, but it includes several river blocks and closer to Pusan, ridge blocks as well. More direct routes have to slant across the central hills southeastward, or come down the thin strip of lowland on the eastern coast. TF Smith was trying to block the entry points to some of these turn-offs. But being less than a battalion of light infantry, with modest artillery support, against divisional columns with armor, this was ridiculously optimistic. The NK were being constantly underestimated in the early period, and the results they were getting vs. the ROKs were put down to the ROKs being ineffective, instead of the NKs being effective. It would prove an expensive mistake. The 24th division fought the largest blocking fight against the NKs while the odds were still against the UN forces, and before better armor and AT weapons reached the theater. It got cut up pretty badly. But the way it got cut up, was not M-24s fighting tank duels with T-34s and losing, followed by armored breakthrough and "collapse". What happened instead is the U.S. block was bypassed, not by the NK armor, but by its infantry. The U.S. were defending a town and roadblocks around it. They were thinking that denying the road-net to the enemy would stop him. It flat didn't. The NKs just went around, through the hills, and cut the roads behind the Americans with infantry. There were not yet sufficient forces for anything like continuous fronts. Hilly terrain requires more troops per bit of space, to truly deny ground to the enemy. LOSes are broken up. There are many draws up there. Troops in one valley are isolated from anyone 1-2 ridges away, especially if they move road-bound. The U.S. forces were green and not used to the terrain, and they stayed on the valley floors, or on the ridges only where roads crossed them. They then found NK roadblocks in their own rear. They often pulled out as a result, and often got shot up doing so, in ambushes down the roads. Or they abandoned their vehicles to escape overland through the hills, but this being a desperate measure, they lost all formation and cohesion in the process. The 24th had this done to it. The NK tanks were used on them, to spearhead infantry attacks when they were already cut off, and to push through in places and raid rear area troops and spread confusion. But the actual surrounding was done the old fashioned way, by flanking with infantry through the hills. And that proved decisive, since the 24th did not have anything like the men to blast its way through the NK infantry up on hills, in depth. In this fighting, one hears reports like "company B lost 7 M24s, abandoned when the road was cut. The men escaped on foot". Or that 4 others got out, with help from artillery or air when running the road-blocks. What one does not hear is "lost 7 M24s in tank duels with T-34/85s". Why would the NKs risk their tanks, which could do so much for them, when they could "kill" U.S. tanks with a roadblock and some 45mm ATGs? Shoot one or two, the rest will not even try. There were some armor vs. armor skirmishs in Korea, but they mostly occurred in the fighting around the Pusan perimeter, after the breakthrough period. By then, the U.S. had far more armor on the field than the NKs ever did. The fights were penny-packet affairs, a company against a platoon at the largest. And the U.S. quickly had the upper hand in that aspect of the fighting. What one hears from this period, is affairs like company C, with 4 Sherman 76 leading, pushes down this road. They have a few firefights and do well. Then the airforce calls them, and tells them the road has been cut behind them in half-a-dozen places and is just swarming with NK infantry. Oops. Back they come, losing 2 tanks to ATG fire in the process - or occasionally they abandon the vehicles to move over the hills. Until the U.S. learned that pushing down a road just did not work in Korea, and moving two infantry columns down the ridges on either side of the road *did* work, this repeated over and over. And the U.S. armor edge therefore did not mean much, until later, when the infantry was better at its part of the job. The NKs understood this from the begining, and whenever their columns were stopped, they fought on the hills to turn a flank. That helped to keep their armor moving, regardless of terrain. But they still ran out of armor (no replacements), and too much U.S. armor showed up. So they rocked for a month or so, then fizzled. For what it is worth.

OK, I can extend the same analysis to the figures provided for German production and fleet numbers. In 1941, the wastage rate is only ~6.5% per month. In 1942 it hits its lowest, ~5.75% per month. In 1943 it jumps to 10% per month, slightly under the Russian figure but barely so. In 1944, it is 12%, the same as the Russian figure. In 1945, of course the front collapses. For what it is worth, I extended the series there on the assumption of a wastage rate equal to the Russian one in 1941 - 24% per month - and it leads to the prediction of about 2000 German AFVs left, surrendered. Or in rougher terms, the wastage rate was half, or the vehicle life was twice as long, during the 1941-1942 period of victories. In the 1943-1944 period, it is basically the same as the Russians, only marginally better in 1943 and no different in 1944. In 1945, it is double the wastage rate of the Russians, akin to what happened to them in 1942. Here in detail is the analysis I made, to "show my work". I took the yearly production figures and divided by 12 to get the monthly average. Then I distributed the production through the year to fit the increasing trend-line. I had a graph of German AFV production by month (from War Economy and Society 1939-1945, By Milward) to help guide this distribution, but it is meant to be approximate. Here is the actual data series I used, monthly AFV production from July '41 on - 1941 - 250x4, 300x2 1942 - 300x3, 350x5, 400x4 1943 - 400x3, 500x6, 600x3 1944 - 650x3, 800x3, 900x3, 700x3 1945 - 500, 350, 200, 50 Then I just find the % wastage rate for the year, that will give the final AFV total in the data series on the other fellow's website. By that I mean (in pseudo-code) - Take the starting amount Multiple by 1 - R% Add the production series number That is the new starting amount Next month Repeat until year end. Find R to hit the target ending number - a standard "internal rate of return" style econ calculation. Of course there were individual months above and below this average figure. But it gives the constant wastage rate actually seen, and thus allows conclusions about "half-life" in combat and the like. Some may be surprised that the relatively stable German fleet size, reflects such internal dynamics. But that is the conclusion when the ramping production figures are properly accounted for. The home front is building tanks faster and faster, than they are mostly just maintaining the existing fleet size. The reason why, is the wastage rate is moving up to match the production rates. Most of that adjustment occurs just where you would expect it, in 1943. The average for that year has 5/6ths the wastage rate of the Russians, up more than 60% from the average of the previous two years. In 1944, the climb to the Russian wastage rate is complete. At that point, German AFVs and Russian AFVs are lasting equally long in combat. The Russians lose more because they have more. One can track the ratio of wastage rates, and then you get these numbers, German/Russian AFV wastage rate - 1941 - 3.7 to 1 1942 - 1.9 to 1 1943 - 1.2 to 1 1944 - 1 to 1 1945 - .5 to 1 (estimate) To me that is a darn sight more meaningful as a measure of armor warfare, than the pretend "tank exchange ratio", with its implicit assumption that only tanks are killing each other, and the size of the fleets doesn't matter. To be explicit about it, any claim that German AFVs lasted longer in combat than Russian ones, is a claim about the numbers in that chart. And the raw number of tanks lost, simply isn't about the same claim. I hope this is interesting.

Useful data. Here is what it implies to me. The Russian AFV loss rate was 24% per month in 1941, probably from very high losses right at the begining, and in a few large cases like the Minsk, Smolensk, and Kiev pockets. Outside of those "one-off" effects, the rate is probably similar to the later year figures. Maybe somewhat above it for worse doctrine and a worse overall war situation.. In 1942, the loss rate per month falls to 11%. Thereafter, is it rock steady at 12% per month. That means a "half-life" of ~165 days. It may surprise some that the figures are so steady, even with the production ramping up and the size of the fleet varying hither an yon, at first glance. But what is really happening is that the production rate accelerates in 1942, and mostly plateaus afterward. The rate of production can sustain the experienced loss rate and a certain size fleet. (Incidentally, I distributed a modest number of Lend Lease vehicles in 1942-1944 in addition to the Russian production figures - 8k all told). See, if the fleet is too large for the production rate, the wastage exceeds replacement and the force size shrinks. This in turn reduces the absolute scale of losses somewhat - for the tanks, not the whole army, mind. When the production rate is high compared to the existing fleet size, then more are produced each month and the fleet expands, but drags the absolute loss rate up behind it. In between, the fleet size stabilizes in "thermostat" fashion. For example, with a production rate of 2500 AFVs per month and a loss rate of 12%, the stable fleet size is (1/.12) * 2500 = 20,833 AFVs. The fleet size will approach that figure, more slowly the closer it already is to it, and from either direction (above or below). If the wastage rate remains the same, but production increases to 3000 AFVs per month, the fleet size will execute an "S-curve" "crawl" up to 25,000 AFVs = (1/.12) * 3000. Look at the 1944 production data, and the 1945 fleet size. Spot on, that is exactly what it does. The figures on locations of the AFVs are harder to credit, as an enemy's guess and only a snapshot. It is not clear the categories of "front", "reserve", "unlocated units", etc, have much meaning. ~1k in the far east will make little overall difference since there are no losses there. The only interesting aspect of it is the estimate for "at the front", roughly 1/5th of the total. Why is that interesting? Because if 1/5th of the overall fleet is in contact at an average time, and the losses occur then, and the half-life for the whole fleet is 165 days, then the half-life in combat would be on the order of 33 days. That is, 20% enter combat, 10% are lost in 33 days. The front portion is "topped off". Repeat five times. In 165 days, half the initial fleet size has been lost. There might be some break-downs in other areas, but there are also repairs. 4-6 weeks will still be the right ballpark, if that is the portion held out of the battle. That portion seems high to me. When preparing a blow, it certainly makes sense. You gather the "fist" and keep the armor wastage rate down. Then you commit a higher portion to combat, but for a limited period. In the October "snapshot" reflects this sort of thing, then the portion at the front *on average*, may be higher than 20%. If it were 35% then the half-life in combat would be on the order of 2 months, which seems somewhat generous to me. But counting quiet areas and places with a high odds edge, it may be right. Another way of looking at this is to say that no realistic figure for portion of armor at the front, will yield a half-life in action as long as 4 months. .88^4=.6, so 83% of the AFVs would have to be "at the front", at the average moment, to get a half-life in action that long. The true figure probably considerably less than that.

"Sniper" is a term that is used both loosely and narrowly. Narrowly, a sniper is a rifleman with a scoped rifle, extra training, considerable patience, and often no parent unit or superiors to speak of. Turned loose to "hunt" individually with as much stealth as possible and as little or as much risk to themselves as they cared to assume, they often scored their kills at long ranges. They were undeniably more effective, man for man, than ordinary infantry, but depended on the battle "context" those provided. And they got this impact over long periods of time, not short intense combats. As in, wait a week, get a kill. A man who can do that consistently without high risk to himself, can account for many, many times his own number (um - 1) over the course of the whole war. Broadly, troops on the receiving end called just about any rifle fire they received, "snipers" or "sniper fire", whenever it was not accompanied by MG fire. And sometimes even when it was. Very rarely were the men shooting at them, "snipers" in the true sense. A sharpshooter is just any rifleman with above average aim, able to hit stationary, man targets at ~300 yards consistently. CM calls its one-man rifle units "sharpshooters", perhaps because it does not mean to model the stealth, independence, and accuracy of true snipers. Instead, they are more like individual good shots "told off" to work for the platoon as single aimed shooters. If you want to represent a true sniper in CM, the best way to do it is probably to take a crack or elite sharpshooter, put him on "hide" somewhere well away from most of your forces, and randomly take him off of hide for a few turns out of the whole battle. As soon as he hits someone, hide again or bug out, leaving the map. But most would consider this rather boring and not very helpful in the local fight. Its cumulative impact, and the near invunerability the tactic can confer on the shooter, and even the psych impact this can have on the enemy, are the militarily useful aspects of what these guys do.

I realized after the previous that I may be assuming too much about knowledge of the opposing force mixes, before the U.S. intervened in strength. The NK army had 150 T-34/85s at the time of the invasion. They also had around 120 SU-76 open-topped self-propelled guns - Marders in CM terms. And they had a large artillery arm on standard Russian lines, with 122mm howitzer, 76mm howitzer, 45mm AT, plus 120mm and 82mm mortars. The entire "armored" compliment of the South Korean army was a single "cavalry" battalion in U.S. terms - 9 M-8 and 18 M-20 armored cars, as scout vehicles. They had 90 105mm pack howitzers, 140 37mm towed antitank guns, a reasonable number of 81mm and 60mm mortars, and plenty of ordinary U.S. WW II era bazookas. In artillery the ROKs were outgunned 3 to 1, in infantry strength outnumbered only about 4 to 3, and in armor it was a division's worth of tanks and TDs vs. practically nothing. The ROKs were also green, while many of the NKs were veterans of the wars in China. To give an idea what happened to the first U.S. units put into combat against the NKs, TF Smith (2 infantry companies plus an artillery battery) had the following heavy equipment on the day it was overrun. 5 105mm howitzer (total HEAT - 6 rounds) 2 75mm recoilless rifles 2 4.2" mortars 4 60mm mortars 4 .50 cal MGs 10 bazookas (60mm, WW II US type) With about 500 men, 400 of them infantry and the balance in the artillery battery. What attacked them was 36 T-34/85s, comprising about 1/4th of the tanks in the entire NK army, plus at least a regiment of infantry. [This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-09-2001).]

Were the first U.S. units that intervened in Korea, unprepared to face the enemy in nearly every respect? Yes. Does this include inadequate AT ability? Certainly. Was this a principle failing, the main cause of their defeats, or a lasting characteristic of the Korean war? Not at all. TF Smith lost 1 gun, many trucks and jeeps, and ~25 men to 33 tanks that drove through them. 5 of the tanks were immobilized or KO'ed. 2 by 105-HEAT, 3 by track hits 105-HE then abandoned. 75mm RR and 60mm Zooks scored numerous hits without apparent effect. The heavy losses came in the pullout, after infantry had flanked them, and the cause of the losses was mostly MG fire. Within a week, Mac asked for 3 medium and 1 heavy tank battalions, and a few days later revised this upward to 4 heavy tank battalions. Front commanders made urgent requests for 105mm HEAT and 3.5" zooks (aka Shrecks). 900 of the new zooks were airlifted to the theater in July and August. AT mine production was started in Japan and the first delivery of 3000 AT mines made within 3 weeks of TF Smith. 26 July a ship sailed from 'Frisco with 80 tanks aboard. 3 Pershings were sent from Japan but broke down, 14 were sent from Hawaii with one regiment, and a battalion of WW-II era Sherman 76s was assembled in Japan, all in the first month. Over the course of July, U.S. and ROK took out T-34s in a number of incidents, with 105mm HEAT, 60mm zooks, the first use of 3.5" zooks before the end of the month, and by air attack with 5" rockets. These accounted for 21 tanks in 4 different fights. A month after TF Smith, 1st Cav destroyed 19 tanks in one fight, air support and ground fire by artillery, and tank fire from Chaffees contributing. All told, the NKs lost at least 45 tanks to U.S. forces in combat in the month of July, ~1/3rd of their force, and probably more like 2/3rds overall, with the ROKs and the air force in rear areas getting the balance. The U.S. forces were not losing tanks in tank-to-tank combat at this time. The U.S. did lose tanks, but they are cases of abandonment after roads were cut, or after mechanical failures. Tanks on both sides were too thin on the ground to encounter each other often. Mostly, each side's tanks supported against enemy infantry, the NKs making better use of theirs to cut roads and the like. But the main edge the NKs had in the early war period was superior infantry tactics, experience, and conditioning. The U.S. operated in too road-bound a fashion, while the NKs moved through the high ground and easily cut roads behind U.S. forces, over and over again, or outflanked U.S. positions. The NKs were officered and cadred by veterans of the wars in China, who not only knew their business but understood the terrain. Rough, hilly terrain with a limited road net, made for quite different tactics and relationships than the wide open flatlands of Europe, or the beaches and jungles of Pacific islands. U.S. commanders lacked the experience, and U.S. recruits lacked the stamina and wind, for the required off-road "mountain infantry" style maneuvering, that mattered the most. The Chinese still had a definite edge in this respect even at the end of the first year. They were much better at it than the NK had been, and the NK had been better at it than the U.S. Even in the case of TF Smith, the tanks driving through had not forced retreat or destroyed the defenders. The infantry was stripped off of them in the process and they were buttoned, while the crews were not very experienced. They fired a few rounds and drove on, without cutting the TF's eventual retreat routes. But a solid battalion of infantry on high ground behind one flank, both forced a withdrawl, and heavily cut it up with MG fire, when it was attempted. The U.S. lost 6,000 causalties in the first month, most of them from the 24th infantry division which was cut off in the above fashion. 900 of these were confirmed PWs, plus 500 missing, and nearly 1900 were KIA. ROK losses in this period were an order of magnitude larger, around 70,000 or nearly a full "turnover" of their original force. They carried most of the weight of the mostly infantry fight, but their fielded force was dwindling, while the U.S. force was building up as formations reached Japan or Pusan. NK lost 58,000 casualties in this period, or about 3/4ths what the UN forces lost. They also lost ~2/3rd of their original tanks, with estimates on those left, counting a trickle of replacements, between 40 and 70 AFVs. There is a noticable dicotomy in the "wars" going on in this period, U.S. and ROK. The U.S. forces were more heavily engaged along the roads and blocking the major transport links, while the ROKs were holding or failing to hold, more of the hills between them. This reflects the greater motorization of the U.S. forces and differences in tactics. The U.S. took out ~50% of the tanks the NKs lost, but bore less than 1/10th of the infantry fighting. At the Pusan perimeter, this changed, and the U.S. forces got up into the hills too. By 6th August, the U.S. had a battalion of Pershings, another of Sherman 76s in theater, along with the Chaffee battalions in each infantry division (3 were in theater). There is no question of being outweighed in armor by then. The enemy armor (SU-76s, not just T-34s) was still able to inflict considerable loss on occasion, when it hit places were U.S. tanks weren't around. But the NKs no longer had any kind of armor edge. They were down to maneuvering in penny packets of 3-6 AFVs. These platoons were used to spearhead infantry attacks, raid artillery positions when they got through on the high ground, and the like. Neither they nor the Chinese ever got an armor edge at any later stage of the war, either. That was over by August. If you want more historical detail, look here - http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/20-2-1/toc.htm

The SMG infantry just rocks. Yes, it has to be well handled. But it does what infantry is supposed to do, but more so. To wit, hold ground, or kill people in cover by moving right on top of them. Yes, other types have better ranged fire. But ranged infantry fire does not kill if the target has any form of cover - it only pins (and burns ammo). Artillery and tanks can kill from range, but infantry kills in close (attack or defense or counterattack, it doesn't matter). That is what I want infantry to do, and the VGers do it like nobody else, and cheaply too.

To Paul - actually, the loss rates for tanks are higher than the quoted figures for either side, might suggest. I am aware this is the basic point you were making. It is just more extreme than the figures might lead some to believe. I suspect those are figures for combat losses and do not include mechanical failures. Either that, or there is a time-deployed factor that is being misundertood. Perhaps both. But I suspect few AFVs on either side are left at the end of a year. Why do I say this? Because the "half-life" of a German AFV in Normandy was more like *2-3 weeks*, not a year or six months. Specifically, they had 300 running AFVs left out of 2500 sent to the front, 2 months after the fighting began. That means the fleet was halved, three times over (50%, 25%, 12%). Many of the tanks did not arrive until late June, so most of this reduction occured in 6 weeks. If the mechanical failures and the combat losses run in a ratio of about 1 vs. 2, then the figures you cited for each sides losses (55-62% range), would be consistent with almost all the deployed AFVs of each side, out of action well before the end of the year deployed. Including recovered vehicles, incidentally, which would extend the average life figure only modestly (only effects a fraction, and then they are lost again). Which fits. AFVs did not soldier on for years, except in rare cases. The Germans designed the Panther's engine to last for only 500 miles. The Russians expected tanks to last for days, not years, once in combat - before destruction or breakdown. AFVs simply are not "durable goods" on the year-long, operational scale. hey are more like a form of ammo, though a slower "burning" one. You throw a pack of them at the enemy, and replace them with a new set as they deplete. They do damage to him in the meantime, and help protect your own forces from the enemy's forces. Lower loss rates, when present, mostly reflect smaller deployed fleets, because all the fleets are wasting assets and wear out over month long time scales (or a season, at best). E.g. DAK will lose a lot more tanks per month when it has 400 of the things running, than when it is operating only 40 while waiting for a new convoy to make it past Malta with more. It will also accomplish more, naturally, in the period when it has tanks. Notice also that "tanks deployed that year" does not mean tanks deployed on January 1, and lost sometime over the course of the year. The ones that haven't become losses yet, are the ones deployed in the later parts of the year - or not deployed yet at all (e.g. reserve units, training, or being transported to battle areas). Imagine the wastage is only 10% per month, and newly produced tanks are not lost in the month produced. Then summing over the months, 60% of the tanks produced in the year would still be around. Raise the wastage to 15% per month, and 48% are still operational. But the chance of a tank that was around on January 1, still being around, is only ~14%. One can see the 48% figure and think "1/2 chance it is lost in its first year, so its average life is 2 years". But this is false. Only 2% could survive 15% wastage 24 times over, and half of them are gone after 4 months of action (.85^4 = .52). The illusion is created by #1 imagining the tanks all there on January 1, instead of built new throughout the year, with most of the year-end survivors built recently, and #2 by imagining a linear process, instead of one effected by how many tanks are in the population wearing out or subject to loss in enemy action. The Normandy fighting was a period of high attrition. But a large part of the reason for that, is that the front was stable despite incessant Allied attacks. Like the Bulge period too, such shorter periods of more intense fighting can account for a pretty large portion of overall vehicle losses. While without such intense efforts, the fronts move in favor of the more numerous side. But to see the distortions created by the "illusion" factors, imagine the half-life of an AFV is 1 month. Then the linear naive thought is "half gone in 1 month, average life 2 months. There are six such periods in the year. Well, they didn't lose every tank 6 times over; that can't be what happened". But this is an incorrect analysis. What actually happens with that rate of "wastage", is 1/12th of the year's production happened in the last month, and those tanks haven't had any time to get smashed or break down. Half that number again are left from those produced the previous month. 11 terms of that series add up to 17% of the AFVs produced, still running. If the AFVs have a 2-month half life, 28% are still running at year end (5/6ths of them made in the last 3-5 months). Even though only 2% of the AFVs around on January 1, would survive that rate of attrition. And if the rate of vehicle production was increasing during the year, you'd get a higher figure with the same loss rate. In 1943 and 1944 combined, the German AFV production rate tripled. So the later months in each year, are more heavily "weighted" than the early ones. And those are the "younger" AFVs, more of which are still "alive". This will cause a "ramp" effect. Suppose we approximate the 1943 "series" as .67 for 4 months, then 1 for the next 4, then 1.33 for the last four months - compared to the average for the year. Put in the 2 month "half life" and add up terms to find the % of AFVs remaining. Only 2.5% of the remaining AFVs are from the 4 "front months", so their lower weighting makes no difference. Most are from the last four months, when the production rate was higher. So you get 34% left, instead of 28%, with the same loss rate - a 20-25% increase just from the "ramp" effect. The life expectency of an AFV in WW II was not measured in years. It was probably measured in weeks. Days in periods of intense combat, months at best in quiet times or inactive fronts. Figures for "lost in battle" vs. "produced that year" are therefore pretty meaningless. AFVs are meant to be lost, not kept, over time scales that long. They are not battleships.

MG 34 and MG 42 pictures here - http://www.geocities.com/Augusta/8172/panzerfaust5.htm M-60 pictures here - http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m60e3.htm

No, the defender does not have to defend the position. That is up to him. Including whether, how much, where, when, and all the rest of it. He chooses to do so when doing so helps him. That is quite completely all.

I just love it when people make sweeping statements like "the Soviets weren't good at high op tempos". How the heck do you know? The Soviets, and Russians since then, lost 2 small wars and both of them were protracted guerrilla conficts. Nobody ever beat them by having a higher op tempo. That doesn't mean the statement is false, and that nobody could have. Just that nobody did. So nobody knows a darned thing about it. Incidentally, this idea of getting inside the enemy's cycle has several different meanings that are all squished together by the phrasing chosen. You can get inside the enemy's *head*. That applies to all strategies - "all warfare is based on deception" and the enemy's plans are a fine "target". You can get inside his ability to maneuver fast enough, which is not his "decision cycle" in the cognitive sense, but is his "maneuver cycle" if you like. That is the maneuver idea in a nutshell. And as a third, you can just make moves faster than he does, to the point where he stands still, which is not quite the same as the previous two (e.g. it can be an effect of a difference in physical mobility, or superior communications). But the effects sometimes claimed from such processes can be wildly exaggerated. Some people seem to expect the enemy to just get dizzy, throw up, and thrown down his arms. Has this ever happened? Sure, with poor commanders. I think of Mack at Ulm, of whom it was once said "he has so far today conceived and put into execution, in sequence, three entirely contradictory strategic plans." But often a properly deployed enemy just cooly says "right face" or something similar easy adaptation, and nothing whatever is decided. The disciples of the "Grand Maison" school of "attack a l'outrance" in the French army before WW I, expected "the initiative" and "the attack" and forcing the enemy to react, and confusion "carried into his ranks", and other such gung-ho magical rabbit's feet, to decide everything in their favor. The Germans just stopped, deployed, fired machineguns, magazine rifles and, above all, their heavier artillery until the French had evaporated, then marched on. The offensive is not all it is cracked up to be, by the cracked heads of the disciples of gung-ho. (Which incidentally, means "work together" in polynesian anyway - LOL). The principle reason is that adapations of deployments to enemy movements are often extremely simple and rapid, but fully effective. "Keep it simply stupid" often trumps the supposed confusion enemy initiative is touted as causing. Clever deployments are not narrowly tailored to one enemy threat picture; instead they adapt smoothly to just about anything he tries. I have personally seen more than one maneuverist attacker in CM and other strategy games, penetrate an enemy defensive system, and then see his attack collapse in confusion simply because he had expected this to have more of an impact on the enemy, than it actually did. I even have a quip reserved for these occasions - "*now* what are you going to do - bleed on me?" A surprising number of maneuverists make plans that do not promise truly decisive results even if the initial phase succeeds. They are especially discomfitted by defenders who do not "think linearly" at all, refuse to react as the attacker's formulaic doctrines expect, and sometimes flat refuse to react to the attacker's actions, practically. If you play chess you know the type. He takes the gambit pawn, ignores the attack and the next two proffered sacrifices, then exchanges off everything and wins. I am reminded of a line from one of the founders of La Maison, who called defeat "mostly a psychological phenomenon", having based this on examination of ancient and Napoleonic case histories. Well, names and atmosphere and supposed dizziness, just don't "hurt" some defenders very much. It sorta leaves it up to them, and if they just decide they haven't lost anything then they often haven't. Incidentally, someone also made the passing comment that there is nothing defensive in air to air combat. There certainly is, although aggressiveness usually pays high dividends in such fights. The defensive aspects are caused by such considerations as the limited lethal zones in front of an behind aircraft, and the general point that being on an enemy's tail also means letting him decide where you go. A tailing plane can then e.g. be dragged in front of a wingman's guns. As this example shows, there is a certain ireducible predictability involved in any kind of effective attack, which can sometimes be exploited. So it is not so simple, even in the air. As for RTS itself, that is another story altogether. The problem with RTS is that it is not real, or time, or strategy. No one person has to give commands to a brigade at all levels in a single minute. There are whole hierarchies of trained officers precisely to break the task into amounts managable in the time available. And it isn't time, because battles actually lasted for months, and RTS battles are always over in minutes. The point, after all, is to give the player a "rush", rather than to reflect the often excruciatingly boring tempo of war. Air combat is about the only place where the two line up well, in the few minutes of combat that punctuate the hours of straight-line flying and the days and weeks of mission prep and base life. And it isn't strategy, because strategy is when the matched wits of two artificial commanders, with full knowledge of the relevant system variables and processes, determine the outcome by their mutual choices. Which is incidentally a requirement for a good game and not a requirement of realism. In real life, there aren't only two commanders and many factors outside of their control and knowledge have huge impacts on the outcome, often swamping the effects of the commander's choices. But the RTS games that exist do not have this characteristic either, because their depth of game play is so incredibly shallow. There are essentially only three processes known to RTS game designers - come-into-being, pass-away, and move from A to B. Each of these is kept simply enough to be understood by an elementary school student. Most often, the first heavily dominates the eventual outcome, leading to the "sorceror's apprentice" plot-line, aka build some endless mongo-unit fountains and point the resulting spray in the general direction of the enemy. Occasionally the others matter, but in a heavily linear fashion (as in, 3 whatsits meet 2 do-dahs, result 1 whatsits marching on). There are generally single optimums for force types or mixes, with numerous "types" included for "variety" that are completely pointless in game-play terms, etc. They got their combat systems from "risk" or a box of cracker jacks, in other words. In fact, the whole RTS tendency, in my opinion, has set back strategy game design at least a decade. The move to computers set it back another decade, but "paid for it" in return by increasing playability by an order of magnitude. But there is nothing like the design of game systems that existed in the late 70s and early 80s, when SPI was putting out scores of games a year with innovative systems every month, with titles like Squad Leader (we all know), Terrible Swift Sword (basis of the Battleground series), Panzergruppe Guderian (V4V series more or less), War in the Pacific and CV and Fast Carriers (PacWar), Wooden Ships and Iron Men - to say nothing of overlooked innovations like John Butterfield's "Stalingrad" (not the old AH one, the one about the fight for the city). At their absolute best, computer strategy games have taken successful designs and move them to the computer, altering the designs to match better what the interface could and could not handle, and which resources were truly scarce, and thereby achieving greater playability with equal depth of play to the old genre. That is at best. The more common result and the uniform result in RTS in my experience, is gutted gameplay for the sake of eye candy and "immersion". The general result is game designers who have forgotten their job description (which is not, incidentally, "realism engineer" nor "historian", but *game designer*) to pretend they are the movie directors instead. If I want to watch cartoon movies, I'll rent one. When I want a strategy game, it has moves.

The Shermans are much like the U.S. ones, but with the Fireflies also available with their superior 17-lb gun. These can defeat most German tanks from the front. In general, you use the same team tactics of shooter and wingman, infantry scouting, etc, as with the Americans. But the Fireflies mean the shooter need not be the half of a pair with a flank shot, for it to work. Churchills are heavily armored infantry-support tanks. They are slower than the other types. The earlier models are not as heavily armored as the later ones. In general, these are undergunned vs. the better German tanks, and combined with low speed this can render them less effective than you might hope, from the armor alone. Because their low speed makes it hard for them to find flank shots, and they can have trouble killing German tanks without them They are at their best bunker-busting or killing PAK. The armor really helps there, and the gun is sufficient to take those enemies out. There are Churchill versions that have a flamethrower in the place of the bow MG, and another with a short-ranged demo-charge thrower in place of the main gun (AVRE). Both are obviously anti-infantry strong-point busters. The Cromwells are faster, lighter tanks. The early models have top speeds up to 40 mph. The later versions sacrifice some of this speed for better upper hull armor, a dubious trade-off in my book. They remain as fast as later U.S. Shermans (M4A3 type - 32 mph) and faster than the Shermans the British have (24-26 mph). The slower Shermans have somewhat larger HE loads and most have a 3rd MG, but the speed of the Cromwells can more than make up for these. Incidentally, the variations among the Sherman model *numbers* (II or V) are of neglible importance, slight differences in armor and in speed. The important Sherman difference is "Firefly or not?" Challengers are to Cromwells, what Fireflies are to Shermans - their upgunned 17-lb "shooter" tank. They are also a bit more armored in turret front (but hardly enough to matter against German tank guns), and have the better upper hull armor rather than 40 mph speed (they are 32 mph). Wolverines are M-10 tank destroyers, just like the American type, with 76mm guns but thin armor. Later the Achilles becomes available, and is superior to the Wolverine in every respect - it uses the 17-lb gun on the same chassis. The late-war Comet is in most respects similar to a U.S. Sherman 76mm - a decent all-around tank but not standout in any particular role. For the Cromwells and Churchills, there are 95mm versions of the tanks in addition to the usual 75mm. These are HE-throwing "CS" tanks, with 25 lb howitzers instead of 3-inch tank guns. They are poor anti-tank vehicles but pack 1.5 times the HE punch per round, plus around 5/4ths the HE load (just from not carrying AP). They are generally a poor choice if you expect any enemy armor. The StuH-105mm is the closest German analogy, with the important difference that these Brit CS tanks have only ~1.5 times the HE power of standard tank guns, instead of ~2x. Key things to remember are - 1 - Fireflies, Challengers, and Achilles all mount the deadly 17-lber. The Wolverine and Comet have the intermediary "U.S.-style" 76mm. 2 - only the Churchills have armor sufficient to stop German tank-gun rounds at typical CM distances. The Mark VIs are borderline, the VIIs and VIIIs are well enough armored to bounce 75mm/L40 rounds regularly (e.g. Pz IV, StuG, Jadgpanzer, PAK40). 3 - The early mark Cromwells are quite fast. 4 - 95mm versions and the Sexton are all meant for HE work against infantry and guns. Their AT ability is quite limited, but they are good at knocking down villages. Pair off some 17-lb "shooters" with standard 75mm "wingman", and use the "wingman" to go for flank shots. Have infantry or light armor scout for the tanks proper. When German armor is found, spring pairs of tanks on them at once, with the 17-lb shooter exposing itself slightly later than the "wingman". The 17-lber can kill from the front; the wingman can kill from the side if he lives. If you have an excess of 75mm tanks for this, then pair them with each other and double-flank individual targets from both sides. I hope this helps.

Vehicles can help get slow teams to the battle area, but this approach does not help once really in contact. The vehicles are often too vunerable, and in the case of the tanks that are not too vunerable, the men riding them are exposed. As a result, the teams usually have to be dismounted some ways from the enemy. Occasional this can be the position you want - e.g. dropped at the back side of a line of woods, and then deployed to the forward side of it to fire. But there is a more general answer. I attack using fire and movement ideas, meaning I do not advance everyone at once. After contact is made, I will generally have half the force shooting, and half the force moving - sometimes 1/3rd - 2/3rds or the reverse, naturally. And I "task" my support teams according to assigned roles. So, with a typical U.S. rifle company, I will designate a "point" or "maneuver" platoon with only a bazooka added to the infantry. It is meant to stay light and fast, and I try to give it a commander witn morale bonuses (heart). Then I designate a second platoon as the "overwatch" or "firebase" platoon, and give it both MMGs (sometimes a mortar too, sometimes not), as well as its own bazooka. Its commander has a combat bonus (lightning) if possible. The overwatch platoon is meant to deliver ranged fire, from 100-250 yards out. The maneuvering process is a "walk", with first one platoon advancing, then the other catching up to "level" on its flank, then "stepping out" again. When the point platoon is moving, the overwatch platoon is farther away, but has the MMGs which nearly double the ranged fire of the platoon. When the overwatch platoon is catching up, the point platoon is shooting, without supporting MGs but from closer ranges. The squads of the overwatch platoon will get into position first, and add to the base of fire the point is laying down; then the MGs come up and add their fire too. Artillery can be added as well, to create a "mad minute" or three with all men on-line and firing. Only after that, does the point platoon move out again to rush defenders. Where is the third platoon? It is the reserve. It can duplicate the role of either of the other two if one of them falters or is badly shot up, play "point" on the other flank, add weight to a rush, or react to a counterattack. The remaining heavy weapons I assign to the weapons platoon and the company CO, in two "weapons sections" with 60mm and the .50 cal. These mostly support from long range. Sometimes the company CO will lead an ad hoc platoon formed from stragglers, when men break and fall behind. In such cases the weapons platoon leader commands all the mortars and the 50 cal. Note, the 50 cal has so little ammo, and retains so much of its firepower at long range, that getting it getting it close is pretty much beside the point. So instead it protects the mortar people, and has the same general job of long-range "suppression" fire, especially at any guns encountered. If I can buy extra teams, I take more zooks for the company CO and weapons platoon leaders, sometimes a second zook for the reserve platoon, and more MMGs for the maneuvering platoons, in pairs. I still see no point in including them in the "point" platoon, but 2 in the reserve, and up to 4 in the overwatch platoon, can make sense. With the Germans, the HMGs are more powerful each. 2 with an overwatch platoon provides quite good ranged firepower. I don't find the LMGs particularly useful, since they still aren't fast enough to keep up with "point" platoons, but they don't have the punch, ammo, or staying power after losses, to really do "overwatch" work. They can provide deception, and on defense that can help, but that is about it I find. It is also possible to take "automatic weapons" still support for the U.S., to replicate the role heavy weapons sections can fill for the Germans. U.S. MMGs are not enough for that, and 60mm mortars do not have enough ammo. The Germans have 95 shots and higher firepower from each HMG team, and 4 of those in a company heavy weapons section. So they can get meaningful ranged MG fire without add-on forces. Historically, the U.S. often used AA units for this tactical role. In particular, it was common to attach an automatic weapons AA section to a vehicle column, in the armor forces in particular. CM does not give all the actual unit types used for it, but a reasonable approximation can be arranged, as follows. Buy 2 M3A1 halftracks. Put 4 M1917 HMGs in them. Cost - 180 points, ~ engineers or 1 vet platoon + teams or 1 field arty module. More flexible and less brittle than just using halftracks (e.g. the HMGs can use building cover), and more ammo that using M-20s. Drive to a point ~300 yards from the position to be attacked, pulling up on the back side of a body of cover, in two locations that will both give LOS to the same spot, and which friendly leg infantry have already scouted. Unload the HMGs into the cover and move to the front side. Pop the 'tracks around the ends of the cover at the same time these set up. Why not use 50 cals? Not enough ammo. Why not use the more mobile 1919 MMG? Only ~75% of the firepower and ~1/2 the ammo. By comparison, the force above has a total of 1000 MG bursts - 125 in each dismounted teams, 250 for the 'tracks. They can keep right on hosing. Two seperated locations keeps enemy arty from silencing the whole bunch, and medium range prevents useful reply by mere infantry. With so much ammo, you can fire long enough to have meaningful effects even on defenders in cover - or force them to displace to avoid your fire. When they displace and break LOS, send in the infantry. Repeat. Variations on the same idea on defense can use 2x40mm Bofors, 4xHMG-1917, with or without 3xM3A1 to move them. I find the 40mm too cumbersome on the attack, though, compared to the HMG teams. Just some techniques I use for MG support on the attack, for what they are worth.