chrisl

Retrain them as drone operators?
 

For now, and for countries with limited tech development.  It won’t be long before lock is transferred from a drone so the launcher is firing over the horizon.  That’s an obvious next step for Javelin and Stugna type atgms.  But availability will be very asymmetric.
 
 

Fair points but western Will is not infinite and the pipeline is limited.  There will be nasty hard fights, but let’s remember that the UA is still pretty well armed in the tank/AFV department.  My thinking is that so long as we prioritize:
C4ISR - from space to UAS, to battlefield radars to whatever.  Integrated and networked backed up by US/western architecture.  And this stuff is not cheap by the way.
Fires.  Tubes, missiles, mortars and loitering munitions.  As much as we can possibly put in their hands.  Why?  To do what needs to be done in corrosive warfare - accelerated precision attrition.  If someone said we had $10M and the choice was a Leo 2 (with all the support) or 50 Spike NLOS, I would take the missiles at this point.  Guns, so many guns and ammo, drowned them in ammo and as much PGM as we can come up.  HIMARs double whatever they have.
Infantry.  Once again the dog faced human on the ground is a critical part of winning this war…that much has not changed.  Anything and everything that can 1) make infantry better and 2) make more trained infantry.
Once we got all that in the bag (and it is not there yet), then start sending the heavy stuff in complete unit packages.  So don’t send 10 Challengers, send a combat team built around the Challenger.  This includes logistics and engineering.  No point in talking about “hard points” unless we are talking assault engineering - MCLCs, AEVs, armoured bridges and the flip side, mine warfare equipment to fix an opponent in place once isolated.
You wanna win?  Focus on finding, fixing and killing Russians right now, and then build in the later stuff for the finishing battles deliberately like professionals.  If we can do both, great.  But I suspect we will have to prioritize and phase in.

Russia has huge holes in its tech stack/ISR/targeting management. Ukraine has limitations on its truly deep targeting imposed by NATO. This is a weird asymmetry that is unlikely to reoccur in exactly this way. Also the next war is probably going to include VASTLY more drones built specifically for military use. The next war, whenever, and wherever that is is, going to have different set of asymmetries .

We have been caught here before.  In fact it drove the operationalization of the tank itself.  My guess is that UGVs may be the game changer, but I am still not sure in which direction.

In the “Recommendations for Military Aid” category I’d have thought a key takeaway from this thread would have been the importance of winning the ‘drone war’ (‘dominating the dronesphere’?). I assume that’s covered somewhere in numbers 1 and 10, maybe?

Getting the remnants of Russia's semi competent pre war infantry to grind themselves to powder for territory that will have no meaningful effect on the outcome of this war is either military genius, or a sign of divine favor. I lean harder every day into the theory that the AFU are following Napoleon's maxim about not interrupting your enemy while he is making a mistake.
A competent Russian command would go entirely to defensive and use every single one of those experienced paratroopers as trainers and cadre for the mobiks

If I were at a U.S. defense contractor, I’d be digging through old designs to find hybrid guided munitions that fire from tank barrels and looking at modifying them to fire from a T-72 and putting updated electronics in them.  Two flavors would be interesting- heat seeking and third-party laser guided.  They would only have limited adjustability due to size and velocity, but that’s ok.  The tankers would be firing from OTH, directed by drone operators and the guidance would just make up for the error so it’s still first-shot hit/kill.  They’d be much higher velocity than typical ATGMs and have longer effective range as long as they’re shaped charge rather than kinetic.

The discussion on (eventually) backfilling MBT's with new orders is academic imho - except to those companies looking for new orders.
The situation in Ukraine currently means MBT's can be used to break through the russian defences they have been digging for several months and hopefully get them running back to their country.  This is a one-off unique situation.  In my somewhat amateur view MBT's became obsolete when the Apache Helicopter started to fly.  In Nato thinking the Apache obsoleted the tactical nukes which had previously been Nato's answer to mass MBT assaults.  This is why Nato has a couple of hundred old tactical nukes versus thousands on the Russian side - Nato air power will annihilate russian tank assaults.
Nato backfilling needs to happen with future drone-based weapon systems.  Tanks may be useful ... but probably not in the roles for which MBT's were conceived.  In my view most of the Nato MBTs should be given to Ukraine right now because NATO won't be needing them, especially when russia capitulates.  And Ukraine can use them right now.  
The main risk right now with deploying MBTs is that russia escalates to their tactical nukes with the loss of control that brings for all parties. Likely this is the reason Germany is being so contemplative as well they might, and wisely so.

Hey Khalerick, welcome to the thread, and it's always good to have a team B / devil's advocate view here.... I and others have played that role on occasion over the last 2000 pages.
But you have now left us about a dozen wordy posts over the last 2 pages in which you have laid out some *extremely* confident statements as to facts, only some of which may in fact be true.   A bit of a Gish Gallop debating strategy.
....And now you seem to be saying 'take it or leave it' on your thesis.  
I'm not tone policing -- we have some *very* cranky regular posters here, some of them in the emerging Western democracy that is fighting for its life. But nobody is going to make it their business to parse and debate each one of your assertions. Especially if your response to being challenged is simply to double down and say 'I thought I made myself clear.'
And then seem to suggest that the people posting on this thread are more preoccupied with confirmation bias via Tweet or giggling over war porn than understanding the ramifications of the struggle.
Because if that's really your impression of this community, you might want to take your opinions elsewhere.

No, A your wounded ratio is at least double the real number. Some if that is the lethality of modern weapons, and a lot more of it is the absolute shambles of the Russian militaries casualty evacuation and medical system. And given the inevitability of imperfection on an estimate like this one it is generally correct. That why Putin is about to round up several hundred thousand more mobiks to feed to the grinder. They will die too. The third wave might get a clue, or perhaps they don't, and in two or three years the Chinese take over the Russian far east without firing a shot.
 

And he, and others, keep trying to turn Kherson into a defeat…why is beyond me.
Magic bullet - Masses precision beats everything.  Double down on precision fires.
At this point anything that can hit with precision at the 100km range.  So more HIMARs obviously.  Self loitering munitions - Switchblade 600 (has the same warhead as the Javelin), Spike NLOS.  And there are rumours of next-gen precision DPICM, now would be a good time for them to show up.  Artillery delivered scatterable AT mines were in that last package which is another really good idea.  Unlike massive western fleet injections (tanks, AFVs and/or AirPower) these things can start doing what needs to be done immediately, killing more Russians in depth and the UA does not need months of training and new logistics system to support them. 
The Russian logistics system can only adapt so much before it buckles, we have already proven that.  I would focus on Russian guns, EW and logistics.

The thing is that NATO is not going to give just a single type of a/c to Ukraine. The idea is to deliver strike packages that contain SEAD/DEAD ; AEW; JASSM (USAF or USN) ; F35 ; and multi-role F/B. A week of 24/7 with those packages and the RA would not exist in Ukraine. Their AD could not deal with the number of in-comings, let alone their precision. This is not a insurgent army, but a old fashioned conventional army to be destroyed. However, there is the escalation piece to mull over. One off A10s and choppers, maybe. No, the magic bullet is something more subtle. Typhoid Jane in Russian foxholes just as an analogy.  

Listening to NPR this morning they had a report on Bakhmut that could have been pulled from here.  They accurately summed up the military significance to the war for Russia as minimal, the value for Ukraine in pulling in RU forces and grinding them up, and the political value at home of even a tiny apparent victory for RU.  They stopped short of bringing in that it may be about determining Putin’s successor.

And we are back to this.  The theory is that somehow if we had showered Ukraine in [Insert favored IFV, tank or whatever] that this war would be over by now.  This is gross oversimplification bordering on disinformation with an undertone of western biases that are frankly bordering on imperial prejudices.
1.  Ukraine has a large arms industry of its own: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_industry_of_Ukraine.  It is no doubt under stress but we have no reports it is falling apart.  It needs all the help it can get, so lets start there.
2.  Ukraine had pretty healthy mechanized force before this war started armed, not surprisingly with its own equipment. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Ground_Forces.  They have sustained losses, but do we have any reports of the UA being critically short of anything?  Any major losses due to those shortfalls?  Ok, so lets not freak out with the "Ukraine is collapsing because they do not have Marders" thing.
3.  Ukraine has captured an obscene amount of Russian equipment - https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html.  If half of those Russian vehicles have been made fit for battle Ukraine likely has more of some natures that it did at the start of the war.  Any support we can to make that happen smoother, better and faster is a very good idea.
4.  Heavy's overall value proposition is in doubt in this entire thing.  The Russians had mountains of it and it made no difference.  The UA is much smarter so I suspect they have already figured out the right conditions for heavy to work and are working to set it up.  We should be aiming at supporting the UA in creating those conditions as a priority, exploitation of that is something I am pretty sure they can cover.
5.  Every sexy peice of western equipment comes with a heavy logistics bill (we have discussed this), and in large numbers that bill could make the UAs life harder, not easier to sustain this potpourri of western hardware.
This whole line of thought, though well intentioned, also smacks of western superiority complex - "well if we had simply given those poor dirty Ukrainian rabble our superior western equipment they would have put Ivan on the run by now...oh dear, shame on us." 
Ukraine has thousands of APCs/IFVs - 40 Marders is not going to magically turn the tide anymore than 100 Leo 2s, or 50 Bradleys or freakin M1s.
Should we give Ukraine support? Absolutely. Should that include complete capability force packages that they can build units around? - again, yes. Should we give them versions of what they already have and can sustain? - definitely.  Should we prioritize things that do make an actual difference?  Like ISR, long range fires, AD and how about simple money so that soldiers get paid and their families can buy groceries?  How about shoring up the existing Ukrainian arms industry and military architecture so they can stop being so dependent on western support? Should we train and support their force generation - oh, most definitely.  
If someone said we had to decide between training 75k Ukraine troops or another 100 Marders, I already know what the right answer is.  You cannot flood a military built on an entirely different fleet system, in the middle of a a war, and magically make it all go away.  You can wring hands and cry "oh dear, think about all the good Ukrainain boys who may have survived if they were in Bradleys", well that assumes a Bradley is shell, mine and ATGM proof as well as invisible to begin with.  It also fails to fundamentally understand how militaries are built, sustained and employed.
Ukraine needs broad holistic and comprehensive support on many levels.  Niche, hi profile sexy equipment donations are nice but we cannot lose sight of the fundamentals - the stuff that really makes a difference.  And when this war is over, that is when the real support will be needed.  We had better see as much hand wringing and noise on donating farm equipment, reconstruction infrastructure and economic stimulus as we have seen on Marders/Bradleys or there was no point to this whole thing.

I would frame it a little differently, but the principle is the same.  The Soviets, and thus their descendants, never really developed SEAD/DEAD capability or doctrine.  But they did develop AD that’s being used to greater or lesser effect by both Ukraine and Russia.  It makes air operations much riskier because there are sufficient AD systems on the ground to prevent most CAS.
US doctrine in particular is driven by having to cross an ocean to get into a fight.  You can haul a bunch of heavy tubes and trucks to haul them and millions of shells.  Or you can focus on precision and stick that stuff on an airplane that flies itself into the theater and back out.  Air support, with some exceptions, is basically self propelled rocket artillery.  And the exceptions (A-10) are SP anti-tank guns.  If your doctrine depends on that, then you’ll see a big need for SEAD.  And once you have it, you effectively also have much longer range artillery for disrupting things far behind the LOC.
What Ukraine is doing with drones so far is mostly different- they’re used to achieve borg spotting so that the drone driver can tell the guy with the howitzer or the grenade precisely where to put the bang.  Using them with or as live munitions is still in pretty early stages, despite their success.  With some next gen of UA drone software they’ll have AR goggles on the guy with the grenade so he can see where the throw lands outside his natural LOS.
 

Listening to NPR this morning they had a report on Bakhmut that could have been pulled from here.  They accurately summed up the military significance to the war for Russia as minimal, the value for Ukraine in pulling in RU forces and grinding them up, and the political value at home of even a tiny apparent victory for RU.  They stopped short of bringing in that it may be about determining Putin’s successor.

I would frame it a little differently, but the principle is the same.  The Soviets, and thus their descendants, never really developed SEAD/DEAD capability or doctrine.  But they did develop AD that’s being used to greater or lesser effect by both Ukraine and Russia.  It makes air operations much riskier because there are sufficient AD systems on the ground to prevent most CAS.
US doctrine in particular is driven by having to cross an ocean to get into a fight.  You can haul a bunch of heavy tubes and trucks to haul them and millions of shells.  Or you can focus on precision and stick that stuff on an airplane that flies itself into the theater and back out.  Air support, with some exceptions, is basically self propelled rocket artillery.  And the exceptions (A-10) are SP anti-tank guns.  If your doctrine depends on that, then you’ll see a big need for SEAD.  And once you have it, you effectively also have much longer range artillery for disrupting things far behind the LOC.
What Ukraine is doing with drones so far is mostly different- they’re used to achieve borg spotting so that the drone driver can tell the guy with the howitzer or the grenade precisely where to put the bang.  Using them with or as live munitions is still in pretty early stages, despite their success.  With some next gen of UA drone software they’ll have AR goggles on the guy with the grenade so he can see where the throw lands outside his natural LOS.
 

I would frame it a little differently, but the principle is the same.  The Soviets, and thus their descendants, never really developed SEAD/DEAD capability or doctrine.  But they did develop AD that’s being used to greater or lesser effect by both Ukraine and Russia.  It makes air operations much riskier because there are sufficient AD systems on the ground to prevent most CAS.
US doctrine in particular is driven by having to cross an ocean to get into a fight.  You can haul a bunch of heavy tubes and trucks to haul them and millions of shells.  Or you can focus on precision and stick that stuff on an airplane that flies itself into the theater and back out.  Air support, with some exceptions, is basically self propelled rocket artillery.  And the exceptions (A-10) are SP anti-tank guns.  If your doctrine depends on that, then you’ll see a big need for SEAD.  And once you have it, you effectively also have much longer range artillery for disrupting things far behind the LOC.
What Ukraine is doing with drones so far is mostly different- they’re used to achieve borg spotting so that the drone driver can tell the guy with the howitzer or the grenade precisely where to put the bang.  Using them with or as live munitions is still in pretty early stages, despite their success.  With some next gen of UA drone software they’ll have AR goggles on the guy with the grenade so he can see where the throw lands outside his natural LOS.
 

RE: Airpower

If I'm not mistaken both Ukraine and Russia operate under an air power assumption of denying airspace to the (peer) enemy. This is the opposite of the western concept of airpower where you don't have AAA and instead rule the air. The U.S. focuses a lot on wild weasel attacks on enemy AAA and itself has little AAA, for example.

So neither force is suited to gaining air superiority because their priors assumed that they ought to be focused on denying it to the enemy. Looking into the war specifically Russia has the missiles but lacks the targeting data to hit AAA that would grant them superiority while Ukraine has the data but lacks the missiles. The result being that traditional airpower is sidelined and cheaper drones are being used.

There's at least a movie short in that, ending in you bashing the gnome to bits.

What you wrote there is consistent with my experience living there for a year as a student in the late 80s and then going back to visit again in the late 2010s.  A lot of social progress was made in that time, and Susan Neiman wrote a whole book about how the process went, including before and after the wall came down that's also consistent with your much, much shorter summary.

I think the trucks are the key.  Not to destroy them, but to follow the little bees back to the hive (ammo cache).  I am hoping that satellite imagery can help us to do this?  Or high altitude drones?  In the landbridge maybe even partisan spies? 

There were some delays in train shedule, but not significant - 5-6 hours maximum in worst case. If railroad power supply was off that trains got diesel locomotives instead electrical. We have enough extensive ralroad network and it's possible to redirect trains in bypass way if some line will have problems. Though, left bank part of counttry has less of bypassing capabilities
Here is railroad network map on 2014 (you can open it on other page and zoom it). Grey lines - non-electrified, green - electrified with alternating current with 25kV voltage, blue - electrified with direct current with 3kV voltage. Since 2014 some sections were electrified, but I hadn't newer map
 

Aka, “the bomber always gets through” and then civilian resistance becomes stronger.