chrisl

So I suspect this is what the UA may be building up to.  It would be the culmination of corrosive warfare.  We saw “infiltrate-isolate-annihilate-repeat” last fall to significant effect so the question is scale of this approach.  One thing missing from the academic criticisms is “why?”  The UA has demonstrated the ability to run two simultaneous operations, 500km apart, last fall.  “But over Xmas they forgot all that and are now penny packing Coy nibbles…silly Ukrainians”?  This is why I am convinced this is shaping.  By employing this probing and poking strategy they are obviously doing so for a reason.  Most likely to draw out RA HVT such as artillery.  These small scale nibblings are not designed to yield breakthroughs, they are designed to stress the RA system until a dispersed mass operation can be set in motion, which then may enable a more traditional mechanized breakout.  Ukraine is doing extra steps because that is how the battle space works.
As to the West, well the Taliban demonstrated that we are really no better than anyone else once you take away our advantages.  I suspect that warfare itself is evolving away from the advantages we had in many ways and we need to rethink things.  We do have the high ground on C4ISR for now.  However if we do not solve for force protection, particularly AirPower at all altitudes, we may find ourselves in serious trouble as other redefine the battle spaces.

I guess my problem with the whole “combined arms is their problem” narrative is that it misses the overall trend lines.  The RA was noted at the beginning of this war as failing to properly conduct combined arms.  This was a little odd as the Soviets essentially invented combined arms at scale and the RA was constructed around combined arms doctrine and concepts.  But we all agreed that “Russia Sux, LOLZ” and watched war porn streams with glee while yammering for “more Leopards!!”.
Now the UA on the offensive is also “failing to coordinate combined arms at scale” after extensive equipping and training by western forces.  So to my mind either two completely separate militaries coming at the problem have both mystically failed to grasp and execute the essentials of combined arms. Or there is something fundamentally changing about the concept of combined arms itself.
As to armchair quarter backing the UA in mid operations, well sure anyone with a podcast and a half decent academic background can nitpick.  It is called friction and it has always been in every war, forever.  Why?  Because human systems are filled with nasty human agency and perception, and error.  To point to a slow operational offensive “because units missed timelines” is weak and amateur analysis.  The biggest problem with trying to get professional assessments is that those able to do them are in the game and not going to speak publicly about what is actually going on.  What that means is that the calculus of this war remains opaque until the thing is over for a few years and we can get access to what actually happened - “How Did This Thing Get Hot?” thread coming hopefully soon.
The rest is academics and pundits trying to promote a bunch of angles.  We heard the same stuff at Bakhmut, Kherson and in the early days.  The fundamental questions are more along the lines of “can the UA translate corrode to breakout without air power as we knew it?”  “Has Defensive Primacy actually happened (again)?” “What the hell is happening with mass?” 
This is not pro-Ukrainian copium either.  The reality may be simply that offensive operations in this war do not work anymore.  We could be looking at the beginning of a frozen conflict line a la Korea.  But why offensive operations may not work is not because a UA unit had their map upside down anymore than when the RA stopped using their tanks as tanks and made VBIEDs out of them.
That all said, my own assessment is that this still feels like shaping.  I nice little feel up before heading to paradise.  It lasted for at least two months at Kherson.  I suspect we have the rest of the summer with this weird Grade 9 gym dancing until something gives and the UA drops the hammer and goes for it.  In fact we have not seen a full scale formation offensive yet - as has been noted - the reason is more likely because conditions have not been set.  Now another big question is “are the UA shaping or leg humping?”  Well given the C4ISR differences between the two forces my money is still on operational shaping, but we will have to wait and see.

So would not this:
Be a result of this:
And why they are doing this:
?
Also, why would the RA be rationing artillery ammo?  
Finally, does anyone think that maybe the UA is fighting in a more distributed manner (pretty much from Day 1) because that is what works on the battlefield now?  Large concentrations are highly visible from way back and can be hit so they are in fact a liability. The RA is the low bar of precision in this war but it looks like they are still able to disrupt UA mass even with the sub-par ISR and dumb artillery mass they have.
This is not a coordination or training issue it is a modern warfare reality - precision beats mass, mass precision beats everything.

That's a terrific podcast but I did not remember Kofman saying that. After reading your post I went back and re-listened to his sections and he never mentions the UA needing better training, or anything else about UA training. Maybe it was Lee or Alperovitch? If you can find it give me the time stamp, please.
Kofman has been openly skeptical of the efficacy of western-style combined arms training for the UA since it's inception, so the idea that what the UA needs is more of it would be a rather un-Kofman thing to say no matter what his traveling companions may think. Here's something Kofman really did say about UA training by NATO forces back in December:
Understand US is trying to find ways to improve outcomes and reduce UA dependence on high rates of arty fire. Less attrition, more maneuver. Training to do combined arms at company/battalion level is good in and of itself, but it won’t necessarily solve this problem. I have no doubt UA can learn combined arms maneuver, and saw elements of this at Kharkiv. However, without USAF air superiority, US logistics, C4ISR, etc it’s a bit hard to ‘fight like Americans.’ How well would we do without airpower? More importantly, it misses that attrition is what enabled maneuver in UA offensives. Against a well prepared defense, with sufficient density of forces, it wasn’t nearly as successful and casualties were high. This is why Kherson was so difficult compared to Kharkiv/Lyman. UA way of war depends on fires, exploited by maneuver. It is a successor military to the Soviet military, which was arty centric, and in that respect is much closer to the Russian military than our own. You have to work with what has proven successful for your partners. Deep strike, precision, better ISR, can help improve UA performance. My bias is that I’m  wary of seeing a solution that implies trying to turn that military more into us. That said, there’s no easy answer here. The US is not optimized to support a protracted artillery-driven war in Europe. Folks can also judge for themselves, looking at the history how good we are at converting other militaries to ‘fighting more like Americans' https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1606637882994819072

I thought I saw that on the rail bridge, too, but decided it was my imagination finding patterns and discounted it.  I'll reconsider it as being real since you see it, too.

Or the explosion warped the deck from below so the light scatters off it differently compared to the other unwarped part.
Need more closer up pics without watermarks all over.

For Japan I it might take a couple of afternoons.  It wouldn't surprise me terribly if they'd already fabricated all the parts and had just never assembled them so they could claim they don't have nuclear weapons.  South Korea might not be much farther from that point.  Taiwan might not need them - they probably have technology for effective directed energy weapons and can just vaporize anybody who comes too close.

Couple things
1.  Russian trying to restore manpower is fraught with problems none of which will improve based on weather
2. Not sure how much rainy season really matters if you aren't doing a mechanized push requiring extending supply lines.  UA could continue its present strategy regardless of weather.
3. So far I've seen no sign of UA committing the reserves it has built up anywhere so I can't say that Russian attempting to force UA to divert resources is having any impact.  In fact going on the offensive only makes it easier for UA to kill Russians.
Net result. It doesn't appear that Russia has come up with anything new in its bag of stupid tricks and UA continues to erode their C&C as well as artillery park.  Patience.

A new trend with the PR teams who produce these clips? (It's also occurs to me maybe we're just old and these are just effects that can be added to any tiktok clip - watch first clip below, towards the end)
 
 

Maybe the legacy of Soviet maps - they deliberately made them wrong for 50 years to mess with invaders.  Their NATO trainers come from a world where the ISR is so good that they can get accurate maps of things behind enemy lines, but there's fear of EW and using ELINT to track them down or cut off their access, so they use paper maps.  
Ukrainians operating in Ukraine have access to their own national comm network, and Russia has extremely limited EW and ELINT capability, which has been apparent for a while.  So the UA can use electronic maps in real time, and COTS drones that have been hacked to not transmit location back to China with minimal concern.

FWIW, I don't think the root interest of this war was centred on the West. The root interest was centered around the vested interest surrounding Ukraine (which also lead to CMBS), perhaps the perceived weakness of the West was instrumental in Russia going forward with the ordeal; I'll give you that.

That’s what closed loop control systems look like right up until the moment they fail catastrophically, particularly if maintaining the control loop depends on an expendable resource, like fuel or mobiks.  Everything looks like it’s going to be ok, then the control propellant runs out and you pancake in the desert.
As has been pointed out many times both here and elsewhere, Ukraine has only committed a small fraction of their newly raised forces and have been steadily corroding the C2 and artillery resources of RU from a distance.  As Russia runs low on reserves, holes will develop and Russia will have to either let Ukraine break through or shuffle troops around, making new holes to exploit.

That’s what closed loop control systems look like right up until the moment they fail catastrophically, particularly if maintaining the control loop depends on an expendable resource, like fuel or mobiks.  Everything looks like it’s going to be ok, then the control propellant runs out and you pancake in the desert.
As has been pointed out many times both here and elsewhere, Ukraine has only committed a small fraction of their newly raised forces and have been steadily corroding the C2 and artillery resources of RU from a distance.  As Russia runs low on reserves, holes will develop and Russia will have to either let Ukraine break through or shuffle troops around, making new holes to exploit.

That’s what closed loop control systems look like right up until the moment they fail catastrophically, particularly if maintaining the control loop depends on an expendable resource, like fuel or mobiks.  Everything looks like it’s going to be ok, then the control propellant runs out and you pancake in the desert.
As has been pointed out many times both here and elsewhere, Ukraine has only committed a small fraction of their newly raised forces and have been steadily corroding the C2 and artillery resources of RU from a distance.  As Russia runs low on reserves, holes will develop and Russia will have to either let Ukraine break through or shuffle troops around, making new holes to exploit.

One has to remember that military systems are highly redundant and over-engineered (yes, even Russian ones).  So if the UA is effectively eroding the RA system of defence we are going to be seeing different indicators of this. Also we need to be watching for stuff we are not seeing but should be.  So stuff like:
- Russian logistics and artillery losses that lead to observable shortfalls
- Lack or shortfalls in RA c-moves.  Or RA c-moves that look like scrambles or dyke plugging (these lateral shift cause enormous disruptions)
- continued denial and loss of AirPower assets.
- RA loss of high profile and high value systems - EW, ISR and Engr
- Indicators that RA morale is flagging - desertions and surrenders.
- shortfalls in the RA medical support system
All this (and more) need to add up over time in order for the RA system to buckle.  Once it fails though it has to fall into a lower energy state in order to sustain and avoid a cascade failure.  We normally call these fall-back positions.  
Corrosive warfare is not just attrition warfare.  Attrition warfare is a grinding of the front end of a system until exhaustion sets in.  Corrosive warfare needs ISR and precision to hit the entire operational system at key nodes of capability - you are essentially de-constructing their operational system.  You need to do this at a rate that those nodes cannot be re-built or shifted.  It takes time do this and compared to rapid manoeuvre and annihilation seems like it may be going nowhere.  However, compared to real attrition warfare which can take years it appears it may happen much faster in the contemporary context. (ie months)

That’s what closed loop control systems look like right up until the moment they fail catastrophically, particularly if maintaining the control loop depends on an expendable resource, like fuel or mobiks.  Everything looks like it’s going to be ok, then the control propellant runs out and you pancake in the desert.
As has been pointed out many times both here and elsewhere, Ukraine has only committed a small fraction of their newly raised forces and have been steadily corroding the C2 and artillery resources of RU from a distance.  As Russia runs low on reserves, holes will develop and Russia will have to either let Ukraine break through or shuffle troops around, making new holes to exploit.

That’s what closed loop control systems look like right up until the moment they fail catastrophically, particularly if maintaining the control loop depends on an expendable resource, like fuel or mobiks.  Everything looks like it’s going to be ok, then the control propellant runs out and you pancake in the desert.
As has been pointed out many times both here and elsewhere, Ukraine has only committed a small fraction of their newly raised forces and have been steadily corroding the C2 and artillery resources of RU from a distance.  As Russia runs low on reserves, holes will develop and Russia will have to either let Ukraine break through or shuffle troops around, making new holes to exploit.

That’s what closed loop control systems look like right up until the moment they fail catastrophically, particularly if maintaining the control loop depends on an expendable resource, like fuel or mobiks.  Everything looks like it’s going to be ok, then the control propellant runs out and you pancake in the desert.
As has been pointed out many times both here and elsewhere, Ukraine has only committed a small fraction of their newly raised forces and have been steadily corroding the C2 and artillery resources of RU from a distance.  As Russia runs low on reserves, holes will develop and Russia will have to either let Ukraine break through or shuffle troops around, making new holes to exploit.

This is the best one:
I think it translates to "Russia should avoid any concentration of any kind of forces in Ukraine for the next 6 months unless they want to be cluster bombed."

That’s what closed loop control systems look like right up until the moment they fail catastrophically, particularly if maintaining the control loop depends on an expendable resource, like fuel or mobiks.  Everything looks like it’s going to be ok, then the control propellant runs out and you pancake in the desert.
As has been pointed out many times both here and elsewhere, Ukraine has only committed a small fraction of their newly raised forces and have been steadily corroding the C2 and artillery resources of RU from a distance.  As Russia runs low on reserves, holes will develop and Russia will have to either let Ukraine break through or shuffle troops around, making new holes to exploit.

translation : Russia is clusterfk'd

This afternoon, there was another short briefing at the Pentagon where Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl answered a few questions:

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3452000/under-secretary-of-defense-for-policy-dr-colin-kahl-holds-press-briefing/

Here are some quotes:
On Ukraine's counter-offensive:

On the delivery of cluster munitions:
 

The only organization with a lick of credibility during the conflict is probably the IAEA. They managed to sneak their way into gaining a permanent team onto ZNPP, and have shown a willingness to listen to both sides, like acknowledging Ukraine’s concerns and seeking more access for areas of ZNPP, and being able to manage Russia into not being expelled. 
props tho to the UN executive for the Black Sea grain initiative, that is important as well.

And convincing the Russins they can't just outlast the NATO's will to fight is essentially the entire ballgame here.
The head of the IAEA should be the next guy to run the U.N., it is the only international body in this entire war that has done its job. The people who have volunteered to go to the occupied nuke plant and try to keep a lid on Russia's stupidity are as brave as anyone in this war.

A solid point on PGM.  DPICM was really a better way to distribute lethality before PGM.  With PGM a few rounds can do the damage of many dumb, even DPICM.  However, what we do not know is the ammo situation of PGM in this war, nor that of dumb rounds either.  I doubt this decision ( if it is indeed not just a rumour) was taken on a whim “Oh hey, that’s right we got all those DPICM rounds” *slaps forehead*.  I suspect that this decision is an offset to another development, shortfalls in PGM ammo most likely.
So What?  Well the calculus is clearly between bad and worse, and they have gone with bad.  The terrain in the break in battle is already highly contaminated so this is fairly incremental risk at this point - I.e. happy rose cheeked Ukrainian children will not be frolicking in these fields for about a century regardless of UA DPICM or not.  So in order to keep the momentum of the grinding a hard decision was made…and here we are.
One thing this war has demonstrated is that when facing the harsh realities of long duration high intensity conventional warfare a lot of idealistic and aspirational ideas we had before the war have become strained.  The “quick clean weekend war” was the first one.  Facing existential conflict the dirty fact is that every nation on earth will likely abandon principles for interests and survival given enough pressure.  War is once again a race to the bottom.  Something to keep in mind on the whole unmanned debate.