Andreas

Kein Problem - if you speak enough German, this site has all you look for: www.lexikonderwehrmacht.de

I don't think the Red Army would have stood a chance. The Wehrmacht would have taken them to the cleaners, on the defense and with shortened and working supply lines even more so then on the offense. You are talking about the Wehrmacht at the apex of its capabilities here, even in Spring.

PR 1 (4 light, 2 medium coys) Panzer I (24 or 26), Panzer II (49), Panzer III (26) and Panzer IV (20). PR 2 (4 light, 2 medium coys) Panzer I (24 or 26), Panzer II (49), Panzer III (30) and Panzer IV (20). I have slightly conflicting numbers for this. Especially for the Panzer I. Panzerjäger-Abteilung 37 - 3coys of 8 3,7cm Pak36, and probably 3 5cm Pak 38 each. Also one AA coy, 8 SP 2cm Flak 38, and 2 2cm quad Flak. Panzeraufklärungs-Abteilung 4 - armoured cars in one coy, maybe plus one platoon, also motorcycle coy, heavy coy. K1 - motor-cycles, MG coy, heavy coy. Also, in the Schützenbrigade, one coy of SP 15cm sIG33.

Michael, I think that it would strike most people who know their English geography (and there are not many, granted), as entirely reasonable to assume that the Durham Light Infantry (DLI) does indeed hail from County Durham. Durham is to Newcastle what a Rolls Royce is to a clapped out, rusty 79 Ford Pinto. The museum appears to be very nice - I have only made it into the bookshop, but walked out with some nice books. On my next visit to Durham I make an extra allowance for it. It is however not fair to say that it is the only attraction, unless you are either blind, or of a mental dullness that would make a leech seem appreciable of fine arts, compared to you. Durham is also home to one of the most magnificent cathedrals in the realm, and a very fine 'city' centre.

Well no - this is the first time I see Paulus mentioned as having any positive influence anywhere. Hence my incredulity. I take your word for him having lectured at Frunze - the make-up of the faculty there has never been a prime concern of mine. I just don't agree with the idea that that was in any way connected to the Red Army getting better at operations.

Nah, it was just too good an opportunity to quib to let it pass.

Rumour grog.

Rumours, shmumours

I think using Victoria Cross citations to support the argument that something was 'not that uncommon' is a bit problematic.

That is one well-staged picture.

Well, even if it was not staged, the Indian Army were the Finns of Burma, I am sure there is one with a toothpick looking for a Japanese tank to disable in the background. Anyway, I think the Japanese in those foxholes made them growl and show their teeth, so this may be an exceptional picture.

I can not remember any mention in 18 Platoon of Brens fired from the hip, but that maybe because of my age. I can remember ordinary fire and movement being mentioned though.

So, what did he actually teach them (and please no speculation, I can do that myself), and do you have any real info on the war-winning secrets he divulged?

Hitler ordered the beginning of preparations for a November offensive in the west on August 19th, four days after the Dragoon landings. Whether he contemplated it much earlier, as Michael indicates, I do not know. Subsequent events in the east, with the desaster in Romania, and the autumn battles in the Baltics, did nothing to change matters.

I considered breaking the sentence up, but it made me feel German to leave it as it is.

I can't answer the first one, but the second one is pretty clear. Without control of the dams, no crossing of the Roer river until Spring. That means no access to the Cologne plain that lies behind Aachen. Without control of the Huertgen, no control of the dams. Even when the Ardennes offensive had failed, the dams needed to be controlled before the Roer could be crossed, IIRC.

Yes you are - Konev in his memoirs is making exactly this point. If you use your infantry before your fire assets have established control of the battlefield, all you is wasting the lives of your men to no avail. The establishment of fire superiority preceeds movement. The Soviet commanders who did not understand this were failures, in his view.

Eh? The German forces that were there in April 45 fought and were destroyed in the Po valley. They didn't retreeat north into some mountain fortress, the forces in front of 10th US Mtn Div excepted. </font>

Well, what was the alternative? While some serious mistakes were made by the commanders, in particular the failure to correctly identify the key objectives, i.e. the dams, it seems pretty clear to me that the battle needed to be fought, and the losses would probably not have been much less even if the objectives had been clearly ID'd. The Scheldt debacle has to rate a lot higher than this on the balls-up scale.

Please. So how did they capture Paulus in the first place? Did he just happen to stroll into their lines while those idiot bumbling Red Army commanders were lamenting their own stupidity and his 6th Army soldiers were shooting themselves to help the Soviets out? What could Paulus conceivably tell them on February 1st 1943 that was of any interest in the later battles? That the Germans were gunning for the Caucasian oil? That they thought until November that they had broken the back of the Red Army? That they would have liked to occupy Moscow in 1941, and he had written a study on it then? That they really really, no really! wanted to win the war in the east, and oh wouldn't it have been nice to occupy Leningrad? Anything he knew then was very interesting for the Soviet historians, but not anyone else. Edit to add - why do you actually think that anyone would like to take lessons from the erstwhile Quartermaster in OKH, who then managed to spectacularly lose his army by consistently underestimating his enemy? :confused: Unless of course he taught the Red Army commanders who really not to do it. [ May 12, 2004, 06:18 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

Keep in mind this was the same time when the German high command denuded the east of reserves to build up forces for operation Wacht am Rhein. You are postulating the forces would go east - there is zero basis for this in reality. Quite the opposite was happening in fact, with newly available, or refreshed units primarily going to the west. Dandelion - while they decided it was not worth battling on for the lowlands of the Po valley in May 45, in August 44 this would probably have been different.

What sort of divisions?

The allied troops at this stage kept a larger number of Germans in theatre then they had to deploy there. Liberating the rest of Italy in one fell swoop would have created a logistics problem in having to supply the Italian population. It may have enabled more Germans to withdraw from southern France, and it would have been against the principle of concentration of force. Finally, there was one place where Germany could be beaten, and that was Germany. Losing Italy would have been a benefit to the German war effort at this stage, freeing a large number of troops and logistical assets for the battle for Germany. The German high command's willingness to squander forces in pointless areas (Baltics, Italy) was of huge benefit to the Red Army and the western allies alike. I don't think the western allies would have benefited much from the additional forces at this stage - they would most likely have been a further drain on the already strained logistical assets in the French theatre. In early September they grounded a lot of infantry divisions to keep the tank formations moving - this indicates that they were not wanting for men, but for POL, trucks, ammunition, etc.

Coming back to Delaforce - while I have not read his 'Taming the Panzers', I have read quite a bit of his stuff, and tend not to trust him on details.