Andreas

Or ARKO, Artillerie Kommandeur. 170 and 240 would normally be in independent Abteilungen (part of the Heerestruppen I think), and attached to a Korps, not a division, for tactical control. This could change depending on specific circumstances, but the standard setup saw them as part of the Korps.

Lies, all lies. There never were no frightenend German paratroopers. They were all steel-chinned elite hampsters. Bah.

I don't quite agree with this from the reading I have done. The infighting between OKW (Hitler) and OKH (Brauchitsch/Halder and then Halder) had started before the war against France, with varying positions being taken by the actors. By the time of Barbarossa though, Halder (the professional German military man) was clearly up for the deep objective all along, while Hitler was shilly-shallying (good to be observed in the treatment of AG North, IMO), and the field commanders seemingly were not quite clear what was going on, or just were fairly opportunistic about it (Guderian in particular). I.e. - the German professional army leadership wanted Moscow, but the interference of the Bohemian private made it impossible for them to carry out their plans. It may well be though that the assumption was that in the direction of Moscow lay the opportunity to destroy the enemy forces even more decisively. Friesner puts the moment of accepting subservience at the time of the Halt Befehl in May 1940, when Hitler rescinded the OKH order to hand the mobile forces from von Rundstedt's army group to the army investing Dunkerque (numbers maybe wrong - no sources at present) while visiting von Rundstedt's HQ. The mistake by the German command was neatly summed up by Heusinger (chief of operations at OKH, later commander of the Bundeswehr), when he said that the Russian does not accept operational defeat, or something to that effect. Meaning that even the string of operational victories that the Germans thought could win them the war, did not add to the required strategic victory.

Moved to new thread. [ March 17, 2004, 03:31 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

It is probably this what he means, to some degree. Not quite the way you wrote it, but certainly the German high command did not really plan for what happened, and when it happened were not quite sure what to do with it, as is shown by the headless chicken dance they performed first after Arras, and then again in front of Dunkerque. German commanders on the tactical and operational level acting against, or at least ignoring, explicit orders led to the success of the Sichelschnitt. Not high command planning according to some secret doctrine that was then called "Blitzkrieg" in British papers. It is a German word, originating in German military thought though. First in the mid-30s. The legend that it was invented by a British hack is just that.

In the German army they were called "Bursche" at some point (English roughly "lad"). Not sure if there was another term at some point. I would be surprised if they ever had it in the Bundeswehr.

Well yes indeed. Unfortunately this op is broken, something we did not notice in testing it.

Schuhplattler

And where is the bus?

Good work, IMO. Can't assess it comparatively, because I have not read anything else about the topic. He does not think much of Monty barging in and throwing it all in confusion on his appointment as commander of the whatever for the invasion. It certainly reads like a PhD thesis.

Ah, sweet drunkenness. Always a pleasurable alternative. Just stay away from the computer while pursuing it.

<big><big>NOW</big></big> you're talkin' Armegeddon! </font>

Someone needs to send a file with that occuring to Matt. All the discussion here won't solve it.

welcome - and it is not just you. They share the model.

Came across this online book today when googling for Tuker's fate. It is the official history of the three Indian divisions in Italy, published by HMSO in 1946, for the Indian government. I only had a quick look through it, but it seems a very well done book, with a lorra lorra pitchers, and maps, and stuff. If you are at a lose end this weekend, which of course London CM players won't be, this could be for you!

Mattias - can you email me?

Of course, every Hannibal needs a Varro and Paullus, as Friesner puts it.

Manstein was, and Halder then adopted it. Hitler realised the potential of going for Sedan, but not of going through it. That was hardly rocket science, since Sedan had been the target in other wars.

That's what I usually do, just ask Sergei.

While I disagree with a lot of Jason's thinking, I would certainly by a published copy of his thesis when he has finished it. One day I have to get Zetterling's book, just to support what he does, although I am also not quite sure about his conclusions, from what I have read in various discussions. The problem is IMO lazyness. It is a lot easier to get a copy of Panzergeneral and five Carrell/Schmidt books at Barnes & Noble for a fiver, and then write a book in the style you describe. Before I do it, I have to find a question that is interesting enough to answer that I would stick through the project. Since we are both round-about the same age, expect to have to wait to your fifties, depending on how my career goes. Anyway, back to SPWs - 13.PD did not have any in June 1941.

Do you have double my volume Kitty?

There are few, if any battalion or regimental war diaries of the early war left. I blame Bomber Command for fire-bombing the place they were stored in. I have looked at Korps and Divisions KTB excerpts from the 11/42 MARS defense, but they don't go into this kind of detail for SPWs. Anyway, if I did move to the Bundesarchiv, I would do the research myself and write books in English about it. There must be a market for sensible analysis based on German KTBs. Just for the record - I don't see myself as part of 'the other side'. I pretty much agree with Jason on the misuse of the HT in CM, I am just more catholic about it and willing to entertain the idea, at least as an analytical exercise, that the Germans at some point early in the war did use them in a more aggressive way. I do not like the logic of 'there were none, so it did not happen', because the first half of that sentence is not correct. Jason - I would agree with you that it is impossible to prove the negative here if it was not the case of having to look at a very low number of units, even though the data quality is going to be bad (see above). How many Panzerdivisionen did have a full complement of SPW battalions in 1941? Less than a dozen I am sure.

You ignore the fact that at least one division already had a full complement (1 battalion) of these, 1.PD. Others had a company at least (12.PD, will check 13.PD tonight). So if you want to continue down your 'they never did this early in the war' line, you need to check the individual combat records of those divisions to prove it. Just to numerically analyse it at a high level and say 'they had almost none, so it did not happen' is not good enough, when some units were equipped to the full or a significant level. I do not disagree with the gist of your argument, but I do disagree with the analysis you undertake to arrive there. In my example there is another addition you have not covered. Moving through gun-equipped bunkers mounted. BTW - the guns were not taken from the rear, they could cover the area in their arc, but they could not be depressed enough to deal with the Germans.

Okay, I had a quick look for an action of 1.PD in 1941, where I thought they may have advanced mounted. Attack on Duderhofer Hoehen, 11th Sept. 41. Force is KG Eckinger, essentially the SPW battalion of 1.PD and some tanks and other support (I./113 and 6./Pz.1). Attack is carried out mounted, against Soviet infantry and AT guns. Throughout the battle description, speed is emphasised, and it can be infered (where it is not mentioned expressly) that a lot of the combat was from the SPW. 'Mounted it breaks into the southern part of Duderhof. Russian infantry with AT guns [...] is crushed by the tanks at the point. Major Dr. Eckinger turns his battalion south, depending on the lay of the land and the situation tanks and SPW alternate in the lead [...].' 'Quickly threading through Duderhof to the east, and moving mounted through enemy bunkers Major Dr. Eckinger succeeds in breaking into the bunker line that is equipped with heavy coastal guns.' 'Pioneer assault teams [...] fight down more coastal guns under cover from tanks and SPW.'

Thanks - about to get a brew on, but no pies unfortunately. Someone ate all of them. May have to check the delights on offer by the local sandwich makers for some nourishment.