acrashb

Just…wow…seriously, we are going to be studying what the Ukrainian military pulled off in this war for the rest of the century.

This is a very good point but a couple clarifications that might help.  A lot of signatories have clauses built in, in the "case of self-defence war" and I do not think anyone would blame Ukraine for their employment in this case, so long as they are employed against legitimate military targets - which is basically any and all Russians on Ukrainian soil.
The US lead the planet on self-neutralizing scatterable mines and ICM, with things like 99.9% reliability, it is one of the reasons they did not feel they had to sign on, that and the Korean peninsula.  The US has done this for the exact reason you layout above, particularly after they saw the mess in Lebanon when the IDF used older US munitions.   So unless those are 80s era FASCAM and DPICM, we are not talking about massive RoW problems and the battlefield payoff is potentially significant.  
So the primary issue is really political and I have no idea what the spin on that will be.

Killed
Wounded
Destroyed
Towed

From the article, "The cause of the fire is under investigation, the military department added." To briefly indulge in some fun, I suppose they are determining if it was a Harpoon, Neptune, or a thunder run by a John Deere. 

Also for point of clarification, the Moskva attack. Im not familiar with the Neptune missile, is it hypersonic or in some way unusual? I read in a tweet they got two hits on three missiles? Seems like a pretty high rate of success if true. Should I take from this that Ukraine has next level ASuM or that the Russian CIWS sucks? Or maybe CIWS isn't all its cracked up to be?
Tbh just having a hard time processing this Moskva thing, IMO its one of the most wild things I've read here in a while. Want to talk about @The_Capt's 'oh ****' moments regarding what the UA can do, for me this is another one. 

From the article, "The cause of the fire is under investigation, the military department added." To briefly indulge in some fun, I suppose they are determining if it was a Harpoon, Neptune, or a thunder run by a John Deere. 

Actually at the end of the day we are a wargaming community with deep interest (and some expertise) in the history of warfare.  This is the first peer-on-peer conventional war of the 21st century and likely the most intense since the Iran-Iraq war back in the 80s, so you can understand why it is kind of a big deal.
As to the games, no small amount of effort you see here is to try and figure out how to make CM more realistic, particularly the modern titles.  So let’s call this game design in contact.   
Finally we are about analysis and assessment that cut through a lot of the noise out there, so we have seen a lot of people migrate here because we try and remain unbiased- as far as we can as we stand with Ukraine on this one- and offer a different picture than a lot of mainstream military analysis.  Moreover, we will toot our own horn as we have been noted as out in front of events thanks in large part to information sharing and a robust online debate.
We are also on the internet and get whackies, which have been warned and in some cases banned.  
That all said, do not worry BFC is still in the gaming business but right now they have their eyes on this history in the making.  They (and “we”: check out CMCW while you are in the gift shop!), will be back to making the game series you love shortly but right now the best good we can do is try and keep a clear eye on things and keep each other informed while supporting those of us in the middle of all this.

I can only speak for myself here but I registered on this forum because the way this war is covered in this topic is better than any other place I have seen on the internet or on mainstream media for that matter.
I have never played a CM game in my life but I will definitely be getting into the series in the future now that I see how passionate people in this community are about letting people understand the realities of warfare.
In the mean time I wish the Armed Forces of Ukraine all the luck in the world!

On the first, as is often the case this doesn't need to be either/or, it can be some where in between, and I think your word "problematic" gets at that.  The Russian economy is being cratered; so has the North Korean one been for some time and they still maintain a large (although likely ineffective) armed forces.  But I agree that the RA will not be the same after this.
On the second, the chart and information you presented are persuasive - and my thanks for putting it forward.  I'll be using some of this to inform my corporate leadership about the advisability of re-entering the Russian market post-war - we drew down our limited business there shortly after it started.
This was directed to panzermartin - and I agree. Russia has been forming a narrative to justify aggression and has been fairly successful in using this to instill doubt in NATO societies - partly because, like every good lie there was a glimmer of truth in the sense that the West as a whole had become somewhat triumphalist with the collapse of the USSR.  The ISW has a tidy diagram, below, and an excellent article on this.
Narrative:

As I've said before, reviewing twenty years of Putin's statements leads me to believe that we could not have prevented both Russian expansion and war - it was one or the other.  Had we conceded the narrative, Russia would have created buffer zones and then adjusted the narrative to expand from there.
The way out?  Russia could have reformed its society and joined NATO.  But that ship has sailed.

 

BREAKING
Russian cruiser struck by Neptune and on fire in Black Sea.
Rumour/radio intercept.

This one I can begin to address; it is part of my day job. 
Pre-war, about 4-6 weeks in advance, the usual authoritative clearing houses (like the US' CISA and Canada's CCCS) were warning of a significant uptick in cyber attacks / reconnaissance.   This uptick has been sustained, but not materially increased, since the war started.  It is mostly or perhaps almost entirely directed at critical infrastructure.
I have worked in critical infrastructure, and the state of OT (Operational Technology, e.g., the tech that runs a pipeline) that I've seen is appalling - software so out of date that there are hundreds of known vulnerabilities, and no possibility of patching because it is attached to aged and non-replaceable hardware that can't take more modern software.  The only technical hope here is a hard shell around the OT and highly-segmented internal architectures to limit the spread of introduced malware.  I'm over-simplifying for discussion.
Then there was the successful Colonial Pipeline attack and others; I thought that the war would bring massive cyber-initiated infrastructure disruption, but it hasn't.  There have been a few impacts mostly located in Ukraine but some have spilled out (e.g., the Viasat KA-SAT communication network in Europe was hit Feb 24 and is still in trouble).
Post-war analysis will figure this out; my thoughts: people ignore security until something happens; many probing attacks by state and state-affiliated actors have generated, in the last few years, a sense that something is happening; budgets for cyber security as a result have been increasing; security on critical infrastructure is specifically monitored and promoted in major nations (e.g., the US' NERC CIP compliance regime for electricity generation); various agencies have developed strong cyber attack / counter-attack capability.  So critical infrastructure may be better protected than we all thought and/or the counter-attack capability is so strong, and so well communicated to our adversaries, that they are terrified of starting something (maybe).
Had state actors kept their powder dry and lulled the world into a false sense of security, I think things would have been different.
In addition, organizations globally have implemented breakneck-speed hardening programs since the war started.  For example, my organization is concerned about Russian and affiliated (e.g., Fancy Bear) attacks; the war has caused us to increase the rating of our threat model and we have taken many (exact number is classified) actions to protect our ability to deliver service to our customers, pausing other activities in an organization-wide effort.  Our attack surface and overall risk profile has significantly improved in the last six weeks (it was good before, now it's better).
Regarding cyber attacks on mil infrastructure, that's a different beast and I have no specific insight.  Civvy crit infrastructure is part of war, however, so worth diving into.
 
In the visible spectrum, agreed.  I wonder that other frequencies, passive and active, are available to UAVs and how well they get through leaves.

Here's something hopeful for those who believe human nature is irredeemably savage:
https://nationalpost.com/news/world/syrian-fighters-join-ukraine-against-russia-whose-troops-are-now-led-by-their-brutal-commander-dvornikov
Syrians helping Ukrainians, not bad.

This one I can begin to address; it is part of my day job. 
Pre-war, about 4-6 weeks in advance, the usual authoritative clearing houses (like the US' CISA and Canada's CCCS) were warning of a significant uptick in cyber attacks / reconnaissance.   This uptick has been sustained, but not materially increased, since the war started.  It is mostly or perhaps almost entirely directed at critical infrastructure.
I have worked in critical infrastructure, and the state of OT (Operational Technology, e.g., the tech that runs a pipeline) that I've seen is appalling - software so out of date that there are hundreds of known vulnerabilities, and no possibility of patching because it is attached to aged and non-replaceable hardware that can't take more modern software.  The only technical hope here is a hard shell around the OT and highly-segmented internal architectures to limit the spread of introduced malware.  I'm over-simplifying for discussion.
Then there was the successful Colonial Pipeline attack and others; I thought that the war would bring massive cyber-initiated infrastructure disruption, but it hasn't.  There have been a few impacts mostly located in Ukraine but some have spilled out (e.g., the Viasat KA-SAT communication network in Europe was hit Feb 24 and is still in trouble).
Post-war analysis will figure this out; my thoughts: people ignore security until something happens; many probing attacks by state and state-affiliated actors have generated, in the last few years, a sense that something is happening; budgets for cyber security as a result have been increasing; security on critical infrastructure is specifically monitored and promoted in major nations (e.g., the US' NERC CIP compliance regime for electricity generation); various agencies have developed strong cyber attack / counter-attack capability.  So critical infrastructure may be better protected than we all thought and/or the counter-attack capability is so strong, and so well communicated to our adversaries, that they are terrified of starting something (maybe).
Had state actors kept their powder dry and lulled the world into a false sense of security, I think things would have been different.
In addition, organizations globally have implemented breakneck-speed hardening programs since the war started.  For example, my organization is concerned about Russian and affiliated (e.g., Fancy Bear) attacks; the war has caused us to increase the rating of our threat model and we have taken many (exact number is classified) actions to protect our ability to deliver service to our customers, pausing other activities in an organization-wide effort.  Our attack surface and overall risk profile has significantly improved in the last six weeks (it was good before, now it's better).
Regarding cyber attacks on mil infrastructure, that's a different beast and I have no specific insight.  Civvy crit infrastructure is part of war, however, so worth diving into.
 
In the visible spectrum, agreed.  I wonder that other frequencies, passive and active, are available to UAVs and how well they get through leaves.

From the article:  
 
The costs of failure for the West are pretty high, the costs to Ukrainian nation could get a lot worse yet, regardless of their chances of victory.

And:
I know some on this forum are all for US/Nato intervention (even if just imposing a no fly zone) and I respect that view, but I stand on the side of thought that the west's strategy; that is, management of escalation, balanced against ensuring that Putin is defeated, is the prudent one.

Clearly though the dial has moved somewhat as we enter a new phase of the war. But equally at this juncture, Putin has also given the West an excuse to now recalibrate the balance of their strategic approach. I reason this because obviously we now know about war crimes; the murder of civilians in Bucha etc; use of cluster munitions in Kharkiv; and (with some assumptions at this stage) the use of a chemical weapon in Mariupol. In light of this, the best most immediate and effective response, but retaining the balance of both escalation and necessity to support Ukraine to maximise a Russian defeat, is for the US (by hook or by crook) to get those Polish MiG 29's into Lviv.

I know I'm repeating my own post here from 300 pages and 3-4 weeks back, but this move in my view is now the most proportionate response (if it wasn't before), and it's a move at a critical point in this conflict (as per the article and as we all aware) where it could be most effective to bring about a Russian defeat. 

I also considered the possibility that this action could give Putin an excuse to attack Poland, but I think that's highly improbable, given article 5 and the fact that Russia has not attacked UK, Germany or anyone else who has supplied lethal assets - those countries have already tested the water and Putin has done nothing. I can only conclude that Putin would be stumped for a response and would just have to suck it up.

EDIT: Just saw @DesertFoxpost about the Slovakian MiGs. A very apt coincidence. We'll add those to the offering too. That makes 40 in total.   

Thanks - luckily I know how to get through paywalls
"It used a complex chain of malware, including some custom-built to control utility systems" - that's the OT I mentioned.
"In recent weeks, American officials have warned that Russia could try to expand its cyberwarfare" - this is a correct statement, and is one of the reasons private companies have been hardening up.
"The attackers may have broken into the electrical company’s systems as early as February" - so it could have been an APT, an "Advanced Persistent Threat", something that hangs around waiting to be activated.  Nonetheless failed, maybe that's why (the article is not specific).  Sometimes an APT is discovered because it disrupts normal activity patterns over time and the SIEM and/or human threat hunters notice.
"since Russia’s invasion began,[...] three times as many attacks as it had tracked in the previous year" - this is consistent with my data feeds, but globally, not just in Ukraine.  
"Some analysts believed that Russia would back up its ground invasion with crippling cyberattacks and were puzzled when widespread hacking campaigns did not materialize during the early days of the war."  - more like _every_ analyst. 
Further to my previous lengthy post, in addition to other speculations I'm wondering if the Russian cyber warfare groups are as borked as the kinetic warfare people.  Someone pointed out earlier that NATO had threatened Article 5, but cyber warfare difficult to clearly attribute to a specific threat actor, and in any event the language used was “massive cyber attack”; we haven't even see significant pinpricks.  You'd think that messing up air traffic control at one of the Polish airports taking in Western aid would be a priority, but nothing, at least not in the public domain.
For those keeping track: 2022 Ukraine cyberattacks - Wikipedia
 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/04/12/pentagon-ukraine-weapons/?utm_source=reddit.com
I think whatever was left of the don't be too mean to the Russians faction in the Biden Administration has been conclusively routed.

Here's something hopeful for those who believe human nature is irredeemably savage:
https://nationalpost.com/news/world/syrian-fighters-join-ukraine-against-russia-whose-troops-are-now-led-by-their-brutal-commander-dvornikov
Syrians helping Ukrainians, not bad.

As much as I try to do minimal politics, if that team (Hilary and Co) was as aggressive about a Ukraine takeover as they were when Ambassador Stevens was killed, Putin could have personally flown to Kiev, shot the Ukraine president, sat on his chair, and nothing would have happened.
I think more likely the issue was a less-prepared / modernized Russian Army, or a lower sense of urgency, or both.

This one I can begin to address; it is part of my day job. 
Pre-war, about 4-6 weeks in advance, the usual authoritative clearing houses (like the US' CISA and Canada's CCCS) were warning of a significant uptick in cyber attacks / reconnaissance.   This uptick has been sustained, but not materially increased, since the war started.  It is mostly or perhaps almost entirely directed at critical infrastructure.
I have worked in critical infrastructure, and the state of OT (Operational Technology, e.g., the tech that runs a pipeline) that I've seen is appalling - software so out of date that there are hundreds of known vulnerabilities, and no possibility of patching because it is attached to aged and non-replaceable hardware that can't take more modern software.  The only technical hope here is a hard shell around the OT and highly-segmented internal architectures to limit the spread of introduced malware.  I'm over-simplifying for discussion.
Then there was the successful Colonial Pipeline attack and others; I thought that the war would bring massive cyber-initiated infrastructure disruption, but it hasn't.  There have been a few impacts mostly located in Ukraine but some have spilled out (e.g., the Viasat KA-SAT communication network in Europe was hit Feb 24 and is still in trouble).
Post-war analysis will figure this out; my thoughts: people ignore security until something happens; many probing attacks by state and state-affiliated actors have generated, in the last few years, a sense that something is happening; budgets for cyber security as a result have been increasing; security on critical infrastructure is specifically monitored and promoted in major nations (e.g., the US' NERC CIP compliance regime for electricity generation); various agencies have developed strong cyber attack / counter-attack capability.  So critical infrastructure may be better protected than we all thought and/or the counter-attack capability is so strong, and so well communicated to our adversaries, that they are terrified of starting something (maybe).
Had state actors kept their powder dry and lulled the world into a false sense of security, I think things would have been different.
In addition, organizations globally have implemented breakneck-speed hardening programs since the war started.  For example, my organization is concerned about Russian and affiliated (e.g., Fancy Bear) attacks; the war has caused us to increase the rating of our threat model and we have taken many (exact number is classified) actions to protect our ability to deliver service to our customers, pausing other activities in an organization-wide effort.  Our attack surface and overall risk profile has significantly improved in the last six weeks (it was good before, now it's better).
Regarding cyber attacks on mil infrastructure, that's a different beast and I have no specific insight.  Civvy crit infrastructure is part of war, however, so worth diving into.
 
In the visible spectrum, agreed.  I wonder that other frequencies, passive and active, are available to UAVs and how well they get through leaves.

As much as I try to do minimal politics, if that team (Hilary and Co) was as aggressive about a Ukraine takeover as they were when Ambassador Stevens was killed, Putin could have personally flown to Kiev, shot the Ukraine president, sat on his chair, and nothing would have happened.
I think more likely the issue was a less-prepared / modernized Russian Army, or a lower sense of urgency, or both.

LOL Our next data center move was to Clifton NJ which is way up above sea level.... didn't fix the transatlantic cable problem though.   It did have better food choices though!

There's nothing so falsely assuring as redundant paths that all terminate in the same side of a building (or small island  ).

This one I can begin to address; it is part of my day job. 
Pre-war, about 4-6 weeks in advance, the usual authoritative clearing houses (like the US' CISA and Canada's CCCS) were warning of a significant uptick in cyber attacks / reconnaissance.   This uptick has been sustained, but not materially increased, since the war started.  It is mostly or perhaps almost entirely directed at critical infrastructure.
I have worked in critical infrastructure, and the state of OT (Operational Technology, e.g., the tech that runs a pipeline) that I've seen is appalling - software so out of date that there are hundreds of known vulnerabilities, and no possibility of patching because it is attached to aged and non-replaceable hardware that can't take more modern software.  The only technical hope here is a hard shell around the OT and highly-segmented internal architectures to limit the spread of introduced malware.  I'm over-simplifying for discussion.
Then there was the successful Colonial Pipeline attack and others; I thought that the war would bring massive cyber-initiated infrastructure disruption, but it hasn't.  There have been a few impacts mostly located in Ukraine but some have spilled out (e.g., the Viasat KA-SAT communication network in Europe was hit Feb 24 and is still in trouble).
Post-war analysis will figure this out; my thoughts: people ignore security until something happens; many probing attacks by state and state-affiliated actors have generated, in the last few years, a sense that something is happening; budgets for cyber security as a result have been increasing; security on critical infrastructure is specifically monitored and promoted in major nations (e.g., the US' NERC CIP compliance regime for electricity generation); various agencies have developed strong cyber attack / counter-attack capability.  So critical infrastructure may be better protected than we all thought and/or the counter-attack capability is so strong, and so well communicated to our adversaries, that they are terrified of starting something (maybe).
Had state actors kept their powder dry and lulled the world into a false sense of security, I think things would have been different.
In addition, organizations globally have implemented breakneck-speed hardening programs since the war started.  For example, my organization is concerned about Russian and affiliated (e.g., Fancy Bear) attacks; the war has caused us to increase the rating of our threat model and we have taken many (exact number is classified) actions to protect our ability to deliver service to our customers, pausing other activities in an organization-wide effort.  Our attack surface and overall risk profile has significantly improved in the last six weeks (it was good before, now it's better).
Regarding cyber attacks on mil infrastructure, that's a different beast and I have no specific insight.  Civvy crit infrastructure is part of war, however, so worth diving into.
 
In the visible spectrum, agreed.  I wonder that other frequencies, passive and active, are available to UAVs and how well they get through leaves.

I do not disagree that we would likely do better on LOCs but I am not convinced it would be "better enough".  @acrashb proposed that:
And here I do not disagree but the magnitude of "less-extended front", "fewer pincers" and "better rear-echelon defence" "solving a lot" is potentially enormous.  Translating this into theory we are talking about force-to-space ratios in the frontages, manoeuvre restrictions we do not have a playbook for, and "better rear-echelon defence" are four words that could very well mean "redesign our entire logistics system".   As a minimum our force planning density is in question, our "just in time" logistics model which we spent the last 20 years building is in question - which impact the entire tooth to tail discussion, and while rear area security as an area defence problem is not new, defence against self-loitering munitions swarm attacks from the ground and/or the air is very new.  
I guess my point is that as a long time professional there are some fundamental and foundational concepts that are being challenged by what I have seen, and they extend well past the fact that the Russian military definitely and definitively failed the opening rounds in this war.

Also keep in mind we have a few unique constraints of our own, not least of which is a low tolerance for casualties.  I can't speak for any nation but my own but if we lost more troops in 6 weeks than we did during the last war we would lose our collective minds.  Political pressure against large losses is significant in the West, short of an existential war, is not insignificant.  If our current methods will see us being attrited at much higher rates, even if they are nowhere near what the Russian's are suffering, we could be in trouble in some far flung field.
I think everyone is looking out for the infamous T-14.  I am wondering if they will ever push the 3-4 they have operational or are they saving them for the 9 May victory parade? (tee hee)