Mattias

[ August 19, 2004, 12:40 PM: Message edited by: Mattias ]

A true beauty Mikey! For while now you have been in the same category as andrewtf for me: Modders who’s work I download without looking at the preview pic. I realise it might reflect poorly on the perception of my artistic judgement. Then again, I doubt anyone cares Great job! M.

They did, and the result was this: T-43 As the text indicates though the situation had changed at the time it was ready for deployment (mid 1943), the top priority was now to mount a bigger gun. Reading about the resulting T-34/85 on the Russian battlefield site it would seem that the bigger turret and gun was already pushing the limits of the chassis, thus making an uparmoured glacis a bit much to handle. I have seen pictures of T-34's with add on armour though, plates that have been welded directly on the hull and turret. One source (John Milsom: Russian tanks 1900-1970) shows a T-34/76B (M41 I think) with add on armour and states that these plates were 15mm thick. M.

It seems reasonable to assume that the bombing of the Alkett factory, and subsequent disruption of the StuG III production there, wasn’t the one and only factor that led to the production of the Hetzer. I am assuming that you present the information regarding the production of vehicles based on the Pz IV chassis to show that there was no dire need for a StuG III replacement based on the Pz 38 chassis. And if that is the case, I agree with you. The JgPz IV was a different project, while the StuG IV was indeed produced directly as a replacement for the lost StuG III production (the StuG IV concept having been proposed and rejected in early 1943). What I am wondering is, just how much a “knee jerk reaction” it was? how far had the plans for a light tank destroyer, based on Guderians demands, progressed when the Alkett factory was bombed? The Achtung Panzer site says that, there was a demand and that there supposedly was a program called the “Panzerjägerprogram or G-13”, which supposedly led to the Pz 38 chassis being chosen as the basis for at least one light tank destroyer design. But that information seems a thin if it cannot be further substantiated. When, on the other hand, a writer like Spielberger who’s concept is to drag out every little fact available in the archives fails to in any way mention these supposed background facts I get genuinely curious. As I have pointed out Spielberger makes a connection between the Alkett bombing and the production of the Hetzer. He states that because of the bombings OKH investigated (silly or not) on several occasions and in detail, the possibility of producing StuG III’s at BMM but found the production facilities to be to small in dimension. Because of these findings Hitler on the 6th of December agreed with the proposal to shift the production at BMM to a new light tank destroyer that had been suggested by BMM. Nothing is said about the status of this design at that time, but on the 17th the basic design was presented and accepted. The first documented mention of what was to become the Hetzer that Spielberger presents is made on the 7th of January 1944, when it is referred to as “leichter Panzerjäger auf 38(t)”. Obviously it must have been mentioned in some form in earlier documents, but is seems significant that this first mentioning is in 1944, rather than say in August 1943. I don’t think the Hetzer was a direct StuG replacement vehicle and I do believe that there existed conceptual requirements for a new tank destroyers, that BMM designers might have pondered. I have yet to see though any documentation that directly contradicts the theory that the design and production of the Hetzer was given a decisive push by the sudden loss of production capacity in what at the time was one of Germany’s most important anti tank assets, the StuG III. Further information regarding the “Panzerjägerprogram or G-13” could clarify. Personally I have not seen a single JgPz (not SPG’s that is) design solution based on the Pz 38 chassis that predates the Hetzer wooden mock-up of early 1944. But really, the original question was why the Hetzer was produced with all it’s obvious flaws. And the answer is still, there was a need, there were production facilities and the Hetzer could be fielded in a reasonable time. M.

Mr. Tittles are you aware of any sources that go beyond the statement that Guderian, in March 1943, demanded that a light tank destroyer be produced that could replace all interim solutions. What exactly did that demand result in? How specific were the requirements and did they result in actual development contracts? It seems to me that it was not until the Alkett factory was bombed, and after which the OKH investigated the possibility to producing Sturmgeschütze at BMM but found that the factory could not handle the 24 ton vehicle, that the idea of producing the light Pz Jäger there really came to fruition. And that it was not until after that, that the design solutions that BMM at some point must have initiated where presented and accepted. In my primary sources on the Hetzer, Spielbergers “Die Panzer-Kampfwagen 35(t) und 38 (t) und ihre Abarten” and “Leichte Jagdpanzer, Entwicklung-Fertigung-Einsatz”, and on German tank destroyers in general, Fleischers “Die deutschen Panzerjägertruppe 1935-1945”, there is no mention of Guderians involvement in the project, directly or indirectly. Obviously he had a large impact in these matters on the strategic level but I have yet to see a source that shows a clearly what happened between the strategic/conceptual stage and the actual production of the Hetzer. As it is the answer to the original question still stands, I think. The Germans had to go with whatever solutions they had ready to run at this stage, the Hetzer was simply the best available design for a light tank destroyer at that point. There were all kinds of attempts at standardisation of the development and production of armoured vehicles but only small parts of those could be implemented before the war ended. M.

double post

You have to have the total war situation of 1943-45 in mind... On the 26th of November 1943 the allies dropped 1424 tons of HE and fire bombs on the Alkett factory in Berlin bringing the production of StuG III’s to a grinding halt. Although production resumed at the factory it was not until September 1944 that the production figures of the previous year were reached again. When alternative production facilities where scouted (read: feverishly sought out) it was clear that the facilities at BMM (Böhmisch-Märischen Maschinenfabrik) were too small to handle production of StuG III chassis. Instead it was decided to develop a new type of tank destroyer based on the Pz 38 chassis which, as previously discussed on the forum, was a superb construction by virtue of it’s exceptional reliability and agility. On the 17th of December the drawings for the new design were presented. On the 24th of January a full scale model was made and on the 28th Hitler declared that the development and production of the Hetzer to be the most vital goal of 1944 for the war industry. The bombing of the Alkett factory also played role in the development and production of the StuG IV. M. [ July 21, 2004, 03:57 PM: Message edited by: Mattias ]

Probably some confusion along the line here, but to clarify: The driver sits on the left side of the gun, behind him sits the gunner and behind him sits the loader/radio operator. The commanders position is behind the gun on the right side of the chassis. Because there is so little space behind the gun the commander sits in a "box" cut out of the engine compartment. The CM:AK model puts the commander in the correct place and it is easy to see the he will actually have the engine to his left when he sits down. Take a look at this picture of a StuG and you'll get the general idea. close up and friendly In a Hetzer the gunner would move forward a bit and the third man would be the loader/radio operator. The commander, as noted earlier, sits on the other side of the chassis. M. [ July 20, 2004, 07:17 PM: Message edited by: Mattias ]

The G(Gewehr)43 was about the same size as the G.41, the K(Karbiner)43 that came into production in 1944 was a special, shortened, version. M.

After 99 turns it was over, and yes, a whole lot of fun it was! Spoiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . I managed to secure VP area "small left" and "small right" fairly quickly and held them with infantry and light armour. In retrospect I had a bit of luck with my infantry reinforcements and a bit of bad luck with my armour. I held against the early infantry attacks and my greyhounds and .50 touting vehicles held his SPG's and Pz IV's at bay. When the big cats arrived though I was forcefully evicted from VP area "small right" and all forays towards the big VP areas stopped. An engineer platoon claimed three Panthers on the wooded hill top in the centre but was subsequently ran over by inf. At the height of the German dominance, around turn 65, I was clinging on with my nails to "small left", the Sherman 105mm + 1 76mm group just saving the day against a Tiger platoon. To make a long story short, the eventual arrival of the M4/76mm platoons (first one on turn 65 something) spelled doom for the Germans as the AI's skill simply isn't enough to stop a human player, with the tools to get the job done. The Panthers were quickly cut down, the Tigers where tougher but succumbed in the end, one of them still functional at the final whistle. I held all VP areas, "big right" only with armour though. As advertised it stayed manageable throughout the game as incoming units to a certain extent was balanced out by units that were lost. Good fun, and I would love to play more scenarios based on the same concept. They will not be historical but they have a nice dynamic that gives the AI something of a chance to offer a fight. M.

Behold! </font>

The description of the layout is correct Kingfish. The fighting compartment was extremely cramped. In particular the loader was on the wrong side of the gun and the commander separated from the rest of the crew, as described in the following account: Armin about the Hetzer Nowadays I must say I much prefer a JgPz IV 75/L48 to a Hetzer, thanks to lessons learnt in CM M.

It would seem about 425.000+ StG 44 and earlier variants were produced. Sergeis document states that some 525.000 automatic rifles (StG and variants not included) were produced. Fairly large numbers that is (to me, surprisingly high). Compared to that the FG 42 production of around 7000 units was minuscule. Why isn't the G41/43's in the game? Well, my guess is that they were deemed not significant enough in a "actual TO&E presence to CM squad firepower" perspective. They could have been sprinkled out the same way as the SMG's in some units sometimes are captured PPSh and sometimes MP 40´s. In any case, had we been able do see what weapon the snipers were carrying we would probably see a few automatic rifles. Or are they in the game somwhere? M.

Consider it a battlefield promotion M.

A great many thanks to you Captain C! Cheers! M.

In a bit of a mishap I managed to erase all my favourites. When starting the BFC forums now I get the "Navframe", with the big Battlefront firing tank logo, on top of the forum screen, which I did not when starting from my old favourites. I know I can get rid of it, I just can't remember how. Any and all answers are much appreciated. M.

A real world note regarding the Pzgr 40 for the 50mm L/60; apparently it was notorious for causing the shell casing to stick in the chamber (case expansion), which than had to be cleared from the outside with the cleaning rod. To steer back towards the subject a bit it can be noted that in 1941 a Pz IV was armed with a 50mm L/60 for test purposes. Other guns that were tested were a 75mm L/40, an L/33 (to have a gun that didn't extend beyond the tank front) and a 75/55mm L/45 with conical barrel. M.

A failure on the eastern front? No, of course not. The panzer IV was the only tank to fight throughout the war, so yes, by the end it was getting old. However… In 1941 it was intended as a support tank (firing HE, smoke and HC) for the Pz III’s and served well in that function. The fact that it doesn’t stand up to Russian heavy and medium tank designs that constituted, what, 5-10% at the most of the Red army forces does not disqualify it as a weapon system. In 1942 when the Pz IV’s begun receiving L43 guns (a weapon that could reach out and kill all enemy tanks before they could effectively engage you) there were zero Tigers around. By the end of the year some 500-700 Pz “long” had been built and Tigers still were nothing more than an impressive novelty. Besides, arguments based on price / performance comparisons in CM works poorly when compared to the real life situation where availability, reliability, strategic and tactical suitability for a wide range of missions are important factors. After all, there was a reason why there were no tank divisions armed solely with Tigers. 1943 the Pz IV can still hold up against the opposition and is in full production with another, what, almost 3000 units being produced during the year. The Panther was moving in as the new Pz Divisional tank (again, as opposed to the Tiger heavy tank) improving on the weak aspects of the Pz IV, but it never reached the numbers necessary to fully replace the Pz IV. At this point it is a matter of using the tanks you have at hand. And the by this time there were no T-34/85´s around. In 1944 the T-34/85´s, Sherman 76´s and Fireflies (among others) reached allied units, all of which were superior to the Pz IV. But more powerful weapon systems also reached German hands, and still the Pz IV soldiered on, not least by virtue of numbers available (and production continued to the end). It was now a very reliable piece of equipment that still could be deployed in a full range of missions and reasonably expected to succeed against the bulk of the enemies armour. Add to this the fact that armour on armour fights only constitutes a minor part of the time spent in battle for a Pz Division. But yes at the end of the day the Pz IV was loosing it’s edge. I wouldn’t say it’s you though, the reality in CM just doesn’t capture the full complexity of the considerations involved. These tanks were never designed to stand at X meters range to exchange fire with a model Y tank, the ability to do so only became a factor once the tank became unsuitable for it’s mission within a Pz Division due it’s inability to handle enemy armour. And as far as I can see the Pz IV never became completely obsolescent in this context during WWII. [ June 25, 2004, 10:22 PM: Message edited by: Mattias ]

Aw, what a swiss, and there were Swedish vehicles running too! I would have loved to see the m/40L running. And you got to climb around on them. And there was the Tiger :eek: Alas, hopefully it will be as fun next year Holien: Incidentally my girlfriends best friend is visiting from Ireland, and she is an archaeologist, specialising in osteology (but somehow I hope you will have no need of any such speciality) Small world... How big is the dig by the way? Here's hoping all is well over there! M.

I don’t think there was any intentional deviation from standard tactics when it came to deployment of captured armour, it too would be deployed in concentration if possible. Then again, the number of vehicles available would obviously influence how large those concentrations could be. What you would see in some numbers in Russian could be French tanks used for security tasks, some Russian tanks with the same mission, some French tank based SPG conversions (the majority of those serving in France though). Add to that some French and Russian armoured cars. And the odd medium and heavy Russian tank. The SU-76i mentioned above, along with the French SPG conversions, along with French tanks and armoured vehicles, were probably among the largest examples of deployment of captured materiel in combat service. The most common use of captured armour in Russia though appear to have been as ”castrated” artillery tractors and all terrain transports. The Germans were strained to the limit just trying to keep their own tanks running. The time and energy to keep large numbers of captured armoured vehicles, with the predictable added difficulties involved, just wasn’t there. French vehicles being somewhat different in this context as, I assume, they were easier to support. M. P.S. I guess you could argue that Czech tanks should be included in the term captured tanks but at the time of Barabarossa they were fully integrated into the German forces. From production to training to deployment. D.S. [ May 24, 2004, 04:24 PM: Message edited by: Mattias ]

I had a looksee too last night, found the same sites. But, likewise, no definitive answer. I know parts of the 5th Gebirgsjäger (Gebirgsjäger Reg. 100) was moving north along the east coast at the time, fighting in Rimini later in the month. But then again, can't say where the rest of the division was at the time. How about the PzG Div. 29? Weren’t they around, and the PzG Div. 90? Interesting how little is noted about the enemy in the AAR's. One would have thought that it would be quite interesting, for many a reason... M.

Looks very interesting indeed! Downloaded the A1 and A2 scenarios, I'll see what I see there Again, looks great! M.

The infantry gun, I think, is the 290 ®, 76 mm Polkovaja Pushka obr. 1927 g (76-27). The 295's are more like regular artillery pieces, 455-680 m/s Vo and 9500 - 13000 meters(depending on model and charge), compared to 387 m/s Vo and 8850 meter for the 290 ®. Model 1902 guns that were updated in the 30's, older models that is. The Germans kept on using them throughout the war though. Same source... M:)

A quick look at 500 meters indicates 1 : 1.5 That is, fully exposed the hit chance is about 50% higher than against the same vehicle hull down. M.