Los

It does seem that the elevations are a little flat. The contour lines in ASL should denote more than just a one elevation CM change. (if using 2.5m cm elevations). Particulary since in ASL if you are standing on a level one elevation you should be about equal to the top of a level one (single story) building. SO that should be at least 2 CM elevations. Los [ September 09, 2003, 01:49 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

Barrie Pitt wrote an outstanding, comprehensive and readble two-volume history of the war in North Africa which I highly recommend. Los Crucible of War; Western Desert 1941 Crucible fo War: Year fo Alamein 1942

I like Beevor's book on Crete a tad over Clark's in terms or readbility and a better look at all the facets of the invasion. I kind of disagree that Beevor doesn't cover details because there are some good details of the fighting, but then again remember that Beevor's book is covering Crete from beginning to end of war and about a third of the book covers the occupation. But most all the major books on Crete suffer from the same thing. They're all overwhelmingly "anglo-centric". Both Beevor and Clark are 90% Allied side of the story. You get all kinds of great details on what various Brit, NZ and Australian units did, what the commanders were thinking and analysis on why they did this or that. Very little on german or Greek side of the story. It's not like there's a lack of primary source material as well as a large number (Actually fast dwindling now) or German para vets still alive, well organized and willing to help out researchers with their time and experiences. Having attended the german airborne course near Altenstadt eleven years ago, I had many great conversation with some of the old hands who used to show up and the Officers and NCO's mess every couple of days for a beer. For example last year during the anniversary of Crete about a dozen reenactros met up with veterans of the battle at Maleme and even had the vets walking up to Hill 107, showing them what approach routes they took for the attacks, where they set up machineguns and all kinds of details on the actions. Little effort seems to be made to have interviewed many German participants of the battle at any level. Of course in some of the books this is somewhat understandable such as the excellent NZ histories (overall plus the ones written on each battalion). But in a general survey book on the battle there should be a more equal distribution of information on what each side was doing and thinking. Another book "Ten Days to destiny:The Battle of Crete, 1941" by George Kiriakopoulos at elast brings into detail the Greek contribution to the defense since in many acccounts in articles and what not the Greeks barely rate a mention. Despite some of the critcal fighting they did (i.e. 2d greek regiment, as well as covering the withdrawl). And it's certainly one of the only books that sheds some details on the Greek "partisan" aspects fo resisting the invasion. But still not a teribble lot from the Germans side. "Daedelus Returns" is a good book but this is by no means a history of the fighting or even von der Heydte's regiment. (It's more like reading some ramblings from your art teacher.) His style is that of a participant, and it's a good book (read it to my Kid as a bed time story!), but anyone looking for insight into the fighting, or commanders, decion making processes other than some interesting anecdotes is left high and dry. (Though we do find out which peers and commanders von der Hydte thought were a***oles). "Heaven and Hell" by Poppel has a chapter some good personal experiences on the fighting but he wasn't at the critcal Maleme fighting. There are some GREAT picture albums from the fighting: Nasse's "Fallschirmjager in Crete" and Peter Stahl's "Kreta" (IIRC). But Stahl just gives a cursory overview of the fighting. Nasse's is better and has a ton a good personal accounts but still is lacking in tying these details together clearly into the overall story of the battle. Kurowski's "Kampf um Kreta" (in german only) has some good details and will hopefully be translated into a new edition some day. For example by details I mean stuff like: The glider assault on 20 May with detachments Brucke, von Plessen and Koch. In most accounts I've read, you get very little detail other than Braun, Koch and von Plessen became casualties and some detail on how many gliders made it, plus the overall results (i.e. the Bofors positions were knocked out, Tavronitis Bridge was taken or initial attack on 107 failed.) But the knocking out of the bofors positions by these guys was an immensely critical portion of taking the airfield (along with 107). These guys landed under fire , in the open, using fire and manuever to take out these positions at the mouth of the airfield as well as he west end and did the job as planned. I'd like to read more about this. (though I did hear about it in Germany from a vet who was there). Or taking the bridge. There was nearly a whole Company (D/22) assigned to cover the bridge and that sector of the river bed. But the Germans landed under their nose and with heavy casualties took that position. Would you like to know more? I sure as hell would. Instead we get details of how many Germans Kippenberger or Andrews picked off with their Lee Enfields and what great sport the whole venture was. Fascinating or interesting stuff to be sure, and critical to the Allied side of the story, but lets hear more from the other side other than that the Paras were in shock and spent most of the morning trying to save their own skins. Well some of them were obviously doing there job. Sidebar does anyone know of a good history of the 5th GJD? Los

But I live in the Pacific, I guess there's no need for my map making. Los [ September 03, 2003, 12:56 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

"An example for a dud would be von Mackensen in command of 14. Armee at Anzio. Other examples are Luftwaffenfelddivisionen, which often seem to have been led by total incompetents." Yes and the Germans had what? 300+ divisions or more and how many Corps and Armies? How many did the British have or the Americans. The question (unanswerable most likely) is what percentage of incompetents were allowed to remain or gone unnoticed. In particular after clear failures of leadership. That would be an interesting thesis. Los Sidebar, anyone read "Battling for Saipan?" or "Howlin' Mad against the Army?" Both have varying degrees of interesting detail of the relief of a division commander in combat (though in that case it's been fairly well proven unjustly so.)

Except keep in mind that von der Heydte's fight was removed from Maleme, tied up in prison valley as he was. If the Germans did not continue to push aggresively against 107 and the airfield with what they had left in the area, and had just gone to ground and decided to bide their time, they would have been sunk. The point being, fairly clearly stated already, that while the Brits lost Crete, the Germans paras were not passive riders just along for the visit. Maleme was not just "handed over" per se. The NZ troops were under heavy pressure from paras, who were already on the airfield, and all over the surrounding foothills of Point 107. This psycological pressure on the commander was not concocted out of thin air,that was the Germans pressing on them. Now you add to this concoction confusion, night, very poor directives and communications and there you have it. It's one thing for one side to make a mistake, it's another thing for the other side to recognize the mistake, and agressively take advantage of it. Even after 107 was seized the Allies had every means at their disposal to recover and failed. Ineptitude of Allied leadership through failure to adequate prepare their defenses (or even really look at their deployments), Failure to take advantage of critical intelligence, and a failure to react quickly or agressively did them in. But at the same time, the Germans, recovering from their initial disaster (and fair amount of their own making also with their poor intelliegnce and preparations too) kept pressing kept attacking and kept taking advantage of allied mistakes. They realized that Maleme was the key and fed reinforcements into that area, (though why they split of the second para drop in that area and put some guys down east of Maleme was a waste of two companies.) Even after the intial arrival or 100 GJR the Germans were heavily outnumbered and outgunned but kept on pressing. While the Germans elsewhere hunkered down through lack of supplies heavy weapons and strength they also nonetheless kept the Allies frozen in their positions and proved difficult to dislodge, denying freedom of movement to the Allies even if had occured to them that they needed to manuever. Both factors contributed to the loss... Los [ September 03, 2003, 11:50 AM: Message edited by: Los ]

Nearly everything written on Crete suffers from lack of telling of German side of story. Almost all the major histories are 90% allied side. But that being said here are some of the more accesible ones which you should be able to find on amazon or ebay: Books just about Crete: Crete: The Battle and the Resistance Anthony Beevor The Fall of Crete Alan Clark Crete: The official history of the New Zealand in the Second World War D. Davin The Battle of Crete George Forty Ten Days to destiny:The Battle of Crete, 1941 George Kiriakopoulos The Struggle for Crete Ian Stewart Hunters from the Sky Charles Whiting Der kampf um Kreta Franz Kurowski Daedelus Returned Freiherr E. von der Heydte Heaven and Hell Martin Poppel Fallscirmjager in Crete Jean-Yves Nasse Anyway, just a few. Los

True Michael on all points. Nor do I mean to imply that there was any shortage, or even lesser amounts, of imcompetent officers in any other Armies. It would be interesting to see how aggresively Armies rooted out incompetent officers. It does seem that the Ggermans spent a a fair amount of effort in rooting out incompetence in their division in higher officers (though certainly their national leadership led them right into ruin). In addition I think there's a book which details identity, cause, and circumstances for every American general who was fired or relieved of duty. Can't recall the name right now and am too busy to go research it tonight. Los [ September 02, 2003, 09:36 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

Actually Freyberg's popular reputation came from his stellar heroic service as a junior and mid grade officer in WW1. (Gallipoli, The Somme, Royal Naval Division in Antwerp, VC holder) A big tough guy, with multiple wounds, he was a hero to the people of NZ. He was a man who deeply cared for his men and one hwo even aftyer the battle admirably refused to shift blame on others around him (and there was certainly enough to go around.) Churchill was a great fan of his. But have you ever heard of the Peter Principle? "Everyone rises to their natural level of imcompetence." There are two things a good commander must do. Care for your troops and accomplish the mission. As Beevor says: "The battle for Crete would be a contest where fast reactions, clear thinking and ruthless decisions counted most. The metality of linear defense and the holding on which lingered in some minds form the First World War would be a grave handicap." Through Ultra, Freyberg had advanced and clear intelligence on the attack. Where the drop zones were, units involved, the plan of attack, what portion of the invasion would come from air and what portion from sea. The brits even had notification when the waves were inbound. Virtually none of this intelligence was acted upon, even after several complete copies of the invasion plans were captured which could confirm what their won eyes were seeing. Even as the Germans unfolded the plan just as he had been briefed by British intelligence at the highest level said it would. Do you have any idea what kind of advantage such a clear picture of enemy intentions and strengths, in particular of an airborne invasion, give a commander? If that wasn't bad enough, once the attack came, he lacked the decisiveness to act at once against the invasion despite the pleas of his junior commanders to cut them loose. In fact during the most critical portions of the battle Freyberg had a sort of breakdown and focused himself on the smallest of details while allowing the bigger more critical things to go awry. (i.e.) He was constantly obsessed wit a seaborn invasion. But don't rely on what I say, here's, for example here's what BG Inglis one of his Brigade commanders said in his offical report to Churchill: "I am far from reassured about the tactical conduct of the defence by General Freyberg, although full allowance must be made for the many deficiencies noted above. There appears to have been no counter-attack of any kind in the Western Sector for 36 hours after the airborne descents had begun. There was no attempt to form a mobile reserve of the best troops, be it only a couple of battalions, there was no attempt made to obstruct Maleme Airstrip even though he knew tehre would be no (british) Air (units) in teh battle. the whole concept seems to have been of static defence of positions instead of rapid extirpations (sic) at all costs of the airborne landing parties." Actually there's no point to me recounting Freyberg's incapacties for higher command since they are well catalogued in most every account of either Crete or Cassino. Certainly the NZ official histories go a little bit easier on him and seeks to shift the blame to more junior officers. But again that goes back to a trend you see from time to time of inability to say ill things about commanders who throw away thousands of troops and lose critical battles becuse they're one of the good old boys. At Crete you have an example where you have some of the finest troops, a clear picture of enemy intentions, (giving YOU, if you will, the element of surprise), you are fighting on home turf, with active popular support from the locals, you have a very vulnerable enemy at the end of a tenacious logistical chain, and you have a command structure so utterly lacking in vision decisiveness or understanding that they drop the whole thing without making even slight use of any one of these advatages which may have sealed the fate of the German attempt to take Crete. Sidebar: I' not trying to take away anything from the German paras who fought in the battle. Another carefully constructed and often repeated myth is that they were so far in the hole at the start of the operation that only Allied incompetence in the conduct of the battle itself saved them. This of course is meant to propogate the myth that the Anzacs, Brits and Greeks were somehow better fighters than the Fallschirmjager and that circumstances above the control of the commonwealth soldier alone led to his defeat. At this stage of the war the British had not quite been disinvested of their comforting theories that German troops would go to pieces in the absence of their leaders and plans going to pieces around them. Para corporals, Sergeants and Leutnants soon found themselves running threadbare platoons, companies, and battalions and exercizing the kind of the fast reactions, clear thinking and ruthless decisions needed to keep the presure on and keep attacking despite horrendous initial losses that would have sidelined most units for the duration. And I didn't even start on Cassino yet... Los [ September 02, 2003, 09:37 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

"But then again Freyberg was very much a WWI general." It's still a wonder that Freyberg wasn't sacked for good after the Crete fiasco, but then again taking decisive steps against defective or damaging senior commanders has never been a strong suit with the Commonwealth. Beevor rakes him over the coals quite harshly in his Crete Book and Ellis is not too far behind in his Cassino book. Los

Interesting side story... I was attending German Parachute (Luftlande) school near Altenstadt (I think the actual town was Schongau, shucks it's beena while.) back in the early nineties as the New German Camo was being rolled out. They were very much aware of the direct relation between the old Waffen SS stuff and the new stuff. I was goofing around with a leutnant: "Sir, I really like your new camouflage. Where did you get the design from?" "Oh well, you see, sattelite imagery was taken of central Europe during all seasons and a computer helped select the best possible camouflage for the job." He tells me all official-like. "Ah yes, I see that makes sense. Funny how it looks like 'Waffen SS 1944 peas pattern camouflage." The guy actualy gave me a wink and laughed as if I'd just been let into some secret club. "Yes it does, doesn't it." And by the way at least at the airborne school, maintaining a direct link with WW2 traditionns was still in evidence. In fact every day I saw WW2 vets arrive at the bases pub where they would hang out with the soldiers and talk all night over a few beers. Had many ineteresting conversations myself. Of course mosty of the guys I dealt with were long term porfesionals, NCOs and Officers, (Old school, hard-drinking, non black-turtle-neck-you-may-touch-my-monkey Germans.) These guys new all the old songs and would sing them when they could, not becasue they were nazis, but because of traddition. (and it was amazing everyone's Dad and Uncle was in this of that para regt in WW2 of this or that SS-Division. As far as the regular two year conscripts, they came and went. Though I was reminded of pre WW2 where the BW has a strong officer and NCO corps, very professional. And if they needed to ramp up it would not be a difficult process. One other thing I do remember at the time at the German tank school, they had a garden walk way where there was a small stone depicting every German Panzer Division's insignia that you could walk through, a respectful schools reminder to the traditions of past elite armored formations. There was a big furor over the fact that they were gong to have all the Waffen-SS panzer units there too. It caused some stir at the time. Eventually they settled on one generic monument for all the Waffen SS units. It sort of looked like the 2SS div patch. Anyway that was almost ten years ago. Los

This is not necessarily true. I have worked closely myself with the BW, attended some of their schools, and carried on extensive conversatinnos with older vets as well as officers and NCOs on this subject. When the BW was formed in the 1950s it's leadership from corporals on up was composed primarily of hardened WW2 veterans. The tried and true training and doctrinal methods established during the war and even before were continued right along (while the rest of the world picked and chose many of the same principals for their own army too.) Leadership schools used WW2 lessons learned and studied WW2 battles. (Up to today also, Chir river defense by 11th Pzr being an example). So just because the Germans stopped wearing feldgrau doesn't mean they exschewed all the fine techniques and lessons learned from WW2. Though it is true that today's German Army is much differnt from old. However any army that hasn't fought a war in 55 years is going to be like that to some extent.Cheers... Los

BTW how one designs the scenario, the terrain, placement and types of victory points and other scenario/operational variables all go into determining how well the strat AI performs on attack and defense. Los

Since I designed the op here's the real scoop. The odds of a realistically acting Wittmann suriving the first scenario are low (Unless you run him away somewhere safe or get very lucky). However in RL after getting his tank knocke out he and his crew moved out 5 miles back to Div HQ and led a second force back to VB so I include him again. If having a second Wittmann bothers anyone just assume the other Wittmann is actually Joe Wittmann. No relation to the first one. Los

M.Bates said... "Having just seen the film, I am happy to have British accents for the Russians. If the actors had been told to do Russian accents then they would have, it is hardly their fault. The alternative was Russian actors speaking English. In any case it's better to have British actors trying their best than some hot-headed American actor spitting and yelling his pro-Stalin lines across the screen." So Brit actors will do what the director tells them but not American actors? What about Ed Harris? Los

I saw it and liked it very much despite the twisting of actual events at the end. Great Sniper action, top notch. People make a big deal about the romance but this film statered out and remained throughout a war (sniper) movie with the love scene being ancillary. At least we got to see her ass! And as far as this mfilm making the Russians out to be good guys, well they made them out to be as bad as the Germans. Go see it, or else you won't be able to come on here and impress everyone about your WW2 knowledge by sharpshooting the flick! Los

"Maybe I should start making up some flash cards with pictures of WW2 tanks on them to get her started." You laugh but my 3.5 year old can identify most WW2 aircraft on sight. And I'm not talking Mustang, Corsair but he can get down to Macci c.202, Fairy Swordfish, Pe2, bf110. AT least 35 to 40 aircraft. If I'm flying EAW or better yet if I'm a gunner in B17 he can id whether it's a 109 or a 190 as it flashes buy for a fraction of a second. Los

Thanks for bringing that up. We'll have Steve and Charles look at it. It's not a design error since there are no Half tracks in the original set up, they come later on in additional battles so the game engine handles there palcement. This hasn't happened in previosuly versions of game. Will look into it see if something need to be modified. Los Los

From Fallschirmjaeger by Uwe Feist and Thomas McGuirl (Reyton Publishing p.12): "The basic differences between the two concepts (Luftwaffe and Heer) reflect the different branches of the Armed Forces from which they arose. The Army advocated the concept of building a Schwehrpunkt by means of a mass drop to large for the enemy to take quick effective countermeasures against. As is stated in point 1 they were to provide a means to advance the man line of advance in the battle of annihlation which tied all support forces to the advance of the infantry main body. The Luftwaffe's more novel porposal wa stp drop small bodies of men, "drops of oil" simultaneously onto seperate targets, combine to form perimeters and threaten the enemy over a wide area in his rear. Such perimeters as offered the best potential for exploitation could then be joined to c reate a schwehrpunkt. Gen. Student, as a trained General staff officer, inclined to the Army doctrine while not neglecting the possibilities of presented by gliders, to realize the methods porposed by the Luftwaffe. As a result, the Fallschirmjaeger and the Luftlandetruppen were able to mount both types of operations." Hope that helps. Los

The first german airborne divsion was called the 7.Fligerdivision, sometime around 1939 eth Army formed the 22.Luftlande (Airlanding) division came into being an air landing division. This sort of represented conflicting theories between the Luftwaffe (oil drop parachute assaults) and the Heer (airlanded intact force schwerpunkt) on how to conduct vertical envelopment. Both divisions were employed in Holland. But the Army refused to release the 22d for Crete and instead sent the 5th GJD in it's stead as the airlanding force. It was not till after Crete that the airborne forces were reorganized and the term Fallschirmjaeger was applied to a divisionsal orgnization (1.FJD), though all along airborne regiments were known as fallschirmjaeger regiments. Suitably confusing? Even today (or until recently at least) the airborne brigade (s) are known as a luftlande brigade. Los

I've used FATS a number of times. It's quite neat. We have a large room maybe 20 m wide by 20 m deep. There is a firing line with I think ten points, two M203s, one SAW and the rest M16 (There is one M9 position too.) The weapons all all converted real weapons with pnuematic hoses going into them for recoil, as well as Miles type devices on the muzzles. A large projection screen is up front as well as a great sound system and several Miles emitters above the screen (yes you can set it to shoot back if youa re wearing Miles. In the rear are a few workstations and a large laserdisk player which holds the programs. A camo net covers the floor as well as a few sandbags at each firing point. The squad or group comes in and gets a quick breifing. Everyone covers down behind a point and you go through familiarization, zeroing, record firing and then scenarios. Range firing is both KD and pop-up. Everything is live actino photo realistic. the weapons kicjk as normal (but don't make the same noise) and you have to reload, clear jams and other stuff as normal. The scenarios range from house to house defense, woods, ambushes and other stuff. Each firing pont gets a score at the end saying hist and misses. It's really quite fun. As for training it helps stress fire rate and distribution, shooting at unclearly marked targets, and buddy team communication during firing. I imagine for civilians it would be a great blast. When you can't get out to live fire its a good cheap quick alternative. Hope that helps. Los

One of the best is "Panzertaktik:German small unit armor tactics" by Wolfgang Schneider. Nothing but good details on tactics, many pictures maps and illustrations too. Published by JJ Fedorowicz. You canget it at Amazon or their site. http://www.jjfpub.mb.ca/ Los

VB-Through the lens is a great book. I relied on it heavily when creating the Villers Bocage operation that's in CM. I have been eyeing the Bulge one. Los

No don't pay $129!!!! The book "Enemy at the Gates" has nothing to do with the movie Enemy at the Gates which is based on teh book "War of the Rats". This book has been rereleased (it's a fiction book) and you can also find at at Barnes and Noble (if you are in the US) for $5.99. Los

Here's what a four year Russian infantryman has to say on the subject (from Valera's site)" Vasyl Bykov says... "Of course, female medics tried their best, but TO&E assumed just one medic per company; there would be dozens of wounded on the battlefield. How could they make it, no matter how hard they tried? They could not; the wounded had to wait for help for long time, lost a lot of blood and died on the battlefield or on their way to the hospital. It is still unknown who is the author of the "genius" idea to employ women in the war. This seems to be a purely Soviet innovation, the Germans did not have anything like that till the end of the war. Given the obvious abundance of male "materiel", what was the need to send young and fragile girls under fire? What was the benefit from that? The benefit was nothing but making life happier for senior and political officers, who temporarily had no access to their wives and girlfriends at home. On their way to the front many of them would settle in staffs and rear offices as secretaries, operators, or medics – these were common positions to disguise those whom soldiers ironically called PPZh (sounds almost like PPSh, stands for pokhodno-polevaya zhena – a field wife). Those who made it to the battle zone were not treated as real soldiers – at war, which is purely men’s work, among masses of male soldiers they very soon demonstrated their uselessness. This goes even for female snipers, who would during quiet periods deploy in the no-man’s land, in direct proximity to the enemy." Just an alternate opinion so we can seperate propaganda from reality.... Los