Los

"those clamouring for the Pacific strike me as being in the same category as those crying out for Omaha Beach scenarios. Err...what, exactly, is the point? Watch Sands of Iwo Jima (or alternately Saving Private Ryan in the latter example) - you ought to have about as much control over events watching those movies as you would playing a tactical simulation of those same events. " Michael I'm sure your well-versed enough in WW2 history to understand that this is an ignorant statement. It's like somebody saying after all what's the big deal about playing CMBB since won't it get boring fighting the same t34 vs Tiger tank battle over and over again? Just tanks hammering each other on an open steppe, where's the skill and control in that? Fighting in the Pacific theater (to include CBI)spanned many different terrains and climates and covered many different engagement types. Surely you understand that beach assaults were just one type of battle seen there? But I suppose bloody massacres on the streets of Stalingrad require somewhat greater understanding and skill than wiping out pillboxes on D-day in Tarawa? There are tactical challenges and opportunities to make a difference good or bad in any engagement. Beach assault or winter ski attack or roiling desert tank battle included. Los p.s. sorry in advance if I come off antagonistic... [ November 26, 2003, 02:29 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

"an M2 is published to have an effective range of 1800 meters for indirect fire, and 1500 meters for direct fire against point targets." Good luck to anyone that thinks they can have any meaningful accuracy against point targets, particularly infantry out to 1800m on their M2 w/ it's rickety pintle mount. (unless it's bench-mounted like whoever does these ballistics test.) I have a good amount of trigger time behind an M2 having spent a fair amount of time in a DMV/GMV out in the desert on numerous occassions The sighting system on a pintle mounted or tripod mounted M2 is not very effective for longer ranges. And even if the sights were of any use, the amount of play in the M2 mounting system means that you have to lean into the gun with your chest to keep it steady for accurate firing and then walk tracers onto the target. You can get good with the gun with lotsa practice but out past 1000m? Note that current coax or commander cupola mounting systems in tanks are not included in my above comments. Those are closer to bench mounted systems in their stability. BTW do you know who in an infantry Coy HQ used to have an M2? It was the cook section and they mounted it on the company truck. Cassh that was a nice post.

Could the CMBO wav files serve as a basis for the CMAK japanese files? Los

An M2 with bipod minus the roudns is like 128 lbs! Just the gun w/ barrell is 84 lbs! The MG42 is 26 lbs on the bipod (still a heavy bastard)though the heavy infantry bipod adds another 40 lbs (the lighter aa one is half that.) A box of 100 rds 7.62 weighs about half as much as a box of 50 rounds .50cal. (Can't remember the exact amounts.) So really as some have already said, they're seperate comparisons, hardly worth getting an argument over. Los Both are great weapons systems.

There's already a quite nice CMBO pacific war mod with Japanese language wav files. There's been some talk of porting to CMBB. Los [ November 24, 2003, 08:47 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

If anyone has ever carried an M2 or even tried to mount it on a pintle of a Hummer or whatever, they would automatically know without a shadow of a doubt why it makes a poor MG for an infantry company compared to an MG42. For that matter make the comparison bsaed on carrying a box of linked .50 cal ball vs a box of linked 7.62mm. Los

"In short, American troops were very well trained to fight WWI at the start of WWII." This statement probably applies to everyone of the major combatants to one degree or another with the possible exception of the Germans... Los

I agree that German officers particpating in the study could have had some chance for collusion (I don't recall if they were physically collocated with each other during the writing?) And certainly they still could have attempted such without collocation. However I don't feel that their opinions were far oustide of the norm of most german accounts of fighting and the enemy, however, certainly with a multiyear war and thousand of kilometers and millions of troops there would have been all experiences confronted. "but just were too hidebound in implementation and training". In my opinion/observations the mark of a good army is not just it's doctrine or weapons, or training, or quality of it's troops and leaders. It's the ability to get the small things right, mitigate friction, and rapidly disseminate lessons learned so that you don't have the same guys making the same mistakes over and over on disparate fronts. Most halfway decent armies do start getting themselves together after a while, some right away, some years later. And this ability to mitigate friction is a VERY perishable skill. In essence the mitigation of friction is a sign of quality leadership and discipline. Of doing the little things the right way, even when nobody is looking. Interestingly enough, Glantz' studies on Afghanistan turned up repeatedly failures of many if not most Russian units (SF excepted) at the Regiment level or lower to conduct effective AARs, conduct effective transitions and unit hand overs, and thus every time new units came into sector, they made the same mistakes were ambushed at the same exact places and suffered the same level of misery. Year after year! Inexcusable. Another interesting example is WW1. The Germans had a fairly effective intelligence organization and actually studied their enemies, and worked out new tactics in small sectors, developed methodolgies to disseminated the lessons learned along the front. It was not until 1917 that the British intelligence section (always viewed askance by line officers in most armies) even had a bureau that studied what the Germans were doing and how they fought, the French neither, though they caught on quicker and established an enemies analysis section before the brits but still not after years of repeated failures and millions of casualties. They read many of the cues of the Germans wrong, always assuming they were on their last legs, for instance reading the German reorganization of the division going from 4 regts to 3 regts as a sign that the Germans were running out of men while in fact the Germans had figured out that it was firepower, not manpower and bayonets that was the key and had trippled or quadrupled MG, mortar and artillery firepower at the division level. Imagine the Allies shock in 1917 when having induced Rumania into the war to attack Germany who was, as usual, "on her last legs", the Germans rapidly transferred 500,000 men from the Western front and smashed the Rumanians. How could they do that? One French minister, having studied German casualty lists as published in hometown newspapers (dismissed by the French as Propaganda) rapidly did the math and found that the disparity between French casualty estimates and published German casualty reports was about a half million guys! I bring up these little tidbits as examples of how Armies at one time or another can easily fall off the band wagon, or fail to climb on. Los [ November 10, 2003, 10:04 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

"There were a couple of Greek regiments (read: battalions) folded into the NZ Div on Crete. They melted fairly promptly when the paras started dropping in their deployment areas." This is typical of the standard ill informed view of what happened on Crete, based off of some dubiously written commonwealth accounts, which often downplay the role of Allies in any action. In fact several of the Greek Regiments fought quite well, gave the Germans as much if not more of a hard time than the ANZACs did during the battle, and through the stiffness of their resistance faciliated the Commonwealth withdrawl by fighting the rear guard action. The 1st Regiment essentially wiped out the Murbe Detachment during the initial invasion, put up stiff resistance for KAstelli, then converted to fierce guerilla resistance in the town that prevented the landing of German units in particular tanks for another two days, with considerable loss to themselves which proved inestimable in helping Freyberg's force during its withdrawl south when it had no AT weapons left. Even units which supposedly "melted away" such as the 2d Greek Regiment (Ill equipped and ill armed) did not surrender but immediately converted to fighting in parties and as Guerillas units and did good work in protecting the withdrawl and afterwards. 3rd Regiment was at Herakliaon, no further info available. 4th and 5th Regiments operated in defense of the Rethymno sector, counterattacking early on with the AUssies mopped up and bottled up most of the 2d para regt. 6th Regiment with only 3 rounds per man at the start of the battle (and most of that ammo had not even been distributed) was described as both ill armed and ill led by Kippenberger, who together with it's sister Regt the 8th, he thought it would be "murder to leave such troops in a position in a position on their own". The 6th Regt with almost no ammo, scattered on the day of the drop. About 200 men of this regt later organized by Forrester continued resistance. With the 8th Regt was a different story. The 8th Greek Regiment (Armed with left-over WW1 Ausro-Hungarian weapons) was one of the outstanding performing unit in the campaign on the Allied side. In addition to stiff resistance in it's sector on the day of the drop, it's sharp fight in the days after the fall of Maleme held up Galatas against the Gerbirsjager and prevented the bagging of the entire allied force in the Canaea Suda Bay sector. 7th Regiment was at Herakliaon, no further info available. And of course when the Commonwelath forces high tailed it off the island, the Greeks were left behind. Many of them simply carried on as guerillas. There's another thread somewhere around here either in this board (CMAK) or in tips and tactics with all my Crete sources. I'm too lazy to report them here. Los p.s. BTW I'm not Greek... [ November 10, 2003, 09:30 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

You mean the Combat Drop Special? I thought that was about the 82d, or at least those were the guys on the commercial. (101st is Screaming Eagles) Los

"Glantz served in the US Army, as an officer, from 1965 to 1993 and he also feels the US Army - at least until the 1980s - was largely ignorant of the more vital aspects of Soviet military art." Note that my statement and yours are not mutually exclusive. I'm just saying that we didn't underestimate them, that doesn't mean that we got them right. BTW I came in in the late seventies and served through this year. So the whole NTC concept was coming up and being implemented right around then. I'd say the best "Soviet" unit in the world in the late eighties and nineties was by far was the OPFOR at NTC, kind of funny. Just like the largest flying operational squadron of HIND-Ds today is operating right at Fort Polk at the JRTC. Amusing. BTW sidebar I actually met Glantz about a year ago, he was in Kuwait at bequest of the Army to write a lessons learned/historical project on ops in Afganistan. (which are run out of Kuwait)Of all people I ran into him at the airport and brought him over to the base. I was right in the middle of reading his "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat". When he found out what I was doing we had a rousing conversation of things historical and present. Good guy. Los [ November 08, 2003, 08:57 AM: Message edited by: Los ]

In the light of our discussions I am poisting the forward from DA PAM No-20-269 "Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia" Department of the Army July 1953. All Pamphlets in the series had a similar forward: "Department of the Army pamphlet No 269 Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia is published as an adjunct to existing training literature in the belief that much can be learned from other armies, particularly the vanquished. It does not embody official training doctrine. Although called a historical study, it is not such according to the precise interpretation of the term. It is rather a series of interesting and instructive small unit actions based on the personal experiences of Germans who actually took part in them. Clausewitz wrote that, in the art of war, experience is worth more than all philoshphical truth. This pamphlet is published with that thought in mind, tempered with the truth that investigation, observation and analysis are necessary to give full meaning to the experience. ORLANDO WAR Major general, USA Chief, Military History Wahington DC Januatry 1953" [ November 07, 2003, 05:10 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

Whoa, typo on my part. Sorry. Glantz, in the Mars book, puts it as 335,000 "casualties" not 335,000 "killed". My aplogies for not picking up on the the misprint. "Also, it struck me after my previous post that maybe I am labouring under the misapprehension that the US Army was actually interested in some solid data. Maybe it was just interested in the primary source data from the German officers, to support further analysis elsewhere. In which case your line that 'they got what they paid for' would becompletely correct." This was the case. The Army was not intending to write doctrine or history off those interviews, it was simply trying to gain impressions from commanders who were fighting for years on that front. As for whether German officers had negative racist impressions as to Russian they fought, that is irrelevant. I can only imagine what US Army or Marine officers writing of their experience of the japanese after fighting them in the Pacific had to say. Or lest anyone makes the mistake of holding up whatever national culture they come from up to the same scrutiny, any army fighting any other army from another race or cultural is going to establish certain racial biases and generalities about their foes. (Or at least it's been that way since time immemorial maybe its different today?) BTW our unit had the whole series which I've read a few times until some numbnuts in the process of cleaning out the unit library got rid of them. I almost held a public beheading when I found out! Anyways regarding what is written in those books, are they really are not out of line with the majority of other German personal accounts and impressions from General to Private,,as to the experience and nature of fighting on the Eastern front? Not really. I doubt they had time to all get together in some mass collusion and work out getting their stories straight for various postwar purposes. None of that says that their view is 100% right but nor is it 100% wrong. And by the way some books on the series which recount tactical matters such as "German small unit tactics" or "operations in forests and swamps" or "operations in extreme cold weayther" or "Equipment maintenace in winter conditions" have had many parts extracted and put into doctrine. There's been plenty of US ARMY's own experience under these conditions to verify the veracity of the books and the "fixes" and shortcuts established or recommended within them. Only a few of the books in that series deal with the more controversial operational or larger matters. Just to work off of Andreas' point (well...add an exclamation point to it) about historiography in general, does anyone, really think they are getting the exact unvarnished that's-exactly-what-happened-for-real truth when you are interviewing anyone particularly general officers? You are always seeing things through their eyes and through their filters and intents, often recounted to protect themselves or others from hitorical criticism and scrutiny from one degree or another. Likewise do you really think you are getting the the exact unvarnished that's-exactly-what-happened-for-real truth when you are reading a unit after action report of official dispatches of what occured in a battle written right after? Again, in almost all cases where real careeers are immediately right on the line for actions recently taken, you can bet that this can very often influence how evcents are recanted: (I've seen it myself very often over the past 25 years.) In both cases the answer swings between "maybe not" to "oh hell no! depending on the situation. Analyzing all these sources for relaibility and veracity are critical skils for historians. Sometimes the last source of the truth rather than the first, is the offical unit after action report. BTW sidebar: There seems to be some misconception that the US Army somehow underestimated the Soviet Army. (Speaking as someone who was directly invlolved in preparing to fight it for a couple decades I believe we grossly overestimated the Soviet Army). Neither in doctrine, in training, or in preparation did I ever see any underestimation of the Red Army's capabilities. Any weakness in inherent in either their huiman material (e.g. having units with so many differnt langauge probelms) or physical materiel were clearly compensated for in their doctrine, trainig methodologies and war fighting preparations, clearly there for all to see, and little open to misinterpretation. They were always the big bad wolf. Los

"Finally, I just have to ask that - does anyone else think the sub-title of the book is most inappropriate?" No. It's a book written from the German perspective, no mystery there. RE: the original series, at the time the US Army was looking for lessons learned re: fighting their new potential enemies. They weren't looking for balanced hsitory, but plain english assessments on a professional to professional level basis from guys that had been fighting them for four years. And that's what they got. It was not meant to be converted directly to US army doctine, nor was it. They got what they paid for. BTW, I'll plug a good book to read. David M., Glantz' "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat." isbn 0-7006-0944-X. Glantz, is one of the foremeost Western experts and authors on the Russian side of WW2. He can by no stretch of the imagination be described as a german apologist. It's about Operation Mars. Oh wait, never heard of it? Of course not. It was meant to be the main Soviet effort against the Germans in Dec 1942, striking against Army Group Center (Rzhev sailent under Model). Zhukov was vehemetly against the pincer operation at against Stailingrad and saw Stalingrad as a side show drawing resources away from the main effort against the bulge aimed at Moscow. The assault consisted of Seven Armies 660000 men and 2000 tranks awith followup forces (Op Jupiter which was cancelled on the heels of the Mars disaster) of another 415,000 men and 1400 tanks.(About 150000 were committed). In less than a month (Late Nov-Dec 1942) of heaving fighting the Soviet offensive was stopped cold. Checking recently released Sove loss data, casualties are put at approximately 335,000 killed! 1600 tanks were lost. The Germans suffered 40,000 casualties. Again. all this in a month's fighting. There then followed a deliberate expunging of all records of the mars operation. Zhukov, (Mars was his personal baby) gives it a passing mention (not even by name) in his memoirs. It was not until five years ago that any Soviet historian even acknowledged the existence of the operation by name. With the success of the Stalingrad operation at the time drawing all attention, and with reputations to be maintained (Zhkov's), it was easy to bury such a catastrophe. It's a popular misconception that from end of 1942 on, The Russain front was an unbroken string was Soviet operational successes as they honed tehir operational art. Hogwash. I suppose if you bury all the dismal and bloody failures it could seem as such. BTW lest we be too harsh on German sources I'll quote Glantz on Russian sources: "It is therefor ironic that many military defeats and the tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers that died in them were in fact forgotten. A regime that in part was responsible for the carnage thought it in its own best interest to play down defeat and instead emphasize victory of the Soviet Nation and the socialism it personified....from 1942 to the war's end the Soviets portrayed their military experience as a constant march to victory. Misfortunes occured, operations ran out of steam and at times the Germans launched successful counterstrokes and counterattacks that achieved local successes...This military historical mosaic had few defeats only because the Soviets willed it so." "The public face of Soviet historiography was at best a partially credible tale and at worst a combination of half truth and half lies....amid the seemingly inexorible Soviet march to victory form 1943-1945 the Soviets suffered many setbacks, many of them significant. Those that were not covered up were explained away as diversions, demonstrations or actions of far less significance than they really were. included amongst these failed operations were the first Kursk offensive of Feb-March 43, the Belorussian operations of fall 1943 and winter 1944, and the East Prussian operation of October 1944." Anyway interesting stuff. This book is full of great CMBB stuff, though mostly told from the Russian persepctive. Some great CMBB operations in there. Los

It's links to JPG images. I can see it Ok? Los

I am posting a few previews of MikeT's CMMOS Pacific Mod for CMBO, hopefully this'll hold you over.... Look under the files section: Look under files for CMBO Pacific jpgs [ November 04, 2003, 12:42 AM: Message edited by: Los ]

I am posting a few previews of MikeT's CMMOS Pacific Mod for CMBO, hopefully this'll hold you over.... Look under the files section: Look under files for CMBO Pacific jpgs [ November 04, 2003, 12:40 AM: Message edited by: Los ]

Mike, Just curious, I already have the CMBO-PAC mod installed (it's great). D0 I gain anything by reinstalling it, any updates to the original? Los

For a temporary fix, try the most excellent CMBO pacific Mod. Los

A few German flicks: "The Green Devils of Monte Cassino:" Made in the fifties. Only in German "The Star of Africa" It's about Hand joachim Marsialles, the top desert ace. Should be available from IHF or belle and Blade Recently re-released on video is also the obscure britich "Desert Rat's" which had some good combat scenes. In addition I believe Desert Fox with James Mason and Richard Burton ha sbeen rereased. There's a self titles Afrika Korps documentary released by the Germans in WW2 available through IHF. History of Fallschirmjager Pt's 1 and 2 available through Chronos has tons of good Crete and Italy footage. There are also two Through Enemy Eyes"(German newsreel episodes) with stuff on Kos and Leros, as well as a ton on other Med stuff. Don't forget Capra's "Battle of San Pietro" which has some vivid and gruesome combat footage. Los [ October 30, 2003, 02:48 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

I do have it on good authority that the latest beta version of CMAK won't self delete itself from your hard drive if you choose to do slightly ahistorical things like fight over terrain tiles that weren't fought over in RealLife. Sidebar, anyone ever see the 1950s German flick "Green Devils of Monte Cassino?" It's about an FJ bn that's stationed by the abbey and the effort they go to to convince the clergy in there to vacate because it's just a mater of time before the allies bomb.(One of those the Germans as good guys stories) Anyways the uniforms and weapons are good, though most of the helmets are look a little small, probabbly vacuum formed plastic made for the movie. And being black and white there's plenty of good scenes cut with real footage. OK for a lark... Los

Mike, Do you remember what the scenario was called Los

Through free association this thread brings to mind a film I acqiured not too long ago called "Stukas" (Ger:1941). It's German language only w/ Czech subtitles, and follows a Stuka squadron through the French Campaign in 1940. It's a propoganda film but being made right after thr campaign with all the real kit and it's pretty interesting. Some miniatures and modles but lots of live footage and real equipment too: In particular French tanks, guns, and uniforms. Lots of coverage of the breakthrough at Sedan. Some neat closeups of 4 and 8 wheeled panzerspahwagens. And of course if you're a stuka fan..... Sidebar at the same time I also aquired a 1950's german movie called "Die Grune Tuefel von Monte Cassino" which covers a company of German paras fighting around the Abbey with a side plot of trying to convince the occupants of the abbey to leave before the allies bomb. It's no "Battleground" but lot's of good footage nevertheless. German language only. Los

MikeT, I just wanted to say that the CMBO Pacific mod was a great piece of work. I enjoyed very much the Tarawa scenarios. It needs a hell of a lot more PR than it gets. (If you redo it for CMAK that would be a great thing, you could use the Italians OB as the base for Japanese as they have a tad less firepower than the Germans?) Los p.s. if you need help let me know.... [ October 18, 2003, 04:32 PM: Message edited by: Los ]

TRL thanks for the pic, I have the same book ("The Armed Forces of WW2:Uniforms Insignia and Organization") by Andrew Mollo. I'll quote a passage: "French African and Colonial troops continued to wear their existing uniforms as long as possible until they were replaced by British or American uniforms and equipment. American uniform was supplied in vast quantities so by the time the French Expeditionary Corps landed in Italy it was dressed in American uniforms with French Headdress (when available) and French Insignia." TRL's picture above depicts a Goumier in Italy. He's wearing a brit helmet over his turban. The FEC had five such regiments (maybe about a third of the FEC infantry strength). Another picture shows French North African troops (perhaps Algerians or colonial troops as most look white)wearing US equipment but all sporting French Helmets adorned with camo netting. Los