Los

Howdy Fionn, The maps run the gambit from overall (a strategic few), to operational (most of them) which cover division/regt operations, to tactical (a few with bn and lower ops). I don't think the maps have much platoon level stuff though the series itself is chalk full of small unit action accounts. BTW there is another book out which details teh history of just the 7th Panzer Kompanie, LAH in similar detail by the same publisher. (Got that too) Los

Re: The Lehman history of the 1ss Division. Yes they are in English. The whole series is five volumes plus at least two map books talking the Liebstandarte from it's inception through the end. While there are pictures, (hundreds) these are not "picture books) there are picture books of the 1s and maybe Lehamn even authors one, but this is detailed unit history comprising several thousand pages total. Hope that helps. (The whole thing will probably cost you $250 US) Los

BTW, re: Bridge too far, I hear it is out on DVD so I'm trying to track it down. that'll be a fine addition to my dvd collection and hopefully there's unreleased footage also. Los

I would also recommend: "ON the Front Lines" (used to be: The Sharp End )by John Ellis isbn0-471-55148-1 A must read about small unit actions in WW2, the experience of combat. "Night Drop" SLA Marshall (don't have teh isbn. airborne small unit actions in Normandy. "Beyond the Beachhead" by Joe Balkoski isbn 0-8117-0221-9 Detaield story of formation and employemnt of eth 29th ID in the Normandy campaign written by a wargame designer. Another great book. "Stalingrad" by Anthony Beevor. I know I know it's east front but I'm reading it now and it's pretty good. That's just the tip of the iceberg. Oh Ok one more: "Liebstandarte volume IV/1 & Volume IV 2. by Rudolf Lehman. I don't have the isbn on me but it's publishe by JJ. Fedorowitz. Thse two volumes, about 700-800 pages total cover in detail operations of the 1ss panzer division, from 1944- to the end of the war. Much detail about all the actions, especially all of Normandy and the Ardennes. illustrated with maps and pictures too. Written by the div ops officer (I believe) so he has access to documnets, pictures, and interviews that most others would be hard pressed to come by. Cheers... Los

I'm sort of a big fan of crete. One of the major things against them was the comlete lack of suprise doue to Ultra and otehr sources. What's amazing is that they took the Island after all. While in the Aftermath the Germans were drawing conclusions that woudl curtail major airborne operations, the Allies were looking at Creter and saying, "holy ****, they've got something there with their airborne forces , we need to expand that capability! BTW there is a great two volume set from Schiffer Militaria called History of the 3rd Fallschirmjaeger regt. It has hundreds or maybe a thousand pictures including tons of never seen before shots from Crete. Los

"Isn't the use of the tank main gun against infantry targets (unless they have AT capability) actually outlawed by the Geneva convention, or something?" The use of a tank's Main gun against infantry IS not against the Geneva convention (they carry AP). Though using AT rounds to snipe at individuals would probably earn you a kick in the head from your TC for wasting such a valuable round on a target like that, That's why they carry machine guns! Cheers... Los

I liked TACOPS and it really excells as a multiplayer experience but the abscence of Morale rules really diminishes from its authenticity (indiv unit supression not withstanding). The battles end up being fights of annihlation. Los

Ken wrote: """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" This is a very interesting discussion. My doubts concerning the IFV either BMP or Bradley or any other has to due with the poor surviveability of the IFV and the large casualties suffered if the infantry is still in the vehicle when destroyed. """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" This is not a Bradley or a BMP issue it is an issue faced by anyone who rides a vehicle in combat, be it a BMP, M113, half track or a truck. A BTR or an M113 is no more impervious to the perils of combat than a BMP or a Bradley, but has to stick it's neck just as far into danger. (Albeit with less armament of its own) WHile no APC is impervious (BTW niether are tanks), I'll take the extra 25mm armor over the canvas tarp on a 2 1/ ton truck any day of the week! Nor should anyone look at Grozny as some sort of deathnell to the viability APC or point out look how bad BMPs were. The handling of those (poorly trained) units by their commander was at best criminally negligent and downright stupid. You can have the most highest quality equipment in the world but if you are going to use it like that, you are going to lose. The obvious thing to point out is that APCs/IFVs have been in combat now (inc half tracks) for getting close to sixty years and are a maintsay of virtually every army in the world. That ought to tell yone about how valuable the professionals thing they are. (That goes for helicopters also!) also... . """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" I have also read that there is concern over the extreme psychological strain of being in an enclosed vehicle in combat conditions for long streches of time. The infantry cooped up in their tin boxes would have little to do and no concept of what is occuring outside. Just sitting there with their imagination running wild.... """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" I don't know who came up with this but a few points are in order... 1. The only time you actually button up an APC/IFV (that is close all the roof hatches where you are normally free to hang over the edge and oogle at village females etc,) is either, on the final run in to combat where artillery is a threat or when it's aining/snowing. 2. Likewise it's not like troops drive around for days buttoned-up and find themselves right on the attack without advanced warning or prep times. Battles, regardless of how screwed up they become when the first firing start, or normally fairly extensively planned out etc. A typical attack (say at the NTC) will have the bn come after an approach march of some length to a staging area or advanced assembly area, where the troops would then receive operations orders. The formations would then shake themsleves out of march formation into some other appropriate formation and cross the LD after some level of prep etc. WHile this could still posibly entail a movement of up to an hour, units will normally be unbuttoned until the last possible moment or at the first sign of indirect fire (For instance, it's too hot in the desert to be otherwise!) AT this piont everyone has already shucked off everything they are not going to need or Don whatever they will. While the run in under buttoning is in itself pretty scary, it certainly is no more scary than walking in on the target. It's just a different kind of fear to be dealt with, and believe me there are plenty of flavors to go around. Inside the box they are usually appraised of what's going on becasue they need to be in order to react to the situation. You just don't suddenly stop and say "Everyone out", then they hop out and say, "Huh, what's this? Where's the enemy?" In fact in most delibverate attacks troops dismount well before the objective, usually out of MAW/small arms range for the advance in, while the IFVs go to ground and support with their weapons (M113s uused to do this too before the Bradley, only all they had was a fifty cal). In fact the IFVs may fire and manuever to some extent following the troops Even hasty situations invaribly afford minutes of pre time before going into the assault or at least the troops are aware that contact is likely. And anyway, trained units invariably inact well rehearsed immediate action drills that everyone is familiar with to deal with thsoe situations. On the defense it's even less of an issue becasue trooops will be dismounted in postions (hasty or prepared) near their vehicles. (some might be out ahead on ambushes/ OP/LPs, etc. The IFV will fire and relocated after one or two shots to other postions even if they're only 20-50 meters away and when the time comes everyone either hauls ass to the track or dies in place as the situation dictates. Cheers... Los p.s. personnaly I still prefer LPC over APC (Leather Personell Carriers)

Re: Squad sized, yes they have been dropping in many armies for a while. Oh well, Personally I thik the mech infantry are much better off with the firepower of the bradley. (BTW why is it that the only people that complain about Bradley's are people that don't use them, that should tell you something?) Any notion about "Oh it might make one more tempted to take on a tank" is nonsense which I suppose comes from playing computer games or something. When it's your ass on the line I can assure you that you are completely free of such ridiculous temptations, and a quick reminder that a TOW armed bradley has an immensely greater reach than a Tank (over a Klick) but that assumes the Iraqi billiard table terrain, obviously ymmv. However a Bradley and a BMP can go around nicely. IMO tanks have a heck of a lot more to fear from competently handled infantry than visa versa. BTW the BTR (a cool looking vehicle) is a maintenace DOG. (to go against the misperception that Russain stuff is somehow more rugged or field capable than western stuff). There are a number at both NTC and JRTC and they have this complicated two engine design which leads to constant headaches and breakdowns. But heck a wheeled vehicle is inherently more reliable than a tracked vehicle so it makes sense that you see 2 fer 1 in MRDs. I do like and have been in/driven/ and seen fired the new BMP-3. The Kuwaitis bought a bunch to make friends with the Russains. For firepower it has a 100mm smoothbore cannon which fires (I think) its spandrel or Spiral (I forget) missle through the bore. It also has a coax 23mm cannon. (These also had some french thermal sights.) BTW as a big SU27 fan (Flanker 1.5 is still one of the best and most realistic (FM-wise)simulators ever realeased.), I would point everyone interested to the August "Flight Journal" (put out by Smithsonian), which has an extensive flight test published on the SU27. (By a Marine test pilot which has a lot of experience in a number of other Russian AC also). WHile it is a great plane it has some key quirks and does not score nearly as well in the pilot friendly handling regime (Read:flying qualities) as it does in the book=performance qualites. The former is what pilots guage the effectiveness of the AC buy, the latter is what the rest of us chairborn types normall guage a plans capabilities by. The SU27 is no silver bullet. (though I still think it's the most beautiful of AC!!!) Cheers... Los

"I still like James Jones explanation of his.. he says that you are so revved up and terrified that you just simply run out of adrenalin...and that essentially you don't have the energy to be afraid or not to act...and that it is indifference in some ways which explains the change in performance..." Are you talking about "Thin Red Line"? I haven't seen the movie, many say its a disappointmnet, but the book remains one of my all time favorites and is still one of the best descriptions of what goes on in your mind in combat. And by the way, Mazzy and Tills are hillarious. I would highly recommend this "non-standard" account. Los

Re: Units sitting in waiting... One of the most important concepts that we picked up from the Germans, and which today remains an important part of combat orders is understanding the commander's intent. It's not enough to say, you have to take that hill. Units need to know that they are taking htat hill (for ex.) in order to interdict an enemy avenue of approach through a gully on the far side. This way if something happens along the way (and it will) or if you get on the hill and see that there's a smaller hill on the far side which blocks your line of fire into the gully, the subunuits can make on the spot corrections to their positioning or actions in order to cover that gully. Certainly many battles have been lost becaus eunits just asat there and didn't use their initiative and often whole armies (early war Russain for example) are inculcated with a general directive NOT to veer from orders. So to me at least it seems CM is moving along the right track. Sure some Armies or units would be less apt to display this initiative and maybe that'sbuilt into teh numbers somewhere.This is essentially backing up what Steve is saying, just in case I'm not clear. Cheers... Los

There is a lot of good stuff being tossed around by many here. I'd like to give a quick bird's eye view of what it's like to command a company on a very simple manuever lasting about 30 minutes. This happened last year. (this is long, please bear with me) I have a rifle company consisting of three platoons of seasoned veterans, however they are learning a new way to fight. (from guerilla to conventional) They are from country X who is fighting country Y on the horn of Africa. (And has been on and off for 30 years) Today they are organized into 2 plts, the third is detached on another op. (3 squads per) with one or two MGs (PKMs) and one or two RPGs per platoon. There is no weapons platoon and the company commander is away with the BC (don't ask why) which leaves 2 PLs, but a group of strong NCOs. No weapons platoon. There are two advisors. Commo consists of two small hand held radios. There is no back-up. Our task is to move to contact against a small village (really a farmstead with about 4 huts) where suspected enemy have a small logistics point. Anywhere from squad to platoon strength. The terrain looks like Mars, high mountainous desert with some scrub. We are about 1500-2000 meters from the OBJ at a rally point and can clearly see the target. Ahead of us is a plain, with a a 200m high ridge on the right and a deep gully on the left. It's five in the afternoon (still 100 degrees) and we have to get this done and link up with another company so time is an issue. (I would have preferred waiting for night) We call the paltoon leaders and platoon sergeants together and visula inspect the target. No one is visible but there is a herd of camels which they use to transport stuff with. We decide that one platoon will move along the floor of the gully in a concealed route to the OBJ. They will move out first and establish security and support positions which can overlook the tgt with MG fire PLUS establish position on surrounding ridges that will block a dirt road that provides access to the area. The second platoon (with me) will move out a few minutes after the first and we will hug the ridge on the right which provides concealment from the target for most of the way. (BTW I have a two man OP up there to ensure there are no surprises as we move). The need to establish security constantly bleeds off guys. We will ahve to cross a road, at some risk, then head off further to the right and enter a gully that will take us nearly to the target. This platoon will provide the bulk of the assault forces. SO we are moving generally in platoon columns somewhat parallel to each other. Which ever platoon makes contact first, the other can attack from the flank in support. We make some coordination then split up. I go with the pl I'm with to hear how he briefs to his Squad leaders. The men , who are in the prone in folds of the ground are briefed in small groups. I take a knee and look down to see most of the skeleton of a human body sticking out of the ground. Not encouraging. A large battle has been fought in this vicinity before. There's unexploded ordinace everywhere. Now everything I explained up to now has taken about 15 minutes. ****ty troops would have required my personal supervision of every move and discussion and could have extended things to 45 minutes. There will be no further contact between the platoons, radio or otherwise until plt 1 is in position (and they will just say "in position" on the radio. WHICH BRINGS ME TO A QUESTION. IN CM DO YOU HAV E TO GIVE ORDERS FROM TURN TO TURN OR CAN YOU SET THINGS FOR A NUMBRER OF TURNS IN THE FUTURE. So 1 plt moves off slowly and carefully descending into the gully. When the last man disappears 2 pl;t stands up and shakes itself out into a platoon column of squads in column. But as we move out I switch them into an arrowhead of squad columns. tehlead squad is in column with 50 m between teams (Always make contact with the smallest element") MOvement porceeds ok for about ten minutes. There is a small finger leading off the ridge to our right that we use to over. I'm in the middle of the platoon (conpiscous with a radio in one hand, M4 in the other and two machine gunner teams behind me. It's amazing to watch these guys deftly scamper up and down craggy ten meter undulations like nothing. The terrain is easily described as rough or broken. (If I had a scanner I could show you guys) ANOTHER QUESTION: IF NO ACTION OCCURS, CAN ACTION PHASES BE STRUNG TOGETHER UNTIL CONTACT IS MADE ala HPS SIMS? As the lead fireteam goes over the finger there is a blast of firing and everyone hits the dirt. **** is cracking over head. WHat the heck! Wisely, the second fireteam of first squad runs up to the lip of the finger, gets in the prone, and starts returning fire to support the point team. I listen to the shooting and wave for both back squads to deploy left and right then signal eth SLs to me. Not waiting for them I run up to the lip of the ridge and see our guys ina pretty big firefight with some unknowns across the small gully on the finger across from us. The SL says it's about a squad and I agree. SOme **** wizzes by me and I back down as the SLs arrive. (As a CO or PL you are running around trying to direct stuff, pointing, shouting, carrying a radio trying to look matter of factly, and it is very easy to forget that you stick out like a sore thumb.) I tell them to set up left and right with the MGs and prepare to trap these guys. I order the first squad to pull back. Maybe we can suck these guys after the fireteam in contact since they probably only think they are up against a patrol. My calls to 1st platoon are unaswered on the ****ty radio. (hopefully Eric, the other advisor, doesn't have his head up his ass.) It takes s a few moments for the squad leaders to run back and get ready then we shout for the exposed team to pull back as we return fire. AT this point I'm nearly horse since firefights mean lots of shouting and running around to personnaly tell people what to do. After the shooting starts, everything relies on two principles: 1. Being flexible, that is being able to change everything on the fly and know it will work due to the quality/experience of your leaders and men. and 2: moving and acting before the other guy. There's time to be tired later, but for now, leaders have to hussle their asses off to make people move in an environment when every instict screams Hide! or Run!. Note that as a leader in combat, this often requires kicking, slapping, pushing and physically moving people, and tons of yelling. Anyway, The team gets up in one gaggle and hauls ass back past us in a hurry, we I can see some figures manuevering towards us. Now teh rest of us haul ass down the finger to the next pile of rocks (this is great infantry country). Imagine the surprise on the enemy when they chase after our guys (they are not very well trained, these guys, which goes for most of their countrymen who rely on old WW2 soviet style numbers tactics), when they come over the finger and a whole platoon is waiting for them. There is massive fire, (the establishment of fire superiority is key to winning firefights. Whoever SOUNDS like they're squared away will suually scare the bejeezus out of the other guys and start degrading their will to resist. ANyway, some fall, the rest run, we get up and bound to the top of the ridge, I'm running around to each sqaud emplacing them where I want them. Leaders trying to control movement so noone shoots any friendlies, no one gets too far out ahead. The G's are now thoroughly spooked, and disappear over the far side of the finger and there is more fire. It's first platoon which has come out of the draw per our previous contingency plan (always have one of those) plan and cut them off.) Some survivors surrender, others throw down their weapons and scatter. A few scattered shots ring out. The big challenge is to get our guys to stop shooting before the two platoons hit eachother, but these guys haven't survived 10-15 years of fighting by being stupid. Now it's running around, consolidating, reorganizing, etc etc. Of course the whole plan to advance stealthily on the OBJ is shot (plans never survive) and speed is of the essence. We quickly in a two minute parlay set up a two platoon advancing in parallel, dropping off MGs and security teams in a hurry. Whoever was at the huts have run off, but they've left a stash of ammunition which is cool. Plus a ton of foul smelling and slightly dangerous looking Camels. We scatter the ugly smelly beasts (no time totake them with us and killing camels here is like shooting a religeous icon-they're too valuable) A few peole actually live in the huts. they're deathly afraid we're just going to massacre them. instead we jsut interrogate them since some of the guys in the company know them. Intel is gathered, We blow up everything we can't carry (which is mnost of it. They keep the PK ammo and theextra RPGs.) and haul ass to take our prisoners back plus get out of the area before help arrives. Later when there is time for an AAR we find out that when our point element moved over teh finger the ran perpendciualrly into a squad sized patrol that was moving to our front, The terrain is crazy and can hold whole companies! During the fight most of the guys had little to no idea of the big picture though the leaders had various levels of understanding. This whole way of doing things fast is new to them. Despite what you see on TV, most combat around the third world goes like this: Two forces bump into each other, both sides go to ground and fire either wildly or sporatically until someone makes a mistake or decides to leave. There's not a lot of agrressive fire and manuever. That requires training and will. Plus in the desert it's too damn hot to run around like an idiot. Anyway, notice that in this particular instance (Caveat:no two fights are alike!), things sort of proceeded in pulses. Plans were made and disemminated, then carried out. SOmething pops up. Things occur very much On the fly at that point until the leader gains control of the situation and issues new orders. There then is another fluury of mevemnt/activity until some other result occurs, leaders then adjust/or reorganize, whatever. In movies you see leaders doing lots of the fighting. If you are busy shooting that normally means youa re neglecting your primary job which is controlling things, and it's almost always chaos. We could have been wiped out ten times from ten differnt directions. But that times we weren't. Luckily. This is the first day of three days of continuous combat operations that ends in a crazy battalion sized night raid. (Note, we've already been working with them for a month straight back in the rear.) We had no casualties except a gushed shin (mine) from a lousy jagged rock. Note that the average joe civilian was safely at home 10000 kilometers way blissfully unaware that this is business as usual for some of their countryman. Two months later I would be back home at my civilian job pushing papers and worrying about budgets and where I am going to find more episodes of Thomas the Tank engine for my kid to watch.... Cheers... Los P.s. Sorry for the ramble. Take it or leave it...

Actually I have had vets relate atrocities to me that they committed, primarily because the two guys in question were friends of mine and also because I am a vet too, so there's a differnt level of communication that goes on than when talking to civilians. Maybe knowing I wouldn't be looking at them judging them in some accusatory manner. Both fought in the PAC, one in Okinawa on the 7th ID (as a flamethrower man no less) and the other was a grunt in the USMC. Both mentioned that it was common practice to get out your K-bar and extract gold teeth from Japanese, dead, dying, or wounded. Interestingly enough, this little anectdote is also related by I believe it was either E.B Sledge (on with the old breed in Peleilu) or W. Manchester (?) who wrote "Good Bye Darkness" (or both,it's been years). One of these guys wrote: (I paraphrase) "There is no creature on earth more savage than a 19 year old American boy" Now having served very closely with many Vietnam vets (not the finance or artillery types either, SF, Lurps, grunts, multi-tour types) common discourse on their operations as part of our proffesional development (read sitting around and telling war stories), I have been related a large number of matter of factly stories which would seem to any civilian sitting at home in their air conditioning as downright horrific, but which seem to me as a mixture of buisiness as usual on the front lines/young boys finding themselves with the power to kill while trying to keep from being killed. It's impossible to explain unless you've been a part of it. Now myself having spent over two decades in the service and been in combat but more to the point been an advisor in several nasty foreign wars I can only say that the vast majority of nitty gritty, which goes on in wars is will never really be published or understood (thank god too) WHich brings me back to the Waffen-SS. I don't for a second begrudge any organization heat of battle type atrocities since there is no Army in the world that doesn't commit them in spades, though only the ones that lose end up paying for them. Yes when you get to the cold blooded Malmedy type operations that crosses the line, but it seems to me most guys in the Waffen-SS were like most guys that joined say, the US Marines. Hey it's an elite organization. I'm a nineteen year old kid, in great shape, and believe in my coountry or just want to get into a good outfit with snazzy uniforms becuase it will increase my chances of getting laid 100%. Then I'm sitting their with teh rest of my Regiment before embarking for Saipan and eth division commander is saying "Well, regarding Prisoners, let me just say this. If you have to take even the slightest risk catching a jap, then I say, don't do it." Which is tantamount to saying don't take any prisoners. BTW I ahve this very clip on tape I believe it is the Island Hopping episode of World at War if anyone wants to see it for themsleves. Still given the horrors of WW2 somebody has to be made an example of, and they did atrocities a bit more above the standard deviation, even if a lot of them were einsatzkommando ops, so they all got a black eye for it. I'm sure a lot of guys in the FRY are going to be branded murders for stuff performed by the MUP and Militia too. (Just an example not looking to get into a Kosovo debate). Anyway, I'm rambling.... Cheers... Los

Hey I'd like to put in a good word for two of my Fav units, 3rd FJR and 6th FJR. I believe both were in Normandy and I hope we seem 'em. Los

There's a great book called "On Infantry" by John English???<Can't remember his name will post it from home later>. I think it was that book, though it could have been another that's points up interesting differences in training of junior leaders between the major powers. Let me sumarize an example: Pre-war/early war officer training... IN UK junior officer training, the students are brought together over a piece of terrain. They are given a situation, forces available and mission. Discussion is made over what they are to get out of the exercize. Several students are tasked with leading the exercize and over night draw up their plans to be implemented in the next day's class. IN German junior officer training, the students are brought together over a piece of terrain. They are given a situation, forces available and mission. Discussion is made over what they are to get out of the exercize. Several students are tasked with leading the exercize and given TEN MINUTES to draw up their plans and implement them immediately. Though the plans may be screwed up, or execution shoddy, students were not criticized for showing initiative or Not to mention the fact that you can train a hell of a lot more exercizes with tis method. It is with junior leaders like this that Germany went to war and turned teh military establishments up side down. Of course as casualties began to take their toll, and the Allies (Slowly) but steadily began to emulate German practices that things began evening out. BTW I'm constantly annoyed with Steven Ambrose's (repeated) quips about how the Germans were robots or automatons much less capable of displaying initaive than their US counterparts. A load of horse**** if there ever was one. There's no doubt that some decisions ("Don't wake up Hitler he's sleeping!" on June 6th for example, which is teh exampel he's always touting), were damn stupid and displayed that tendancy, however there doesn't seem to be any greater display (ON THE WHOLE, of course individually there were exceptions) of stunning initaitive by the ALlies over the Germans on a regular basis. I agree about stats having their place but it's how those tools are used that matter. Dupuy of course has his very detailed statistical assessments of German performance during the war which point oput the fact that regardless of early war, late war, on defense or on offense, they doled out more casualties against the allies on a consistent basis. Still this is where that critical mass of quantity eventually (or at some point) overcoming qualitative edges comes into play. And quantity is sustained not just by superior porduction but also by superior logistics, replacement systems, etc etc. And that's where the Allies came through pretty well. Cheers... Los (interesting threads here...)

Another option is to use the old ASL tactic of assault movement. Even in open terrain there are usually variations in teh ground etc that allow units to move in a safer manner than just waltzing like they're at the park on Sunday. This of course comes at the cost of distance moved per turn. Los

I wonder whty Monty never performed a series of modest amphibious landings to leap frog the German positions at El Al, ala MacCarthur in New Guniea. The RN did have control of the Med. Must have been a resource issue. (Reminds me of screwing around with Campaign for North Africa) Los

There is always a tendency about non miltary (and some military) typoes to argue equipment and weapons performance over all otehr factos in combat. This is of course because these are easily measures by those that don't do the fighting. All this technical talk is nice, butthe tank itself, but the quality of the crew inside and the doctrine that guides them that counts the most. Not to dismiss numbers, there is of course some critcial point or mass, where numbers overwhelm quality. (This vaires from situation to situation and takes into account other factors like logistics air power and other fire support agencies, etc) , but look at some of the Golan Height enagegements, particularly during Yom Kippur, the Israelis were grossly outnumbers at time smore than Germans in Normandy, but crew quality and doctrine was so lacking that it pushed that critical mass where numbers overwhelms quality far off the edge. Los

BTW as an aside I was in Normandy in mid-May. Spent two days tooling around their with my wife and Kid in her Grandma's Renault. What a great time. Spent most of the time at Omaha beach and crawling around (I think tt was ) resistance nest 62. Stayed at a small INN on the beach by the Veirvill exit. (Le Hotel du Cassino). We also stopped in at Pont du Hoc. Then tooled up to St. Mere. Eglise to check out out the town and the small tiny bridge directly to teh west at Le Fiere (sp?). My alma matter (in the late seventies early eighties) was 1/505 P.I.R. so I wanted to see where they had landed and fought. Very cool, especially the small bridge which sits at one end of the Mederet flood plain. (there is an Iron Mike there now), I got out and walked around looked at the terrain, figured where I would have emplaced my machineguns etc and went to those spots, where you coulds still see some feint remains of emplacements. I then walked eh whole casueway (it's about 3-500m) imagining the long run it would have been under fire to get across. There area few trees there that would have been old enough to have been around at teh time and I squatted by them, snapping pictures, trying to imagine if they had protected some cowering trooper. Anyway after that we drove around just checking out Hedgerows and on theh way out of Normandy drove along the British route of advance for Goodwood and several other main offensives, checking out the terrain and stopped in at Villiers Bocage to see the mains quare where Michael Wittman had done his terribe execution on the sharp end of (I think it was ) Goodwood or Totalize, one of those. Though I had never been to Normandy, nor even read a book about it in a few years, I felt as if I knew that area like my backyard. Sort of like my first trip to Gettsyburg. BTW most of Normandy still looks like it did 55 years ago. My wife enjoyed the free guided tour and wants to go back when our kid is old enough to understand. ANyway, it's a highly recommended trip. Next year, the Ardennes! Cheers... Los

Yes I'm familiar with T. Dupuy and have read some of his stuff (good stuff) but have not read his whole book. Though it's interesting it seems to be a somewhat different line of research from SLAM. Dupuy (IMO) is concerned with building a model to help strategists predict or model combat, (which is potentially quite useful and interesting to us as wargamers) while SLAM's work is (IMO at least for me) more geared towards issues front line leaders can sink their teeth into and learn from, how men react under fire and how they can be trained better for the traumatic event. Though tis may not apply to Dupuy, it brings me to anotehr tangent, I have a problem with combat models and simulations which do not take into account (at least in some way) the human elements and frictions in modelling combat and instead concentrate on penetartion factors and other physics stuff alone. Many US Military models (i.e. Janus?) are like this because soft factors are difficult to model and do not fit into easy equations. In the past I've been round and round with the Major (from TACOPS) about his game on this . I like TACOPS especially in multiplayer mode, but totally ommitting morale (save from a bit of individual suppression) is in itself more realistic than risking an over or under modelling of the soft factors. I lean more towards the Robert Leonard Manuever Warfare side of beliefs. Anyway, taken all together, I feel both Dupuy and SLAM are valuable contributors. The Army and Marines still values boh writer's works and they are always prominently displayed on any porfessional reading list. Cheers... Los

p.s. Sorry about the typos! Los

Howdy guys, Just found this board though I have been following the progress of CM (Very excited). Another book of interest by SLA Marshall is called "The Soldiers Load and the Weight of the Nation." Which is a great book about how much we weight down our soldiers to their detriment. (So true) I have also read Men Against Fire, Not Drop and several other SLAM books. There are a few key points that I like about Marshall. One is his discussions about fire distribution. Prior to WW2 most all marksmanship and firing was done on KD (known distance) ranges against various pop-up and other targets. It was found in early actions in WW2 that many troops would not fire because they did not see targets like they were expecting as they had on the range. In the bascence of targtes they just laid low. training began to emphasize firing at terrain features. I have witnessed this myself many times. (21 years in the Army and have been an adviser overseas inmany scary places also) Many troops do not fire, not just becasue they are scared but also because they don't see targets. This is overcome with strong leadership and good training. Particularly in the early phases of a fire fight success is all about establishing fire superiority over the other side even if most all of it is supressive fre. This normally begins to work against the side with the lower volume of fire, unless they are very well trained, and success is all about breaking morale and will to stick it out more than killing x number of guys. Anyway, there;'s not much point to my story <grin> though I understand many of te criticisms against SLAM, but I have myself observed many of his key points throughout my long career and do incorporate it into my training. Cheers. Los