155mm arty was used in direct fire mode to blow Panthers up?

[Magpie_Oz]

No, same thing.

"A gun mantlet is an armour plate or shield attached to an armoured fighting vehicle's main gun ....."

"A mantle (from mantellum, the Latin term for a cloak) is a type of loose garment usually worn over indoor clothing to serve the same purpose as an overcoat."

[wokelly]

Ah forgot the T.

[Michael Emrys]

Gun (HE) - Sherman is better than the PzIV. Not sure about the T34

The T-34 may have had a more powerful HE round. I understand they used a more powerful, albeit less stable, explosive formula. So, they'd have a more effective round at the cost of more likely to have a violent brew-up if hit and penetrated. But that might only come down to whether you'd prefer to die in a millisecond or half a millisecond.

Michael

[gunnergoz]

Regarding whether or not there were shortages of Shermans in the theater, the Army's history entitled Logistical Support of the Armies had this to say:

The problem of replacement factors as nowhere better illustrated than in he case of the medium tank. Attempts o get the replacement factor for the M4 tank revised had a long history, dating back to pre-invasion days when the theater had predicted that losses in the landings would not be covered by the currently authorized factor of 7 percent. As with other items of equipment, however, the War Department insisted that any requests for revision must be backed by experiential data from actual combat. In June it raised the factor to 9 percent, but, as before, mainly on the basis of experience in Italy, for no conclusive data were yet available from operations in France. Losses in the first three months were considerably above the existing replacement factor, and thus tended to confirm he theater’s earlier assertions. In mid- August ETOUSA reported that its reserves were exhausted; by mid-September it was finding it increasingly difficult to keep armored units at their authorized Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) strength.

The War Department meanwhile had agreed to expedite the shipment of tanks al- ready released. But receipts did not meet requirements despite the lower losses which attended the revision to more static operations in the next few months. Losses in September came to 16.5 per- cent of the theater’s T/O&E strength as compared with 25.3 percent in August. In October the rate fell to 9.8 percent. In November the rate advanced to 11.2percent and in December shot up to 22.8, reflecting the greatly intensified combat activity.

Early in October the War Department had announced an increase in the re- placement factor for the medium tank from 9 to 11 percent. But this revision was made on the basis of the combined loss experience of 9.9 percent in the North African and European theaters in the month of July, and did not reflect the experience of August and September. By October the cumulative loss rate, according to the 12th Army Group, was nearer 20 percent in the European theater.

Revisions in the replacement factor consequently lagged far behind cur- rent experience. Under these circumstances the theater found it impossible to maintain units at their authorized strength, to say nothing of reconstituting reserves. At the end of September First Army, having operated with approximately 85 percent of its authorized strength in tanks during the month, adopted the expedient of temporarily suspending the Tables of Organization and Equipment of armored units so far as medium tanks were concerned, and reducing the authorized strengths in order to effect an equitable distribution of the available tanks and to establish a small reserve. The new T/O&E’s temporarily cut the authorized strengths in 75-mm. and 76- mm. gun tanks from 232 to 200 for armored divisions organized under the old T/O&E (the 2d and 3d Divisions only), from 168 to 150 for divisions organized under the latest T/O&E (all remaining armored divisions), and from 54 to 50 for separate tank battalions. The Ninth Army later adopted the same provisional T/O&E’s for its armored formations.

The situation saw no improvement during the fall months. By the end of November there were on hand in the theater only 3,344 tanks against a T/O&E requirement of 3,409 and an authorized on-hand reserve requirement of 937.

No true reserve existed, there- fore. The 12th Army Group reported that two of its tank battalions had fewer than ten serviceable tanks, and field commanders in general deplored the fact that armored units had to operate at from 10 to 25 percent below authorized strength. Furthermore, the current theater troop basis failed to provide the one tank battalion per infantry division which field commanders considered a necessary minimum. As a partial remedy steps were taken to convert two battalions of the 10th Armored Group to composite tank battalions for use with infantry divisions.

The field commands had continued to urge the theater to obtain a higher re-placement factor, arguing that a larger flow of replacement tanks was imperative if the habitual infantry-tank co-operation which had characterized all operations thus far was to continue. The12th Army Group noted that at no time since the middle of August had the armies had their full T/O&E allowance of tanks, and that not since the early days of the Normandy beachhead had they possessed a reserve. It maintained that a 25 percent reserve in each army was an operational necessity.

[JasonC]

The armor battalions available in the ETO were about evenly divided between those in armor divisions and the independent battalions. For example in Normandy to the race across France (cut off is in actual combat during August or earlier) there were 20 divisional medium battalions and 19 independent ones. By the time of the Bulge (cut off January 1 1945 reports, in action before then) there were 72 with again about half independent. From the unit histories of individual independent armor battalions, they show rates of personnel and vehicle losses in line with the armor division ones, if in action over comparable periods.

To be conservative, assume the AD battalions account for 60% of the overall losses; the higher figure would allow for higher use and heavier combat than the independents.

All the armored divisions combined report a total of 57962 battalion casualties.

The tank losses, Sherman only, over the whole campaign are variously reported as 3263 (seems to exclude 7th army in the south of France) to 4300. Assume the higher figure is correct. Then we'd expect 2580 lost in the ADs, and we'd expect them to be in line with the battle casualties of each division.

Take 2nd AD for example. It reports 6751 battle causalties or 11.6% of all the battle casualties in the divisions. It reports 290 Shermans lost, which is 6.7% of all Shermans lost and 11.2 of those lost by ADs specifically, on the 60% estimate above. This supports the 60% estimate, but shows how battle losses and tank losses can be expected to track each other.

Now, 3AD lost 10105 battle casualties, the highest of any AD in the theater. That is 17.4% of all AD battle casualties. On the same 60% figure for tank losses in the ADs, we'd expect 450 Shermans lost in the 3rd AD - which would still put it the highest among ADs, but in line with the 2nd adjusted for total losses. Instead we see 633, or 41% higher losses in tanks than the proportion of battle casualties.

The only other unit that might approach that level of tank losses, proportionally, is 7AD, which besides seeing heavy fighting (10.6% of all AD battle casualties e.g., thus an expected 275 Shermans lost by the above procedure) was basically destroyed at St Vith in the Bulge, and rebuilt from cadre afterward. Needless to say this never happened to 3rd AD.

As for overall losses and whether they were sufficient to cause any lasting shortage of US army Shermans compared to TOE, the highest loss figure for the ETO whole war is 4300, and Italy adds only 1171.

The US army was issued 19247 of the nearly 50000 Shermans produced, with 17000 going to the UK, 4100 to Russia, 1100 to the Marines for PTO and up to 800 more to the far east (non USMC). That still leaves nearly 8000 unallocated, probably stateside in depots. And it means losses in ETO and Med combined never amounted to more than 30% of those assigned to the US army in Europe. The fielded force at TOE for both ETO and Italy combined was under 5000 tanks, meaning only about half of the US army's allocated Shermans fit into ending TOE plus all losses to date. The other half are surplus to TOE requirements, assigned to the US army not LL, and not lost. Undoubtedly parked in every depot through the entire logistic trail...

Some shortage.

[JasonC]

gunnergoz - "no improvement during the fall months. By the end of November there were on hand in the theater only 3,344 tanks against a T/O&E requirement of 3,409"

Right. No improvement, a whole 65 tanks below TOE. The horror, the horror.

"(12th Army Group) maintained that a 25 percent reserve in each army was an operational necessity"

There is your shortage, then. They expected 125% of TOE in order to remain completely topped off in action and complained that they hadn't gotten it. And probably they could have had it, even as absurdly generous as that "necessity" (desire?) sounds, since in fact there were several times more Shermans built.

Shipping them to theater and planning for the number needed, the only issues.

Now compare to an item they were actually competing for shipping space against that was actually in shortage throughout the fall - 105mm artillery ammunition. There were entire months in which Patton's army was on a ration of 10 to 15 rounds per gun per day.

Which should the next freighter leaving the states be loaded with, Shermans to help 12Army Group get a comfortable 25% overstock to TOE as a reserve, or 105mm shells so Patton's entire gun park isn't silent?

[gunnergoz]

Jason, with all due respect, I'll take the US Army Chief of Military History's opinion view of the subject as having a bit more weight than anything we here can generate about it. If the army officially concluded there was a WW2 Sherman shortage in the ETO post-Normandy, that's good enough for me. Production figures like we enjoy throwing around here are not anywhere near as relevant as what the commands in the theater were reporting at the time about tanks being available to them. Seems to me that the people on the scene at the time were not just making this stuff up and if they reported up the chain that there was a problem, how can we argue that there wasn't?

If they felt that having a solid tank reserve was critical to winning the war, I find I cannot disagree.

[JonS]

... The other half are surplus to TOE requirements, assigned to the US army not LL, and not lost. Undoubtedly parked in every depot through the entire logistic trail...

Some shortage.

Sure.

Of course, that approach also informs us there was no fuel shortage in September, either, since there was plenty of fuel in France.

[JonS]

If they felt that having a solid tank reserve was critical to winning the war, I find I cannot disagree.

*psst* the Allies did win.

[gunnergoz]

Yes, and the Germans ran out of tanks and lost. The fact that we won tells me that the people on the scene at the time knew what they were doing and all that we can do 60 years later is stand in their shadows and act like we know what we're talking about.

[gunnergoz]

One more contribution and that's all I can do here to make my point. Here's some figures from the WW2 HQ ETO AFV & W section reports of tank losses and unit status. Sorry I can only find figures from August on, but I think the point is clear enough: there were significant shortfalls in Sherman inventories in some front line units. If there were such reserves on hand as some claim, then perhaps the totals would not be so low. OTH while we won without the 25% reserve 12AG would have liked to have had on hand, it probably cost some blood because units had to make do with less. That I think is the crux of the matter - if unit strength falls short, firepower on hand decreases and you have to work harder to kill off the other guy. If we supposedly fought a war based on the idea of quantity over quality, I don't see quantity reflected here but it does speak more of the quality of US units that had to accomplish more, with less.

[JasonC]

There were 4 US armies in the field, not one. The Germans never had more than 2000 AFVs in the west - all types, not just turreted MBTs. The US is half the force in Normandy and more like 2/3rds later (Brits, Canadians, French, etc). The US alone is fielding 3300 Shermans - plus several hundred TDs - at its lowest point post Bulge. Which with TDs and allies means something like 6000 AFVs in the field, minimum. Um, if that isn't overwhelming armor odds, what would be? It was easily 4 to 1 when the Germans sent a lot of armor west -which they managed all of twice for a month or so each time - and 10 to 1 and upward when they didn't, which is 3/4 of the campaign.

As for JonS comment, my point is that the limit on tanks in at the pointee in was the formations and their complete and continuous supply, not tanks. Not that there was no limit on the ADs. The AIBs were definitely not at 80% of TOE in riflemen at their lowest points. They were way lower, and that was the rate determiner for how long a US AD could spend in active combat.

To gg, the notion that any army can ever fight with all forces at 100% of TOE at all times is ridiculous on its face; only an army on maneuvers not taking any losses from the enemy could ever hope to approximate it. The figures in the table look about like those for German panzer divisions or Russian tank corps that have been in action that long. And I mean the US *battalion* figures... All but one of the US division figures look like what Germans or Russians had only for fresh formations right out of refit and not yet heavily engaged. 7AD in the Bulge period looks about like Panzer Lehr in Normandy in early July - and that is the worst US division after six months in action equal to the best German after one month in action. (And it is temporary; it just reflects its St Vith stand).

[Magpie_Oz]

But that might only come down to whether you'd prefer to die in a millisecond or half a millisecond.

Millisecond for me, I live life to the fullest !

[akd]

"A gun mantlet is an armour plate or shield attached to an armoured fighting vehicle's main gun ....."

"A mantle (from mantellum, the Latin term for a cloak) is a type of loose garment usually worn over indoor clothing to serve the same purpose as an overcoat."

From Chamberlain & Ellis, British and American Tanks of WWII:

Mantlet or Mantle - armoured housing protecting the gun mount in the turret.

Mantlet is probably more correct, but both terms are used. And of course mantlet is the diminutive form of mantle, so is also from the Latin mantellum.

[gunnergoz]

I love all this discussion of how the US fought a war based on having superior numbers - of artillery, tanks, aircraft - and in large part that is true. Yet, when the army's own modern historians take note of the fact that WW2 army leaders were concerned that their tank inventories and reserves were insufficient, suddenly to some people here, numbers don't matter any more. We won so everything must have been fine. Sure, we can say that in hindsight. We know they wind up winning. That was not a sure thing in 1944, it still had to be made to happen.

It seems to me to be hubris to think we today somehow know better (wink, wink) than these apparent fools who ran the war back then. Today we know that the shortfall in Sherman numbers in 1944 was not going to affect the outcome of the war on either front, ETO or PTO. Back then, it was not so obvious and had to be paid in terms of lives lost from a generation of men who are now mostly gone. It is easy to criticize today from the comfortable distance of time but I wager that it was nowhere so easy for those men in leadership back then to evaluate their situation, make decisions and then carry them out while watching their peers die for their miscalculations.

[Sgt Joch]

Its all a matter of perspective, the Allies were able to keep their Armored Divisions at 80%+ TO&E on a consistent basis from june 6th 44 to may 8th 45.

They were also able to equip almost all their infantry divisions with a tank battalion, keep them at 80%+ TO&E, giving them firepower equivalent to most German PDs after a few weeks of combat.

Meanwhile the German PDs typically went into battle at 60-80% TO&E, which over a few weeks or months would be ground down to nothing, since they received few if any replacements. After which they would be pulled off the line for 2-3 months to bring them back up to 60-80% TO&E.

So compared to the Germans, the Allies had Shermans coming out of their ears. Was there a "shortfall" of Shermans in the field compared to the TO&E? Certainly, but Von Rundstedt could only dream of having that "problem".

[MikeyD]

U.S. seemed to have suffered less a shortfall of tanks than of crews. They didn't expect the horriffic attrition rates in trained tank crews and did not plan for sending half-enough crews over to Europe following the landing. For awhile they resorted to grabbing warm bodies at random to stick in the turrets. Lucky for us, about the same time the Germans ran out of tanks (losing all of them at Falaise) and the ones being manufactured were being held back in anticipation of the Bulge battles. So while the Germans sat and built up their tank inventory we sat and built up our replacement crews.

[Magpie_Oz]

From Chamberlain & Ellis, British and American Tanks of WWII:

With due deference to Chris Ellis of who's many works adorn my shelves even he is secondary to the Oxford English Dictionary for meanings of words

http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mantle?rskey=vhsKsI&result=2

http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mantlet

I do note that Mantlet can be used interchangeably for the coat meaning but not the shield meaning. I also note that Mantle can be taken to be a covering of a specific sort which is probably where the confusion arises.