155mm arty was used in direct fire mode to blow Panthers up?

[Blackcat]

"They only grudgingly accepted "funnies" like flails, flame tanks and mine rollers."

They didn't, at least not for D-Day. See "Cracking, Hitlers Atlantic Wall" (Appendix C) for details. Mind you even if the had, as Einsenhower wanted, it is doubtful that enough could have been produced in time.

[gunnergoz]

Still, it seems to me, if they can put in heavy towed AT, there's no reason not to include something as ubiquitous as the M2 105mm howitzer. For that matter, let us have the US 105 and 75 pack howitzers, the former for the infantry regiment cannon companies and the latter for the airborne scenarios. Heck they already have 99% of the M2 built into the M7 model...

It would make for some really interesting scenarios and there are plenty of historical incidents to make them about.

[gunnergoz]

"They only grudgingly accepted "funnies" like flails, flame tanks and mine rollers."

They didn't, at least not for D-Day. See "Cracking, Hitlers Atlantic Wall" (Appendix C) for details. Mind you even if the had, as Einsenhower wanted, it is doubtful that enough could have been produced in time.

My strong recollection from several sources is that the US planners basically only saw utility in the DD tanks and were minimally interested in anything else, which later proved to be short sighted. Again, the army and its not invented here syndrome...but the army did go ahead and eventually adopt some of these ideas and used them in the ETO after D-Day, you are correct.

[MikeyD]

I recall reading somewhere that the U.S. armored force had come out of WWII completely demoralized. The Secretary of Defense in a speech to the graduating class at West Point in 1950 forecast 'the end of tank warfare'. The Air Force had recently been organized as a standalone arm of service and the next wars would be fought with aircraft dropping A-bombs. Postwar U.S. tank design was moribund. We were so traumatized by our WWII experience we very nearly gave up on tanks altogether. Then about a month after that speech to West Point the Korean War started. Oops! Nevermind about that 'death of tanks' thing.

[gunnergoz]

I recall reading somewhere that the U.S. armored force had come out of WWII completely demoralized. The Secretary of Defense in a speech to the graduating class at West Point in 1950 forecast 'the end of tank warfare'. The Air Force had recently been organized as a standalone arm of service and the next wars would be fought with aircraft dropping A-bombs. Postwar U.S. tank design was moribund. We were so traumatized by our WWII experience we very nearly gave up on tanks altogether. Then about a month after that speech to West Point the Korean War started. Oops! Nevermind about that 'death of tanks' thing.

"Completely demoralized" may be overstating the case a bit IMO. The army was certainly somewhat demoralized after the war but it was more because it did not know how to cope with the idea of a nuclear battlefield, than anything to do with tank performance. As you say, the army (along with the navy and everyone else) was hearing all the air force trumpeting about how it was the new war winner. The best the army could come up with was the 280mm atomic cannon, which just did not have the PR glamor of the new B36 bomber for instance. And the secretary of defense at the time was George C. Marshall, hardly a man to put the army down, but he too was with difficulty trying to understand where the army fit into this new nuclear battlefield, with little success.

I think tank design was more accurately starved for funds than moribund for lack of ideas. The army had been jolted by the new Soviet tanks being fielded, most notably the JS-III but there just weren't funds to field and develop new American tanks postwar and the army had to settle for upgrading the M26 a bit into the very similar M46, followed by the M47 with a stereoscopic rangefinder. And yes, the old M4, along with the M26 and M46 ended up doing the fighting in Korea...and fortunately for us, did not encounter any JS-III's.

[wokelly]

For this decision we have the hidebound army brass at branch level to thank. These were the same hair shirts who in their wisdom decided that tanks were not for fighting other tanks, that one needed tank destroyers for that purpose. So the army went into the war with a mish-mash of lights, mediums and towed and SP TD's. Some efforts were made to design a workable heavy tank (the M6) but even though hundreds were produced, the decision was made that they took up too much space on the cargo ships and it was considered best to just keep shipping Shermans and TD's. The GI's at the pointy end of the stick made do with what they had, but a more rational development and procurement approach would have served the GI far better than the rigorous adherence to this now disproven doctrine that restricted what could be designed and fielded for far too long. The army finally wised up after the war and redesignated the M26 from heavy to medium and then finally just decided to call it's grandsons (M48's and M60's) main battle tanks by the 1960's.

The M6 was a poorly designed tank which would not have increased survivability or firepower over your upgunned Sherman. It had 83mm of frontal armor, not that much more than the Sherman actually had. Not to mention it only mounted a 76mm gun which proved ineffective against the frontal armor of a Panther or Tiger. The US military made the right decision not to waste space shipping those over, but the wrong decision with Sherman armament.

I recall seeing pictures of a Pershing like turret on an M4 hull. Also, the M36B2 was basically a 90mm gun turret on a Sherman hull. Put a little top armor on that, and you have a tank that can go up against a Panther pretty well.

But make no mistake, any tank or AFV will burn if the ammo, hyraulic fluid or fuel ignites as a result of a penetration. And, has been noted, post war analysis showed the Sherman to be little worse than its opponents as far as fire risk went, particularly as modernized ones went into service.

The big British/Commonwealth report on the Sherman was an examination of Canadian Shermans KOed from June 6th to July 10th. This is a partial copy of that report from Jarymowycz's book Tank Tactics: From Normandy to the Lorraine:

Of interest is the huge number of penetrations to the side and rear armor vs the frontal armor (46 vs 19). The British OR men felt that increasing the frontal armor to withstand half the hits would only result in a negligible increase in survivability as most shots were going through the side armor, and that the extra weight should got to a better gun.

From the report, 33 penetrated shermans brewed up from the 40 penetrated shermans examined, so about 82% brewup rate. I do not have a copy of the German report but I have read it (Copp's Montgomery's Scientists. The 60 panthers examined had a brew up rate of about 62%.

It would appear the Sherman was 20% more likely to burn, but there is a problem with stating this conclusion (as some authors have). Many tankers carried extra ammunition within their tanks outside the armoured bins, which increased brewup rates. The OR report is rather selective in its examination, there was only ONE Canadian armoured unit in action from June 6th to July 10th, and that was 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade. Perhaps as many as 2/3rds of 2CAB's lossed from June 6th ot July 10th occured during June 6-11th (With the disastrous attack on Le Mesnil-Patry on June 11th alone costing some 50 tanks). 2CAB did not see action again until 4-5 July for Operation Windsor and 8-9 July for Charnwood, but they only suffered some 40 losses over that period compared to well over 80 from June 6th to 11th.

Its a rather selective time period and we don't know the extra ammunition policy for 2CAB was during that time. The same report on Canadian losses state that during Operaiton Bluecoat, a British unit with a strict no extra ammunition policy had a much lower brewup rate than 2CAB. The Panthers were KOed from June 6th to August 11th, and 60 Panthers represents around 10% of all Panthers deployed to Normandy during the battle. IMO it is a good representation of Panther losses and brewup rates, unlike the Sherman report.

What I am saying is that a definite conclusion should not be drawn from these reports in terms of individual percentages. It can not be really argued the Sherman was 20% more likely to burn because of the selective nature of the report. It is safe to say through that Allied and German tanks brewed up more often than not (above 50%).

"the 3d armored division entered combat with 232 m4 sherman tanks. During the European Campaign, the division had some 648 sherman tanks completely destroyed in combat and we had another 700 knocked out, repaired and put back into operation. this was a loss rate of 580 percent. In addition to this staggering battle loss rate of 580 percent in our main battle tanks, we also experienced extremely heavy wear and tear due to the everyday operation of the equipment."

The 3rd Armoured Division had the highest loss rate of ANY US armored division in WWII by far. For example 2nd AD (also a "Heavy" Amoured Division), which was in combat for a month longer in Normandy (landed June 9th vs July 9th for 3rd AD), suffered some 276 permanent losses from 1944-1945 compared to the 3rds 632. The second worst casualties for a US AD in the ETO was 7th AD with 360 permanent.

I don't mean to demean the men of the 3rd, but frankly it may just have been a poorly run unit. None of the other US ADs come close to the 3rds losses, even those which were in combat longer. The 3rd had about a 270% turnover in permanent losses alone, compared to the 2nd with had the same TOE but only had maybe 120% turnover in permanent losses.

I don't think the Pershing would have changed things dramatically for the 3rd, Coopers book come off a bit to me as the workman blaming his tools. The Sherman was not a stellar tank by this time, but no unit comes close to the holocaust that was 3rd ADs losses. A few units (one AD and two Tank battalions) hover at or above the 200% permanent turnover rate, but no one near 3rd ADs losses both as a percent of its unit strength or in actual losses.

[gunnergoz]

No question that the M6 was a poor design, more of a heavy support tank than an AT tank and certainly no Tiger equivalent. And yes, it was probably a good decision to leave them behind. My point is that there was precious little else the army's "deciders" were willing to do to move things forward, beyond coming up with dead ends like the M6. They just did not see the tank as having an AT role. By 1944, their errors were becoming obvious. Fortunately, some with more vision than these guys prevailed and the M26 was the result.

Regarding the divisional losses, I'd never picked up on the 3rd AD being so lopsided compared to the 2nd. That is curious and I can't for the life of me figure out why that would be. Bad leadership? Only if they insisted upon using their assets wrong and I'd never heard anything bad about Gen. Rose in that respect.

[JasonC]

2469 3rd Armored personnal were KIA in the ETO.

1569 of them were in the infantry.

195 in the cavalry, 93 in the engineers, 55 were medics, 25 in the artillery, 21 in Anti Aircraft, 8 were in Ordnance jobs (handling ammo and the like), 7 were in Signals, and there were all of 2 in the Quartermaster corps doing supply jobs.

493 were in the armor, including an attached TD battalion (53 of them were in TDs).

Whole division, the division that lost the most tanks in the war, which was in the heaviest combat, and in combat for 231 days.

Wounded were about 3 for each 1 KIA.

780 new tanks drawn, counting lights (the division had 2 full battalions of lights, plus an attached cavalry squadron), and 1700 round tripped through the repair shops over the war as a whole.

The chance that a tank going through the shops or being fully lost would result in a single armored soldier becoming KIA, 1 in 5.

The increase in survival chances from being assigned to a tank as compared with being assigned to the armored infantry? A factor of at least 3.

"Deathtraps" my eye...

[MikeyD]

and 1700 round tripped through the repair shops...

You reminded me of the sheer volume of Strykers, Bradleys and Abrams round-tripped through repair shops in Iraq. "K.O." became so narrowly defined the vehicle basically had to be entirely burned-out before it qualified. If it was theoretically possibly to weld the two halves of a vehicle back together it was kept on the 'disabled' list.

[JasonC]

I think 3rd AD had rather the opposite policy in WW II. Their AFV turnover is outlier high in relation to their casualties sustained and days in combat. They did face heavier fighting than say 2nd Armored (though 2AD also simply performed better, by a large margin), and took 50% higher battle losses as a result. But their tank turnover was well above 50% higher. They appear to have sent vehicles to the shops for damage or mechanical conditions other units would have handled in the field, and also appear to have written off entirely and drawn replacements for tanks other units would have returned to service.

Nothing much wrong with that, because tanks were actually in significant oversupply throughout the ETO. But anyone extrapolating from specifically 3rd AD tank turnover would estimate overall US armor losses way higher than they actually were. And anyone believing the spin about relations between tank losses and casualties, would vastly overestimate personnel losses in the armor, in 3rd AD, and even more so in the rest of the force.

[JasonC]

To gunnergoz - You wrote in passing "And yes, the old M4, along with the M26 and M46 ended up doing the fighting in Korea...and fortunately for us, did not encounter any JS-III's". Easy Eight Shermans were fine main battle tanks. The mid WW II models did need upgunning, and got it, and improved ammo was definitely useful for them against larger critters. But with those additions, they were entirely capable, not just against T-34/85s but against much later tanks.

In Korea, half the fleet sent in 1950 were Shermans. Another 10% were light Chaffees. Pershings were only about 20%, and they were conspicuously underpowered in Korean hill country. The Pattons were better, and replaced all the Pershings later in the war, and eventually most of the Shermans. But the Shermans were operationally a complete success there.

And they were also a complete success in 1967, fighting T-54s that were way nastier than JS-IIIs. And they were also a complete success in 1973, fighting T-62s that were nastier still. Yes the Israelis upgunned them, to approximately the firepower of a Sherman Firefly at first, and later with modern 105s. But they remained an operationally useful main battle tank for 30 years after their supposed obsolescence in WWII, but the simple expedient of upgunning. All it ever needed, really.

Is it a good thing that we later had M-1s and a real edge in gun and armor terms? Absolutely. But the differences between ungunned older medium tanks and the typical threats was never large enough to matter at the operational level. Not compared to factors like proper armor doctrine and tactical handling, experienced crews, the operational situation, and simple numbers. The difference between a 75mm Sherman (or a Chaffee) and anything like a JS-III - or even just T-34/85s or Panthers - was certainly big enough to matter. But the difference between an Easy Eight 76mm Shermans with APCR, or an Israeli Super Sherman, and any of them, was not.

[gunnergoz]

Thank you Jason; you're preaching to the choir though. I'd mentioned the Israeli use of Shermans several entries before in this same thread, noting that the Israelis had no disdain for the "death trap" that some posters here like to call the Sherman (much to my intense frustration.) So I'm not the one here who needs reminding of the Sherman's value, quite the opposite. Everything you write is true...I suspect you and I read many of the same books.

[wokelly]

Nothing much wrong with that, because tanks were actually in significant oversupply throughout the ETO.

From my understanding the US suffered a severe shortage of Sherman tanks throughout much of the ETO fighting. If anything such a loose policy of what could be written off and what could be repaired would compound the issue, especially for a heavy armored division which requires so many tanks. I wonder if the 3rd could really have gotten away with tossing away Shermans like that given the shortage that existed, those numbers must have raised eyebrows further up the chain of command.

[JonS]

The OR report is rather selective in its examination, there was only ONE Canadian armoured unit in action from June 6th to July 10th, and that was 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade.

I believe you are in error there. The OR report (No.12) did NOT just look at tank cas from 2CAB. Also, No.2 ORS was not even a Canadian unit, although it was commanded by a Canadian, and did have a reasonable number of Canadians.

Jarymowycz's book (and thesis) read to me like a conclusion in search of suitable facts.

[wokelly]

I believe you are in error there. The OR report (No.12) did NOT just look at tank cas from 2CAB. Also, No.2 ORS was not even a Canadian unit, although it was commanded by a Canadian, and did have a reasonable number of Canadians.

Jarymowycz's book (and thesis) read to me like a conclusion in search of suitable facts.

Hmm, you may be right. Looking through the report nothing states its Canadian losses, now I am wondering how I came to think it only examined Canadian losses. Forum wont let me go back and edit the post though

Anyways this was the qualifier the report included that Jarymowycz neglected to put in:

1. The proportion of brewed up tanks is high and it is therefore important to know whether or

not this must always be the case. A more recent examination of later battles, which is not yet

complete, has shown that the 1st Bn Coldstream Gds (5 Gds Armd Div) have suffered fewer brew

ups than other units, e.g., during operation "BLUECOAT" only 1 in 20 casualties, of which casualties

at least 12 were due to penetrations. The unit concerned attributes this to the fact that they carry

no extra ammunition outside the armoured bins. It should be recognized that in no recorded

case in our sample has the extra outside applique armour resisted any hit, and therefore the

protection afforded by keeping all ammunition in the bins is almost certainly due solely to the

internal flying fragments failing to penetrate the ammunition.

Would be interesting to find that report.

EDIT: here is the rest of the report not quoted by Jarymowycz:

2. The small number of A.P. hits failing to penetrate is noticeable. This small number has

been confirmed by the opinions of technical adjutants, etc., who agree that the proportion was

probably not above 5%. This opinion is in keeping with the calculated expectations of failures

based upon penetration figures for 75 mm and 88 mm guns at the ranges of engagement estimated

by tank crews. There have also been complaints at the apparently low resisting power of the

present Sherman armour. REME, 5 Gds Armd Div state that an AP.300 and an AP.500 Browning

both fired at 100 yds range, penetrated 1/2 and 1 1/2 inches respectively into the turret armour'

Added to this, it is at present the practice to recondition for service partially brewed-up tanks

whose quality of armour might often be low.

3. From the data collected, it will be seen that the proportion of hits on the sides and front of

the 75 mm Sherman tank is more or less equal and therefore, for up-armouring to be effective a

large area would need to be strengthened. For instance, up-armouring the front of the tank so

that in the cases considered it would have given 50% protection on this face, would only have

decreased penetrations by 15%. In consequence, if changes are required it would appear wiser to

use the extra weight-carrying of the 75 mm Sherman to take a better gun; ie., to make German

tanks more vulnerable rather than to attempt to decrease our own vulnerability. This suggestion

would appear to be in keeping with present policy.

4. Requests have been made by DTD for any additional battlefield data to assist decide [sic]

on the optimum thickness of individual armour plates and on their optimum distribution On the

evidence of this report, where tanks are expected to attack in country as, or more, enclosed than

Normandy, it is recommended that an almost homogenous defence be assumed (a homogenous

defence being defined as a defence where the enemy are able to hold their fire so long, they are as

likely to hit from the side or rear as from the front: for the use of this convenient term see DTD

armour reports). Therefore, for optimum armour distribution, etc., a "p.d.v." (probability directional

value) for an almost homogenous defence should also be used.

It is considered that present homogenous German defence is due to ease of concealment and

that, until better methods of spotting tanks and A/T are found, such a form of defence will

continue and can safely be assumed for similar terrain. It should be carefully noted however

that the present sample of tanks has been taken from a series of battles where our forces were

nearly always attacking, and it may well be that, in defence, more frontal hits will be recorded.

http://www.wlu.ca/lcmsds/cmh/back%20issues/CMH/volume%207/Issue%201/%28OR%20Report%29%20Analysis%20of%2075%20mm%20Sherman%20Tank%20Casualties%20Between%206th%20June%20and%2010th%20July%201944.pdf

[dieseltaylor]

Just because the Israeli Army used Shermans is not a matter of good but necessity. It is true to say that they did improve them significantly other than just the gun. And bear in mind that using tanks defensively in good positions you would not be relying on your armour - more on your earthworks.

And talking of necessity - the Churchill survived slightly longer than Sherman in terms of damage and more crew would escape when hit. And if I find the book that told me .....

As for the 3Rd Armored, and knowing what we do of the variability of armour in the earlier Shermans I do wonder if :

a] they had the crappier tanks

b] they knew it and deliberately sent back "damaged " tanks for exchange.

c] they were not as well officered/trained ... most likely

d] that acknowledging armour was variable was not acceptable to acknowledge during the war and immediately after

[gunnergoz]

If you ask me a potential explanation for the differences in tank write-offs is some type of discrepancy in the paperwork, either over-reporting or under-reporting, depending upon what was to be gained, or even just p!ss poor reporting. The army is and was a bureaucracy and bureaucracies do have a tendency to justify their own existence. Not to mention that there were then (and are now) plenty of "inventive" ordnance and supply officers/NCO's out there who will bend rules when it suits them. I can't prove it but it just seems a possibility that the figures turned in for the 3rd AD just didn't add up because they weren't meant to. I also read that most of the individual tank records were destroyed after the war, which is unfortunate if it is true, since serious study of the records might have revealed something the unit records are not telling us.

Just my two bit WAG, mind you but I was raised in the post WW2 army around supply sergeants and I know my chickens...

[MikeyD]

Its interesting to note by the end of the war a fair number of late model Shermans were being uparmored in the field. Flame cutting the entire bow off of another late model Sherman to double the bow thickness. That's 137mm at 47 degrees. Tiger II's got a 150mm bow at 50 degrees. And they did that to a LOT of tanks too.

[dieseltaylor]

Never heard of that. Do you have any references. Not that I doubt you its just I ahve never ever heard of it which makes me think uncommon or very very late war. The weight on the front would be excessive one would think!!

[Vark]

Poor old Shermie! She takes far more of a battering from 'historians' than her opponents were able to give her and her victory overshadowed by the attention lavished on those she vanquished.

[MikeyD]

Inferior references - a model kit.

http://ipmsmalta.forumotion.net/t595-uparmoured-sherman

I've got an article somewhere that has a photo of a canabalized Sherman with its bow and sides cut away. This modification still exists as gate guardians and museum pieces.

[MikeyD]

Back again with a real photo.

Note the doubled bow still has the headlamp guards and gun lock still on it, so it was obviously cut off another Sherman. One division in particular started churning these out at a fast clip about the start of '45, God knows were my references are.

[gunnergoz]

War almost over = wonderful incentive to live and not be the last tanker KIA. Some veteran GI's got really superstitious, paranoid and cautious in the final months of the war, for with the end of the war in sight, some hope of living through the war began to take form in the minds of guys who might previously have become fatalistic about their own survival. Of course there were many field extemporaneous upgrades during the war made in an attempt to reinforce an AFV's survivability, but I find the photo of the Sherman above especially poignant. It seems a very human reaction to double up armor like that in the face of all those fearsome late war German AT weapons, especially knowing that the end of the war might be finally be in sight. If I was a tanker and knew I wasn't getting an M26 anytime soon, I might just try to make my own Sherman Jumbo. If an entire AD was in favor of letting the troops do it, all the better. Too many good men had died already.

[Destraex1]

It still seems to me that the evidence suggests the Sherman was certainly inferior to both German and Russian tanks.

I remember reading about Russian Shermans being destroyed by the column during Bagration. iirc it was the 505 Tigers that did that. The Russians certainly did not like the sherman from what I have read.

It certainly sounds like the Sherman would have been a much larger liability if the Germans got similar numbers of their current medium tank the panther out with the fuel and other logistics to support training etc.

As it was the Sherman was made a good tank by the sheer size of the support thrown behind it to ensure that it has massive operational numbers in the field.

I don't like the idea of crewing a Sherman that could be killed by almost everything the Germans had. Certainly in CMBN where we are dealing with early Shermans often without the 76mm, death traps would be an apt term for them. Almost anything was a deadly threat to them.

As for the 155mm direct fire incident mentioned in Death Traps. I guess if it did happen it must have been a one of a kind.

[MikeyD]

to both German and Russian tanks.

Don't forget the German workhorse PzIV was pretty much a piece of outdated crap and burned like the dickens when holed. Someone once mentioned they had never read an account of a PzIV shrugging of a hit from a Sherman.