High Wire Balancing Act

[Lars]

Probably by not having transport that used gasoline, among other things.

Yeah, hauling the longboats by hand over the portages was probably much easier...

[Kuniworth]

Railroad convertion to the urals would take time don't you think?

[pzgndr]

This is why I want a model that focus on material and production capabilities. In the long run this will be decisive. So I hope SC2 will simulate a Germany that is fighting time, they need to knock out Russia(sea lion in 1940 is as JJ stated unrealistic) in one big blow or cripple that nation.

SC2 is much better with respect to all this. USA and USSR IT research growth rates allow for more expansion, but research randomness will make this different each game. Lend Lease convoys will allow USA/UK to transfer MPPs to USSR. Germany will find itself stretched thin in 1942/43 with its force pool limits. So timing should prove to be more decisive in SC2. Can Axis expand fast enough to cripple the Allies, or not?

With regard to the original question, my opinion is that as a game the campaigns should be balanced 50-50 so all players have a chance to win. I believe we can still keep it historical and define the victory conditions accordingly. But it is a game after all, and you do want to play to win regardless of which side you select.

[Kuniworth]

I hope you wont make Germany get to much MMP out of conquering the neutrals. No more cookie cutter please. Would be nice if the value of having certain countries for example Norway would be strategical(u-boat bases, swedish irons) and not because the axis player gets a fat check by annexing it.

Reduce plunder to a minimum.

[Edwin P.]

RE: IT Research growth rates for USA and USSR.

How do they differ from the standard 5% in SC1?

Will the AI know to invest in IT? In SC1 AI investments in research never matched the human players', and would sometimes be in areas where it would never or could never afford to build units.

[Edwin P.]

Conquests would be more strategic if controlling an iron mine or oil field increased your force pool limits. ie: If you control a mine tile you gain a +1 bonus to your naval and/or armor build limits.

[pzgndr]

RE: IT Research growth rates for USA and USSR. How do they differ from the standard 5% in SC1?

The standard in SC2 is now 10%, but there's a lot of increased tech costs now to worry about. USA gets 20%. USSR is also at 10% (contrary to what I just said previously). We started testing with a higher value but USSR has a Urals Industry event that activates several resources after Axis invades. Between the Urals and Lend Lease, they do OK. It's a balance, and there has to be a challenge.

Note that if Axis does NOT invade and trigger the Urals event, USSR won't get those resources. So they aren't exactly positioned for overwhelming offensive action even if they activate due to other events (like Sealion). Players will have some interesting choices to make.

[SeaMonkey]

This has to rate as one of the top SC discussions of all time, what a history lesson. All points well presented, especially you Kuni, most unexpected.

I think JJ said the words, "define victory conditions", in the context of SC2 features. My vote for definition is "an army runs on its stomach", simply... control and use of resources. The SC symbol of that....MPPs. Isn't that the key to balance? Put history aside for the moment and reflect on the gameplay of SC1.

If we want an historical flavor, then the timing and acquisition of MPPs is configured to attain that goal.

If it be balance, the same conclusion.

If HC decides that the default 39 campaign should reflect the historical unfolding, then the definition for an Axis win will be the effective acquisition and use of a certain number of MPPs over and above what was historical, the degree of winning based upon that exceeding margin.

Obviously, we know what then constitutes the Allied victory.

Now if HC decides balance, well we can still have the historical campaign as a basis, with the players agreeing on the use of scripted events either turned on or off, to level the playing field, depending on their individual play skills.

The use of those events should be configured so that the skewing of advantage for either side should be slight, more events, more advantage.

In our perfect world of SC2, a balance which all sides embrace, would just be a matter of selection.

Eventually, just as SC1 gameplay evolved, the players of any skill levels will deduce what events represent parity for them and include them in their competitive play with either humans or the AI.

[hellraiser]

"You are all forgetting one thing: Logistics, Logistics,

Logistics. It is a fantasy that Germany could have

made it to the friggin' Urals by the end of 1941,

Hitler or no Hitler."

Exactly - methinks a guy like Manstein or another sane german army commander wouldn't have tried to conquer the whole solar system in 2 years

[Gavrok]

John Di Fool brings up a great point re logistics and why getting much beyond Moscow, mind to the Urals in 41 was not very feasible.

Aside from the logistics/ supply side more Axis tanks actually broke down than were knocked out due to the time, conditions and distances involved. 1940s engineering was not up to todays reliability standards especially when we're talking about a 20 tonne piece of metal.

Guderians Panzer leader book highlights this continual attrition brought about by weather, distance and continual campaigning.

Remember reading about axis supply conditions in North Africa whereby it stated that for getting fuel to the front line there was a 1:14 plus relationship (ie more than 14 times as much fuel needed to actually get the fuel forward)

One consideration in SC type games would be declining combat strength the further a unit travels in a turn to indicate this factor...much easier to launch an offensive right next to you than 100 miles down the road.....options here could include actually reducing strength permanently or preferably including a reduction % for any combat incurred based upon distance travelled in that turn alongside distance from hq and supply status as currently used. This could also convey the shorter time to attack as the first part of the period involves travel before preparation for an attack at the end of the turn. Seemed wierd that a unit could attack at same strength at end of its move if supply conditions were ok!

The above would not hinder huge advances but would mean a greater likelihood of taking combat losses and attrition therefore building up towards the actual losses suffered. This would also affect Russia when it went onto the offensive as logistics inexperience seemed a key point of offensives grounding to a halt.

Hope the weather rules may give some of the effects as above, as it is a bit late for any of the above......well until SC3!

G

[Gavrok]

reminds me that i must reread that Panzer leader book in light of all the discussions re divergent plans and Hitler continually changing objectives in 41

[JerseyJohn]

I mentioned earlier that the USSR, if they'd attempted a preventive invasion of Poland, would have had a logistical nightmare that they couldn't have handled. -- That was the same idea as what is now being discussed in terms of the Axis having reached the Urals.

Russia poses a special problem because it's railroad operated on a wider guage than that used by Germany and the rest of Europe, so every mile of RR line had to be converted as the territory was acquired.

In general terms I agree with my friend Hellraiser that sane leadership on either side would not have advanced byond the logistical support capabilities.

I also agree with Lars that, more often than not, logistical problems have been overcome by able commanders and armies that are adept at conducting a war. Germany qualifies in both respects.

-- What's always puzzled me was the action of the Japanese, who so often stationed troops in hellholes and forgot about ever supplying them. Even their most well supplied garrisons usually lacked even minimal medical care. Japanese aviators stationed at land bases often died soon afterwards from malyria or other tropical diseases; if they lived, they were often too sick to properly carry out their duties.

[Kuniworth]

It's vital to remember that not only the railroad would be needed to convert(which is not that slow), the trainstations and supply depot would be needed to rebuild. That was historically real slow down on rail road logistics on the eastern front and one important reason why Hitler defended cities so strongly.

Well then maybe we all can agree on Axis reaching Urals or even the caspian sea from june-dec 1941 would be impossible under normal russian resistance. This is something I hope we will not have to see in SC2, a steamrollin axis going to the edge of the map in like 1 year.

[ January 07, 2006, 06:43 AM: Message edited by: Kuniworth ]

[Panzeh]

Why do the Axis powers get the benefit of the 'what if' scenarios but the Allies don't? What if the French and British had not aggressively pushed into Belgium? What if they had not walked into the German trap and actually blunted the armored spearhead?

[Kuniworth]

Originally posted by Panzeh:

Why do the Axis powers get the benefit of the 'what if' scenarios but the Allies don't? What if the French and British had not aggressively pushed into Belgium? What if they had not walked into the German trap and actually blunted the armored spearhead?

Because axis lost. But seriously you illustrate my point well. If we want to have some kind of historical balance you need to look on missed oppurtunities on both sides.

And then it becomes even more obvious that axis would have a tough time.

[Kuniworth]

Originally posted by JerseyJohn:

In an historical 1939 situation the Axis should have a 55-45 edge.

smells like Claus Boobie in here...

[jon_j_rambo]

Do I sense the German Worship coming out of the closet again? Manstein this, Manstein that...whatever.

[JerseyJohn]

Yeah, right. Germany was just along for the ride.

It's like this. The war in Europe had two phases. Germany won the first of them and lost the second. That's all there is to it. How do you give it 50/50 coming out of the shute when that wasn't the situation? At several points, even after invading the USSR, Hitler could easily have cut his losses and consolidated. It would have been all but impossible for the UK and USSR to have defeated him. Instead he declared war on the United States, which baffled even his generals and was the his one truly fatal blunder.

True, he might not have actually conquered either Russia or Britain, but even combined they would not have been able to conquer the Axis.

Anyone who says otherwise doesn't understand the situation.

[Retributar]

Your an insomniac like i am Jersey John ... and also i am in complete agreement with your short dissertation on Germany's situation/postion in WW2!.

Those are the realities...not the fantasies of that particular situation!.

[JerseyJohn]

Thanks Retributar, one insomniac to another, it's appreciated.

What bugs me is to express these opinions seems to also mean being seen as a nazi. Okay, I guess that's part of the other viewpoint's ignorance.

[Kuniworth]

Originally posted by JerseyJohn:

Yeah, right. Germany was just along for the ride.

It's like this. The war in Europe had two phases. Germany won the first of them and lost the second. That's all there is to it. How do you give it 50/50 coming out of the shute when that wasn't the situation? At several points, even after invading the USSR, Hitler could easily have cut his losses and consolidated. It would have been all but impossible for the UK and USSR to have defeated him. Instead he declared war on the United States, which baffled even his generals and was the his one truly fatal blunder.

True, he might not have actually conquered either Russia or Britain, but even combined they would not have been able to conquer the Axis.

Anyone who says otherwise doesn't understand the situation.

This is not the case. Of course axis could have failed military against Russia and the UK and did it badly in the autumn of 1942. This map from autumn 1942 only shows that Germany came a long way picking off one opponent after another but failed in a two front war. Ironically is that this map from autumn 1942 is at the same time the UK and the Soviet union reversed the situiation with the victories at Stalingrad and El Alamein without any US soldiers who were just about to do their first operation in french north africa.

But do you agree then, concerning your view on american prtoduction, that the Axis should get one big oppurtunity and after that it will be downhill? It would be good if we can be on the same level here.

This is the vital point for me. If the axis wont strike a hard blow to Russia in 1941 that will pretty much be it.

[JerseyJohn]

Kuni,

Yes, we basically have the same premise.

My view is, and it was also that of most of Hitler's sensible advisers and generals by the war's midpoint, is that Germany, after the winter of 1941-42, could no longer have forced a victory on the Soviets.

It could, however, have held on to the territory it had already conquered and, eventually, settled with Stalin. The USSR was already hurt pretty badly by the Spring of 1942 and there were feelers on both sides, through Sweden (you may very well know more about this than I do) trying to find out what the other side would want to sign an armistace. Neither the USSR nor the Axis believed it would be permanent, but it might have lasted a few years; long enough to present an entirely different situation.

If Hitler hadn't DoW'd on the United States, the US wouldn't have entered the war against him. It's that simple. Oh, of course, if some German U-boat had sunk an American Battleship it might have happened, and this was what FDR was secretely hoping for. Shocking, not really, he'd already tried to stir up war frenzy from the sinking of two US destroyers that were on convoy duty. It backfired on him when American congressmen and the press pointed out that naval vessels had been expressly forbidden from actually assisting in the transport of war material to beligerants. FDR continued doing so in any case, but there was no enthusiasm at all among the American people for going to war with Germany.

Or Japan for that matter. Roosevelt had tried the same political tactic even earlier with two US gunboats that had been sunk by Japanese aircraft on Chinese rivers. The US public's response was a simple one: why were American gunboats patrolling rivers in China?!

Prior to the German invasion of the USSR, there was even a strong chance of establishing a Berlin-Rome-Tokyo-Moscow Axis. The Japanese very much wanted this. Part of what the USSR sought out of the deal was an Atlantic warm water port in Norway and a 100 year lease on a rail line connecting it across Norway-Sweden-Finland to the USSR. Hitler choked on the idea but was it really so unreasonable? It was actually discussed during Molotov's trip to Berlin.

An alternative might have been to support a Soviet drive to the Indean Ocean through Afghanistan and what was then Western India, all in the British sphere of influence. It was only Hitler's fixed idea of advancint East that prevented any of that from happening.

BTW -- if a suitable deal with the USSR had been worked out, which would have included trade of oil and other resources with Japan, FDR's embargo would have become meaningless and it's possible there wouldn't even have been a Japanese-American war.

Much of that is beyond the scope of what we're talking about in SC-2 but I think a game capable of reflecting these possibilities would be very interesting.

Anyway ...

Returning to what we were saying at the outset:

In my view, many of the things taken as inevitable by some of this discussion were certainly not set in stone.

The main point is, Lend-Lease would not have been a decisive factor in the war's outcome. The United States had to actually enter in order to cause the eventual Axis defeat.

-- Regarding El Alemain, without Operation Torch landing almost simultaneously, the same infusion of Axis troops and supplies to North Africa, would have meant a stabilization at Tobruk. Given the 250,000 Axis troops that were thrown away in Tunisia, there's little reason to suppose Rommel couldn't have triumphed after all if only opposing the Eighth Army with nothing in French North Africa.

-- The Eastern Front after Stalingrad, without the already large number of troops being sent to France and the Mediteranean, could have been stabilized.

Of course, both Stalin and Hitler were fully capable of causing their own massive fiascos and Churchill also made his share of very costly blunders (Greece, Creete, Tobruk and Singapore). So, in purely military terms there's no way of saying who would or wouldn't have thrown the war away. But, hypothetically, without American participation, I think the war in Europe becomes a standoff in 1942.

[Sombra]

Regarding of balancing the game there is one mayor concern: Please make every unit useful. SC1 had at least 2 units which were quite useless / to expensive : bombers and rockets. It would be nice if we would see differnet strategies based on different "development concepts" opposed to SC1 where nearly every player used the same old mix: Carriers ;many many jets; some armies; sometimes tanks (sometimes many ), many corps.

[hellraiser]

@Kuni

"If we want to have some kind of historical balance you need to look on missed oppurtunities on both sides."

Dude, you know what would happen in this case - one lost opportunity for the allies was the failure to attack in force the germans while they were still busy in Poland - it would have meant game over in 1939. Now we don't want to play 7 turns games, do we

again @ Kooni:

'Ironically is that this map from autumn 1942 is at the same time the UK and the Soviet union reversed the situiation with the victories at Stalingrad and El Alamein ...'

They didn't reverse squat IMHO. Ref. the eastern front, I strongly second Manstein's opinion that not Stalingrad but Kursk was the turning point in the east. At Stalingrad they lost an army (well a veteran army); at Kursk they lost the initiative in the east. Which one is worse?

El Squatamein - another example of german high command lack of strategic sense IMHO. You either send THE army there or you don't send nothing. What 2 divisions followed by over a quarter million of Chianti wine drinkers and guitar players, were supposed to do down there?

Gerry would've been better off sending those divisions in southern Russia instead of NAfrica...Or sending a full army to deal with the brits in Egypt/MEast. You either pack a lot of punch or stay calm. There is no middle way here.

@Sir Jersey

'An alternative might have been to support a Soviet drive to the Indean Ocean through Afghanistan and what was then Western India, all in the British sphere of influence.'

According to my knowledge, german diplomacy tried to convince USSR to focus its attention on that area but USSR had claims regarding Romania (and other minors) which Hitler considered unacceptable. Maybe you have some more on this, I am much interested.

[JerseyJohn]

Brother Hellraiser,

It was, essentially, the same policy that Wilhelm got Nicholas to follow prior to the Russo-Japanese War. Forty years later it ran into the same problem, the Japanese.

Hitler and his toadies were busy trying to assign specific plots of land to specific people. He was trying to ferment rebellion in India against the British while convincing the Japanese that they'd make a great ally once the British had been driven out. So, he couldn't actually tell the Soviets he thought they should invade India, as he'd already committed himself there.

Nor did he want them to invade Iran or Iraq as he wanted to control the region's oil himself.

He had the same problem with the USSR that he had with Spain and Vichy France. He wanted Franco to enter the war, but couldn't hand him the French colonies that he was interested in (Western Africa). So, in the end, Hitler's diplomatic efforts waffled and fizzled out. But, probably he could have found a solution regarding the USSR if he'd tried hard enough.

Regarding Rumania, Stalin wanted as much of a buffer zone between the USSR and Europe as possible. The flip side, of course, is the larger that buffer zone became the more of Europe had to be ceded over to Soviet control. He was willing to back off on those points if Germany had gone along with his desire for a warm weather Norwegian port and a coffidor connecting it directly to the Archangel/Murmansk area. But Hitler felt that was too sensitive an area to have Soviet troops wandering around in. He felt the same way about Rumania, so their territorial talks never got anywhere.