Relative Parity on the Eastern Front in CMBB

[Keke]

Now you seem to say that's not what you meant. That's cool but watch out for emoticons. The net is a very, very tricky place and you can easily be misunderstood ( as I've found to my cost).

Sorry about that. I´m no pro with smileys. :cool:

Oops, wrong one again...

[Fionn]

Nah, that one was a pretty good choice actually

[Panzer Leader]

I hope I'm not intruding, but I have a question on Soviet tactics regarding the "expenditure of soldiers" or... "human wave" as it might be called. Having read both "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat" by Glantz, and "Zhukov's Greatest Battles" by the man himself, it seems clear that this leader, in particular had no qualms about the sacrifice of infantry for a successful operation.

Now, what I am curious about, not knowing the details of Soviet Doctrine, is this a SOP for Soviet tactics, or was Zhukov forced into such a postion by the turn of events in his many operations? Or perhaps, were his ideas of "cost" different from regular Soviet doctrine?

If his ideas were different from Soviet SOP, were his subordinates, the commanders in the field, required to "share" these ideals, in that, they were forced through higher command, to commit their forces to heavily defended areas in such a manner that casualties were high?

If the Doctrine is sound, and comparable to Zhukov's actions, then was this taught down to field command level, where unit commander knew that in order to mount a successful attack they had to be willing to accept the huge losses that might incur?

I hope my question is sound and comprehensible. It all hinges on the theory that for Zhukov, success must be met even at the highest cost, and it is with him and his operations that one can truly see the large numbers of casualties required for success.

Also,note I am not comparing the doctrines of the two adversaries, and my question is based solely on Soviet doctrine, not comparing Soviet vs. Wermacht doctrine, nor claiming one is "better" than the other.

[killmore]

Originally posted by Fionn:

Those who believe Soviet doctrine was woeful often can be shown to know nothing about it. Often they seem to believe that human wave attacks were the height of Soviet tactical complexity.

But wait Fionn !

Don't the 90% of German accounts mention that they lost because Soviet sub-human waves made them simply run out of ammo? I think same guys blaim Hitler for every failure...

Germany seem to have two cover stories:

1) Soviets had just too many people and they could not killed them all in time.

2) Hitler was a cause for 100% of tactical/operational failures.

Germans seem to win propaganda war - lost of people tend to believe in endless Soviet human waves.

On the other hand Soviets did't mind that people thought they had poor strategy... It made them look weaker then they were.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Fionn:

Bastables said:

" 20 Aug:926

None of these figures show a catastrophic loss of operational Panzers."

Umm, unless you feel that a reduction from 2300+ operational Panzers in June to 926 just 2 months later ( a loss of 1400 tanks) isn't drastic I think you're wrong. Also don't forget that the Germans lost 1400 tanks PLUS all the newly produced tanks which arrived in July and August. If they got 2/3rd of the monthly production ( roughly 500 tanks out of 800 or so produced each month) that means they lost a FURTHER 1000 tanks in those 2 months.

So, in order to get from 2300 tanks in June to roughly 1000 tanks in August AND accounting for the 1000 new tanks sent to the Eastern Front in that time period we can see that in two months the Germans lost roughly 2400 tanks on the Eastern Front. A figure just slightly OVER their ENTIRE operational strength a couple of days before Zitadelle. If you don't think those are drastic losses then I suggest you never, ever lead men into battle. It'd make World War I look like a picnic .

I think you're missing the point that those where operational numbers

Total numbers retained by division in the eastern front

10 July 2609 Panzers held by divisions

10 August 2065 Panzers held by divisions

As you know Germans only held tanks if they could at the worse be repaired within the month. Also when tracking Panzer units in action with operational and strength reports they tend to have if they’re lucky around 50% operational when engaged in action. Prior to engagements with a “quiet” build up as long as Kursk of course you are going to see unusual things such as the 80%+ operational Panzers in divisions.

I think you'll find that 1,131 Panzers and StuGs were lost on the entire eastern Front 1 July to 31 Aug. For comparsion Army group Centers 9th army lost 88 Panzers and StuGs up to 14 July. For the whole of July including the Russian Counter attack 311 Panzers and assorted StuGs were lost. Army Group South lost 190 Panzers and StuGs 5th July to 17 July. Not quite the shattering of the Panzer arm.

[ May 10, 2002, 01:52 AM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Keke]

Now, what I am curious about, not knowing the details of Soviet Doctrine, is this a SOP for Soviet tactics, or was Zhukov forced into such a postion by the turn of events in his many operations? Or perhaps, were his ideas of "cost" different from regular Soviet doctrine?

That is a very good question. Maybe Fionn can answer it. Btw, implementation of various doctrines are naturally more important than the actual doctrines.

Human wave attacks were used in so many occasions that one could easily thought them as a to be a significant part of the Soviet doctrine. Fe a US general (sorry, don´t remember the details) asked a Soviet general just after the war, how Russians delt with German minefields, because they caused so many problems on the western front. The Russian general answered that after three wave of infantry attacks there were not so many mines left anymore.

Here´s one, not so good example of Soviets use of manpower. During the heavy fighting at Karelian Isthmus on June-July 1944 Russians tried to outmaneuvre Finnish defensive lines by landing operations at Bay of Viipuri. Before this the numerous small islands of that bay had to be cleared from Finnish troops. One rocky islet which had no military use whatsoever was invaded by a Russian platoon. Finnish artillery FO noticed this on the other side of the bay and ordered a mortar barrage to hit them, because he knew the Russians would be annihilated without any cover from mortar shells. And so happened. After a while came another platoon with motorboats to the same islet. The Finnish FO ordered another barrage with the same results. Much to amazement of the FO there came yet another platoon to that same islet and were blown away. After that some Russian officer must have realized that the invasion of the islet was a futile thing, because it was not invaded for the fourth time.

I want to ask how essential part of the Soviet doctrine(s) was the use of well-armed Komsomol volunteers and NKVD detachments as a blockin groups behind the front lines? Their job was to prevent any retreats and they often just machine gunned stragglers from the frontline.

And don´t forget that Russian officers had the acceptable right to shoot to kill as "an extreme measure to be used only on active service when a Red Army man refuses to fulfil a military order or retreats from the field of the battle".

And this right was often used very harshly:

Antony Beevor, Stalingrad (p 169):

`During the night of 17/18 October, two soldiers dissapeared from [204th Rifle Division in 64th Army]. The regimental commander and the commissar ordered the company commander to execute the platoon commander of the men who had deserted.´ This nineteen-year-old junior lieutenant had joined the regiment only five days before, and scarcely knew the two deserters from his platoon. `The company commander obeyed the order. He went to his trench and, in the precense of the comissar, shot him dead.´

[ May 10, 2002, 07:04 AM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Keke]

1. RKKA had ~12 million irreversible losses.

Out of these 12 million, 4.5 million were POWs. Almost 50% happened in the first 12 months of war.

2. German armed forces had almost 8 million irreversible losses, including 3 million POWs. That is, if we are not counting another 4 million who were taken POWs at capitulation.

3. 34.5 million soviet people and 21 million german people went through military service during 1941-1945.

4. If you include axis minors and western allies into the picture, the overall ratios would be not changed much, very roughly speaking.

Antony Beevor presented these not so exact numbers (Stalingrad, p 428):

[German unconditional surrender]...For Russians , on the other hand, it was the proud yet sad end of a nightmare which had begun almost four years before and cost the Red Army nearly 9 million dead and 18 million wounded. (Only 1.8 million prisoners of war returned alive out of the 4.5 million taken by the Wermacht.) Civilian casualties are much harder to assess, but they are thought to run nearly 18 million, bringing the total war dead of the Soviet Union to over 26 million, more than five times the total of German war dead.

[Fionn]

" And don´t forget that Russian officers had the acceptable right to shoot to kill as "an extreme measure to be used only on active service when a Red Army man refuses to fulfil a military order or retreats from the field of the battle".

So did British officers... There's at least one recorded case of a British officer shooting a soldier to stop a rout in Normandy. There are a few more such instances from the time of Dunkirk.

As to blocking barrages and NKVD groups and suchlike... Those things are the sorts of things desperate nations do. They aren't part of doctrine obviously but they were done by both Germany and the Soviet Union when things went bad and they were also done by America and Britain etc when things went bad or have we forgotten General Puller's order to a Tank Company commander to fire on an American Bn if it withdrew from its positions without his personal permission during the fighting around Chosin?

Again, doctrine is one thing... What desperate people actually do is another.

Panzerleader,

Even the Soviets thought Zhukov extremely wasteful. OTOH their situation in 1941 and 42 was that they were fighting for their national survival and Stalin was willing to give command to anyone who could meet his objectives irrespective of the cost paid.

As regards doctrine etc... The Soviet officer corps had been gutted by the Purges in the late 30s. The guys who survived into 1941 were either no threat to Stalin ( so incompetent or bland as to fly below his radar so to speak) or just got really lucky and were in some out of the way districts or said exactly the right things at the right times. Either way it can be seen that the officers in 1941 were, on the whole, not going to be the brightest and most effective guys around. So in 1941 and 42 the Soviets were trying to survive with the dregs of their pre-1938 officer corps, new conscripts who received some hasty training ( often only a couple of weeks) and were told they were now officers and should lead men in combat and a very, very small number of professionally competent officers who had had the good fortune to survive the Purges. If I went in to a US Army, lined up ALL the officers in the Army HQ, Corps HQs, division HQs, component battalions and companies and shot the most highly rated 90% of them in the back of the head and then told the surviving 10% that they were going to be shipped overseas to fight the German Army in a month's time and had to train a bunch of conscripted civilians ( in that time) to do all the jobs that the dead officers had previously done do you think they'd do well and be able to apply US doctrine perfectly and give a good account of themselves? Of course not. Well, the example above gives you some idea of the state of the Soviet officer corps in 1941 when the Germans invaded.

So, let's paint a late 1941 picture for you.... Your Army is commanded by a guy who has 15 years service in the army. He survived the purges by being so unthreatening that no-one bothered with him and moved from being a regimental commander to being Army commander in the space of 1 year. His immediate subordinates ( commanding the Corps and doing all the staff work) were battalion and company commanders 3 years ago and have been promoted to their current positions not on the basis of ability or training but because the guys who used to do these jobs have all been shot in the back of the head. Only 5% of all your staff officers have actually attended a staff training school. The rest just have to try to figure out what works and doesn't work through trial and error. They have never received lectures explaining to them how to set up supply dumps, how to maximise the efficiency of supply runs and suchlike. Instead they just do what they think sounds pretty reasonable and hope it doesn't fail too badly. When their "best guess" inevitably falls apart they try to figure out why it failed and, next time, try not to make the same mistake again. Unfortunately becuase there is so much they don't know they usually end up making a different mistake and the whole thing falls apart again. You've got entire staff sections which are learning their trade on a trial and error basis and for any of your attacks to be a success you've got to luck out and have each staff section get almost everything right at the same time. The odds of them all get most things right at the same time are miniscule and so most of the time your Army commander's plans never come off.

Add in some zampolits, a healthy dose of Germans doing their very best to screw up anything and everything your Army commander and staff officers come up with and add in even lower levels of competence in the corps, divisional and regimental HQs and it quickly becomes aparrent that most Red Army troops were good for little more than finding a position, digging in and holding it for the first few years of war.

Actually the re-organisations in 1942 are a very interesting topic. As the Soviets realised their staff work was woeful they broke their tank units up into individual Bns and regiments, utilised them in small-scale operations until their commanders and staffs were competent, then they formed Bdes and utilised them independently of eachother until Bde staffs began to exhibit some competence. Then they formed Corps and got Corps staff used to co-ordinating the Bdes and finally they formed the Corps into Tank Armies. All of this happened in 1942 to early 43 and clearly shows the Soviet identification of staff work and staff competence as their major achilles heel. Losses would continue to be high once the staffs began to exhibit some competence ( since the lower level officers ( Bn and regimental) were rarely particularly competent) but once the staffs got themselves organised at the Army level the Soviets began to achieve some success with operational manoeuvres ( initially beginning with 20km deep pincer movements with Tank Corps, then advancing on to 50km deep penetrations with Tank Armies and, finally 100km+ deep penetrations with Tank Army Groups... the same sort of learning slope which they had to embark on in 1942 )... you can see this learning slope ( I can't remember the right English phrase for that at the moment... It is learning "something" but I can't remember it.) at work in 1943 in local and, later, general offensives.

In any case the take home messages are as follows IMO:

1. In the early war years the general state of the officer corps is such that THEY didn't even know their own doctrine never mind have the competence to apply it. ( due to the absolute haemorrhage of trained staff officers during the purges).

2. They spent late 42 and 43 building up the experience among staff officers and commanders to actually be able to begin applying their doctrine ( with some modifications since it was now 1943 and the last major iteration of their doctrine had been published in 1936 IIRC).

3. Zhukov was ALWAYS a bit of a steamroller. Not avoiding enemy strength but just constantly bulling into it relying on his mass and material to overcome it. He was always the same even at Khalkin-Gol.

4. I'm referring to the soundness of a doctrine when competently applied by people who know it. I just say that saying the underlying doctrine was unsound because of what happened in 1941 and 1942 is naive. I do little more than apply basic Soviet doctrine competently and I certainly don't do all that badly in CM or operational or strategic level games so there must be something to it even if it is only being applied in games.

In any case the discussion is largely irrelevant at the level of CM. At CM's level good basic tactics work irrespective of which army they come from because we don't have to rely on conscripted officers to put them into action.

Bastables:

The problem I see with your figures and claims is that you mix irrevocable losses and mission losses together without ever clearly differentiating them and for people who aren't familiar with strength returns etc etc that can be very misleading.

So, here's my reply:

The Germans had about 950 OPERATIONAL tanks at the end of August. That they had another 1100 who couldn't move or fire but would be back up and running within the month does them no good when some Soviet Tank Armies come over the plains at them.

As to the Panzer arm not being shattered by the losses it sustained: Using your own figures they could field about 2400 operational tanks at the end of June and only 900 operational tanks at the end of August. That they could repair many of those damaged tanks given time isn't in contention.. OTOH an immobile tank which can't fire its gun in a workshop 200 kms to the rear isn't much help when a Soviet Tank Army comes over the hill. ALL you have to rely on then is the 900 or so operational tanks, the 1200 sitting back in workshops which will be ready in 2 to 4 weeks are worth sweet FA at that point in time.

IN any case I've learnt that when people hold strongly held opinions regarding the interpretation of some points of data nothing good ever comes of discussing it. The interpretation will be held to ( by both sides). So, before it degenerates I'll withdraw from this one Bastables.

[ May 10, 2002, 08:13 AM: Message edited by: Fionn ]

[Keke]

In any case the discussion is largely irrelevant at the level of CM. At CM's level good basic tactics work irrespective of which army they come from because we don't have to rely on conscripted officers to put them into action.

That´s right. It´s quite amusing to observe how these threads `mutate´ after the original subject.

Back to the Soviet´s implementation of a doctrine...

Didn´t this `trial and error´-method of training officer staff began already in 1939? Fe Chuikov was a veteran from the 4 months long Winter War against Finland.

[Fionn]

Keke,

Trial and error learning began the instant the 1st lieutenant got told he was now in charge of ALL logistics for his entire division. It didn't begin with any particular war etc, it begun when the poor SOB got given the job which got his predecessor killed. The less error there was the less chance he got killed for incompetence but conversely the more competence he showed the more likely he was to be shot for being a threat to the state .

It's like something out of Monty Python.

[Keke]

The less error there was the less chance he got killed for incompetence but conversely the more competence he showed the more likely he was to be shot for being a threat to the state.

Yes, it was quite disgraceful how stalinist inquisition treated fe the most competent partisan leaders who distinguished themselves during operation Bagration.

[Grisha]

Keke,

Regarding your doubts about the superiority of Soviet Operational art versus the Blitzkrieg at the operational-strategic level, I suggest you email Col. David Glantz about his opinion on that. If you don't wish to disturb him, then might I suggest the following books, all from Frank Cass Publisher:</font>

• Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War(over 700 pages, btw)</font>
• Soviet Military Intelligence in War</font>
• Soviet Military Operational Art</font>
• Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver</font>

[Keke]

Who said that German operational-strategic planning was superior to Soviets? It was the weakest link in the German war machine!!!

Added:

Main stress on the word strategic.

[ May 10, 2002, 11:25 AM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Roksovkiy]

In a recent university talk, David Glantz said the total russian military casualty numbers are still unknown with many archives closed.

He said a minimum of 14.5 million military casualties, however the number is constantly increasing with new releases and discoveries from the archives.

He said Krivosheevs numbers are not complete and do not include casualties from mars and many other operations.

A Russian historical firm named SEARCH who toured the battlefield and and sifted through soviet documents, condemn Krivosheevs numbers as a relic from soviet secrecy.

Glantz gives the total German losses from (1941-1944 december) on the eastern front as 2,742,209 million.

[Andreas]

I think it is in the discussion transcripts in 'The initial period of war' that IIRC Generalleutnant Plato mentions that from the time of the Lvov-Sandomierz operation (July 1944) the Red Army operated inside the Wehrmacht decision-making cycle. I understand that to mean that before the Wehrmacht reacted to Soviet Step A, they had already undertaken Step B. Which, in a war, is not a healthy situation if you are the slower guy.

[Grisha]

Very true, Keke. It also applies at the operational level. However, one has to remember that this is only with respect to a timeline, namely, that Soviet operational art(along with so much else Soviet) while based on excellent, well-thought theories took very hard experience to match in practice. When the final product did arrive(circa-1944) it was matchless, as an operational-strategic form, to anything at the time. In contrast, German operational/strategic art(Blitzkrieg was really a way of combining operational art into strategy - the short, decisive war, so to speak) was only as good as its tactical element and the mind of its overall operational commander.

Another thing to realize is that Soviet operational art determined Soviet tactical methods. I don't want to go too much into detail right now, but this is crucial to understanding the Soviet method of war. For example, let's say it's 1944, and we're playing a Soviet assault in CMBB. If this assault were part of a main operational direction, these would have to be the conditions for it to be historical:</font>

1. The map would have to have anywhere from 50-70% of German positions and weaponry labelled/landmarked. That means trenches, pillboxes, minefields, barbed-wire, and gun emplacements.</font>
2. Soviet forces would have anywhere from 8 to 16 times the points to use than the Germans for units.</font>

As you can see tactical versatility, or expertise, is somewhat redundant under these conditions. But what one must realize is that such conditions were the direct result of Soviet operational art, which 'created' these battlefield conditions at the outset.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I think it is in the discussion transcripts in 'The initial period of war' that IIRC Generalleutnant Plato mentions that from the time of the Lvov-Sandomierz operation (July 1944) the Red Army operated inside the Wehrmacht decision-making cycle. I understand that to mean that before the Wehrmacht reacted to Soviet Step A, they had already undertaken Step B. Which, in a war, is not a healthy situation if you are the slower guy.

While generally I agree with this statement, the reference to 'decision-making cycle' is misleading. Terms like 'decision-loops' are a western idea, revolving around the German-based concept of versatility & speed. The Soviets were much more interested in creating illusions and cloaking movement than working inside an enemy's decision-loop. It would be more accurate to say that from June 1944 the Soviets effectively misled and deceived German intelligence to the degree that German military reactions played into the hand of Soviet operations.

Incidently, Andreas, that is a fascinating quote. I'm not familiar with Lt.Gen. Plato. Was he in the Wehrmacht? If so, could you direct me to the source of this quote? It could be useful for a project of mine.

[Redwolf]

As good as this thread is, I sense a slight problem here.

I think we mostly agree that Soviet operational conduct was much better than that of the Germans, on average.

And you rightly bash some German generals for pushing all the blame on Hitler. However, when doing so you must be careful not to bash those German generals who actually might have been ahead of the rest of the German generals in operational thinking. In special that applies to Manstein, who surely had his own share of Montgomery-like ego problems, but people like him might actually have been a successful base for better operational thinking if other Generals or Hitler didn't hold them back. Cause and effect are very hard to untangle here.

EDIT: grammatics

[ May 10, 2002, 04:32 PM: Message edited by: redwolf ]

[Fionn]

Grisha,

While you're correct to point out that the Soviet staff didn't specifically address OODA loops within their own planning cycle I think you'd have to agree that the whole emphasis on momentum, follow-on echelons passing through stalled assault echelons etc was done with a view to achieving all of the things you get when you get inside someone's OODA loop. The Soviets just didn't give the lower levels enough free rein to beat the enemy's OODA loop with a superior and faster OODA loop of their own so they relied on speed to negate the effectiveness of any decisions the enemy COs made after running their OODA loops.

In effect they beat the OODA loop by making the action irrelevant because of the speed of their advance. BY the time the US or German COs got the info and decided on an action and issued orders to their subordinates the situation would have changed enough that those orders no longer would have a decisive impact. And this, of course, lead to the delegation of command to the lowest levels possible as US doctrine evolved to defeat SOviet doctrine with a view to ensuring that the US forces by dint of their very local command levels could react so quickly as to maintain OODA coherency in the face of Soviet follow-on echelons.

It's all very chicken and egg and quite interesting to see how the doctrines developed from 1944 to 1984 actually.

Aside: Actually, there seems to be a nice bit of knowledge re: Soviet doctrine here. It is nice to see.

[ May 10, 2002, 02:07 PM: Message edited by: Fionn ]

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Fionn:

Aside: Actually, there seems to be a nice bit of knowledge re: Soviet doctrine here. It is nice to see.

I just tried to apply a maneuver right of out Baxter's Soviet Airland Battle Tactics in CMBO and failed miserably! So I guess Soviet doctrine must be crap after all

[Grisha]

Fionn,

First, I'm glad to see your posts gracing the forum once again. I came into CMBO a little after your time here, but your articles were very informative and instructive.

Generally, I have to agree with your reply on decision loops and Soviet operations. It did require versatility from Army and Front command in such situations, since upon execution, time was of the essence.

I would only qualify your statement on speed with a note on forward detachments. By mid-1944, the Soviets had figured out that the use of forward detachments only worked well in numbers, resulting in even ordering Rifle Armies(and their subordinate units) to send out forward detachments. With this checkerboard array of mobile formations streaking across the map, maskirovka was re-established, albeit a thinner version. And while the numbers of formations sent out alleviated a great need for versatility and initiative, the Soviets did tend to form these ad-hoc units from experienced units/commanders.

Another thing I just remembered was the level of intelligence collected before an operation began. Operational(Army-Front level) intelligence was responsible for determining possible reserves in the area(should maskirovka have failed to influence their redeployment). Armed with this knowledge, Army-Front command staffs would be better able to plan most efficient/deceptive exploitation routes.

But it really does all go back to the breakthrough, and since no plan ever goes completely as intended, Soviet command staffs at the Army/Front level would have to possess versatility as well.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Fionn:

I think you'd have to agree that the whole emphasis on momentum, follow-on echelons passing through stalled assault echelons etc was done with a view to achieving all of the things you get when you get inside someone's OODA loop. The Soviets just didn't give the lower levels enough free rein to beat the enemy's OODA loop with a superior and faster OODA loop of their own so they relied on speed to negate the effectiveness of any decisions the enemy COs made after running their OODA loops.

This is why the Red Army performance seems to have been at its best when the enemy followed the game book and plan as dictated by the prevailing doctrine. It also seems the Red Army was at its worst when the opponent did not play by the book for what ever reason.

In effect they beat the OODA loop by making the action irrelevant because of the speed of their advance.

The timetable seems to have been the most vulnerable part in the Red Army plans.

BY the time the US or German COs got the info and decided on an action and issued orders to their subordinates the situation would have changed enough that those orders no longer would have a decisive impact.

And this, of course, lead to the delegation of command to the lowest levels possible as US doctrine evolved to defeat SOviet doctrine with a view to ensuring that the US forces by dint of their very local command levels could react so quickly as to maintain OODA coherency in the face of Soviet follow-on echelons.

A very interesting parallel is the Finnish experience in the summer of 1944.

Postwar German sources condemn the Finnish course of action as a failure because the Finns failed to follow the German doctrine when defending against a strategic level assault. The Finnish army did not take heed the German warnings and lessons learned they tried to pass on.

The German doctrine was to construct a deep defensive zone with multiple defensive lines. That was supposed to dissipate the Red Army strenght until it ran out of steam and the assault was stopped and beaten back (and the original positions were taken back). Admittedly The Finnish army was caught with its pants down. During the static phase (early 1942- June 1944) no real work was done to improve the defensive positions. The intelligence service failed to notify the front line commanders of the clear signs of coming assault. The division to receive the brunt of the initial assault had sent its transportation (horses and tractors) to farm duty some way behind the front line.

What happened next is interesting: the Finnish army units facing the attack switched to delaying action and pulled back fighting. The high command started concentrating forces far behind the front line. The Red Army plan went well. They reached and took Viipuri in 10 days (during Winter War it took them 105 days to reach it but they never took it in combat). After Viipuri the Red Army hit a brick wall. From ~20th June until ~20th July the Red Army tried to use massive force to break through the Finnish defences. Any break in the defences would have meant the Red Army would have had a clear path all the way to the capital Helsinki. After July 20th the attacks were called off and cease fire was signed Sept. 5th.

Swift local reaction to follow up echelons was relevant only when it meant it could be delayed. OODA coherency during the pull back phase was generally maintained but that was because the game plan was simple: delay and pull back to fight another day. A noteworthy factoid: the Finnish army did not lose any large (from platoon up) formations to encirclements. Any formation that got encirceled tried to slip away and reach friendly lines. The Soviets took only (IIRC) ~2000 Finns as POW during the entire Continuation War, from 1941 to 1944.

Beyond Viipuri the plan was equally simple: hold positions at all costs. A breach in the line would mean the fall of the nation. The trick was by then the Red Army units had been worn down.

The Finnish doctrine dictated that a defensive line should be in friendly hands at the end of the battle. More often than not this was acheived even if the force had to pull back later on. Of equally importance was the decision to gather the reserves to a location the Finnish army had chosen. If it had been fed to the front line piece meal to try and hold the first line of defence (or a series of defensive lines as required by the German doctrine) the results would have been catastrophic for the Finnish army.

[Fionn]

Redwolf,

LOL!!! It would be funny if it weren't so true .

Grisha ( and everyone else),

1. Thanks for the welcome Grisha . May you fare better in a storm than your namesake . ( And if you don't know the Soviet navy then that won't make any sense. Let me know and I'll explain it.)

2. If you haven't already checked out Armor ( the US Army's Armoured community magazine) I suggest you look it up. A while back either it or some of their National Training Centre sites contained some excellent critiques of some battles fought at the NTC, particularly the reconnaissance phase ( which I would feel is the most decisive phase of all FWIW). Anyways one author made a most interesting point... he found that once REDFOR had correctly ID'ed 90% of BLUFOR's main positions they almost invariably won the battle since they could minimise uncertainty to such a level that they only had to account for a few decision points ( for those of you unfamiliar with post-war Soviet doctrine a decision point is a pre-decided point at which certain things will become clear about the enemy... e.g. the enemy is holding this village, defending from outside the village or not near the village at all... and to which you, as a Soviet commander, have pre-decided and pre-planned contingy plans all worked out. Once you arrive at the decision point you simply implement the plan which most closely fits the current tactical situation. ) and their doctrine worked wonderfully.

When the number of enemy positions discovered was lower Soviet scientific planning methods were less effective... ( There are some excellent articles on decision point tactics also... and FWIW I find them invaluable in CM. I use them all the time. I find it takes all the complicated thinking and second-guessing out of PBEMing.)

So, what you are talking about re: the locations of reserves etc would have fed into the Soviet plan by creating decision points... E.g. When we break through German reserves can react in 3 ways. As soon as we find which way they are reacting we implement whichever plan we've prepped and briefed for that situation.... I'm sure you already know that Grisha but others mightn't.

3. FWIW as some of you may be beginning to see Soviet doctrine was rather inflexible BUT through the briefing of multiple plans and contingencies it tried to ensure that components could react quickly to situations once higher command levels had ascertained jsut what was happening.

The more perceptive amongst you will also note that all of the above relies on:

a) the higher command levels knowing what is happening,

b)the higher command levels not being wiped out by an MLRS pod dump right on their TacHQ and

c) radio communications both up and down the chain of command being unaffected by enemy jamming etc.

Interestingly enough the Americans began to spend serious money in the 80s in ensuring they'd have the ability to do b and c above . One thing I always found interesting about American doctrine is that when they finally did really set their minds ( and cheque books) to it they really analysed Soviet weaknesses and were willing to pay the money required to build weapons systems to specifically attack those weaknesses.

4. And as re: intel gathering... In any Soviet division slightly over half the men and vehicles would have had at least some training in reconnaissance techniques ( whether they be deep penetrations 50km behind enemy lines or just training in how to act as a forward detachment for their Bn, regiment or division). I, personally, find it staggering how little the Americans seemed to focus on good ground reconnaissance prior to the development of UAVs. The number of men trained in reconnaissance in any Mech division was absolutely paltry.

*sigh* I can't wait for AA to cover some good mechanised operations. It'll really be a great test bed.

5. You know guys, have any of you ever thought about getting together and putting all of this stuff down in a series of co-ordinated articles so as to build up a picture of the development and working of Soviet ( and other doctrines)? It strikes me that it would save us all a lot of trouble every few months explaining just why Soviet doctrine wasn't just all "walk blindly forward towards the Germans ". What say ye?

[Keke]

And you rightly bash some German generals for pushing all the blame on Hitler. However, when doing so you must be careful not to bash those German generals who actually might have been much ahead of the rest of the German generals in operational thinking. In special that appiels to Manstein, who shurely had his own share of Montgomery-like ego problems, however he might actually be right that he would have done things right the other generals didn't and/or Hitler prevented from succeeding.

I second that.

I have said this in some other forum before, but I have always wondered, why is it so hard for some people to accept the fact, that Hitler´s meddling with operative decision making caused major catastrophes for the German Army. Stalin did the same thing for the Red Army, but Soviet Union was a superpower, and in fact the only country which could survive after such catastrophes. Germany couldn´t and didn´t.

[Grisha]

tero,

Interesting post. I don't know much of the Continuation War, since my focus has always been Soviet-German. Since Soviet operations were highly dependent on a combination of intensive intelligence(razvedka) and deception(maskirovka), it sounds as if Finnish forces were able to temporarily render Soviet control of intelligence useless by a lengthy withdrawal from frontline positions. After a withdrawal of 10 days time, the Finns then established a defensive position that they were determined to hold. At this point what Finnish forces would've been contacting would be Soviet exploitation formations. These formations would not have the capability of taking prepared/defensive positions.

Of course, now that Finnish forces were at a position from which they would not retreat, it's fortunate that a ceasefire was agreed upon. Otherwise, a Soviet assault from these new positions would've been no different than against the Germans. Do you understand my point?