Relative Parity on the Eastern Front in CMBB

[Grisha]

tero & Keke,

I understand how close this issue with the Continuation War is to both of you, so I'll keep my comments civil and respectful. I ask the same of you.

After looking over a few websites(Finnish & Russian) these are my initial observations:</font>

• The Soviet Karelian operation's political objective was to force unconditional surrender at the negotiating table(something Finland never agreed to). Militarily, this operation was to restore the border to the 1940 line.</font>
• The Finns undermined the Soviet operation through an extended withdrawal after buying some time to allow for Finnish units up north to redeploy to a designated defensive position 120kms to the rear, next to Vyborg. 3/4's of this defensive line was also along a river line, making for a particularly difficult situation for the Soviets.</font>
• Soviet operations were predicated upon thorough intelligence of enemy defenses and deployment, combined with extensive deception to obfuscate enemy intelligence. By planning an operational withdrawal, the Finns rendered any advantage gained by razvedka/maskirovka moot for the operation.</font>
• Soviet resources were taxed at this point in the war, and it was expected that a Karelian resolution would be forthcoming, thus freeing up Soviet forces on this front to be used in the Baltic and Berlin operations. Logistics had only been arranged for the one operation as well. The Finnish operational withdrawal upset the entire timetable, forcing Soviet forces to conduct an extended operation without sufficient preparation or resources. Basically, the Karelian Front had to make do with a bad situation until some resolution was forthcoming on the negotiating table.</font>

In the end, the Soviets did not achieve their political or military goals in this operation, but had to compromise with both. The Finnish plan was largely responsible for this result. The Finns took a gamble, but realized where the real Soviet direction lay - Berlin.

[ May 11, 2002, 02:46 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Fionn]

Redwolf,

People can make any and all exceptions they wish so long as both parties agree to them. However, the official rules won't allow 4.2 inch arty or 120mm arty as standard in Short 75 games. Individual players are free to negotiate exceptions at any time however.

FWIW though I don't find the British underpowered as far as artillery goes under the Short 75 rules.

As to the rules being finished etc. They are finished, they simply await posting which, as I said, will happen in about 10 days or so.

I'd get ready to redo the whole page at TH rather than think about doing simply re-editting. Changes have been extensive.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Grisha:

I understand how close this issue with the Continuation War is to both of you, so I'll keep my comments civil and respectful. I ask the same of you.

OK. Mind you, being respectful does not mean I can not disagree with you on some of the points.

The Soviet Karelian operation's political objective was to force unconditional surrender at the negotiating table(something Finland never agreed to). Militarily, this operation was to restore the border to the 1940 line.

A few discrpencies here.

First: if the political objective was what you say it is then it is not unreasonable to assume the ultimate political goal was also the occupation of the entire country. Unconditional surrender was a king pin when first feelers were sent out in late 1943 and when the actual cease fire agreement was signed a couple of months after the attack petered out. IMO when the Soviets dropped that then the original political goal of the operation was trashcanned.

Second: the military objective was unattainable for one simple reason. The 1940 border was negotiated. It ran (runs) in an area that provides very few defensive benefits for the Finns. Holding that borderline would be militarily impossibile. Both the Winter War and the 1944 assault ended up pretty much exactly along the same frontline in both cases. I really doubt the Red Army would have stopped at the 1940 border had the Finnish defences collapsed in 1944.

The Finns undermined the Soviet operation through an extended withdrawal after buying some time to allow for Finnish units up north to redeploy to a designated defensive position 120kms to the rear, next to Vyborg. 3/4's of this defensive line was also along a river line, making for a particularly difficult situation for the Soviets.

The frontline ran along the river Vuoksi also during the Winter War. Both in 1940 and in 1944 the southern sector of the Isthmus was the most critical from the Finnish POV. And in both cases the Red Army advanced the furthest in that very sector.

Soviet operations were predicated upon thorough intelligence of enemy defenses and deployment, combined with extensive deception to obfuscate enemy intelligence. By planning an operational withdrawal, the Finns rendered any advantage gained by razvedka/maskirovka moot for the operation.

Sounds feasible. First time I have seen this particular interpretation BTW.

One noteworthy thing: after the operation was started the Finnish intelligence was up to speed in the SIGINT/ELINT. On several occasions they alerted the front line troops of massing attacks and their exact locations and the artillery would blow the attacking force away before it attacked. That would indicate the razvedka/maskirovka measures did not exceed the start of the operation. At least in this particular occasion. Can you comment on this on operations against the Germans ?

Soviet resources were taxed at this point in the war, and it was expected that a Karelian resolution would be forthcoming, thus freeing up Soviet forces on this front to be used in the Baltic and Berlin operations. Logistics had only been arranged for the one operation as well. The Finnish operational withdrawal upset the entire timetable, forcing Soviet forces to conduct extended operations without sufficient preparation or resources. Basically, the Karelian Front had to make do with a bad situation until some resolution was forthcoming on the negotiating table.

Sounds feasible.

In other words the planning for this operation was done better than for the Winter War but the goals set were based on (overly) optimistic projections on the Finnish defensive capabilities. Again.

In the end, the Soviets did not achieve their political or military goals in this operation, but had to compromise with both. The Finnish plan was largely responsible for this result. The Finns took a gamble, but realized where the real Soviet direction lay - Berlin.

True.

BTW: It is nice to see your findings pretty much corraborate the major key points those done by the Finnish historians and military analysts already right after the war.

[ May 11, 2002, 02:36 PM: Message edited by: tero ]

[argie]

Originally posted by Fionn:

you can see this learning slope ( I can't remember the right English phrase for that at the moment... It is learning "something" but I can't remember it.) at work in 1943 in local and, later, general offensives.

Learning steep?

[Grisha]

tero,

Thanks for your reply

One noteworthy thing: after the operation was started the Finnish intelligence was up to speed in the SIGINT/ELINT. On several occasions they alerted the front line troops of massing attacks and their exact locations and the artillery would blow the attacking force away before it attacked. That would indicate the razvedka/maskirovka measures did not exceed the start of the operation. At least in this particular occasion. Can you comment on this on operations against the Germans ?

No, generally razvedka/maskirovka were geared to enhance the initial breakthrough-period of an operation. However, razvedka did indicate likely enemy reserves and their most probably routes. Also, maskirovka could be conducted to a diminished degree through the extensive use of forward detachments, but in cases where advance routes were limited or the objective could be determined with a high degree of certainty, then the effectiveness of this method would be negligible.

[edit] No, it didn't extend into the exploitation phase as much. Also, forward detachments were part of exploitation.

In other words the planning for this operation was done better than for the Winter War but the goals set were based on (overly) optimistic projections on the Finnish defensive capabilities.

Not so much the Finnish defense capabilities, but that it was assumed the Finns would try to hold the line at all costs - rather than pull back 120 kms to another defensive position.

[ May 11, 2002, 04:07 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Keke]

BTW: It is nice to see your findings pretty much corraborate the major key points those done by the Finnish historians and military analysts already right after the war.

I echo that.

One detail, which Grisha may find interesting, is, that the Soviets had even more artillery and tactical bombers with the breakthrough attack at the second defensive line (VK-line at Kuuterselkä was 28km behind the frontline) than with the initial breakthrough attack at Valkeasaari.

[ May 11, 2002, 06:13 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Grisha]

One detail, which Grisha may find interesting, is, that the Soviets had even more artillery and tactical bombers with the breakthrough attack at the second defensive line (VK-line at Kuuterselkä was 28km behind the frontline) than with the initial breakthrough attack at Valkeasaari.

That is interesting, and may indicate an attempt made by the STAVKA to compensate for the unexpected turn the operation took. Though the Soviets were 120kms closer to the 1940 borders, they found themselves in nearly the same situation as before the initial assault, facing a prepared defensive line. The whole reason for conducting the operation was to put themselves deep in the Finnish operational depths, where such possible chaos could result that the Finnish gov't. might be pressured into unconditional surrender. This didn't happen due to the Finnish operational withdrawal, and that left the Soviets with two choices: a) continue to attack in such unfavorable conditions, or begin plans for another operation. The Soviets chose (a), but probably tried to offset the poor odds with more support assets. Anyway you look at it, the Finnish operational withdrawal was the perfect response for the given political-military situation. Atari!

[Keke]

Grisha, you may have misundertood the detail slightly. I was talking about the first delay line, which at Kuuterselkä was 28km behind the original frontline. It was the focal point of the offensive after 5 days of fighting. It seems to me that the razvedka/maskirovka measures included this delay-line (VK).

Although the greater amount of arty and air support for Soviets, and the poor condition of the delay-line, Finns managed to hold the line a couple of days (the costly but effective counterattack of the jager brigade happened there). Because of the stiff resistance, Soviets quickly redirected the focal point more to the left (or southwest from Kuuterselkä), where the resistance was much weaker and made a breakthrough there.

[ May 11, 2002, 08:54 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Fionn:

FWIW though I don't find the British underpowered as far as artillery goes under the Short 75 rules.

So you find the 25pdr module to be usable with the current rate of fire? I find that hard to believe.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Thanks for your reply

You are wellcome.

No, generally razvedka/maskirovka were geared to enhance the initial breakthrough-period of an operation. However, razvedka did indicate likely enemy reserves and their most probably routes. Also, maskirovka could be conducted to a diminished degree through the extensive use of forward detachments, but in cases where advance routes were limited or the objective could be determined with a high degree of certainty, then the effectiveness of this method would be negligible.

No, it didn't extend into the exploitation phase as much. Also, forward detachments were part of exploitation.

So, the Finnish fumbling the ball on the preparations for the assault was actually beneficial. All the maskirovka measures went equally unnoticed and thus were totally ineffective in their intended purpose ?

Then again there was no fooling the Finns.

Both sides knew the most likely route the attack would take anyway. In the northern half of the Isthmus the Red Army advanced only as far as the Vuoksi river. The natural choke point of the southern route was between the bay of Viipuri and Vuosalmi. Curiously enough the attack was directed there and the attack was beaten back there.

Not so much the Finnish defense capabilities, but that it was assumed the Finns would try to hold the line at all costs - rather than pull back 120 kms to another defensive position.

So this is why the ground attack planes did not interdict the trains far behind the front line but concentrated on the area just behind the front line.

[Grisha]

tero & Keke,

Thank you for the discussion! It has left me with a greater appreciation for the Continuation War. I will have to study this aspect of the Soviet-German War in more detail because of it

[Fionn]

Redwolf,

Yes I find those modules eminently usable. OTOH I also find British infantry usable vs SMGs, don't mind going into cityfights against German SMG squads with nothing but vanilla infantry ( no arty, no fire support etc).

It is ALL to do with how you use what you've got, not what you've actually got. Just my opinion of course.

[Keke]

tero & Keke,

Thank you for the discussion! It has left me with a greater appreciation for the Continuation War. I will have to study this aspect of the Soviet-German War in more detail because of it.

I´m glad you have enjoyed it.

BTW, if you play TOAW, you could download my `Red Thunder at Isthmus´ -scenario from the Warfare HQs scenario archive, and learn more about the Soviet 1944 summer offensive. Although the scenario needs some updating, it´s scenario briefing is quite informative. :cool:

[Tero]

Originally posted by Grisha:

tero & Keke,

Thank you for the discussion! It has left me with a greater appreciation for the Continuation War. I will have to study this aspect of the Soviet-German War in more detail because of it

Before this tread sinks into oblivion:

The Soviets refere to this operation as the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation. What has puzzled us Finns is why they chose to stagger the start of the attacks so that it was possible to widraw troops from the front North of Lake Ladoga to the Isthmus front. And apparently that pull out started unnoticed.

Had the attacks been simultaneous it would have been much harder to mass the troops to stop the push in the Isthmus.

Also: the disuse of ground attack aircrafts in interdiction was something that has puzzled me at least. They had absolute and total airsuperiority and they failed to interdict rail and road transports in debth. They did make moving in the immediate front line area difficult but further back they made no concentrated effort to interdict traffic.

[Keke]

The Soviets refere to this operation as the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation. What has puzzled us Finns is why they chose to stagger the start of the attacks so that it was possible to widraw troops from the front North of Lake Ladoga to the Isthmus front. And apparently that pull out started unnoticed.

Soviets basically applied this against Germans too. Hit hard on one area causing enemy reserves to move there, and then hit the area where there are no enemy reserves left. The succesful abandonment of the bridgehead positions at Isthmus of Syväri (east from Ladoga) must be one of the finest withdrawal operations in WWII. When Soviet arty bombarment started there 21 of June, it hit emptied positions.

Also: the disuse of ground attack aircrafts in interdiction was something that has puzzled me at least. They had absolute and total airsuperiority and they failed to interdict rail and road transports in debth. They did make moving in the immediate front line area difficult but further back they made no concentrated effort to interdict traffic.

How about the lack of radios in Soviet aircrafts and mediocre training? Interdiction was one of the hardest missions to carry out properly. There were several cases where Sturmoviks attacked road columns and managed to hit nothing. If I remember right, Soviet tac bombers operated only within a radius of 60km over enemy occupied territory.

BTW, not everything went smoothly (if there are such thing in warfare) from the Finnish point of view during the summer of 1944. The defense of Viipuri (Vyborg) 20 of June was a utter disaster (referred as `the black day of the Finnish Army´ on some sources). Won´t go to the details, but Soviet recon companies with tank support managed to rout one battallion of 20 inf brigade, which led to the abandonment of the city.

[ May 13, 2002, 09:16 AM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Munter]

Originally posted by Grisha:

tero & Keke,

Thank you for the discussion! It has left me with a greater appreciation for the Continuation War. I will have to study this aspect of the Soviet-German War in more detail because of it

Wow! This is by far the nicest way to say "could we talk about something else, please".

M

[Grisha]

Keke,

By 1944 most VVS aircraft possessed both radio receivers and transmitters. By late 1943, the use of RUS-2 radar sets was becoming widespread, capable of detecting aircraft from 80-100kms. Training had also improved, but given the very high attrition rates in combat aircraft units(something all air forces experienced - USAAF combat units had a higher percentage of casualties than the USMC, for example), experienced crew were rarely higher than 50%, even among Guards units.

Munter,

Please, I can speak for myself. If I wanted this discussion to end, you'd know in no uncertain terms

[Keke]

By 1944 most VVS aircraft possessed both radio receivers and transmitters. By late 1943, the use of RUS-2 radar sets was becoming widespread, capable of detecting aircraft from 80-100kms. Training had also improved, but given the very high attrition rates in combat aircraft units(something all air forces experienced - USAAF combat units had a higher percentage of casualties than the USMC, for example), experienced crew were rarely higher than 50%, even among Guards units.

Then how come the poor ground interdiction results? Among the Russian air units were three guard divisions equipped with tac and fighter bombers.

[Grisha]

Keke,

I can't say really, only guess. It could have been the result of poor razvedka, at least to the operational depths. One thing is certain, it sounds like a campaign definitely looking into with more detail. Not because I doubt your claims, but more that there had to be an explanation for all this, whether military, or political. The Soviets of 1944-45 were an entirely different army than the one of 1939-42, with a very sound military art(and science). It is strange to me as well what happened. Even Glantz hasn't covered the Continuation War. I really think someone needs to start accessing the Soviet archives, looking for explanations wrt the Continuation War. Only by hearing the Soviet side will you be able to piece it all together, Finnish & Soviet.

[Keke]

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finnish historians have been able to use Russian archives in their researches, and new Russian studies have emerged with many interesting details. It is a accepted fact that the Soviet army was an entirely different army in -44, than in the Winter War or the first years of the Continuation War. FE during the -44 summer offensive Soviets could use difficult terrain as their benefit, like in outflanking maneuvres. But there were still many defects found, like ineffective interdiction and tactical rigidity, which led to needless casualties.

Because of the effective `self-censorship´ practised by Finns after the war (caution towards Soviets) and the disinformation spread by the official Soviet historiography, Western World don´t know much about the facts of the Continuation War.

[Grisha]

Fionn,

Regarding work on a Soviet military art project, my email's posted(meaning, yours isn't) if interested.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Not because I doubt your claims, but more that there had to be an explanation for all this, whether military, or political.

Looking from the Soviet POV and the Finnish POV the set of facts are very different.

The Soviets of 1944-45 were an entirely different army than the one of 1939-42, with a very sound military art(and science). It is strange to me as well what happened. Even Glantz hasn't covered the Continuation War.

Perhaps his esteemed Russian friends have persuaded him nothing of interest happened in this neck of the front that has not been satisfactorily covered before. "See, even the German sources corraborate the Soviet historical tradition concerning the Continuation War".

I wonder what kind of a responce your findings would get on the Russian Military Forum. I think you should try to float them there to see what kind of a responce they would get from people like Oleg.

I really think someone needs to start accessing the Soviet archives, looking for explanations wrt the Continuation War. Only by hearing the Soviet side will you be able to piece it all together, Finnish & Soviet.

As Keke said the Finnish historians have been rummaging there already.

[Keke]

One little known fact about the Continuation War: Finnish artillery used same kind of TOT-system than Americans. Quick-response and concentrated fire of 16-21 arty btns during the battle of Tali-Ihantala caused major losses to attacking Soviets. Even Soviet contemporaries admitted that defensive arty fire was at times `unbearable´.

Added: When German 122. Inf Division came to Viipurinlahti as Hitler´s help on early July, it´s artillery was given only pre-planned barrage missions, because its slower targeting system was known to all.

[ May 14, 2002, 09:58 AM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[kipanderson]

Hi,

This sort of discussion is always fun, even if we have been here before on a number of pervious occasions. The question always comes down to one of the relative combat effectiveness of the Germans and the Soviets, even if expressed in slightly different terms. Anyway, first a couple of quick points.

One, to answer Le Tondu’s question about the quality of Soviet and German tanks directly. “Quality” can mean a number of different things, but I will take it to mean combat power. In terms of the relative combat power of the German and Soviet tanks the war on the Eastern Front can be, very roughly, split up into four periods. From the summer of 41 to the end of 42 the Soviets had the advantage. For the first six months of 43 things were roughly equal. From mid 43 to the spring of 44 the Germans had the advantage, and lastly, for the last fourteen months of the war things were roughly equal.

Two, welcome back to Fionn. Good to have you back on the broad.

Now more stuff on Soviet/German combat effectiveness.

All of what follows relates to the period end June 43 to end March 45. Importantly, this period includes the heavy Soviet losses at Kursk but, correctly, excludes the round up of Germans during the last two months of the war. The figures are not skewed to the Soviet advantage.

In June 43 the Red Army numbered 6.3 million, rising to 6.5 by the end of the war. 1943 was the first year of the war in which Soviet losses were less than the annual intake of recruits. Importantly the Red Army was no longer being bled to death. It was official policy to allow Soviet infantry divisions to reduce to an average of 4,500 men while more troops were channelled into the mobile and mechanised forces. The 450 odd Soviet infantry divisions became very heavily armed brigades, by western standards. By “very heavily armed” I mean that they had a generous supply of heavy weapons for the number of frontline riflemen in the divisions. The average force ratio over the period was 2.7:1, Soviets to Germans. Close to 2:1 in June 43 and then slowly increasing.

When it comes to Soviet relative combat effectiveness the simplest way to calculate it is to assume the Germans were fighting an enemy whom, in terms of quality, were in every detail clones of the Germans themselves. After making the above assumption you then use the “actual, historical” figures for the number of Soviets. To cut a long story short, during the second half of the war if the Soviets had numbered what they actually did, but been of identical quality to the defending Germans in every detail, the loss ratio would have been expected to be 1.4:1, Soviet to German. The actual, historical loss ratio for the above period was 1.6:1. In turn this tells us that Soviet combat effectiveness relative to German, during the second half of the war, was 1.15:1. The lower the figure the better. To put this in perspective, both Commonwealth and US combat effectiveness relative to German in WW2 was 1.2:1. During the second half of the war all four of the main players had very similar combat effectiveness; the above figures are just as close as they look. To put the above in even greater perspective, the figures you reach for the first half of the war on the Eastern Front are closer to 4:1, Soviet to German. Remember, the lower the figure the better.

In summary, the Soviets were just as tactically unsound, during the first half of the war, as the Germans claimed. However, during the second half of the war the Soviets improved far more than post war German accounts claimed. During the second half of the war a 1,000 man Soviet combat team was often the equal of its German opposite number.

I will stop boring everyone, but give just one last example. Soviet losses per 100 front line troops, per combat day, fell to levels equal to those of US troops by the autumn of 43. This still represented horror enough, but not the mass slaughter some German accounts would indicate was still the norm in late 43 and in 44. Importantly, it also indicates that it is “likely” that the Soviets and the Americans were using similar tactics. But I am not claiming it “proves” they were using similar tactics.

None of the above should surprise people. One of the lessons of military history is that, over prolonged wars, the less effective player tends to come up to the level of the more effective opponent; provided adequate resources are available. This is what happened on the Eastern Front. The Soviets had the resources, and by mid 43 a vast and tragic amount of experience. They put the two together and came up with rational solutions to help them deal with their enemy.

All the best,

Kip.

[Keke]

All of what follows relates to the period end June 43 to end March 45. Importantly, this period includes the heavy Soviet losses at Kursk but, correctly, excludes the round up of Germans during the last two months of the war. The figures are not skewed to the Soviet advantage.

How about excluding `the Cannae of Army Group Center´ (July 1944) from those figures? When calculating tactical-level (or level used in CM) combat effectiveness, the overall loss ratios of certain periods of the war don´t help much. Much more informative are loss ratios from individual, well defined battles.