Relative Parity on the Eastern Front in CMBB

[Dave H]

Originally posted by mrcitizenkane:

One more thing

7 million Germans died total on two fronts

22 million Soviets died total on one front

who had the better what?

Despite all the endless arguments about which nation had better tanks, I think you will find that tanks caused an infinitesimal fraction of these casualties. So I really don't think these figures have any bearing on relative equipment quality. Possibly these figures tell us more about the mindsets of the two governments (Germany and the Soviet Union) at the time.

[Mattias]

Well, MrCK, as much as I agree on the general futility and madness of war, you are now at a forum dedicated to the simulation of WWII combat. The men and the materiel that took part in it, what we know about them and how to produce the most accurate representation possible.

So, please take the "painful truth" out to the General forum and let the search for the best tank of the war continue in here.

Or did you have a point that is relevant to the discussion that you wanted to show by those numbers?

M.

[The Commissar]

Originally posted by mrcitizenkane:

One more thing

7 million Germans died total on two fronts

22 million Soviets died total on one front

who had the better what?

1. Majority of those German losses were inflicted by the Soviets.

2. You seem to have included Soviet civilian casualties as well for some reason. Maybe you're arguing who had the better death camps and execution squads? :confused:

3. I wont even begin to go into all the reasons for the larger proporitonal losses for the Sovs. Read a book, dont assume it's because "Germans had the better tech".

[Keke]

who had the better death camps and execution squads?

That is a interesting question...

[killmore]

Regarding Effectivness of Soviet 76mm.

Picture from Russian Battlefield (http://www.battlefield.ru/) seems to show that 76mm was much worse then US 75mm. It that True?

(Sorry for posting direct link to the picture page but it is rather hard to find)

http://www.battlefield.ru/library/archives/weapons/weapons6.html

If you believe that picture then Soviet 76mm was much worse than British 57mm

[ May 08, 2002, 12:21 AM: Message edited by: killmore ]

[Mattias]

The basic premise that the 76mm mounted on the T34 was generally inferior to the 75mm mounted on the Sherman with regards to armour penetration appears to be supported elsewhere.

It is, again, important to remember that in 1940 when the T34 went into service it was heads and shoulder above the competition in many respects. However, in wartime development moves ahead by leaps and bounds and as the years went by the T34 went from being a battlefield dominant to "just" one medium tank among others.

It was still a revolutionary vehicle but like most revolutionary developments it was eventually overtaken by competing designs.

The Sherman which was standardised in 1941, and today is a favorite object of ridicule for some, was in many ways just as good as the T34, ask the Germans who had to deal with it in the desert. What subsequently brought it down was, later, being exposed to German armour designs that had been shaped by confrontations with the T34.

It's just the flow of time and I bet the T34 76mm crews where just as doubtful about their situation as any Sherman 75 operators in late 1944.

M.

[ May 08, 2002, 05:15 PM: Message edited by: Mattias ]

[Keke]

I hope CMBB will model T-34´s mobility correctly. Its wide tracks allowed it to move with speed on terrain where most german panzers would get stuck.

The other thing I´d like see modelled, is the high tolerance of T-34 to arty fire. Diesel didn´t catch fire easily.

Then again, the metallurgic flaws of the Russian tanks and ammo should be modelled too.

[TSword]

Keke,

Wrong, the germans compared Panther with T-34, PzIV, Tiger, Sherman in regard to acceleration force (Amplitude of vertical oscillation of the chassis) result was that T-34 hull oscillation was so heavy at 25 km/h that the tank could go not any faster, whereas the Panther could go along at 40 km/h (Source: Spielbergers's Panther).

Panther had the best chassis together with Comet, Chaffee tank in respect to smoothness going over heavy terrain.

T-34 may have had superior floatation because of it's low groundpressure, but groundpressure alone gives you absolutely no indication of speed cross-country.

Greets

Daniel

[Keke]

Haven´t heard that before! T-34´s top speed only 25 km/h? In every other war history book I have read mobility and speed of T-34 has been praised, and Panther is said to have many problems with realibility. Are they just myths? :confused:

[ May 08, 2002, 10:28 AM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Renaud]

Mobility does not necessarily imply high top speed. Just looking at the T34 horsepower though, it should be able to haul ass over flat, hard surfaces such as sun-baked/frozen steppes, paved roads or solid ice.

The suspension on the T34 was not tortion bar, right? I think it was a 'Christie' suspension which was really advanced in 1932 or something, but inferior to a modern torsion bar suspension with interleaved bogies. Tiger and panther (and modern tanks such as the Abrams, Leopard and Challenger) all have the superior torsion bar suspensions. I can tell you from personal experience that torsion bar equipped tanks roll over bumps like a cadillac. The T34 crew is going to take a terrible beating if they try to go too fast over rough terrain.

On the other hand, I expect to see the T34 modeled with very low ground pressure (kg/sqaure cm) and a higher horsepower to weight ratio(?) compared to, say, the pzkw IV, so it should be far superior when trying to cross mud and other nastiness...light years ahead of the PzKw III/IV chassis.

regards,

Ren

Edit: Wait I think the Challenger has gas suspension or something...don't remember...too lazy to look at a book.

[ May 08, 2002, 07:32 PM: Message edited by: Renaud ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Keke:

Haven´t heard that before! T-34´s top speed only 25 km/h? In every other war history book I have read mobility and speed of T-34 has been praised, and Panther is said to have many problems with realibility. Are they just myths? :confused:

http://www.battlefield.ru/t34_76_2.html

Good look at intial coparative trials of T-34 vs PIII.

By 1944 Panther Gs were about as reliable as the PIV H/J. T34 was never as reliable as the PIV

[Keke]

On the other hand, I expect to see the T34 modeled with very low ground pressure (kg/sqaure cm) and a higher horsepower to weight ratio(?) compared to, say, the pzkw IV, so it should be far superior when trying to cross mud and other nastiness...light years ahead of the PzKw III/IV chassis.

That is exactly what I had in mind when talking about T-34´s mobility.

T34 was never as reliable as the PIV

From where did you get that information?

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Keke:

[From where did you get that information?

The above pages are a fine starting point. Note how top speeds are lower than the PIII. Note that transmission failures due to improperly heat-treated gear cogs making them unusually brittle and prone to falling off. There is one very big reason that so many parts were accessible to Russian mantanice team because things like engines and transmission had such a high failure rate. Look at the American tests on a hand picked T-34, which died due to an engine failure after being driven 343km. http://www.battlefield.ru/library/archives/stat/stat7.html

The above pages have Russian stats saying max speed for T-34s was 25km offroad as well.

Operational numbers in reports tend to have an equal percentage of PIV and Panthers working when the reports were compiled

Members of this board have discussed all this before.

[ May 08, 2002, 11:34 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]

[Keke]

Bastables, both of these sites offer information about the earliest T-34-models.

For example:

"Americans got the T-34 with a 4-speed gearbox. With a such gearbox, T-34 could use the 4th speed on a firm and even surface - i.e. on roads. Thus, the max speed on the cross-country was 25.6 km/h. On later modifications there was a 5-speed gearbox to be installed. This gearbox allowed to drive with a 30.5 km/h."

And what do you mean by this?

Operational numbers in reports tend to have an equal percentage of PIV and Panthers working when the reports were compiled.

Does this mean that the losses between these two tank models were equal?

[Fionn]

An interesting thread...

Parity will only be achieved when the two commanders have equal experience and skill. As always the victory will go to the better commander ( assuming fair points ratios) irrespective of weapon quality, troop quality, terrain, climate and mission.

In CM:BO it is entirely possible to beat an Elite British Parachute Bn (unsupported by arty or vehicles) with an entirely Conscript force of German Sicherung troops (unsupported by arty or vehicles) when the British paratroopers are attacking with a 1.5 to 1 advantage in points and nice covered terrain. Similarly one can beat a Pershing platoon with a company of infantry and some Panzerschrecken. It all comes down to the experience and skill of the commanders and their ability to deploy their troops and weapons systems in a tactically propitious manner.

In the early war the German tank crews are more likely to co-ordinate their actions well, more robust once in the thick of battle and more likely to hit their opponents. Conversely the Soviets will find it more difficult to get into favourable engagement positions and are less likely to hit even if they DO get into such a position... assuming people are reasonable and crew their Soviet tanks with poor quality crews. On the other hand if they do get a hit then it is likely to be devastating. Which is better? Well, in the hands of an experienced and skillful commander either can be absolutely devastating. They must be handled differently ( a common failing in CM players IMO) and judiciously but either can comfortably secure victory if well-handled against a less experienced and skillful opponent.

As to which tactics will work best. Well, the Germans can afford to be fancy due to their better C3 and troop experience while the Soviets will, IMO, have to rely on a mild variation of mid-30s Soviet doctrine as laid down by Tuchachevsky. Trying to command the Soviets as though they were slow Germans is many, many things (none of which I can say without breaking profanity rules ) but one thing it certainly ISN'T is effective. The Soviets are NOT slow Germans and they can't be treated as such. The Soviet problem wasn't that their doctrine was woeful but that they had butchered all too many of the junior officers who could have implemented that doctrine with the terrible dregs which filled their ranks in the early years. CM players don't need to rely on barely literate ex-tractor drivers as lieutenants and captains, aren't limited by this real-world factor and therefore CM players can apply the Red Army's doctrine much more effectively than it was applied in real life ( with consequent advantages to their battlefield performance).

Those who believe Soviet doctrine was woeful often can be shown to know nothing about it. Often they seem to believe that human wave attacks were the height of Soviet tactical complexity. This is a quite ignorant point of view which simply doesn't jibe with reality. The implementation of Soviet doctrine often was woeful BUT poor implementation doesn't mean that the doctrine itself was wrong. I'm sure that no-one would say that Allied doctrine was fundamentally flawed because some idiot got the idea of telling some Allied soldiers to advance over nice open wheat fields in full view of everything the Germans had in the area towards Hill 112 in Normandy. No, idiots give dumb orders on all sides and cast no reflection on the fundamental soundness, or otherwise, of their professed doctrine in so doing.

Personally I'll say that with Regular troops, a lot of mortars and a little bit of tank support I've found 1936 Soviet doctrine to be virtually unbeatable on the attack in CM. This applies whether I am playing as the Germans, the Americans or even as ordinary British infantry. If you use Regular (or Green) infantry according to Soviet doctrine and don't do anything dumb you can do at least as well as using fancy German tactics.

Commanders and Soviet Comand Capability:

Manstein: Cauldron if you read many of the German generals commentaries you'll find that they almost always seem to be beaten by sheer weight of numbers and outside circumstances. Rarely, if ever, are they beaten because the guy on the other side of the hill was a better tactical/operational/strategic commander than them. Even when playing CM we've all come across the guy who gets annihilated, suffers 3 or 4 times your casualty levels, whose forces auto-surrender on turn 10 and who then bitches about how you just got lucky and really shouldn't have won etc. Well there were just as many self-deluders among the German generals as there are among CM:BO players.

Certainly many German officers were extremely competent but to believe that simply because they say something after the war it is the absolute truth is to be extremely naive. Certain types of humans react badly to being beaten. These people exist now and they existed then and they always try to shift the blame off themselves and onto other things. You might find a reading of the Nuremberg Trial records illuminating. Even when facing certain death sentences only a very small number of the Germans involved exhibited any honour and stood up, admitted what they'd done/allowed to happen and accepted responsibility. The rest were all involved in the "befehl ist befehl" shuffle.

The best German commanders were probably better than the best Soviet commanders but there were many Soviet Army, Front and Strategic Direction commanders ( even if SDs in WW2 were ad hoc organisations which may not have been identified as such a careful perusal of the command hierarchies and staff movements around the times of major offensives will show that by 1942 the Soviets were creating the equivalent of Strategic Directions... each of which commanded 3 to 5 Fronts and co-ordinated their actions in search of a lesser strategic goal) who were superior to many German Korps, Armee and Armee Gruppe commanders. I'm quite sure Rommel wouldn't have had much fun going up against Kirponos, Chuikov, Vasilevsky or Rotminstrov in a multi-corps battle on the Ukranian plains.

Soviets vs Germans...

Also, everyone here seems to be approaching this as though the Eastern Front was decided by tactical battles. This simply isn't so. The Eastern Front was decided by one thing and one thing only. It was decided by the German failure to integrate their operations into a greater, cohesive and fundamentally sound strategic plan for bringing about the destruction of either:

a) the Soviet ability to produce war goods,

the Soviet willingness to wage war or

c) the Soviet front line war machine ( either through losses or loss of morale).

The Soviets had the poorer lower level officers and troops and so were only able to implement very basic tactics and doctrine all the way up to Army level right up until 1944 when useful numbers of experienced and, at least, partially trained staff officers began to become available for the first time. ( Again this is something you can either take on faith or you can do the research yourselves in any books detailed enough to give information regarding the staffs of various HQs from 1942 to 1944.) However the Soviets, in the main, integrated their operations into their overall strategic plan in such a way that there was little wasted effort at the operational or strategic effort. This contrasts markedly with the German wastage in both 1941 and 1942 which cost them any chance they had ever possessed of victory. Tactical inexperience/ineptitude was not decisive in determing whether or not victory was achieved. It merely played the major part in deciding the COST of victory.

oh, BTW, to Soviet thinking tactics stretch all the way up to divisional level. Moving a division from one area to another is a tactical move to them. Only when integrated into a Corps or Army level plan does it become an operational issue. The Germans seemed to have viewed operations as beginning at least 1 and, probably, 2 levels lower than the Soviets did.

So, basically, the Germans never created a cohesive strategic plan and often let themselves get side-tracked from their greater strategic goals in the attempt to achieve noteworthy operational successes. E.g. the containment of pockets with Panzergruppen in 1941, the whole Chir River debacle in 42... set a new standard of excellence in mechanised warfare at the operational level but also meant that strategically the Soviets could achieve their goal of encircling Paulus and his Army at Stalingrad. Because of this failure to single-mindedly concentrate on achieving significant strategic objectives which would have a real impact on the Soviet war machine/psyche they lost any chance they ever had of winning.

Bastables said:

" 20 Aug:926

None of these figures show a catastrophic loss of operational Panzers."

Umm, unless you feel that a reduction from 2300+ operational Panzers in June to 926 just 2 months later ( a loss of 1400 tanks) isn't drastic I think you're wrong. Also don't forget that the Germans lost 1400 tanks PLUS all the newly produced tanks which arrived in July and August. If they got 2/3rd of the monthly production ( roughly 500 tanks out of 800 or so produced each month) that means they lost a FURTHER 1000 tanks in those 2 months.

So, in order to get from 2300 tanks in June to roughly 1000 tanks in August AND accounting for the 1000 new tanks sent to the Eastern Front in that time period we can see that in two months the Germans lost roughly 2400 tanks on the Eastern Front. A figure just slightly OVER their ENTIRE operational strength a couple of days before Zitadelle. If you don't think those are drastic losses then I suggest you never, ever lead men into battle. It'd make World War I look like a picnic .

To address the opening question again:

The decisive factor will always be the commander. Good commanders will win irrespective of equipment, bad commanders will lose. It truly is that simple in the vast majority of cases... With that said common sense will point out that a good commander with a single T-60 facing a kompanie of Koenigstigeren doesn't have a snowballs chance in hell but in anything even remotely close the best commander will win.

As Drizzt says about CM PBEM "Skill is the final arbiter."

[Fionn]

test

[Mattias]

Hello Fionn, nice to have you back in person on the open forum

I assume the reason this thread has taken in interest in the tactical level is because it was aimed at good match ups at the CM scale. Look around and I think you will find more than one post indicating that what was asked by Le Tondu is one thing, what really won the war is another.

M.

[Redwolf]

The Soviets were better on an operational scale. They often brough excessive nmerical superiority into tactical battles, but not because they possesed so much more material. Instead they concentrated better, and concentrated where the Germans didn't expect it. They were better from an intelligence, deception and camouflage standpoint (as they have been throughout the Cold War, BTW), both from knowing where the Germans were and not letting the Germans know what they were up to.

I think this tactical versus operational superiority issue offers a very fine analogy to some complains by CMBO players.

Some CMBO are utterly disturbed by the stupid TacAI, and my opinion is they think on a much too low tactical level. They try to win small subegagements inside a CMBO battle by more skillful moving of single units, micromanaging, like this clash or two or four tanks, or this infantry sweep through some woods, or this artillery strike. But this is not robust against even slight amounts of bad luck, including TacAI screwups.

If you view the CMBO battlefield from a more distant view and consider the forces as a whole, and play battles of 2000 points and above, CMBO playing become much less dependent on luck and TacAI screwups. Of course, it won't hurt to still position every single unit in the optimal place, and know they exact effects of each CMBO command.

[Keke]

However the Soviets, in the main, integrated their operations into their overall strategic plan in such a way that there was little wasted effort at the operational or strategic effort. This contrasts markedly with the German wastage in both 1941 and 1942 which cost them any chance they had ever possessed of victory.

The Soviets were better on an operational scale. They often brough excessive nmerical superiority into tactical battles, but not because they possesed so much more material. Instead they concentrated better, and concentrated where the Germans didn't expect it. They were better from an intelligence, deception and camouflage standpoint (as they have been throughout the Cold War, BTW), both from knowing where the Germans were and not letting the Germans know what they were up to.

I´ll answer these views with the words of David M. Glantz:

The manner in which Operation Mars was fought and the carnage the operation produced has few parallels in the later war years. In its grisly form, its closest peer was the famous Soviet frontal assault on the Zeelow Heights during the April 1945 Berlin operation. Not coincidentally, it too was orchestrated by Zhukov. Unlike the case in 1942, however, the victorious conclusion of the Berlin operation required no alteration of the historical record to preserve Soviet pride or commanders' reputations.

The legacy of Operation mars was silence. Stalin and history mandated that Vasilevsky's feat at Stalingrad remained unblemished by the Rzhev failure.

...

Soviet military history ignored other notable Soviet defeats during the later war years. Among those notable operations, which, like mars, endured obscurity and silence, were the failed Soviet Central Front offensive of February-March 1943 in the region west of Kursk, the abortive Soviet Belorussian offensive of fall 1943, and futile Soviet attempts to invade Rumania in May 1944 and East Prussia in fall 1944. This silence was possible because each of these defeats occurred at the end of a major Soviet strategic advance, when victorious context masked the failure to vanquished Germans and history alike and shrouded the events in a cloak of anonymity, which has endured for more than fifty years. That cloak is finally being lifted.

[Fionn]

Mattias,

Agreed. I definitely strayed from sticking rigidly to the original question but I felt some interesting points had been meandered into.

Keke,

To discount a general point because you can point to a specific instance in which it didn't hold true ( during a time frame in which I have previously specifically stated Soviet staff work was very poor) is to make a serious mistake. If I stated that the Tiger was an absolutely useless tank because the first six committed to action in Russia got easily taken out when used in extremely unsuitable terrain I'd be guilty of the exact same improper generalisation as you appear to have indulged in.

Perhaps you might like to write an article outlining how the various minor operations ( of which there were at least 5 IIRC) during Bagration were NOT integrated in time and space in order to further a greater strategic goal during the summer of 1944? Of course you wouldn't because everyone understands that the Soviets planning for that strategic offensive comprised several separate but inter-linked operational offensives each of which was related to the others in both space and time AND end-objectives in such a way as to create the conditions necessary for the success of the following operational offensives.

No-one would say that Operation Mars was a high point in Soviet operational art but, then again, I believe the fact that it occured early in the war and I stated " The Soviets had the poorer lower level officers and troops and so were only able to implement very basic tactics and doctrine all the way up to Army level right up until 1944 when useful numbers of experienced and, at least, partially trained staff officers began to become available for the first time. " is sufficient to show that any comments regarding Soviet operational doctrine being effective applied only to time periods when the staff officers existed to actually deal with the logistics and planning necessary for such operations. I think any unbiased reading of what I and others who are tacking this view have written would make it clear no-one is holding up the 1941 Soviet Army as some sort of brilliant force. All people are saying is that the underlying doctrine was good and when they got the experienced officers to actually apply it things, generally, worked very well. Even the "all-conquering German Army" of myth had its failures, even during the early days which most people fail to mention.

Seriously, you seem to have read your Glantz etc. I'm surprised you don't seem to be au fait with the change which occured in late 42 to late 43 as war-experienced staff officers became available and the effects that had on Soviet capabilities ( particularly staff capabilities at the operational level).

And finally... Failure is not always the best measure of a doctrine's utility. In the end the Germans lost the Second World War but I don't see anyone here arguing that because they took on most of the rest of the world and lost that makes their doctrine poor and their soldiers poor. That a Soviet offensive which started in the Ukraine didn't simply steamroller right through to the borders of Germany isn't exactly a surprise. To expect it to be able to roll westwards at a fast pace whilst outdistancing the rebuilding of railroads and thus receiving less and less resupply is to ignore the fact that logistics is the ball and chain of mechanised warfare.

Offensives HAVE to run out of steam sooner or later for purely logistical reasons ( e.g. German advance into Russia 41, Western Allied advance through France 1944, Soviet 1944 summer offensive). Many people mistake a military rebuff at the end of a 500 mile advance as being a sign of the failure of an offensive. Instead it is simply a sign that the truism that an offensive's power is inversely proportional to the distance it has travelled is holding true. If you meet a Tank Army after it has advanced 50 km it will be able to bring much more combat power to bear than it will if you only meet it after it has advanced 250km ( breakdowns etc sap a unit). A force which could not stop it after 50kms may be able to stop it cold after it travels 250km.

As Drizzt said "ALL attacks stop somewhere even in the absence of opposition." It may be a really simple statement but that doesn't stop it being something very true and something we can all forget about when looking for really complicated answers about force structure etc. At a certain stage a unit simply can't bring up enough fuel from its distant railheads to contine to advance and therefore it must halt, even if there isn't an enemy soldier within 100 km.

[ May 09, 2002, 02:18 PM: Message edited by: Fionn ]

[Keke]

Did I touch a nerve or something? :eek:

All I wanted to point out is that the Soviets made major operative mistakes too. And if you read the Glanz´s quote more carefully, you´ll find that not all of these failures happened before the summer of 1944 and were all not in a situation were the steam of the strategic offensive ran out, so to speak.

I´d like to add that the 4th strategic offensive of the Soviet Union (Bagration was the 5th) was almost a total failure. It didn´t reach Helsinki as was planned but was repulsed in Karelian Isthmus by the Finnish army. Defensive doctrine used there was almost a textbook adaption of German doctrine of defending against overwhelming odds. Unfortunately for Germans, they didn´t apply the doctrine (fe 100km of fighting withdrawal before the main defensive line) themselves when operation Bagration began. German High Command had other thoughts about effective defending...

[Skipper]

Kursk / Prokhorovka

1. I don't have the german TOE at Prokhorovka on 12 July. So, if there were no Pz-Vs, well, fair enough. There were quite a few in the 4th Army, afaik.

2. The difference between the CM meeting engagement and what was going on at Prokhorovka was quite profound - in CM you only need to get to the middle of the map to win.

3. Can anyone explain how does a number of 2700 tanks at Kursk Salient on 5 July fits with the number of 2400 operational tanks on 30 June? What makes up for a difference, StuGs or the tanks that were not operational on 30th, but were on 5th?

4. 800 is the paper TOE for Vatutin's army. The actual force engaged at Prokhorovka initially consisted of about 600.

Losses

> 7 million Germans died total on two fronts

> 22 million Soviets died total on one front

> who had the better what?

1. RKKA had ~12 million irreversible losses.

Out of these 12 million, 4.5 million were POWs. Almost 50% happened in the first 12 months of war.

2. German armed forces had almost 8 million irreversible losses, including 3 million POWs. That is, if we are not counting another 4 million who were taken POWs at capitulation.

3. 34.5 million soviet people and 21 million german people went through military service during 1941-1945.

4. If you include axis minors and western allies into the picture, the overall ratios would be not changed much, very roughly speaking.

[Keke]

800 is the paper TOE for Vatutin's army. The actual force engaged at Prokhorovka initially consisted of about 600.

As Zetterling stated in his analysis:

"Depending on how one prefers to define the battle at Prokhorovka, it involved from 294 German (II SS-Panzer Corps) and 616 Soviet AFV (those engaging II SS-Panzer Corps) up to a maximum of 429 German and 870 Soviet AFV."

[Fionn]

Keke,

No, no nerve. OTOH when all you reply with is an emoticon it is kinda hard for the other guy to figure out just where you may be coming from. A single "eyes up into the air in exasperation" emoticon is the "oh gees, what a loser viewpoint" emoticon so I replied to it in that vein. If you had accompanied it with even a sentence of explanation I wouldn't have had to guess at your meaning quite so much.

Now you seem to say that's not what you meant. That's cool but watch out for emoticons. The net is a very, very tricky place and you can easily be misunderstood ( as I've found to my cost).

So, if all you are trying to say is that Soviet doctrine etc didn't always work even when they had some competent guys to plan it all out etc then I'd agree 100%. Same thing happened/happens in all armies. Doesn't speak to the basic soundness of the doctrine in any way IMO. And that's what I was getting at. I don't see anything in those Glantz quotes ( or anywhere in his books) which contradicts the fundamental soundness of that point.

And, of course, my particular bias in this discussion ( and it is a pretty well known one on this forum IMO) is that I largely adhere to Soviet tactical and operational doctrine ( with some success) and find it disquieting to consistently hear people who don't even know what okhvat is decrying Soviet tactics. Surely they should know, at least, the basics before deriding something?

[ May 09, 2002, 06:17 PM: Message edited by: Fionn ]

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Keke:

Bastables, both of these sites offer information about the earliest T-34-models.

For example:

"Americans got the T-34 with a 4-speed gearbox. With a such gearbox, T-34 could use the 4th speed on a firm and even surface - i.e. on roads. Thus, the max speed on the cross-country was 25.6 km/h. On later modifications there was a 5-speed gearbox to be installed. This gearbox allowed to drive with a 30.5 km/h."

And what do you mean by this?

[Does this mean that the losses between these two tank models were equal?

You're assuming that Russian quality control went up after 1942. It should be noted that the troublesome air filters of the 42 model tested by the Americans was not replaced/redesigned until the T-34-85.

http://www.battlefield.ru/specific.html

Again the Russians 25km speed off road agree with the German comparative tests between the Panther and contemporises.

Considering the larger number of PIV assigned to Panzer grenadier Div and the preference of leading the attacks with Panthers coupled with the preference with shipping Panthers to the West, no.

Skipper

4th July 1943

AG Centre 747 (Tanks and StuGs)

AG South 1508 (Panzers and StuGs)

[ May 09, 2002, 06:24 PM: Message edited by: Bastables ]