Proposed Cover-based MG firepower modifier

[MajorBooBoo]

These discussions about tests make me wonder if the following would be a way of "booting" up WWII firepower. By booting up, I mean bringing it up through the ages.

Could testing be done first with just rifle armed troops? This would allow a base that other layers of forepower can be built on? Once the rifle models out well (meets a certain design specification for effectiveness, etc), layer on different small arms and then finally MGs of different types? Sort of a Law of Partial Pressures approach. It is difficult to say if MGs are modeled well if there is the prescence of other weapon types in the same test.

These tests, of course, require many runs to be of any use and would take alot of time.

[Battlefront.com]

Jason,

Thank you for your valuable feedback. As usual it was productive and highly instructive, as well as being polite and respectful. It makes me want to spend more of my valuable time doing things for you.

Steve

P.S. I don't think you would last long as an officer in a war. Tough to survive long when you have to watch your back as much as your front...

[JasonC]

Why thank you Steve, that was quite kind. I am glad some of it managed to help.

[CMplayer]

Steve,

While you're in such a good mood can you teach guns to lead moving soft targets...thx!

[Desertor]

The fellow who didn't like the 4 HMGs is still thinking western Europe.

He has a name Jason, how is possible to be so impolite? You have only place in your mind for a thing a time?, please, think at the critics you get. Beeing as you are can be only if you are a old soldier out of service because you were a maniac.

It is a nice game this one, even if it is not perfect, I love it even if the grazing effect of the guns is not "that real", take it easy man, still better, take a vacation...

[Battlefront.com]

The fellow who didn't like my setup obviously is in serious need of improved education about these matters since his setup was no more realistic than mine was. Is it any more realistic to have 4 HMGs defending a large zone all on their own against an enemy infantry force which is also, oddly enough, attacking without any supporting arms? I think not. So while this fellow wishes to think he is "all that", I think he is "all wet" since his scenario is about as divorced from reality as any.

For giggles I redid my test having the German HMGs engage the more widely spaced out Soviet advancing forces at about 250-300m instead of 100m. As expected, the Soviet attack was seriously disrupted and sent to ground or back to cover. Also as expected, this allowed the Soviets better chance to recover and regroup, which is why I had previously told all the Germans to hold their fire until 100m where advantages of firepower and terrain were maximized.

As a result of opening up earlier, intitially the Germans fared pretty well. The MG gunners managed to score quite a number of kills as well as messing up the attack. But the Soviets were able to regroup a bit better than the last time. One Platoon crawled through the wheatfields while one provided cover and a portion of the other flanked right. Several squads were out of commission at this time.

The crawling Platoon reached the edge of the wheatfield and the German Squads opened up. One of the Soviet Squads had flanked far left and managed to take out the HMG there before getting nearly wiped out by covering fire from one of the German Squads. Meanwhile another Soviet Platoon Assaulted from the right flank. This took out the other HMG in hand to hand fighting.

And that is where the Soviet assault petered out. The central Platoon was running low on ammo at the same time it was getting hammered by the German Squads' fire. The Assault platoon on the right was beaten back with heavy losses after getting within grenade range.

I stopped the game there because it was clear the Soviets lost, even though they had not extricated themselves. If the battle had continued for a few turns I think the end results would have been just about the same as before. 50% casualties or higher for the Soviets, but with positions far closer to the German MRL than before. The Germans, on the other hand, suffered a few more casualties this time than last, but still lost the bulk from its two HMG teams.

Conclusion? None of this makes any difference. I would have to run dozens of different "tests" dozens of times to yield results that could not be picked apart by some fellow or another. Even if I ran the previously mentioned fellow's test verbatium, it still wouldn't mean jack squat.

Artificial tests like this can only show a trend at best. In this case it shows that coordinated, interlocking small arms defenses are far more difficult to overcome with only small arms on the attack. That seems to be pretty realistic to me, and is probably why "combined arms" tactics were evolved and utilized with such frequency on the battlefields of WWII.

Steve

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

which is why I had previously told all the Germans to hold their fire until 100m (emphasis added)where advantages of firepower and terrain were maximized.

Steve

We can do that in CMBB? COOL!

[Battlefront.com]

Yes, by laying down the Covered Arc out to the desired range. in my case, I had all three squads plot partially overlapping arcs out about 100m from their position. This means that they will not fire until a unit comes within its arc. Of course, this is partially dependent upon Experience.

As a reminder, Covered Arc replaces the current Ambush system.

Steve

[pilgrim]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Jason,

Thank you for your valuable feedback. As usual it was productive and highly instructive, as well as being polite and respectful. It makes me want to spend more of my valuable time doing things for you.

Steve

....and....

Originally posted by JasonC:

Why thank you Steve, that was quite kind. I am glad some of it managed to help.

:eek:

Whoa. Whoever took the real Steve and JasonC, could you please return them to the forum?

Thanks.

Editted because I'm a formatting dunce.

[ February 06, 2002, 05:07 PM: Message edited by: pilgrim ]

[Charlie Rock]

Okay, here is my test:

Terrain:

November 1944

Daylight, bright sunny day.

small map

flat

minimum trees

rural

(Minimum cover I could come up with)

Attacker:

Americans of varying quality

12 rifle squads

4 rifle platoon leaders

1 company commander

Running like heck

minimum 300 meters to get to the enemy line

approx 150 meters in width from flank to flank

Defender:

4 crew served weapons

2 platoon leaders

dug in

100 meters width

Iteration 1:

4 German 20mm AA guns

370 meters distance.

Result:

Regular Americans overran Germans in three turns, 16 US KIA

Iteration 2:

4 37mm guns

370 meters distance

Veteran Americans overran Germans in three turns, 11 KIA

Iteration 3:

4 quad 20mms

350 meters distance

Green american attack repelled.

Iteration 4:

4 quad 20mms

300 meters

Regular americans overran Germans in four turns, 17 US KIA

Iteration 5:

4 FLAK 88mms

388 meters

Regular American attack repelled

Iteration 6:

4 FLAK 88mms

310 meters

Crack Americans overran Germans in three turns.

84 casualties

Iteration 7:

4 MG 42 HMGs

Regular Americans overran Germans in 4 turns

35 US casualties, 8 US KIA

Conclusion:

Using 4 crew served weapons vs. a rifle company at the full charge is an irrelevent test. Regardless of firepower,this would make me conclude a regular infantry company can overrun ANY automatic weapon platoon, regardless of their firepower. Intuitively, iterations 2,4,6 don't pass the "Common sense test"

[ February 06, 2002, 10:28 PM: Message edited by: Charlie Rock ]

[Battlefront.com]

Charlie,

Not sure what you were trying to show, but interesting results none-the-less.

I'd agree that Tests 2 and 4 don't "pass the test", which is most probably the result of CMBO's overly generous cover rating for guys Running. I am confident that an entirely different end result would come from CMBB.

Test 6 I actually don't see a problem with. The 88 was offensively devistating, but defensively weak as a wet noodle. The Company's 60mm mortars could have silenced them without taking a single casualty for example. And this brings up one of the big problems with "tests":

In CM's editor you can set up practically any situation you want, no matter how unlikely it was to have appeared in real battle. That right there pretty much ensures that some tests are going to be rather impossible to evaluate because there is no real life situation that can be compared to. I'd say that the 88 infantry charge is one such test.

The other problem is that the tester inherently enters his own bias into the test by the way he positions the units, orders them to move, and in the Big Picture what those troops are trying to achieve. With the 88 scenario, if a real commander were put into the virtual battlefield he most likely would not try a suicide frontal charge. Instead he would likely try knocking the guns out first, perhaps while at the same time trying to blindside them with a flank or double envelope manuever.

My point about your tests, and ALL tests (including mine), is that they have to be taken with a pinch of salt in some cases, a truckload of salt in others This is why I more or less sided with your scenario setup vs. Jason's. Although I don't think what I wound up doing was terribly realistic, it was more so than what Jason suggested.

And my test did at least establish one thing. And that is there is a rather huge difference between CMBO and CMBB in such a situation. Bum's rushes in CMBO are a common tactic from what I understand, and the work too frequently from what I am told. Well... I don't think the defender will complain much after playing a few rounds of CMBB against these same players

Steve

[MajorBooBoo]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

In CM's editor you can set up practically any situation you want, no matter how unlikely it was to have appeared in real battle. That right there pretty much ensures that some tests are going to be rather impossible to evaluate because there is no real life situation that can be compared to. I'd say that the 88 infantry charge is one such test.

With the 88 scenario, if a real commander were put into the virtual battlefield he most likely would not try a suicide frontal charge. Instead he would likely try knocking the guns out first, perhaps while at the same time trying to blindside them with a flank or double envelope manuever.

Steve

A good book is the Burgett "Arnhem" accounts. His company, in fact, bum rushes a platoon of 88s without german infantry support! So it just goes to show that unlikely tests could happen!

The outcome was pretty bad for the airborne company also. The 88s were blasting the US guys at close range and had to be over run. Burgett describes how he ran strait at them because he wanted to get closer before they fired again. the 88s were effecting airbursts and it was clobbering the US guys. How the airbursts were made (trees, fuzes) was not that clear. I forget the actual losses but it was like 30 percent. This was at a fairly close range too. I doubt that many of the US guys would have made it from further back.

[Battlefront.com]

MajorBooBoo,

Well... I figured SOMEONE probably did this, but I didn't expect an example to turn up so quickly

OK, so it sounds like #5 and #6 that Charlie Rock played out in CM happened at least once in real life. And from the sounds of it, the results were similar between game and real life too. In your historical example it sounds like the attackers started out much closer than in Charlie's, which should make a major difference as would any range/time shift in favor of the defender. Interesting stuff.

One thing that gamers need to keep in mind is that 30% is a rather brutal way to win a single position. As the old saying goes "if we keep winning battles like this, we will likely lose the war"

Steve

[ February 07, 2002, 01:02 AM: Message edited by: Big Time Software ]

[Charlie Rock]

Agreed.

My original point was that a "test" with four machine guns vs. a rifle company was an invalid way to argue that machine guns were undermodeled.

I prefered the rifle platoon/MG mix, myself.

If one was to take the 4 MG/rifle co. test as a valid experiment, (and I don't), than I would say that if you increased the firepower of the MGs to the point where the attack stopped, you would then be at a better "model".

With the somewhat unrealistic results you could draw one of three conclusions:

a) MGs need to be given more firepower until they have greater firepower than 37mms and quad 20mms currently have.

Testing four automatic weapons vice a rifle co is not a valid test in the first place, as it is so skewed in favor of the attacker no reasonable conclusion could be drawn.

c) This was a perfectly accurate test as it illustrates that in November 1944 it was impossible to stop a dismounted rifle company with four crew served automatic weapons, given no cover for the attacker. (Historically inaccurate conclusion).

c) might be a reasonable conclusion, say in the French Army of 1913.

I like B.

[MajorBooBoo]

Burgetts guys had just landed and were forming up in a woods. The main issue, I believe, is that the 88s SPOTTED the airborne guys firsts. So the troopers were thrown into confusion and went down where they were. The 88s were blasting the trees and the troopers were losing key people. Finally the remaining NCOs formed everyone up (under fire, only elite/crack should be able to do this!) and hurled everyone at the guns. If the germans had just a couple of LMGs, they probably could have slaughtered the troopers as they ran at the 88s (which were just firing like madmen).

It is mentioned several times that airborne believed in running at the enemy in battle. This is because, in their intended role, they would normally have the element of surprise and be attacking rear area elements. As the troopers were more often used in front line type battles as the war dragged on, they paid for these tactics.

I can also supply cases of airborne guys also rushing quad 20s! I believe it is in A Bridge Too Far. It wasnt pretty either as the guns were in towers with sandbags. The troopers finally got underneath the guns (who couldnt fire back) and hit them with bazookas.

[Battlefront.com]

Airborne tactics were quite similar to counter-ambush tactics. The concept is to hit the enemy hard and fast when at a disadvantage. The reasoning is that when the odds are stacked against you that "shock" can be the equalizer. At the same time, sitting still and getting hammered is not the best countermeasure.

The above is especially true for paras since they are assuming themselves to be surrounded (at least after the initial drop) and locked into fighting with whatever weapons they have at that very moment. This means certain options open to normal frontline troops should be assumed unavailable.

The downside of this type of tactic is that when it fails, if fails miserably. As you said, if just a few German LMG/HMGs had been holding their fire until the paras came out in the open... slaughter.

Interestingly enough, this was standard doctrine for Soviet troops throughout the war. Their concept was to get in close and litterally beat the enemy to death and therefore acheive a decisive victory in one fell swoop. Obviously this didn't always work out for the best but it did often enough to result in some spectactular victories.

Steve

[MajorBooBoo]

http://users.skynet.be/bulgecriba/hankel.html

Heres a good account of MGs using Final Protective fires..for what its worth.

[Desertor]

And that is there is a

rather huge difference between CMBO and CMBB in such a situation.

Hi Steve I would like to know the difference. For CMBO I did give you my credit card number, for CMBB i would add a big PLEASE to convince you, do you need another beta tester ? Come on man, sell us your new toy

[Battlefront.com]

Desertor,

The best way to see the difference is to read the account on the previous page. Try setting up a similar situation in CMBO, or think about examples in games you have played, and you will see the difference.

As for Beta Testers... we have too many already, not to mention the hundreds that are waiting in the wings

Steve

[JasonC]

This seems to be an inordinately difficult concept to grasp, so I will try to be clear.

Combined arms fighting involves multiple roles for multiple types of arms, each with different capabilities and different countermeasures. An ideal strategy game shows the role of each type of arm, and thus allows players to see real relationships between them. They duel with move and counter in the "paper-scissors-rock" set up by differing unit capabilities. This is the attraction of tactical and grand tactical wargames, from a strategy game point of view. It is the complexity of combined arms - whether in Napoleonic grand tactics, or WW II / modern tactics, that is the attraction in the first place. I expect this is completely uncontroversial.

One of the first principles of testing anything is to isolate the dependent variable one is attempting to learn something about. You would not test infantry overrun behavior by subjecting the attackers to a 155mm howitzer barrage in mid charge, because it would tell you only that heavy artillery is nasty - without telling you anything about infantry overrun behavior - which by hypothesis was the dependent variable you wanted to know something about. That many charges were historically broken up by artillery fire would not matter to this one iota.

Everyone agrees that squad infantry to squad infantry combat interactions are well covered by CM. A few concerns existed about run and overrun behavior, and CM has made changes to address that issue. Everybody knows by now that that problem is fixed. Great. But it is not the only issue with MGs. The issue with MGs was not and is not limited to infantry overruns. The question is whether they fufill their roles in the combine arm paper-scissors-rock relationships. And in particular, whether the historical ability of MGs to suppress ordinary infantry at range in open ground is simulated properly or not.

Notice, it is entirely possible for a game to *not* simulate MG suppression of infantry in open ground at range, but to accurately simulate the power of defending, stationary squad infantry in foxholes, against infantry attackers trying to charge them over open ground. The two issues have almost nothing to do with one another logically. In tactical terms, they are entirely different paper-scissors relationships.

A test that shows that squad infantry in foxholes defeats 100m bum-rushes by infantry over open ground, does not say anything at all about the ability of MGs to suppress infantry in the open at range. Putting both factors into the same test, therefore, simply fails to isolate the dependent variable. The result of the test tells you (accurately) the answer to a different question than the one that was asked. This has nothing to do with whether squad infantry was often bum-rushed over 100m of open ground, any more than it depends on whether many infantry attacks were broken up by heavy artillery fire.

The only way to test whether MGs suppress infantry at range in open ground, is to test that and that only. If they do, then that part of their role in combined arms relationships will be accurately reflected by the game. Players will use that as one tool in their toolbox. If, on the other hand, they don't, then players will have to use other tools, and may be unable to accomplish some ends entirely. The role and importance of other arms - as counters to MGs, for example - is also altered.

If, for example, MGs do not suppress infantry in open ground, but infantry in foxholes does hold ground against direct charges, then people will try to hold open ground areas not by using MGs to prevent approach over them, but by stationing infantry directly on them. If they can, in terms of forces available, etc. But this will completely change the combined arms dynamics set up.

Now for Russia, especially the defensive phases in the long combats in the south, in quite open country and often with low force-to-space ratios, this matters more than it has before, as I will try to explain. The defensive power of MGs over open ground set off the main tactical dynamic in that fighting.

The Germans did not have enough infantry to hold a continuous front. This means concretely, if they had spread their infantry, the Russians could have rushed them with more concentrated masses at the points they chose, and broken throuhg. The Germans therefore used a system of seperated strongpoints, each deployed tightly enough to prevent such overruns.

The Russians could have walked right between these strongpoints, bypassing them. But the Germans had a counter that counter. The strongpoints were tenanted with infantry heavy weapons, and some light cannon, and with FOs. HMGs, 81mm mortars, light artillery direct, and on-call field artillery, covered the areas between the strongpoints. The smaller strongpoints in the thinner sectors had to make do with the HMGs almost alone.

Interlocking HMG fire lanes in the open ground around their strongpoints (often situated in the only cover in the area, e.g. a village) could and did deny passage to much larger Russian infantry units. The Russians therefore had to reduce some of the strongpoints in order to move through the defense.

The HMGs then had a powerful effect on that portion of things as well. The infantry squad vs. infantry squad duels others are simulating, did not come about, unless first the Russians managed to close to rifle range. They started kilometers away, and had to walk through the entire range envelope of the defending heavy weapons.

They had enough infantry numbers, that had it just been a matter of infantry on infantry, even with the Germans dug in and tightly deployed, they would have won these combats easily. They would have taken higher losses due to being in the open. But for the limited defenders of a few strongpoints, they could afford to lose several times their number eliminating them.

They did not need to crack every strongpoint. A few would give them entry through the defensive zone. The Germans in adjacent strongpoints would then either have to withdraw - difficult in the open, with superior numbers of attackers about to chase them - or remain isolated and screened behind Russian lines, hoping a local counterattack would relieve them. If the Russians lost 3 or 5 to 1 (from the cover difference) taking out n strongpoints, they could count on 2n-3n Germans becoming combat ineffective as a result, due to the after effects of the local break-in.

But they were not able to crack the strongpoints by moving to rifle range and simply trading their men for the Germans at the cover differential ratio. Because the heavy weapons would not let them get that close. Either at all, or in enough strength to outshoot the Germans inside the strongpoint. Therefore, they could only get close enough to even try the "infantry exchange" approach, if they first suppressed the heavy weapons.

To suppress the heavy weapons, the easiest tool available - the most widespread and responsive - was to use the infantry formation mortars. Artillery coordination was comparatively hard - though a light (76mm) artillery battery in direct fire was a common substitute. If the Germans were not heavily dug in, this could work. So, the combined arms "chain" to that point was as follows -

More infantry on wide space forces strongpoints.

Strongpoints are defeated by bypassing.

Bypassing is defeated by heavy weapons fire plans.

Strongpoints with heavy weapons are defeated by superior numbers of infantry combined with light artillery or mortar support.

Then, however, there is still another counter. Digging in sufficiently, with bunkers rather than just sandbagged MG positions, adequately protects the heavy weapons from light artillery (76mm, 82mm and 120mm mortars). This requires only *time* to prepare the position sufficiently.

Therefore, *if* the front is *stable* for a reasonably long period of time, Russian infantry with its common support weapons cannot get through a strongpoint defense. If the front is rapidly moving, limiting time to improve positions, the Russian infantry can chew through the defenses the German infantry can offer.

Next, there is another step up the chain. There is a counter to HMG bunkers, light mortars, and a few light guns. Tanks, heavy enough ones to toss effective HE (45mm is not enough there), and heavy enough to withstand 20mm FLAK and 75mm infantry gun replies. These can roll close enough to target each heavy weapon position with direct fire. The tanks having eliminated or suppressed the heavy weapons, the infantry can then get through the extended range envelope to assault the strongpoint - or bypass it altogether if the heavy weapons have been completely eliminated.

Therefore, the situation becomes - where the line is stable, the Russians can break through German infantry defenses if and only if they bring tanks. If the front is moving, they can break through German infantry defenses with infantry and its support weapons alone.

To counter the tanks, the Germans need either numerous effective heavy PAK and FLAK (which tend to be attrited in the process, being hit by artillery in the strongpoints), or more effectively, they need mobile "linebackers" in the form of divisional Panzerjaeger battalions with SP guns, StuG brigades, or Panzer division kampgruppen.

That whole dynamic depends on heavy weapons being deadly in open ground, to the point of small outposts with half a dozen such weapons, being able to disrupt companies and indeed entire infantry battalions, trying to close through their whole range envelope, or to bypass between two such positions, a km apart.

If the heavy weapons cannot do that, then virtually all the reasons for the combined arms symphony that was actually played, evaporate. The Russians just walk between the strongpoints. They don't need to assault them at all.

Now, notice that this is not the same issue as infantry overrun behavior. What HMGs and such should be able to do, is pin an attacking formation before it closes to rifle range. They don't have to wipe it out (although that did happen, on more than one occasion). They should be able to do this whether the infantry is trying to bypass the strongpoint they are in, or to assault it. And *before* the Russians get close enough for their replies to decimate the ordinary squad infantry defenders. (In practice, this means 100-150 yards out).

Notice also, that the Russians need not be attempting a bum-rush. I have already explained the proper way to conduct such an infantry attack - moving to rifle range, shooting to suppress, fire ascendency to take ground. The fact that bum-rushes work too well in CMBO - corrected for CMBB - does not mean that in CMBB, everyone who attacks will attempt such a bum-rush to close combat distance. I sure won't.

Now, there are problem simulating such attacks accurately in CMBO, because of things like run behavior. But it is still possible to get closer to the reality, instead of just repeatedly testing the only thing we know is already fixed.

One fellow reported a single such test with 4 MGs, which he deployed tightly, and bum-rushed with 4 platoons of Americans at the run, tightly deployed. (From only 300 yards, however). They lost 36 men and took the position - obviously innaccurate historically. But also irrelevant, because fixed - final protective fire hot-gun behavior and changes to "run" have been added, and the results of similar tests have been reported, and such simplistic bum rushes no longer work.

I did the following test instead. 2 groups of Germans 350 yards apart in 100 yard clumps of scattered trees. Each group at 2 HMGs and 1 HQ (one a company, the other a platoon HQ). All HQ bonus +1 max. Dug in.

650 yards away, 1 company of British standard infantry, minus their mortars and PIATs. (I used them because they are rifle-based with 1 clip-fed LMG per squad, much like Russian small arms). Platoon with 3 squads, company HQ with 2, platoon with 2, platoon with 2. On line, 400 yards long.

The Brits group move for locations about 150m from the scattered trees. The Germans hold their fire until 500m, then open up. To deal with run behavior, I halted units that accelerated the next turn, or gave them multiple pauses to let the others and the HQs catch up. The Brits keep moving forward to rifle range, fire from rifle range, creep down to 100 yards by bounds as others just fire.

Once at 100 yards, they fire until German replies slacken somewhat, then rush the nearest MGs with 14-18 men each. Note that by this time, the British company has effectively split in two, with two platoons (counting the company HQ force) going after each MG position. The left force with 5 squads and the company HQ naturally does better than the right one, with 4 squads. No bum-rushing, not even much in the way of local odds.

So what happens, as things are now? The ranges went 500 start, then 300-400, 225-280, 150-250, 125-185, 100-150, 100-125, 100, 0-100, 0-100. The range is from the closest to farthest units. The British losses per minute of the fight go 7, 14, 22, 27, 32, 36, 38, 47, 61. The uptick in the last two minutes reflects the closing rushes, probably delivered a minute or two early.

The attack succeeded, though at high cost. The first German was hit in the 3rd minute; by the 7th, 8 MG gunners were down and 2 MGs were suppressed, with essentially the entire remaining British force on-line and firing at 100 yards. That set up the rush, with a platoon remainder on each side covering by fire as the other rushed the most suppressed MG on that side.

The losses the British took had a close relationship with total firepower they had received, down to the point where they began suppressing the MGs seriously. The first 6 minutes of fire all saw the losses the Brits took running at about 1 men hit per 200-300 fp thrown by the MGs (adjusted for % exposure - about 68%).

What would have happened if MG grazing fire bonuses were used? Assume the smaller option is chosen, without the leading "2" factor. Then men in open ground fired at from the front would take 1.5x the fp. The HMGs did get some crossing fire, especially before the Brits were on-line and shooting (since at that point, the MGs turned to face the nearest attackers). The crossfire opportunities were highest at around minute 3, about 200 yards range (some 150, some 250).

The losses would probably have run 1.5 times as much until the 3rd minute, 2x there, then back to 1.5 times. Once the British replies become important, however, obviously no comparison is possible, since a more damaged force would have delivered less firepower at the Germans. So just look at the approach portion.

The Brits would have lost more like 21 men in the first 2 minutes, about what they actually lost in 3; and about 37 men hit by the end of the 3rd minute, about what they lost in the first 6-7 in my test. At the 2-3 minute mark, the Brits were near their peak suppression in the whole approach, too. They had 14 men in red and 44 in yellow morale states after minute 2, 13 and 33 in those states after minute 3.

Being hit 1.5 times harder and with half the time to rally, it is very likely the attack would have been stopped around 250 meters, with the lead units perhaps making it to 200. 1/3 of the attackers would have been hit, about 1/3 would have been broken. The remaining effectives would only match the numbers of the defenders, with less firepower at the medium range they would have reached. And the cover differential would still be there. Notice, also, that such a result would happen before the MGs lost more than a single man.

Instead of a deliberate attack against dug in MGs being expensive but possible, it would have failed utterly with serious losses. Just getting men back out of the killing field would have been nearly impossible, once they were reduced enough to be unable to suppress the MGs. Very likely the whole thing would fail with 50% losses. And because that would be the result, it would rarely even be attempted.

To attack such a position would not be a matter of course, as some seem to think. No, a company should not generally be able to attack 4 crew served weapons over completely open ground without supporting firepower, and succeed. That is why supporting firepower is needed. A company conducting such an attack should *need* mortars or artillery or tanks blasting the HMGs, to have any chance of closing to rifle range, anything like infact.

In my test, at the 4th minute the Brits were begining to rally, as they reached rifle range and began to put fire on the Germans. They had lost 1 Bren gun, 3 Stens, 22 Enfields and 1 Pistol. No one was broken (the front units were the ones broken, then they halted and thus lagged, the good order ones passed them, German fire shifted, the broken men rallied), only 17 were in yellow morale states. The range was down to 125-185 yards, roughly centered on the initial objective of the British group move. The company had about 650 firepower at that range, vs. 400-450 for the defenders. That was much less than the cover differential (3:1 about), but the attackers also still had 2.4 to 1 depth (raw number of men) to absorb the fire, as well.

They would not have made it to "on line" at rifle range if they had been hit 1.5-2 times as hard in the approach. The MGs would have stopped them, quite alone. Right now they don't, even without exploiting "run" or bum-rushing unsuppressed defenders to bayonet range.

Since Vickers style MGs have less firepower than German HMG-42s, such an assault would have been even more successful against Russian (or British, etc) MG defenses.

The proposed grazing fire bonus, if the smaller option is taken (no leading 2x) is not going to make MGs into uber-weapons. But it will make assault-moving over open ground through the whole range envelope of multiple unsuppressed MGs an elaborate form of suicide. Which is what it should be, if the combined arms relationships vital to east front tactics are to be modeled accurately.

I believe I have now made my case, so I will let others think about or ignore what I've offered, as they like, and move on.

[ February 07, 2002, 04:00 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Mr. Johnson--]

OMG

[WWB]

JC:

I really cannot understand why you have not figured this out by now, but games of CM are not played in the kind of artificial lab environment you propose and seem addicted to. It does not matter if a single component works perfectly on its own, because in a real game there will be other components which might well effect how that component works. The interaction of advancing troops and incoming fire is not at all the simple equation which you precieve it is, but a huge series of complex interactions which you apparently cannot fathom.

Basically, you are trying to make sure if the widget device works in the clean room, not on the street where it is to be used. Leave the lab tests to the academics.

WWB

[JonS]

wwb_99,

while it may be amusing to scoff at the scientific method, the fact is that our modern world is based on it. Basically, it works. Isolating the factor you are interested in examining is the only way to figure out how it works. Removing the interactions is the key, not an unfortunate side effect. Jason explains this in the first half dozen or so paragraphs.

Anti-intellectualism alive and well.

Regards

JonS

[Redwolf]

[if this posting is too long for your taste, read last two paragraphs first]

For what it's worth, I agree to parts of Jason's observations. No doubt the CMBB changes will fix the worst problem in CMBO: overruning the MGs. Don't jump on me for disregarding the work on CMBB, I fully appreciate it.

Jason's point that long-range ground-denying MG fire might still be too weak has something for it. Note that I am not talking about shooting men moving towards the HMG (overrunning it), I talk about squads crossing the ground from one place to another, trying to ignore (not attack) the HMG. Jason's example of the defender's choice whether to deny some open ground by placing a HMG overlooking it or a platoon sitting in it is valid. It would be great if CM could offer the same tradeoff as reality.

From what has been posted on the other HMG thread, I do believe that -in reality- a platoon crossing 100+ meters of open ground up to -say- 500 or 800 meter in front of a HMG would be supressed to the point that it cannot make it, they would strand in no-mans-land for the rest of the game, or even slowly eliminated if the HMG is willing to invest the ammunition.

What I think is the issue here is that -like Steve explained- there is no way for CM to move aways from the single-indentifyable-bursts fire model for small arms. In the situation I am thinking of this will lead to only one squad of the platoon being fired at at a time in any CM game. The other squads can make their way, granted slowly, but they can.

Note that I am not speaking about outright killing all of them. A real HMG would cover the angle of 100 meters horizontal in a distance of 500 meters with a constant flow of bullets over the whole angle. Thus all squads would be supressed at the same time. This cannot happen in CM, unless CMBB gives them excessive amounts of CM-style bursts for each turn, so that the HMG switches between all squads fast enough. Which as I understand is not the case at this distance, and for a good reason, it would cost too much ammo and is too much of a penality for the receiver.

What I am thinking of as a solution is a concept of terrain-local morale modifier. All enemy units that are in the covered arc of a firing HMG (or any high-ROF smallarms unit) suffer substancial morale degration, so that they go to ground and stay there until the MG stops covering at that covered arc.

If you want to make it more sophisticated, lower the firerpower for the squad actually being shot at, in exchange for the supression delivered elsewhere. That way the player can influence the tradeoff by setting a narrower covered arc. Or the player can set one single target which is being shot at with full power while not influencing the other enemies nearby, giving current CMBO behaviour. But that doesn't have to be, the basic idea about the local bad morale in the covered arc would be a big step towards lowering the bad effects of the single-burst computer model.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Ah.... couldn't wait, so I did a quick test.....

Just out of curiosity, could you do the test again ? This time you'd split the German squads and form a proper defensive line of the half squads (preferably in a slit trench). Just to see how the set up playes out. Pretty please...