Action by infantry when coming under fire quote

[Michael Dorosh]

Section 38 - MOVEMENT

2. Normally troops in action will move at walking pace. In the final stages of an assault, however, they will double. On other occasions it may be necessary to double or to crawl. If, for example, attacking troops move into enemy defensive fire, it is nearly always correct to double forward and through it.(Emphasis added) To lie down is frequently the most dangerous as well as the most ineffective course. It must be remembered, however, that doubling and crawling are tiring and should be reserved for the critical situation and the final assault.

from: CANADIAN ARMY MANUAL OF TRAINING

INFANTRY SECTION LEADING AND PLATOON TACTICS

1954

We all know the difference between fightin' and book learnin' but I just stumbled across this and thought it illuminating, in light of the frustration we have felt at troops that go into Sneak mode as soon as coming under fire. I have to believe these lessons were drawn directly from Second World War experience, though possibly the tiring aspect of crawling is emphasized in the manual because it is the most natural thing for a soldier to do under fire, and the need to "train out" this natural instinct was acute in 1954 as it was in 1944?

I think it might be worthy of discussion from a historical/training point of view, which I haven't seen yet. What were the Russian and German battle drills/contact drills for coming under fire (effective or otherwise)?

Has BFC defended their stand on this point?

[ November 07, 2002, 12:23 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Tarquelne]

According to the manual, just what does "final stages of an assault" mean?

[marcusB]

Maybe getting a terrible overwhelming urge to lie down could be considered the final stage of an assault.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

According to the manual, just what does "final stages of an assault" mean?

I should imagine it is the point where the fire team leaders will give the order to throw grenades and rush individual enemy positions - ie "Number two rifleman, take out enemy trench".

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Tarqulene:

According to the manual, just what does "final stages of an assault" mean?

I should imagine it is the point where the fire team leaders will give the order to throw grenades and rush individual enemy positions - ie "Number two rifleman, take out enemy trench".</font>

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Tarqulene:

According to the manual, just what does "final stages of an assault" mean?

I should imagine it is the point where the fire team leaders will give the order to throw grenades and rush individual enemy positions - ie "Number two rifleman, take out enemy trench".</font>

[MasterGoodale]

VEEEERRRRY interesting quote. Funny, because in basic training I was trained to hit the ground when fired upon. No exceptions. From there you figure out what to do. You are much less vulnerable in the prone position so it seems like the AI is making a somewhat good decision. What would you do if you were walking along and suddenly a MG starts ripping into your squad?

[Renaud]

This is one of the more interesting questions in the game right now. And in reality.

In specific instances, it is easy to see that moving quickly through the zone of fire and closing with the enemy, or reaching other desired cover such as house or trench, would result in lower casualties than simply hitting the dirt immediately. We've all seen that in play. But often I think orders to cross open ground under machine gun fire would result in heavy, perhaps total, casualties were it not for the soldier's natural instinct (properly coded into the AI behavior of CMBB) to get as flat and inconspicuous as possible. Obviously the propensity to order our phosphorescent men into no-win situations varies by player, some being more guilty of ordering the impossible than others (we know who we are ).

We are stuck with one troop rating (well, perhaps 2 counting fitness) for determining reaction under fire, currently a kind of amalgamation of bravery, esprit-de-corp, battle-experience, and training level. John Salt and others have brought up excellent alternative systems over the years on this forum. I presented an alternative several years ago and steve replied that they indeed would like to break the rating down into multiple specific ratings, but that it wasn't in the cards for the current engine. I was happy with that explanation and have been ever since.

I can't help but think of the fearful historical examples of men pitted against rifle and MG technology by commanders who were living in a Napoleonic past. The carnage of the Somme and the US Civil War jump to mind. On the modern battlefield it's tough to know when you can cross that grassy field with 'acceptable' casualties. If you make a mistake, it's up to those you ordered into the fire to extricate themselves. There could be cases where bravery is hazardous and the elite squad continues forward only to be cut down, and the green squad survives because they hit the dirt immediately and crawl back to cover (hopefully ignoring my lunatic orders to the contrary ).

Those are my thoughts. I'll stop now before I write a book.

Ren

[jrcar]

Doctrine vs reality

There are reasons these things are stressed in doctrine, and thats generally because at the time the doctrine is developed that aspect is seen as being lacking in the force.

From what little I have experianced in my 12 years as a non combat officer (Intel) and what I have read over 20+ years I believe the natural reaction is to go to ground when fired upon. Its training that tries to change this instinct, and doctrine that describes the framework in which the training is to be implemented.

Most soldiers in WW2 were poorly to very poorly trained in comparison to modern troops.

On the comments about hitting the ground being modern training that is true in a meeting engagement, but is not true of the assault. In the assault you know where the enemy is, your job is to get through the killing zone and into the enemy position ASAP.

Cheers

Rob

[Nidan1]

When I was in the Marine Corps in the 60's we were taught in infantry training to advance in "fire team rushes". When we got to Vietnam and the real bullets were flying, all of that seemed to go out the window. From my personal experience it boiuled down to the courage and leadership skills of individual Marine Officers and enlisted men. We all had basic infantry training, but the "book" was quickly forgotten, when the first shouts of "Corpsman, Corpsman" were heard. The following is a quote, from FMFM1 on Maneuver Warfare, which is fairly recent. It makes some good points:

"Because war is a clash of opposing human wills, the human dimension is central in war. It is the human dimension which infuses war with its intangible moral factors. War is shaped by human nature, and is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies and peculiarites which characterize human behavior. Since war is an act of violence based on irreconcilable disagreement, it will envariably be inflamed and shaped by human emotions.

War is an extreme trial of moral and physical strength and stamina. Any view of the nature of war would hardly be accurate or complete without the consideration of the effects of danger, fear, exhaustion and privation on the men who must do the fighting. However these effects vary greatly from case to case. Individuals and peoples react differently to the stress of war; an act that may break the will of one enemy, may only serve to stiffen the resolve of another.

No degree technological development or scientific calculation will overcome the human dimension in war. Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is therefore inherently false."

How would you build human reactions into a computer simulation? I think BFC has done a damned good job. Based on personal experience and a lot of reading, infantry reactions in CMBB seem pretty accurate to me.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Nidan1:

[snips]How would you build human reactions into a computer simulation?

Agent-based programming.

All the best,

John.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Renaud:

In specific instances, it is easy to see that moving quickly through the zone of fire and closing with the enemy, or reaching other desired cover such as house or trench, would result in lower casualties than simply hitting the dirt immediately. [snips]

I think this may be what is mainly intended in the piece originally quoted. It depends on exactly what value you give to the words "defensive fire". To me, from what I know of British Armyspeak, that would tend to indicate a DF task, rather than aimed fire from individual defenders. The fire would, therefore, whether from MGs or HE weapons, be falling on a pre-determined location rather than aimed at individuals. In those circumstances, getting away from the grid registered for the DF as quickly as possible makes a good deal of sense.

All the best,

John.

[Renaud]

What i'm referring to here is directed machine gun fire. Such as what you see in the Yelnia demo scenario.

I'm familiar with what you are talking about. Always seems best to run out from under mortar fire, this is definitely an area where the tendency to grab cover or start sneaking can be disastrous. However I believe the AI probably treats directed MG fire and mortar stonks the same...it doesn't know it's in a 'mortar' barrage as opposed to directed HMG fire. Incoming firepower is detected as a generic intensity with a one-size-fits-all reaction. Ah well. Clearly room for improvement.

Ren

[Abbott]

No one can dig a hole better or faster then an infantryman under fire.

[lassner.1]

Nidan1

Member

Member # 9125

posted November 07, 2002 04:45 PM

When I was in the Marine Corps in the 60's we were taught in infantry

training to advance in "fire team rushes". When we got to Vietnam and the real bullets were flying, all of that seemed to go out the window. From my personal experience it boiuled down to the courage and leadership skills of individual Marine Officers and enlisted men. We all had basic infantry training, but the "book" was quickly forgotten, when the first shouts of "Corpsman, Corpsman" were heard. The following is a quote, from FMFM1 on Maneuver Warfare, which is fairly recent. It makes some good points:

"Because war is a clash of opposing human wills, the human dimension is central in war. It is the human dimension which infuses war with its intangible moral factors. War is shaped by human nature, and is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies and peculiarites which characterize human behavior. Since war is an act of violence based on irreconcilable disagreement, it will envariably be inflamed and shaped by human emotions.

War is an extreme trial of moral and physical strength and stamina. Any view of the nature of war would hardly be accurate or complete without the consideration of the effects of danger, fear, exhaustion and privation on the men who must do the fighting. However these effects vary greatly from case to case. Individuals and peoples react differently to the stress of war; an act that may break the will of one enemy, may only serve to stiffen the resolve of another.

No degree technological development or scientific calculation will overcome the human dimension in war. Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is therefore inherently false."

Indeed, a very accurate assessment, and one that is very much reflective of the nature and phenomena of war as discussed by Clausewitz in book one. It is not an accident that this view has surfaced in FM1 on Maneuver Warfare, as a number of soldiers and scholars worked resolutely to get it into the doctrine in the first place.

Without getting into detail, one can see the similarities readily. FM1 on Maneuver Warfare as quoted by Nidan1 states: “Because war is a clash of opposing human wills, the human dimension is central in war.” Clausewitz writes in book one chapter one: “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” Several paragraphs later he continues that “War, however, is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass ... but always the collision of two living forces.” Clausewitz goes on in book one, especially chapters one and three through seven, to discuss the human dimension in war, which he clearly holds as paramount. In doing so we once again see the contention that men in combat are unpredictable, and that numerous factors, which are not subject to exact knowledge, will have an influence on soldier’s behavior (Clausewitz, it should be remembered, saw quite a bit of fighting). The logical extension of this argument, of course, is that no model will be completely accurate – though I assume that that is not what is being argued here in any case.

I agree with Nidan1 that CM:BB has done a good job in trying to estimate the behavior of men under fire, and I have noticed in my games that squads will break into a forward run in some cases when coming under fire; they do not always go to ground and begin the crawl.

[The_Capt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> Section 38 - MOVEMENT

2. Normally troops in action will move at walking pace. In the final stages of an assault, however, they will double. On other occasions it may be necessary to double or to crawl. If, for example, attacking troops move into enemy defensive fire, it is nearly always correct to double forward and through it.(Emphasis added) To lie down is frequently the most dangerous as well as the most ineffective course. It must be remembered, however, that doubling and crawling are tiring and should be reserved for the critical situation and the final assault.

from: CANADIAN ARMY MANUAL OF TRAINING

INFANTRY SECTION LEADING AND PLATOON TACTICS

1954

We all know the difference between fightin' and book learnin' but I just stumbled across this and thought it illuminating, in light of the frustration we have felt at troops that go into Sneak mode as soon as coming under fire. I have to believe these lessons were drawn directly from Second World War experience, though possibly the tiring aspect of crawling is emphasized in the manual because it is the most natural thing for a soldier to do under fire, and the need to "train out" this natural instinct was acute in 1954 as it was in 1944?

I think it might be worthy of discussion from a historical/training point of view, which I haven't seen yet. What were the Russian and German battle drills/contact drills for coming under fire (effective or otherwise)?

Has BFC defended their stand on this point?</font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Good points, Capt, which is why I was wondering what the actual German and Russian doctrine said on this point - a point no one has been able to elaborate on.

As well, there is the question of actual practice as opposed to the doctrine - doctrine is often, as has been pointed out, in place to train out "bad" or simply instinctive habits acquired by 18 year old boys who are being shot at with some malice....

[The_Capt]

I have always prefered the "HE is a fine substitute to human flesh" philosophy myself.

Doctirne is often (hell let's say normally) idealistic to say the least. It comes up with the perfect solution. The fact that the solution is entirely impracticable is often beyond th authors of doctrine.

I have had the fortune (or perhaps "mis") of both leading 18 yr olds under fire and trg. And I can tell you that once "the metal hits the meat"(I really like that phrase) what we want more than often goes out the window.

Now don't get me wrong..I have seen troops plant a sandbag..have around hit the sandbag they have just planted..and then put another on top of it. This is not the norm nor should it be for a simulation, These were with highly trained and very jaded troops in a bizarre sit (one they still seem to be issuing medals for it wounld seem).

So we have to be very careful when trying to quantify just what "was normal" in any given theatre.

Modeling insanity is very difficult and is probably too much to ask of any game.

[jrcar]

Agent based programming is advancing very rapidly at the moment. The use of multiple "intelligent agents" each with their own agenda, procedures and capabilities will be the foundation of modern simulation over the next ten years. I don't think we've seen it implemented in computer games yet, its still very much in the labs but will break out soon methinks.

Cheers

Rob

Originally posted by John D Salt:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Nidan1:

[snips]How would you build human reactions into a computer simulation?

Agent-based programming.

All the best,

John.</font>

[CMplayer]

It's okay that they hit the dirt. It's the turning around and crawling away, to the point of exhaustion, that is really getting under my skin.

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> Section 38 - MOVEMENT

2. Normally troops in action will move at walking pace. In the final stages of an assault, however, they will double. On other occasions it may be necessary to double or to crawl. If, for example, attacking troops move into enemy defensive fire, it is nearly always correct to double forward and through it.(Emphasis added) To lie down is frequently the most dangerous as well as the most ineffective course. It must be remembered, however, that doubling and crawling are tiring and should be reserved for the critical situation and the final assault.

from: CANADIAN ARMY MANUAL OF TRAINING

INFANTRY SECTION LEADING AND PLATOON TACTICS

1954

</font>

[Blackhorse]

The following Battle Drill is taken from FM 7-8 INFANTRY RIFLE PLATOON AND SQUAD and FM 7-92 THE INFANTRY RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON AND SQUAD (AIRBORNE, AIR ASSAULT, LIGHT INFANTRY).

It is similar to the Canadian Battle Drill with the exception that it contains a bit more detailed than the 1954 document.

F-2. REACT TO NEAR AMBUSH

The reconnaissance platoon/squad may also be required to react to an ambush. The actions taken by the reconnaissance platoon/squad are determined by its distance from the enemy at the time of the ambush. The near ambush is one in which the killing zone is within hand grenade range of the enemy executing the ambush.

a. When a reconnaissance platoon/squad is caught in a near ambush soldiers in the kill zone carry out one of the following actions without order or signal:

(1) If cover is not available, soldiers assume the prone position and throw concussion or fragmentation and smoke grenades.

(2) If cover is available, soldiers assume the prone position, seek the nearest covered position, return fire, and throw fragmentation or concussion and smoke grenades.

b. After the explosion of the grenades, soldiers in the kill zone return fire and assault through the ambush position using fire and movement.

c. Soldiers not in the kill zone identify the enemy location and place accurate suppressive fire against the enemy positions. Fire is shifted as the soldiers in the kill zone begin to assault. (Figure F-2.)

d. Personnel in the kill zone continue the assault to eliminate the ambush or until contact is broken.

Figure F-2. React to near ambush.

F-3. REACT TO FAR AMBUSH

The far ambush is one in which the kill zone is outside hand grenade rangeof the enemy executing the ambush. The actions of the reconnaissance platoon/squad are as follows:

a. Without order or signal, soldiers in the kill zone assume the prone position and return fire. They take available covered positions and continue well-aimed fire at the ambush position. Smoke grenades are used to impair enemy observation of the kill zone and affect his ability to place aimed fire into the kill zone (Figure F-3).

b. Those soldiers not in the kill zone continue the assault until the ambush is eliminated or contact is broken.

c. The reconnaissance platoon/squad leader requests indirect fire when the enemy withdraws or the separation between the elements is far enough to avoid friendly casualties. Smoke is used to impair enemy observation.

Figure F-3. React to far ambush.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

[snips]

I don't think this is a keystone document..

The British Army did not use the phrases "keystone document" or "capstone document" in 1950, and would probably have coughed uncomfortably at the suggestion that it had anything so continental and religious-sounding as a "doctrine".

"Infantry Training" was, however, the definitive document on infantry training.

Originally posted by The_Capt:

particularly when the current doctrine is double tap dash DOWN, when coming under fire.

When did the double-tap become fashionable? That's new to me.

I don't know how much the fashion has changed since I trained for this sort of thing, but when I was in it was made very clear that halting and returning fire was to be done only under effective fire, not any fire at all. As one of my sergeants told me, "Salt's section stops, the whole platoon stops; the platoon stops, so the company stops; the company stops, so the battlegroup stops; the battlegroup stops, so the brigade stops; the brigade stops, so the division stops; and before we know it the whole of the NORTHAG advance has come to a halt because you're frightened by a couple of stray rounds."

Originally posted by The_Capt:

This sounds like some foolish staff weenie stuff put out saying "A steady pace and strong heart will beat the machine gun", AAR and lessons learned were not all that strong in the Canadian Army in WWII, that is why we are still asking for mine sniffing dogs today.

I wouldn't blame the Canadian army for it, as this particular piece of advice seems to be British in origin. I don't know whether the document Mike has is identical with Infantry Training Volume IV 1950, but the parts he quoted are, word for word.

Since Infantry Training Volume IV was written at a time when the British Army had an enormous wealth of recent, varied and successful high-intensity combat experience against first-class enemies, I rather doubt the "foolish staff weenie" hypothesis.

Looking at the whole of the rest of the document, I'd say it is much better-written and more useful than any written piece I have seen emerge from DGD&D (the Directorate general of Doctrine & Development), and while I wouldn't claim to have read everything DGD&D has put out, I used to have a CD full of the stuff, and I've read a fair amount of it.

Originally posted by The_Capt:

Also in what context are you coming under fire..for an ambush drill perhaps but to come into contact in a deliberate assault?

As I've already said elsewhere, I think this advice is intended to refer to getting past enemy DFs. Elsewhere, in a section headed "Section battlecraft for the attack", the document says:

"The section, moving in groups as above, comes under effective enemy fire and each man carries out any anticipatory orders he has received from the section commander. If there are none he drops flat and crawls to a fire position, unless other orders are given. All riflemen return the enemy fire independently until ordered to stop."

All the best,

John.