British Infantry

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by tero:

I can not imagine a German Company commander reporting his subunits being "in the general area performing unspecified attack operations under adhoc command of any number of my neighbouring Company CO('s)" and not have his arse kicked for not knowing the specifics.

Isn't that what the Germans called augtragtaktik - the very essence of their military thinking at all levels, where commanders were given freedom by their superiors to perform whatever deeds they saw necessary to accomplish the mission? Mission-oriented command rather than micro-management? Perhaps I'm misreading you - you mention neighbouring company COs so maybe you're not saying what I think you're saying...

[flamingknives]

BTW, I think you're using the wrong word about the SMLE. Try "obsolescent" rather than "obsolete".

Obsolete and obsolescent mean almost the same thing, both deriving from the latin obsoletus, meaning worn out.

Obsolecent seem to imply the action of becoming out of date.

[gibsonm]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> BTW, I think you're using the wrong word about the SMLE. Try "obsolescent" rather than "obsolete".

Obsolete and obsolescent mean almost the same thing, both deriving from the latin obsoletus, meaning worn out.

Obsolecent seem to imply the action of becoming out of date.</font>

[Slapdragon]

Since only two Armies, the US and USSR, had made serious attempts at conversion to self loading rifles, I also think of the SMLE as a weapon that was verging on the obsolete, but not tipped over the border. It did not have the firepower of the Tokarev or the Garand, but things were moving away from the firepower of the individual rifle anyway and toward using fully-automatic weapons at the squad level as the primary basis for the squad's power.

CM accurately reflects this by making the automatic weapons in the squad responsible for much more firepower than the rifles in any case. I think the BREN is around 5 times as powerful as a SMLE at most ranges, and the BAR is like 2-3 times as powerful as the Garand at most ranges.

[Brian]

Originally posted by gibsonm:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Brian:

Basically, the trick when loading a Bren magazine is to always remember to load 28 rounds, not the indicated capacity of 30 rounds (in reality, you can manage to fit up to 32 rounds in them). The spring on the magazine became strained with 30 and was simply unable to feed with 32. 28 was the maximum it could handle. Failure to do this results in stoppages due to misfeeds or failure to feed. This is part of the basic introduction to the Bren gun, which I remember well from my days.

Sounds like the good old F1 SMG (which could also accommodate a bayonet) Now there's a definition of bravery / stupidity - going into battle with a weapon with an effective range (aimed shots) of 100m and even when fitted with a bayonet you were still just about within arms reach of your opponent!!</font>

[Brian]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> BTW, I think you're using the wrong word about the SMLE. Try "obsolescent" rather than "obsolete".

Obsolete and obsolescent mean almost the same thing, both deriving from the latin obsoletus, meaning worn out.

Obsolecent seem to imply the action of becoming out of date.</font>

[Brian]

I forgot to mention, Tony Williams has an excellent article on the British pre-WWI quest for a better cartridge than the .303 on his web page.

[Tero]

Originally posted by JonS:

They should have. I think you may be misunderstanding the usage of the word. In Brit usage it is an SOP that deals with reorganising consituent units (unmingling sections etc);

* organising the position you have just taken for defence,

* calling back units and/or men who have exploited too far,

* calling up units/men that have lagged behind,

* redistributing ammo,

* taking care of wounded,

* handling POWs,

* policing up captured weapons and equipment, and

* preparing to move on if required to.

All this is good and proper. However (from what I have read) the prevailing, most important reason given for the British army reorganization after such a charge/assault was to be able to fight back German counter attacks.

An interesting point is that * calling back units and/or men who have exploited too far. How much further ahead did the Germans plan their attacks than the British did, if they did ? How was the individual attack integrated into the master plan in the respective armies ?

If the Germans didn't bother with, or plan for, all that after an attack I would be very surprised.

Indeed. But if you look at the basic training of the British and the German infantry you will find that whereas in the British infantry the officer was the most trained element (in terms of combat tactics and doctrine) in the organization in the German army the entire organization was trained. Much has been said about the regimental tradition in the Commonwealth armies. To my knowledge the training in the German army was much more uniform and standardized than it was in the British army.

In case you have not read Military Training in the British army 1940-44 (or something to that effect) I must recommend it strongly. It makes surprising and harrowing reading.

It does not mean 're-organising' in terms of;

* changing the axis of advance,

* changing the objective,

* changing unit affiliations,

* changing unit attachments,

* issuing new orders, etc.

This is what I meant by

the Germans were more cohesive in their planning than the British were. They did not wish to wind up in a situation where they would have been forced to reorganize after an assault. They tried to keep their plan focused on the mission and to maintain cohesion within the parameters of the mission. Having to reorganize in the middle of the mission was not what they planned for.

If you take a generic assault on an enemy position and then compare the British SOP and the German SOP you will find that the German army unit will spend less time than the British army unit reorganizing once the objective is taken.

The example of the German army operating with Finnish units I gave does pertain to atypic terrain with which the German army was not familiar with at the time. But the German army units did advance slower than the Finnish army in these conditions. The reason for this was the Germans operated more systematically and the unit commanders did not want to lose contact with their subunits. Also, they feared outrunning their fire support elements. Extrapolating from this I think it is safe to say that even in a more familiar setting the German army units will strive to maintain cohesion so that when the objective is taken the minimum of time will be lost reorganizing, be it to take on a counter attack or a push forward.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Isn't that what the Germans called augtragtaktik - the very essence of their military thinking at all levels, where commanders were given freedom by their superiors to perform whatever deeds they saw necessary to accomplish the mission? Mission-oriented command rather than micro-management? Perhaps I'm misreading you - you mention neighbouring company COs so maybe you're not saying what I think you're saying...

Mission-oriented command is indeed what I mean. But the Germans micro-managed in the micro level during combat whereas the British unit commanders seem to have lost control (like John D said) and with it the cohesion when the battle started. But I think this was a fault of the British Army as an organization, not because the officers and men were inept. The Germans did regard the British quite high as adversaries after all.

Compared to the Finnish army the German army would (and could) detail whole units rather than proceed with the plan with a force that was basically a mob in their eyes. (The Germans did remark they had seen more organized armies in defeat than the Finnish army was in advance )

And the Germans did try to maintain cohesion at a "manageable" level. This is IMO BTW why they were so big on nominating Kampfgruppes and other formal ad-hoc command structures.

A typical Finnish attack (also defence) would go ahead with squads from different companies (even different regiments at times) fighting side by side for days on the most senior officer's on site say so rather than having a higer echelon commander planning and deliberately ordering it (which is basically how the Germans did it). A Finnish company commander could wind up having no subunits to command or conversely having a total of (say) two companies worth of units (or men) under his command. By the same token an überFinnish squad cut off from the proper command unit in the heat of the battle would latch on to any command unit in the area on its own rather than start searching for the parent command unit. This is why sometimes even an artillery FO could sometimes wind up commanding scattered infantry units.

[JonS]

Tero,

I'm dealing with 're-org' at the pn/coy level. If you want to fret about it at a higher level, fine, but you're going to have to find someone else to spar with. Most of your specific questions I'm not going to attempt to answer because a) some of them appear to be rhetorical, some of them I could only give an educated guess to, so won't, and c) many of them seem, um, ... typical Tero questions

Bear in mind is that during an assault (as opposed to an attack. I.e., an assault is the last little bit to carry the objective), command tends to devolve downwards rather quickly. Once the objective is taken and is secure, it is in everyones interest that command once more be taken at a higher level. It is the devolving downwards that others have, I think, refered to as 'loss of control.' You seem to have picked up on those words and read too much into them.

As an example (and despite what I said in the first para above about not considering higher levels), most accounts I've read regarding the initial Op Overlord assaults - and indeed most of that day - on 6th June in Normandy speak of the helplessness of the higher commanders. They pushed the "GO" button, and after that everything else was up to the lower level commanders. In other words, the higher commanders had 'lost control.' Lower and lower commanders took command of the men near them, in the small geographic areas they found themselves in, and carried the assault were they could, with or - in most cases - without specific direction or control. Until the beaches were secure. This was particularly true at Omaha, but it applies at the other beaches too. Now, that is all well and good - and indeed appropriate - but I hope you'd agree that it makes sense for higher command and direction to be re-enforced at the earliest practical time. Scale that down to the coy/pn level, and you have the rationale for having a defined, planned, standardised, and expected, SOP "re-org."

Having said that, I don't really know what point you are trying to make, or even if you are trying to make one. Is it that the Brits had an SOP for something the Germans didn't feel the need for? Great, but so what? Or maybe its that having SOPs is a bad idea? In that case I disagree.

My point is that, IMO, re-orging to an SOP after an assault is a good idea.

Regards

JonS

PS. I am aware of the book you refer to.

Edit: clarity

[ March 31, 2002, 06:41 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

[QB]But Clausewitz was speaking specifically about large-scale (i.e. battalion and up) Napoleonic-style bayonet charges.[QB]

Wrong on two accounts. He was not talking about anything so specific as a battalion, and very seldom was a charge, by infantry, during that period end in crossed bayonets. They ended in close range firefights if the defender didn't fall back first. What Clayswitz said was that you cannot win a battle by shooting your enemy... you have to go forward and take the ground from him

[flamingknives]

Do you always use language so sloppily?

Only in discussion forums.

The British Army continued to use the Lee Enfield up to and including the Korean War. Three decades plus is quite a long time for something to be obsolescent (with hindsight, this probably was the more correct word to use, the distinction in my dictionary wasn't too clear)

I love the English language. There's so many ways to be wrong.

[Andrew H.]

Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

Wrong on two accounts. He was not talking about anything so specific as a battalion, and very seldom was a charge, by infantry, during that period end in crossed bayonets. They ended in close range firefights if the defender didn't fall back first. What Clayswitz said was that you cannot win a battle by shooting your enemy... you have to go forward and take the ground from him

While it's true that Clausewitz doesn't specify units size (i.e., battalions), he is talking about the napoleonic wars, where battalions were one of the smallest maneuver units of infantry. The reason for this is to better clarify the context in which Cl. was writing; specifically, that he does not mean anything like a typical CM charge, where one squad might charge suppressed defenders in, say, foxholes.

As to your other point, crossed bayonets is simply a strawman argument: my point was that bayonet charges were a part of almost every Napoleonic action; not that the action necessarily ended "crossed bayonets." In the battles I'm familiar with, they tended to end in the side receiving the charge routing from the charging units.

You can find a lot of accounts of stuff like that here, although there are lots of other accounts of bayonet charges in the napoleonic period available. This quote:

The battle tactics used in these examples proved far too mobile and flexible for the armies of Europe who still used the old linear formations, slower for deployment and manoeuvre, going back to Frederick the Great. The Combination of skirmishers followed by line to maximise fire power and column to achieve shock and to break through the enemy formations proved much too effective for other armies who, despite studying and being familiar with the French tactics, could as yet find no remedy to them.

describes the sort of conventional French method of attacking, with the units in column being the guys with the bayonets.

[Jeff Duquette]

This has less to do with the tangent discussion on close assault, brass-knuckles, bayonets, and the psychology of closing with the enemy. This goes back to page 1 & 2 regarding some information Andreas and Jason were touching upon regarding German MG ammunition expenditure.

From: Sydney Jary's "18 Platoon", pages 53 - 54.

Like most infantry subalterns trained in the UK for the invasion of Europe, I was convinced of the excellence of our Bren light machine gun. After 40 years, I still view the Bren with affection. It was excellent, particularly as a highly portable and accurate infantry section weapon invaluable in the attack. However, when it came to a fire-fight between a German and a British platoon, their MG34 and MG42 won hands down. I remember my first reaction to actual infantry warfare in July 1944 was one of amazement at the crushing firepower of these very rapid-firing guns. It seemed to me that the German infantryman seldom used his rifle. He was a carrier of boxes of light machine gun ammunition of which they seemed to have an endless supply. Our Bren gunners usually fired in short bursts of about five rounds, which not only conserved ammunition but also avoided the gun barrels overheating. Our theory was that, unless one hit the target with the first burst, the opposition would go to ground and subsequent bursts would be unlikely to be so effective. The Germans thought otherwise, firing in long sustained bursts, the object of which seemed to me to be to keep us pinned to the ground regardless of the ammunition expenditure. Typically German - protracted and discordant. While we were usually attacking and therefore had to carry all the magazines for our Brens, the Germans, in defence, had the advantage of stockpiling belts of ammunition for their Spandaus. Jim Kingston was convinced that their profligate use of small arms ammunition was a major factor in their downfall. Perhaps he had a point.

[Brian]

Out of a matter of interest, does anybody know what the service life of an MG34 or MG42 barrel was?

Tangentially, would anybody like to estimate what the load on the German logistics system was of both small arms ammunition and replacement barrels for their MGs?

[Charlie Rock]

While I do not have it on the close at hand, I believe that in Joseph Balkoski's book "Beyond the Beachhead" (Excellent read, IMHO)it was said that 1500-2000 rounds per day in a squad MG42 was not that uncommon.

If each rifleman in a british squad carried an extra magazine for the bren (I think that was the SOP) squad-on-squad you're looking at twice the ammunition expenditure for the Germans.

Point is that the German riflemen were supposed to hump MG ammo and feed the MG, and by carrying a few boxes of MG ammo they were accomplishing more than firing with their Kar 98ks.

[edward_n_kelly]

Originally posted by Charlie Rock:

While I do not have it on the close at hand, I believe that in Joseph Balkoski's book "Beyond the Beachhead" (Excellent read, IMHO)it was said that 1500-2000 rounds per day in a squad MG42 was not that uncommon.

If each rifleman in a british squad carried an extra magazine for the bren (I think that was the SOP) squad-on-squad you're looking at twice the ammunition expenditure for the Germans.

Makes the assumption that the British will expend all their ammunition per day where it is stated that the actual expenditure for the Germans was 1500 to 2000 rounds per day.

What was the average expenditure per day for the British ?

Anyone have access to British (and for that matter German and US) Staff tables which give the planning figures for ammuntion expenditures under the various conditions of comabat (attack, defence, stong enemy action or "quiet time", etc)? These will give what the planning staffs predicted and ordered forward for the DPs/APs for each side - actual expenditure would vary a little from these "well worn" guesstimates.

(The supply of ammunition and the assets to use them (artillery/tanks) were one of the main complaints of the Canadians with the attacks on the Channel Ports and the Scheldt)

Point is that the German riflemen were supposed to hump MG ammo and feed the MG, and by carrying a few boxes of MG ammo they were accomplishing more than firing with their Kar 98ks.

So the KAR98 was in doctrine and in practice only for self-defence ?

Edward

[ April 02, 2002, 08:43 PM: Message edited by: edward_n_kelly ]

[Mattias]

Originally posted by Charlie Rock:

If each rifleman in a british squad carried an extra magazine for the bren (I think that was the SOP) squad-on-squad you're looking at twice the ammunition expenditure for the Germans.

Only posting because I have the numbers here..

Rifle man No 1-6: 2 Bren magazines each

Bren group leader and gunner: 4 each

Bren group No 2: 5 magazines

For a grand total of 25 magazines containing, what, 700 rounds.

--

M.

[Jeff Duquette]

Only posting because I have the numbers here..

Rifle man No 1-6: 2 Bren magazines each

Bren group leader and gunner: 4 each

Bren group No 2: 5 magazines

For a grand total of 25 magazines containing, what, 700 rounds.

What was the reference on the above figures?

[Jeff Duquette]

Some squad level figures for German Infantry:

Originally From: "The German Squad in Combat" with large excerpts included in "German Squad Tactics in WWII" by M. Gajkowski:

Gruppen Fuhrer (Squad Leader) 1 Machine Pistol, 6 magazines

LMG Section

MG Schutz: Soldier #1, LMG and drum magazine 50 rnds each, Picked for their shooting skills. He is also the leader of the LMG section.

LMG Soldier #2 One spare MG-34 or 42 spare barrel, 4 drums of 50 rnds each, 1 box 300 rnds ea., side-arm pistol. Assistant gunner.

LMG Soldier #3 One spare MG-34 or 42 spare barrel, 2 boxes 300 rnds ea., also armed with a K-98. LMG Ammo bearer.

Rifle Section

Soldiers 4 - 9 (Gewehrshutzen), K-98 rifle, two 3 section ammunition pouches, had grenades, smoke grenades, explosive charges, ammunition, and tri-pod for LMG. [Note: ammunition is not defined…could be additional LMG ammunition, could simply be additional rifle ammunition J.D.]

The Riflemen execute close combat fighting with rifle fire and bayonet. The most senior rifleman is the Truppfurher (assitant squad leader)

[Tero]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

[Note: ammunition is not defined…could be additional LMG ammunition, could simply be additional rifle ammunition J.D.]

IIRC the ammo was the same for both the rifle and the MG. Carrying loose ammo or in carton boxes (as opposed to having it ready in the MG belts) would enable the ammo to be used either way.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by tero:

IIRC the ammo was the same for both the rifle and the MG.

I believe you are mistaken. The rifles fired 7.62mm ammunition, the MG 7.92mm. This may have been a logistical error by the Germans, but they seem to have coped with it.

Michael

[Brian]

Originally posted by Mattias:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Charlie Rock:

If each rifleman in a british squad carried an extra magazine for the bren (I think that was the SOP) squad-on-squad you're looking at twice the ammunition expenditure for the Germans.

Only posting because I have the numbers here..

Rifle man No 1-6: 2 Bren magazines each

Bren group leader and gunner: 4 each

Bren group No 2: 5 magazines

For a grand total of 25 magazines containing, what, 700 rounds.

--

M.</font>

[Tero]

Originally posted by JonS:

I'm dealing with 're-org' at the pn/coy level. If you want to fret about it at a higher level, fine, but you're going to have to find someone else to spar with.

Re-orging at any level is serious business. Losing control at any level is also a serious business, especially if it is done as a point of SOP.

many of them seem, um, ... typical Tero questions

I'm applying patents for them.

Bear in mind is that during an assault (as opposed to an attack. I.e., an assault is the last little bit to carry the objective), command tends to devolve downwards rather quickly. Once the objective is taken and is secure, it is in everyones interest that command once more be taken at a higher level. It is the devolving downwards that others have, I think, refered to as 'loss of control.' You seem to have picked up on those words and read too much into them.

Being trained as a squad leader I know something about the subject from personal experience.

The thing is the British army seems to have worked through the officers. It would appear the regular soldiers were treated as cannon fodder more than anything else. Like the Germans their SOP had its roots in the WWI experiences. Only, they had learned different lessons. The very term "minor tactics" is IMO very indicative how much value was given to the execution of battlefield manouvers. Whereas the Germans had evolved the Stosstruppe tactics into an art form the British held on to the WWI linear tactics.

The Stosstruppe tactics require highly skilled leadership and careful coordination. These tactics are also more demanding on the individual soldier. It seems the British leaders did not and/or were indoctrinated not to trust in the regular individual soldiers as much as the Germans trusted their individual soldiers.

As an example (and despite what I said in the first para above about not considering higher levels), most accounts I've read regarding the initial Op Overlord assaults - and indeed most of that day - on 6th June in Normandy speak of the helplessness of the higher commanders. They pushed the "GO" button, and after that everything else was up to the lower level commanders. In other words, the higher commanders had 'lost control.' Lower and lower commanders took command of the men near them, in the small geographic areas they found themselves in, and carried the assault were they could, with or - in most cases - without specific direction or control. Until the beaches were secure. This was particularly true at Omaha, but it applies at the other beaches too. Now, that is all well and good - and indeed appropriate - but I hope you'd agree that it makes sense for higher command and direction to be re-enforced at the earliest practical time. Scale that down to the coy/pn level, and you have the rationale for having a defined, planned, standardised, and expected, SOP "re-org."

I'm looking at events beyond the landing, when there was more time to do things and the situation was nowhere as chaotic or desperate. During the landing I would expect any army would have done it that way. But beyond it, it was far too rigid and cumbersome (as an SOP) to yield the best results possible. How long do you think it took the Germans to realize there would be a gap between the assault and the follow up and to utilize that gap to the fullest ?

And I am amazed the German counter attack was still the bogey man for the British commader after so many years of first hand experience. Before reading the book on the training I would have thought they had learned to counter the German tactics. It took only 2 years for the Red Army to come up with a plan to reduce the effectiveness of the German style counter attack (namely directing massive arty barrages on the flanks and shoulders of the break-in where the counterattack would normally come from).

Is it that the Brits had an SOP for something the Germans didn't feel the need for? Great, but so what? Or maybe its that having SOPs is a bad idea? In that case I disagree.

The Germans had evolved their tactics and doctrine so that their SOP made it less likely they would need to re-org after an assault in the scale the British apparently had to.

My point is that, IMO, re-orging to an SOP after an assault is a good idea.

Re-orging to an SOP ?

I do agree re-orging is OK and sometimes necessary. But the SOP should have re-org elements in it every step of the way, not just the end. And this is IMO how the Germans had it worked out.

PS. I am aware of the book you refer to.

Have you read it ?

[ April 03, 2002, 01:26 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

[Brian]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by tero:

IIRC the ammo was the same for both the rifle and the MG.

I believe you are mistaken. The rifles fired 7.62mm ammunition, the MG 7.92mm. This may have been a logistical error by the Germans, but they seem to have coped with it.

Michael</font>