infantry first, or armor first?

[newlife]

Hi all,

Looking at most of the threads discussing armor tactics, it seems the concensus is to lead with infantry, and keep the armor back.

However, it seems that historical accunts posted on this board tend to tell of the armor leading the way. Why the disconnect?

So question one, what were army SOP on who leads the way? Second, what was the historical reality? Finally, why do we see infantry first being hailed as the best strategy?

Bonus question, what is modern day SOP on this?

And my final ponderance, will the improved MG action in CMBB make infantry first too costly?

[gredeker]

Here's my off-the-cuff response:

I think your question has a lot to do with the scope of CMBO vs. the scope of the action described IRL. CMBO assumes that the enemy has already been located, and that a battle is imminent. I suspect that many of the RL stories posted have to do with the recon phase of the battle, which is outside CMBO's scope.

[Priest]

How about together?

That is what I do.

[Phoenix Flame]

NEITHER!

Always, and I mean ALWAYS lead with the gamey Jeep rush! Then back that up with M8 Greyhounds or as an even more gamey tactic, M20 Utility Cars. But then don't discount the mortar Universal Carrier. And on the German side, be sure to lead with Kubelwagans and Sauer Trucks. Then to back that up use 251/16s Flamethrower HTs and even better yet the 251/2 Mortar HTs. Flamethrower HTs.

Please note the above might, just might, be full of sarcasm.

[Kingfish]

The infantry should go ahead of the tanks, but not before the fireball and shock wave from the 30 megaton warhead has first obliterated the opposition.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by newlife:

Looking at most of the threads discussing armor tactics, it seems the concensus is to lead with infantry, and keep the armor back.

However, it seems that historical accunts posted on this board tend to tell of the armor leading the way. Why the disconnect?

Probably depends on the time frame. During the first two years of the war, the glory days of the Blitzkrieg, the infantry had very little in the way of effective antitank weaponry and were often overawed by massed armor. In that environment, it made sense to go charging in with armor, shoot the place up, and wave the surrendered POWs back toward the follow up friendly infantry.

Once effective antitank weapons got into the hands of the grunts in significant numbers (about mid to late '43), charging right in was a good way to have your armor turned into scrap. Tanks now needed an infantry escort to protect them from those skulking little bastards with Panzerfausts, PIATs, etc. clutched in their grubby little hands and an ambition to kill a tank. This is especially true in close terrain that facilitates the ability of men on foot to get within killing range of their weapons, but can work even in open terrain for guys in spider holes with lots of guts.

Michael

[Redwolf]

This impression is usually formed by some of the well-known Normandy breakout attempts or the actual breakout.

It is true taht especially the British were using isolated armor in several attempts in June and July, and authors like von Luck stress the point that the attacks didn't have a chance. So far so good.

The british had serious shortage of infantry and were generally unwilling to sacrifice men were material could do.

On the other hand, they had plenty of tanks, in fact so many that they couldn't make use of all of them in the narrow space of the Normandy bridgehead or rather the short front to the Germans. And while these battles have seen a lot of penetrated tanks, their actual casulty rate amoung crewmembers was quite low, I think Hastings says 1 casulty (or dead?) per knocked out tank. Given that they actually made some progress, and bound teh German armor to the frontline, rendering it much less dangerous to the whole invansion, this can be a cheaper way of gaining ground than the numbers of abanonded or knocked out tanks may apply.

So, think of a CMBO battle with a German defender with medium amounts of 75mm AT and 88mm flak guns, high-quality infantry contentrated in some regions, less-quality infantry all over the place and tank formations rather up front, instead of concentrated out of the area for counterstrikes. All supported by lots of mortars and some nebelwerfers which are quite nasty for advancing infantry. Add some infantry guns, both towed and SP.

In this CMBO battle, set the price of an infantry platoon to 240 and the price of a Sherman to 40 and then make a choice of units. You will surely come to the conclusion that outnumbering the AT guns with tanks on a local basis (one after another) and risking an occasional lower-odds tankfight is a more sensible tactics than to send infantry into effective smallarms fire, mortars so end, single or paired tanks outside infantry AT weapon distance and a lot of other nasty tools that break up infantry in the open. The Germans were strong in AT defense, but they were also strong if not stronger in stopping infantry. If tanks are really cheap and numerous, it's better to deal with the fewer identifyable teethy obstacles than having your infantry shot up by units that are even more various, some of them a lot easier to hide and move than long-range AT defenses.

On top of that, add lots of medium to heavy artillery for the British attacker, this is easier to use when your own units approaching are tanks fighting in greater distance from the enemy lines than infantry. Add planes and it gets even more like that.

Having said this, the actual amount of losses in some of these battles were probably more than Montgomery could imagine, a whole tank battalion shot up by a Flak (not AT) gun battery is surely below of what you hope your tank commander will accomplish.

As for the Americans and Corba, the whole battle is distorted in public view from the image that "Patton army broke out of Normandy", implying that his tanks shot the way free. This is nonsense, Corba was massive air (heavy bomber) attacks, with the gap being populated by infantry and Patton exploiting, not creating the gap with his tanks.

Running across France, they met few opposition and they were going to fast for infantry to lead on foot.

[Silvio Manuel]

Originally posted by redwolf:

This impression is usually formed by some of the well-known Normandy breakout attempts or the actual breakout.(snip)

It is true taht especially the British were using isolated armor in several attempts in June and July...(snip)

The british had serious shortage of infantry and were generally unwilling to sacrifice men were material could do.(snip)

On the other hand, they had plenty of tanks, in fact so many that they couldn't make use of all of them in the narrow space of the Normandy bridgehead...(snip)

From what I gather about Normandy, I imagine that the British may have taken in account that while leading w/ armor would lead to lots of losses, if they were quite certain of eventual victory in a given sector (assisted by the massed tank formations), the large numbers of damaged/KO'd tanks could be recovered and repaired.

The Germans, being on the defensive could not do the same; rather, they took to burning their tanks to prevent their capture.

[ February 26, 2002, 10:38 PM: Message edited by: Silvio Manuel ]

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Silvio Manuel:

From what I gather about Normandy, I imagine that the British may have taken in account that while leading w/ armor would lead to lots of losses, if they were quite certain of eventual victory in a given sector (assisted by the massed tank formations), the large numbers of damaged/KO'd tanks could be recovered and repaired.

I don't believe that applies in that many cases. The Germans usually shot at enemy tanks until they burned or were otherwise considered to be very very real dead (instead of just stopped for now). Photographs of Shermans with 7+ holes in them are not uncommon.

I apologize for my spelling, BTW, it's late here...

[Silvio Manuel]

I see your point. It may not have been a common occurance on the battlefield but...I was envisioning, oh a battalion of UK Shermans bulling through a German line, and losing maybe 20 tanks. If they had driven the Germans back, surely the Germans wouldn't have had time to worry about re-drilling abandoned/KO'd tanks just to increase the damage...they'd have 30 live tanks to worry about.

At any rate, this is certainly just conjecture on my part.

[murpes]

From my novice, gamey perspective: When I first got CMBO, it seemed natural for me to lead with my armor. "Go in and blow stuff up!" and then clean up with my soft, pulpy soldiers. Usually my tanks would lead and get destroyed by anti-armor weapons of some sort. Then I'd send in my infantry and they'd get squashed by whatever enemy tanks that were hiding in the background.

I've had much better luck reversing the process - sending the troops in first, clearing out all the anti-tank crap, and then sending in the tanks to duke it out with whatever is left. The difficult part has been getting my slow-moving power infantry weapons in to help my tanks out. More often than not they lumber in around turn 29/30 and may as well have brooms, not bazookas.

What is "game" and what is "real life?" I dunno; the closest I've ever come to combat is the paintball I played last month.

[Michael Emrys]

My own technique is to scout with sharpshooters (you can use half-squads if you feel that it more historical) until the enemy positions have been identified. Then I start maneuvering my infantry into the chosen attack, assisted by armor and artillery wherever possible. Care must be taken, however, not to needlessly expose the armor to anything that can kill it. Take advantage of blocking terrain to break an LOS from any position where a long range AT weapon might be concealed if you can. Use your infantry to guard it from short range AT weapons. If a gun reveals itself, try to knock it out with artillery. Even light mortars can do this fired indirectly. Try to keep your armor massed. You ought to commit it in no less than pairs if possible so that if you do get into a duel you will be able to bring fire from more than one tank on each target. You'd be amazed at how much that can increase your longevity and shorten your opponent's!

Michael

[JasonC]

U.S. WW II doctrine made a distinction between pursuit-exploitation fighting, and deliberate attacking. The question of whether to lead with tanks or infantry turned on which sort of fighting was going on.

For armor force units in an exploitation phase, the lead unit was a tank unit, usually a full company of Shermans. The second unit was a combined arms unit, with mixed infantry and tanks. But if it were a case of deliberate fighting against an enemy in position and in contact, then the lead unit would be mixed infantry and tanks, usually armored infantry riding on the tanks instead of in their halftracks. The infantry then dismounted on contact and led from that point on.

For infantry force units in an exploitation phase, they led with attached tanks or tank destroyers, with infantry following, in trucks if available. But in deliberate fighting, the infantry went first, scouting for the tanks, which provided overwatch and reacted to the resistence the infantry encountered.

The idea behind the dicotomy was to avoid having a mobile column pinned down by light enemy forces, on the one hand, while providing scouting and combined arms for the tanks in the case of serious opposition, on the other hand.

Light roadblocks, small ambushes, a few delaying MGs, the enemy outpost zone - all of those were better dealt with by hitting them with more medium tanks than they could handle, and all at once, without providing soft targets. But if the enemy had armor, PAK, was in position in strength, or dug in - then forget about trying to run him off his feet that way. Instead, scout ahead deliberately with the infantry, and use the tanks to destroy all resistence encountered by fire, from range.

The US doctrine explicitly stated that tanks fight by fire, from range. The importance of their mobility on the attack was to prevent the attack from losing momentum, in the sense of retaining the ability to change the axis of attack under enemy MG or artillery fire. Not to run over or through the enemy.

The doctrine also noted that while flanking attacks were preferably in theory, once down to the battalion level or below almost all attacks were head on affairs. All arms cooperation and deliberate reduction of each defense point by fire was stressed. The infantry advanced first to scout the enemy, then after he was suppressed by fire to finish him off. Close coordination of the maneuver arms with supporting artillery fire plans was stressed as the key difference between excellent field-level commanders and mediocre ones.

That was the historical doctrine. Many histories note that the difference between a green infantry unit and veteran infantry could be seen in whether they had learned to lead the tanks, or expected the tanks to go first. Green infantry invariably expected the tanks to go first, based on the obvious intuitive sense that an armored anything was less vunerable to the most common enemy arms than a man on foot.

What the vets had learned is that it is not the first contact that matters but the subsequent fight to reduce the enemy who opens up. And that it is better to have the tanks alive to outshoot the defenders, than to lose them on contact and then be ordered to continued the attack anyway.

Units were pushed to reach their objectives by higher HQs, unless deliberate attacks with whatever they still had with them had already expensively failed. As a result, it was cheaper for the infantry to go first and keep their support alive and effective, even from the standpoint of the infantry themselves.

As for the British, in general they did know enough to lead with infantry, at least when the terrain called for it, as in operation Epsom in late June. The tanks led in Goodwood a month later and the result was a particularly expensive failure. That attack followed large scale carpet bombing and came when the Germans opposite had already been seriously reduced by a month and a half of attrition. The British commanders who planned it undoubtedly hoped the defenders would have little left and that the tanks would manage to break into the clear relatively quickly. They were wrong. Around 300 German tanks were still available in the divisions opposite the attack sectors.

Leading with tanks was obviously a mistake against such intact defenses. They just probably did not know there was that much left - or wishful thinking lead them to act as though their wasn't. When the US launched Cobra shortly after Goodwood, the carpet bombing was repeated. But US infantry divisions went first, fighting through the crater zone. Only after they had substantially penetrated the front line positions was the armor behind them turned loose. From that point, the US ADs lead the breakout, fighting through numerous German formations thrown in to stop them, but piecemeal.

In CM, at the tactical scale, it is almost always better to lead with infantry. It scouts, and it also provides a screen of infantry forward of the tanks that can keep enemy infantry AT systems far enough away for safety (which just sniper scouts - vunerable and expensive anyway - can't do).

The exploitation reason for tanks first rarely applies. If you are playing a CM scenario, there is a fight not a road march. And they are usually pretty even, odds wise, which means the methods of deliberate fighting are required. In special scenarios or certain operations, the tanks first idea to deal with light enemy forces, not yet in position, or to reach a key objective faster in a sort of pre-fight race, might arise.

But that sort of thing was much more common in the real war than it is in CM. Because real war fights weren't announced beforehand with a "go" button, and often weren't remotely fair in odds terms. Making the issue of delay by tiny forces and dealing with it, more important in real life than it is in CM. So, in CM you can just send the infantry first, nearly always.

I hope this helps.

[manchildstein (ii)]

in quick battles you can sometimes win by attempting to shatter the opponent by driving through them.

with the americans you buy a bunch of m8 hmc, m3a1 halftrack, and stuart or chaffee tanks. then you load them up with infantry and drive straight into/through the enemy positions.

this is sometimes shattering to any opponent; sometimes their FO is overrun and of no consequence to the battle.

it works best in low-los and probably not as well with the germans...

there you want to use foot infantry and a combination of psw 234/3, spw 251/9, spw 250/8, and spw 250/9... the 251/1 isn't worth the money...

so allies -british or american - are probably better for this sort of tactic...

[Stixx]

Originally posted by Priest:

How about together?

That is what I do.

No.. You just kill me, it doesn't matter which you put first, i still die!

Gamey bastard!!!

[Bry Barnard]

I lead with Artillery (where possible), 'coz it keeps their heads down on the way in.

Then hit them with the armour and infantry together (mutual support).

But always, always, always use the principle of "When in doubt empty the magazine", which is also known as "Make them more interested insaving their own ass than in getting yours!!".

SSSeeeeeeyyyyyaaawwwwwwllll,

Bry

[Phorncastle]

The british had serious shortage of infantry and were generally unwilling to sacrifice men were material could do.

On the other hand, they had plenty of tanks, in fact so many that they couldn't make use of all of them in the narrow space of the Normandy bridgehead or rather the short front to the Germans.

--------------------------------------------------

Is this reflected in the point cost of British tanks at all would you say? Just wondering, sorry if its abit off top.

[xerxes]

It you play a scenario like "In The East" you'll find that you can't afford to always lead with your infantry. I think this depicts some of what people are talking about in terms of real british tactics ("In the East" has Poles, but in CM world they're the same). If you're short on infantry & heavy on AFVs and the German infantry has a lot more firepower, leading with your infantry the whole way will leave you with an infantry deficit as the battle progresses.

Most combined arms scenarios have a greater proportion of allied afvs then a player would pick on their own.

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Phorncastle:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />The british had serious shortage of infantry and were generally unwilling to sacrifice men were material could do.

On the other hand, they had plenty of tanks, in fact so many that they couldn't make use of all of them in the narrow space of the Normandy bridgehead or rather the short front to the Germans.

Is this reflected in the point cost of British tanks at all would you say? Just wondering, sorry if its abit off top.</font>

[imported_Wildman]

Actually, I think the biggest mistake (CMBO-wise) that most make is not leading with artillery. I always find myself trying to lay the artillery on after I've found the enemy, and by the time it lands, I've either won that firefight or the enemy has moved.

Having no actual experience in laying down an artillery fireplan, I can say that the times I've planned for artillery to land in a space and had my infantry arrive as the last shells fall are the times I've succeded the most.

Maybe that is how I need to approach the battle.

1. Where does my arty need to fall to prepare the path.

2. How long will it take my troops to reach the impact area.

3. Based on 2 when should my arty start.

Now that I've actually written this down it makes sense. Damn, now where is a game to try this on.

[CMplayer]

One serious tactical challenge in leading with infantry in RL was that the tanks can't provide cover fire if the infantry is in the way. This is coveniently glossed over in CMBO, with the result that the game really doesn't work as a tool for learning about effective deployment.

[MikeyD]

I agree about the 'lead with artillery' line above, or more specifically -- lead with fire. Send some gun or mortar shells into a suspicious clump of trees or a building to see if you spook anybody out. If you scare off a heavy mg so much the better for the infantry, if you scare off a zook so much the better for the armor. Don't know what's behind that ridge? Lay smoke so the infantry can safely get to the site to inspect it for you.

Under ideal circumstances the infantry and armor will support each other, but in some of the more maze-like CM scenarios that can't always happen.

[Moriarty]

The general concept of armor supports infantry, infantry supports armor also was stated in a translation of a German armor field manual or somesuch document. Someone probably still has the URL available or you might find it at feldgrau.com

The concept is valid that the tanks take care of MG positions, dug in infantry positions, while the infantry uses its concentrated firepower and ability to attack from multiple directions to kill the enemy's AT assets.

In a situation where you have not made contact, whether you lead with armor or infantry or a combination is dependent upon other factors, notably terrain, ground conditions and expectation of where the enemy likely will be found.

If reconning with armor -- likely light tanks, HTs, MG Jeeps or scout vehicles -- I would still want infantry close enough for support. I would not be leading with the pricier tanks or thin-skinned AFVs until I had viable targets. On the flipside, if my recon is by infantry, I would want armor support in a position to give support quickly if needed.

Priest makes a good point about advancing together ... not necessarily tank-squad-tank-squad in a line across the map, but having infantry and armor close enough to be mutually supporting depending on what unfolds.

[IronChef4]

Hey Newlife,

Who needs armor??? You punished me without any of it!!!

[Harry Yeide]

As much as I love JasonC's posts, the best answer this time for RL probably would have been, "It depends." At least for the Americans, pre-existing tank-infantry doctrine appears to have exerted at best a passing influence in the ETO once the shooting started. Flexible problem-solving was the key. American AARs demonstrate that sometimes leading with tanks was genius, and sometimes disaster. The other guy might have an 88, or he might have a bunch of machine guns, or he might have both. People guessed wrong with some frequency, which is one reason guys got shot up. One can discern rules of thumb that might hold most of the time under certain limited circumstances. German troops defending villages on the Roer plain where the 747th Tank Battalion was engaged, for example, tended to have more machine guns than AT weapons, so American soldiers learned to rush with tanks to clean out the MG nests on the edge of town and follow with infantry to take the town itself (panzerfausts!). In other areas at the very same time, there were so many AT guns and automatic weapons and losses were so high that the Americans decided to attack at night when neither was capable of hitting at a distance. It depends...