Mike Dorosh's Sherman question

[JasonC]

In the epic and done to death Sherman thread, Mike Dorosh raised a fair question that deserves a better fate than being buried on page 7 of that monstrosity (which I materially assisted in making unreadable - mea cupla etc).

The opinion he expressed is a common one, but not one I find justified by the actual sequence of events discoveries and adaptations taken in the matter.

First his actual comment - "Their "primary mission" as you put it was based on faulty doctrine which was revealed to be faulty in 1942 or so. What excuse, then, was there in 1944 for fielding a tank in a role for which it was not suited? Why the scramble to upgun and ap-armour Shermans both at the factory (Firefly, Jumbo) and in the field (spare track, sandbags, applique armour)?"

First as to the initial bit. The supposedly faulty doctrine apparently means that tanks are breakthrough weapons rather than fighters against other tanks, and the supposed correct one is that tanks are primary tank killers in duels etc. First, nobody thought so in 1942, in any army including the German. I'd say that piece of conventional wisdom actually belongs roughly in the mid 1960s.

It is also dubious applied to WW II, where it is usually leveled against the supposedly "failed" US TD doctrine. The evidence against which is abolishing TDs after the war. But actually TDs worked as intended whenever the Germans actually attacked - they just didn't have enough armor to attack the western allies as often or as strongly as the force mix planning had feared. The TD formations thus found themselves underemployed in their intended role, and were naturally pressed into others.

But there is a more basic problem with the statement. He says it all should have been known in 1942. Um, the Sherman was used by 1942 in exactly one serious fight, El Alamein, where it was entirely successful and easily the most powerful all around tank on the field. The best thing on the German side was a mere handful of F2 specials, still sporting thin armor. Most of the German fleet had 50mm guns and many of them short ones.

The US faced only French in North Africa in 1942. A few scrapes with the earliest German forces in Tunisia right at the end of the year, in which not Shermans but Stuarts might have been noticed to be too light. The first time Shermans faced superior enemy armor was Kasserine in February 1943, in the form of a mere handful of Tigers. They were very rare in the German mix, and nowhere decisive. The US lost fights for reasons of poor training and unsound tactical use, and then won them when they used sound tactics - which meant gun lines and massed artillery etc.

The best one could say is that in the first quarter of 1943, allied planners should have noticed that the Germans had seriously heavier tanks than the Sherman, though most of the fleet they were facing it was still equal or superior to. Later that year, PD HG used a Tiger battalion on Sicily and might have underscored the lesson. It can also be pointed out they had already deployed 76mm armed M10 tank destroyers in Tunisia.

OK, fine. But the fact is the allies decided on the need to upgun the Sherman and designed the 76mm Sherman in May of 1943. That's pretty fast adaptation. Because of prior exploratory work, they had the turret required for this already laid out, though initially intended for an entirely new tank. They still had to go from blueprints to changes to mate with the Sherman hull (ammo layout etc) to physical prototypes and then into production etc.

It may be argued that the gun they picked, the US 76mm, was inadequate to the task. But it was theoretically adequate to defeat the Tiger or Panther turret front at 1000 yards. It failed to do so in practice with plain AP due to ammo quality problems and shatter gap, but this was not widely appreciated by anyone during the war. Plain AP worked under 400 yards about. At longer ranges HVAP worked. Because there was no great difficulty on the production side providing enough HVAP, the gun was in fact adequate. More below on the operational problems seen anyway.

OK, so they saw the need for a 76mm Sherman about as rapidly as anybody could have, to within a few months, and moved to put one into production. So why did men land at Normandy a year later in plain 75 Shermans?

Mostly because the US mobilized its economic for war very rapidly. US production of Shermans in calendar 1942 hit 12000 vehicles. Continue that through the first half of 1943, and any way you cut it there were going to be a huge number of plain 75 Shermans running around.

The Germans fought the first half of the war in III and short IVs. But they also lost most of them by the end of 1942, and by mid 1943 they were down to a third of the fleet or so. Half were long IVs and 1/6 were superior types by then. But that is because their production ramped slowly and their loss rate in Russia was high. The old tanks all dropped out of the mix on 6-12 month time scales, and new production swamped the number remaining, since it was expanding gradually throughout, clear to mid 1944.

In contrast, US production "switched on" in 1942, losses did not appear until 1944 in any meaningful amount. Frankly they were low even then, certainly by the standards of the eastern front. What was the US supposed to do with 20000 Shermans made before they knew they had to upgun, and never lost? Throw them in the ocean? Half the fleet is going to be short 75 because it was made before anybody knew they'd ever need anything better, and losses before Normandy were small compared to that production.

And some 76mm Shermans were out before Normandy. They still had to get to Europe of course. The first reached England in April 1944. By the end of the Normandy campaign, 600 had reached the theater.

Why wasn't it a higher portion? Largely the development time needed from upgun decision to output and transport. But also shipping space, which was the critical shortage for the western allies. They had a whole stream of 75mm Shermans coming out of the factories, and a whole transport management problem to get them to Europe. First in first out was the way to optimize that problem. Meaning the first Shermans made went on the first ships available, and so on.

Might they have saved 3 months by cutting to the front of the line? Perhaps. They also would have reduced total thruput to Europe by messing up the shipping schedules with last minute urgent orders etc. Might have been worth it, but hardly a clear call before the fact.

The allies overall fielded a large number of upgunned vehicles to deal with the German cats. In fact the portion of the western output totals that had some form of superior gun (to the 75mm I mean) was larger than the portion of the German fleet that had armor sufficient to stop a 75L38 round from the front.

The figures are about 3/8s for the former, and 1/3 for the latter. The upgunned allied types were UK Fireflies, Achilles, Jacksons, Hellcats and M10s, US 76mm Shermans, and Sherman 105s. The German types with good armor were Tigers and Panthers, Jagds of both, and the Jagdpanzer.

But Pz IVs and StuGs, the most numerous types by output on the German side, were defeatable by the 75L38s. And there was a full quarter of the German AFV mix that was lighter still, in the form of all their Pz 38 and Pz II chassis vehicles, SPA and SPAT, etc.

There was still a command failure, but it wasn't not upgunning at all. It was failure to understand the shatter issue and to adapt to it. The brass surveyed the men and concluded by the end of Normandy that the 75L38 was inadequate, but though providing more of the upgunned types was a sufficient answer.

The men told them they also needed HVAP in quantity, but this was not made a sufficient priority. There was enough tungsten for it and production capacity etc. It should have been rush-ordered by, at the latest, July 1944, and readily available at the westwall. It wasn't, that was command slowness to adapt. But largely because of the technical aspects of the problem - shatter being hard to diagnose, it being easy to confuse the insufficiency of the 75L38 with the whole problem, etc.

If Allied decision making had been perfect, they might have had marginally more upgunned vehicles by D-Day, but nothing like all of the fleet. The majority were going to be 75L38 regardless, they were just made too soon to be anything else. (And they would not have been around in such numbers if they had waited to make them etc). And again they would have had more HVAP for it by fall and winter 1944.

But they could not have seen they would need 76mm HVAP E8 Shermans in 1942. The tanks they would be needed against had not been encountered yet, no appreciable difficulties had been seen in the existing Shermans - which were top of the line at El Alamein etc. Design time, production time, shipping time, and front loaded production without losses ensured the fleet would be much less than that in 1944. And by the end of 1944, it was about as upgunned as the German fleet was uparmored, as it was.

So I see no glaring and avoidable error here. A few minor ones - losing a couple months here, not rushing an item there - both before any appreciable difficulty had been encountered or any serious loss incurred, etc. And one real communication failure with the men, in not rush ordering abundant HVAP during Normandy, when it could have first been seen to be necessary. That is the worst a fair assessment can make it out to be.

Naturally, it would have been nicer to have fought the whole war - of from say January 1944 on - in 76mm E8 Shermans with HVAP. But it would have been nicer for the Germans to have fought the whole war in Panthers, without needing to use IVs or StuGs, or being outgunned and outarmored by KVs and T-34s for a while before having even a portion of heavies let alone a main fleet as good as long IVs and StuGs, etc. The lag times are in fact quite similar. The US just started it late at a higher level, because of later entry to the whole war.

One man's opinion.

[JasonC]

Slight amendment to the HVAP point. Theoretically the US might have noticed the need for it by the time of Anzio in February 1944. At Salerno the German counterattack was almost exclusively armed with Pz IVs and the existing US guns were perfectly sufficient. Panthers were not used in quantity in Italy before Anzio. But by February, if sufficiently alert, staffs might have noticed the problems even the TD guns were having with cats, a few months before Normandy rather than during it.

Frankly the failure at Anzio was put down to early failures to exploit rapidly enough from the beach and then to operational problems - the Germans just getting enough force opposite etc. Also, it was so muddy the tanks were restricted to roads throughout, and German tactics emphasized night infiltration by infantry more than armor slugging. Allied armor did have problems with cats at Anzio, but it was put down to their being bound to a few narrow roads by the combination of mud and a short frontage and thus unable to maneuver etc.

I mention it simply as an earlier time - about the earliest realistically possible - that weaknesses of the 76mm against the better part of the German tank mix might have been noticed. Because earlier, the overwhelming majority of the German fleet encountered had been Pz IVs or lighter.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

First as to the initial bit. The supposedly faulty doctrine apparently means that tanks are breakthrough weapons rather than fighters against other tanks, and the supposed correct one is that tanks are primary tank killers in duels etc. First, nobody thought so in 1942, in any army including the German. I'd say that piece of conventional wisdom actually belongs roughly in the mid 1960s.

That wasn't the doctrine I was referring to; I was referring to the doctrine that tanks used for infantry support should also not be used for combating tanks - the Infantry Tank/Cruiser Tank dichotomy, sure, but more the lightly armoured SPs in the US Army, termed Tank Destroyers, and the segregation of Anti-Tank units in the Commonwealth, rather than true all-arms forces. I was referring to the notion that tanks would not have to fight other tanks in the front lines, rather than discussing the breakthrough role or Guderian's Armoured Idea. The importance of working tanks and infantry together was highlighted I think by 1942 or 43 - notice the scramble in Italy to provide more infantry to the armoured divisions there, and the decrease in the number of tanks in PzGren divisions (?) It was obvious by Normandy that tanks and infantry would be fighting together, and in conditions that made it difficult to seperate the functions of pure tank destroyer (or tank defence or anti-tank or tank hunter or whatever descriptor youw ant to use) from those of tanks.

[ November 08, 2006, 07:36 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[MikeyD]

A relavent quote from General Eisenhower:

"You mean the 76 won't knock these Panthers out? I thought it was going to be the wonder gun of the war. Why is it I'm always the last to hear about this stuff?"

The quote was undated but it was inserted into a chapter on the start of Operation Cobra, July 44. We assume that everybody back then knew everything that we know now. it appears stuff that was immediately apparent on the front line would sometime only become apparent to the higher-ups after slowly filtering up the chain of command.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

A relavent quote from General Eisenhower:

"You mean the 76 won't knock these Panthers out? I thought it was going to be the wonder gun of the war. Why is it I'm always the last to hear about this stuff?"

The quote was undated but it was inserted into a chapter on the start of Operation Cobra, July 44. We assume that everybody back then knew everything that we know now. it appears stuff that was immediately apparent on the front line would sometime only become apparent to the higher-ups after slowly filtering up the chain of command.

Your quote is out of context. Eisenhower was told that the 76 would penetrate any enemy armour. He was expressing surprise that it wasn't the case, but as Supreme Commander, it really wasn't his primary worry - how to knock out tanks was the problem of his tactical commanders. A captain in a tank battalion didn't need to tell a 4 star general how to suck eggs.

What Eisenhower thought about all-arms mixes wasn't really relevant to grand strategy either; I take it the actual use of Combat Commands was something of a reaction to the gulf between doctrine and reality?

[Guest Mike]

WEren't the US armoured (tank) units mostly equipped with M3 Lee's at the time of Kasserine Pass?

[JasonC]

SO - there were some M3s at Kasserine, but there were also plenty of Shermans, whole battalions of them.

[JasonC]

Eisenhower was not out of touch on the matter. On the contrary, he listened to the men and heard the complaints about US equipment in Normandy, and was bothered enough he ordered a full blown investigation, soliciting comments from the line and compiling them etc.

He heard the short 75 trashed, everyone screamed for 76mm tanks and some added a request for HVAP. He thought 76mm tanks alone were supposed to solve the known problems, and he was right, they were supposed to solve them - that was the plan. That they didn't without the HVAP component was appreciated by practically no one, other than a modest number of the best front line tankers.

Why would they? Shatter gap was not understood theoretically. Engagement ranges in Normandy were usually small. Most of the fleet had short 75s. Unless you were a TD driver and had engaged superior types at long range with both AP and HVAP and seen the difference, how would you be able to tell?

All the distinctions may seem easy to us. To them, is was - engage one of half a dozen enemy types, from several possible aspects, at several possible ranges, with several possible guns and different rounds for them. The shatter problem occurs precisely when the type is Tiger I or Panther, the aspect is front, the range is 500-1000 yards, the gun is US (not Brit) 76mm, and the ammo is APC.

Put a Jadg there, goes away. Make the aspect side, goes away. Drop the range to 400, goes away. Using a 75L38 or a 17 pdr, no issue. Use only APC and you will think it is the enemy type or the gun and never see it. Use only HVAP against that type and you will never notice the range differences. Out of all engagements, do you think neon signs flashed for those and those only? It was simply not easy to spot.

[hoolaman]

References?

[JasonC]

Stick up your backside?

References for what? Is there any point you actually dispute, or are you just a school marm wannabe asking for the bibiography after being given a free research report?

[dieseltaylor]

JasonC

I find your argument persuasive apart from one major factor. In June 1941 the Churchill was being produced with frontal armour of 102mm which the Sherman would barely penetrate at 100 metres.

Given the UK probably mentioned this fact the question must be what persuaded the US army that the Germans would not be up gunning and up armouring their tanks.

Working on a gun with more oomph to fit to the Sherman should have been actively managed in 1941 regardless of what current success was occurring.

[dieseltaylor]

shatter gap

I was curious to see when the concept of shattering was first being experimented with:

wiki

For instance, a trial by the French Navy at Gavre in 1880 found compound armour superior to all-steel plates. An 1884 trial in Copenhagen found that there was little difference between the two types, although compound armour was subsequently ordered by the Danish Navy, probably because it was cheaper. At the same time a similar trial to select the armour of the Italian battleship Lepanto saw 20 inch thick compound armour plate demolished by two shots of the 100-ton guns 10-inch calibre guns which were to be fitted to the ship, whilst the same projectiles were shattered by 20 inches of French Cruesot steel plate.

Interesting stuff from here regarding the shatter gap and other interesting stuff.

web page

[ November 09, 2006, 09:48 AM: Message edited by: dieseltaylor ]

[Black Jack Pershing II]

Jason C-

I agree with your analysis. One thing you do not focus on (and which I think CM models very well) is that the Sherman is an unbelievable good infantry support vehicle -- better than any tank the Germans fielded. The good speed, high ROF, fast turret, good HE ammo load and .50 cals make it a dominant force on the battlefield against infantry.

[civdiv]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Why would they? Shatter gap was not understood theoretically. Engagement ranges in Normandy were usually small. Most of the fleet had short 75s. Unless you were a TD driver and had engaged superior types at long range with both AP and HVAP and seen the difference, how would you be able to tell?

The problem I have with this is what was the Ordnance Board or whatever they were called doing? We captured plenty of German tanks in N. Africa to carry back to Aberdeen or where ever they brought them back then. Plus once they had a few captured Tiger Is they could reproduce the armor (to an extent, I know about face-hardening) and shoot 76mm APC at it. The fact that APC rounds had a high shatter rate should have been discovered by testing. I do, however, agree with you that it's basically impossible for a tanker to discover that his AP rounds are shattering when firing at a target a thousand meters away. Add in the fact that (at least in the Infantry) every tank was a Tiger regardless of what is really was. And when looked at from long range I could see how a partially concealed PzIV could look like a Tiger. And late at night the sound of a tank engine and the clank of the treads led to more cries of 'Shiite, Tigers are coming' rather than 'Shiite, Panzerkampfwagen Fours are coming'.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Black Jack Pershing II:

Jason C-

I agree with your analysis. One thing you do not focus on (and which I think CM models very well) is that the Sherman is an unbelievable good infantry support vehicle -- better than any tank the Germans fielded. The good speed, high ROF, fast turret, good HE ammo load and .50 cals make it a dominant force on the battlefield against infantry.

We've discussed the relative value of the .50 vs. infantry here many times. I'm trying to remember if you were part of those conversations or not - so forgive me if this is broken record territory! It was used that way, but rarely - it was primarily an anti-aircraft gun, and most Commonwealth tanks deleted it altogether. Wasn't of value to them.

[McIvan]

Pardon me for saying so, but wouldn't someone hopping out of the turret and using the .50 cal against German infantry be exceptionally vulnerable and prone to a rather short life-expectancy? Sort of like wearing a large "snipe me" signboard.

Interested to hear if it was or wasn't. Hadn't really thought about it before. I suspect that CM, in happily applying all the .50cal ammo against whatever you're firing against, might be a little unrealistic....?

[The_Enigma]

As always - great topic! Large ammount of great info!

Cheers!

In June 1941 the Churchill was being produced with frontal armour of 102mm which the Sherman would barely penetrate at 100 metres.

Given the UK probably mentioned this fact the question must be what persuaded the US army that the Germans would not be up gunning and up armouring their tanks

If i understand correctly, American doctrine called for there tanks to avoid 1 on 1's with the German or anyone else’s tanks and leave them to the Tank destroyers.

However other then that, i don’t see how you can compare an infantry tank, designed to take as much punishment as possible in braking the enemy line with what is ... a Medium/Cruiser.

Should one not compare the Sherman’s armour with British tanks which are similar to it, the early cruisers, Covenanters, Crusaders, Cavalier and the Centaur/Cromwells (the Comet and Centurion being more comparable to the up gunned tanks and the American later war models).

Anyhoo on the subject, from some quick research it would appear the first 1400 models built were quipped with the 2 pounder (40mm gun), a few hundred of them with a 3inch howitzer (76mm?) in the hull.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by McIvan:

Pardon me for saying so, but wouldn't someone hopping out of the turret and using the .50 cal against German infantry be exceptionally vulnerable and prone to a rather short life-expectancy? Sort of like wearing a large "snipe me" signboard.

Interested to hear if it was or wasn't. Hadn't really thought about it before. I suspect that CM, in happily applying all the .50cal ammo against whatever you're firing against, might be a little unrealistic....?

http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic;f=30;t=000362;p=2

To summarize my position based on a lot of time researching the topic (and I'll be happy to share sources if anyone wants to explore this further):....

...On vehicles, it was intended as an AA weapon, but was used whenever practical. On the Sherman, this was rarely since one had to leave the turret and stand on the rear deck to engage ground targets (unless you had modified the mount). This was changed in the Pershing, for example.

[dieseltaylor]

The enigma,

Your argument is different from the one of JC's that production imperatives lead to there being 20000 M4's with 75mm.

Let us look at it differently then. If you knew in 1941 the enemy was producing tanks with 100mm of frontal armour would you still go with a gun that cannot penetrate at reasonable range?

Doctrinally you can say we are building tanks not to fight other tanks however the enemy may force the point on you. Arming your tanks sufficiently well to deter must be a consideration.

Strangely the 3" T13 project - placing it in a Sherman was started in August 1942 but DROPPED in November 1942 for lack of support. The same gun was used later in the T23 turret was deemed a great success and the Armoured Board agreed to going into production. After the earlier refusal it can be seen as the face saving decision it was.

I must admit to being curious as to why test firing had not revealed the shatter gap as I would have thought this a necessary part of warfare.

The tank destroyer seems to me to be a little bit of an after the event rationalisation of having tanks just capable of defeating the enemies tanks.

The M10 had serious drawbacks, it was a rush design, and all cases the open top meant if the enemy was devious enough to launch a combined artillery/mortar/tank attack the TD's were at a disadvantage.

Lastly I would have thought it reasonably certain in 1941/42 the concept of invading Europe was seen to be a few years away. Allowing for the trend in larger guns and more armour it would have been easy to consider that tanks would be tougher in 1944/45 and then when proof positive ,with the sighting of Tigers occurred, make plans accordingly.

[JasonC]

On the Churchill as a standard for 1941, um, it moved 15 mph, was designed for trench warfare in WW I fashion, was armored to resist artillery in pillboxes not tanks, and was considered so unsuccessful (for lack of mobility, in favor of Cromwells) it was slated to be cancelled in 1943 - until the troops in Tunisia asked for it to be kept because it was a more useful I tank than Matildas or Valentines.

All it might have suggested was that a tiny number of immobile breakthrough heavy tanks might need larger guns. It would have looked in fact like a standing demonstration that too much armor was impractical because it made a tank too immobile to work as an operational weapon.

As for testing vs. enemy vehicles, the first Tigers were taken by the Brits in Tunisia in early 1943. Only a handful were. The first had been taken out by towed 6 pdrs.

As for shatter appearing in testing, it depended on ammo quality and the range of the engagement - under 400m it would not have been seen. Most enemy vehicles would have been penetrated easily etc.

As for TDs supposedly being stop-gap, the actual doctrine question they went back and forth over was the dispute between a towed gun and SP. They rightly decided on SP, turreted and armored sufficiently.

In tests and doctrinally and from experience seen in the war, theoretically inclined officers favored the towed gun as likely to win against tanks, PAK front style. The front line types instead thought they would be tank fodder because they would not be handled aggressively enough, and would be penny packeted. Which was correct.

Halftracks with short 75s were tried in Tunisia and universally considered a failure. They switched some battalions to towed 3 inch after that, but the real turreted TDs rightly got most units. In Normandy it was completely obvious those were better and units transitioned to them as more vehicles became available.

The M-10 units transitioned to superior types - Jacksons and Hellcats - in the second half of 1944. By January 1, the M10s were outnumbered by the other two types and towed 3 inch were rare.

As for anticipating a need to uparmor and upgun, they did, and the Sherman replaced Stuarts and Lees because of that need. The Brits then reported them as having solved all problems seen with those prior types - because they were.

The Germans did not anticipate T-34s either. They saw Char-Bs and Matildas in France and only concluded that Pz IIIs needed more than a 37mm - and the rear echelon types then decided a 50L42 was adequate instead of the 50L60 originally called for after seeing those.

It took the T-34 shock in action to get them to design the Panther as a response. Those appeared, with teething problems, 2 years after the invasion of Russia. 2 years after the invasion of Normandy, the US would have been driving Pershings with 90mm - but they won the war before that.

At that date after seeing T-34s, the bulk - half - of the German fleet had long 75s but not armor proof against the enemy guns, and a third did not have even that. By 1 January 1945, 6 months after Normandy, a third of the Allied fleet were upgunned types.

There simply are lags in response to seeing enemy vehicles, and successful use of prior types leaves them in action until they hit something too tough to handle. Then the rate at which the existing fleet transitions to better types depends on loss rates, development time, and production of the new types overtaking the existing fielded stuff.

The Russians also had a lag in reacting to Tigers and Panthers by upgunning T-34s and fielding ISU and IS-2s. They arguably did better than anyone else in pure time terms, but still faced far superior enemy types for 6-12 months and never pulled ahead again.

The US wasn't better in this respect than the others. Best actions with info at the time might have saved them 6 months or so.

[Black Jack Pershing II]

We've discussed the relative value of the .50 vs. infantry here many times. I'm trying to remember if you were part of those conversations or not - so forgive me if this is broken record territory! [smile] It was used that way, but rarely - it was primarily an anti-aircraft gun, and most Commonwealth tanks deleted it altogether. Wasn't of value to them.

Sorry I missed it

So you're saying that the Audie Murphy "To Hell and Back" routine was not SOP? I guess that's why he won the CMH.

I was actually also referring to the Bow and Coax MGs, but had forgotten that they were .30s. Anyhoo, the M4 did throw off a decent amount of anti-personnel firepower.

[dieseltaylor]

I think that showing Germany and Russia were also tardy is not really fair considering that they were both involved in a major land war where tanks on the ground were more important than switching designs.

However for the Russians once they had mastered the original assault and moving of factories seem to have got their act together.

The Commissariat of Defence ordered a more heavily armoured tank than the KV IN ANTICIPATION of further German progress in heavy tanks. Thereofre towards the end of 1943 they 21 prototypes and of these six went forward for production. One hundred IS's were available at year end and 2250 by the end of 1944.

The IS2 was not perfect and as a result of its first battles in February '44 the major re-design was commneced for the IS3 in time for it to appear at the Berlin Victory parade.

So given the constraints the Russians did very well. As for the Germans it was not so much not upgrading as the ability to churn them out effectively, and Hitler, that they suffered from.

Anyway that is irrelevant in that the Western Allies had the opportunity to imagine ahead and failed. The decision to stop / start the 3" gun programme was a great failure of vision.

According to Gander and Chamberlain the British saw the requirement for a battle tank to mount the 17pdr in 1941 and in fact an order was placed in early 1943 for this - the A30. So whilst the US decided not to up-gun the British were trying to do so.

An obvious example of technological change would have been the air war and you might have thought that this a portent. Furthermore I have made no reference to the possibility that the Western Allies should have been aware of the Russian tanks ,armour, and guns which though primitive vehicles was hardly likely to lead to an arms race in reverse.

[pamak1970]

A relative article from call site can be found here.

It is about the antitank doctrine in US during wwii and the debate about the scope and role of TDs to combat enemy tanks.

http://tinyurl.com/yx46v6

P.S any idea how to make the link short ?

[ November 10, 2006, 12:26 PM: Message edited by: pamak1970 ]

[The_Enigma]

The enigma,

Your argument is different from the one of JC's that production imperatives lead to there being 20000 M4's with 75mm.

My argument, is how can you compare 2 tanks which were designed with 2 different things in mind to combat the orginal question.

Stating if you wanted to look at comparable armour thickness and weapon caliber why not look at the stated tanks for said comparison.

Let us look at it differently then. If you knew in 1941 the enemy was producing tanks with 100mm of frontal armour would you still go with a gun that cannot penetrate at reasonable range?

Yes it is logical to want to get a gun which will punch right through whatever the enemy is making, but thats not real life is it lol

Just look at the contuined use of the 2 pounder by the British Army.

[dieseltaylor]

www.tinyurl.com PLEASE!

enigma

The British recognised the need for the 17pdr early so showed an appreciation of the future of tank warfare. The fact that in an emergency they were fitting 2pdr's is not that important. At the time they were fitted the 2 pdr could still deal a nasty bite particularly if the armour of the Churchill would defeat most German tank guns.

Regarding looking at other tanks etc. and their armour and guns. Here am I talking about planning for an invasion two years hence and you suggest we look at tanks of 1942. The basic incontrovertible fact is the US Board should have gone for the 3" gun and did not do so at the first opportunity.

I have suggested that they should have been aware that both Britain and Russia had existing tanks that would defeat the 75mm's penetration and that to think the Germans were not up-armouring and up-gunning was incredible.

The notion that when you invade new territory that your anti-tank arms modus operandi of ambush is going to be effective is hopeful. You are attacking therefore ambushing enemy tanks is unlikely because they will prefer to do that to you.