Mike Dorosh's Sherman question

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

[QB] I see this line from Rich Anderson online at his US army in WW II website. It appears to have gained wide currency.

"the lightly armored tank destroyers *proved regularly* that they were *unable to engage and destroy enemy armor when it attacked* in mass, even when the tank destroyers were deployed in concealed defensive positions.".

Partial quote are, as they say, 'partial'.

What about the sentence in its full context?

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/usarmy/doctrine.aspx

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Doctrine and Training

"U.S. Army doctrine, as developed during the prewar and early-war Army expansion, emphasized mobility and combined-arms in both attack and defense. Mobility was achieved by developing reliable, robust armored and soft-skin vehicles. Unfortunately, in the case of tanks and tank destroyers, thickness of armor was sacrificed in the interest of mobility to the detriment of U.S. Army armored vehicles in tank-versus-tank-combat. This flaw was exacerbated by one of General McNair's fundamental beliefs (later proved to have been fundamentally unsound) that the armored division would not be required to engage and destroy enemy armored formations since that would be the task of the tank destroyers. Rather he visualized the armor divisions as a cavalry force to exploit gaps opened in the enemy lines by the tank-supported infantry divisions. The major flaw in this concept was that the lightly armored tank destroyers proved regularly that they were unable to engage and destroy enemy armor when it attacked in mass, even when the tank destroyers were deployed in concealed defensive positions. While the tank destroyers on defense were often able to delay or blunt an armored attack, they could rarely defeat them. Thus, instead of operating in an independent antiarmor role, the tank destroyers were semi-permanently attached to infantry and armored divisions, while armored divisions were forced to take up defensive as well as offensive missions, a role for which they were not well designed (since they lacked sufficient infantry)."

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Now here is my problem. Nobody has remotely established this proposition, and in fact it is false..........................................It was basically pure second hand smear in other words.

If anyone knows otherwise and can cite actual occasions, I am all ears.

Would it not be better to take it up with Rich himself?

No doubt he would be grateful when you point out his 'mistake'.

Perhaps you could repost your argument at Dupuy where Rich can see it and respond. Failing that Rich also posts at AHF

http://forum.axishistory.com/profile.php?mode=viewprofile&u=7220

I do not know enough to answer with any authority on US Army matters but would welcome the chance to see this 'second hand smear' laid to rest.

[John Kettler]

Table 2 here should be helpful in establishing the distribution of antitank and tank cannon caused T-34 losses for several periods of the GPW. Note particularly the statement in the text that most of them are from antitank artillery, not tanks.

http://www.battlefield.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=80&Itemid=50

Regards,

John Kettler

[Corvidae]

And yet another M4 sherman related thread gets out of hand,

Whats with that anyway?