Hindsight 202: USA if the British had gone belly up in 1941

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Other Means:

Michael, isn't that what i said?

You wrote, and I quote, "...if the British Isles aren't invaded they, and the RN, act as a barrier to the USA." I assumed by that you meant that they act as a barrier against the US. Did you mean something else?

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dalem:

I thought the original hypothetical from Hans is:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Assuming a change of government in Britain and a negotiated peace.

Given that, I have to leave the UK out of further conflict.</font>

[Other Means]

yes, i meant act as a barrier to axis movement to the US.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Other Means:

yes, i meant act as a barrier to axis movement to the US.

In that case, I apologize for misunderstanding you.

Michael

[dalem]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Why? They've been in and out of wars before, and they certainly had no reason to love or trust Hitler & Co. I think it would be purely a matter of finding an opportune moment to reënter hostilities. But then, my guess is that the Germans would not be asleep to this possibility and would insist on at least a partial disarmament of British forces as they did for France and the presence of some kind of occupying force to ensure that they maintained control. They would doubtlessly also demand and get bases for their navy and air force.

I don't mean that the UK would just toot peaceably along next to a growing 3rd Reich forever; I was thinking strictly in terms of a "surrendered" UK circa 1940-1945, while the U.S. dismantles the Japanese Empire and Germany (probably) defeats the USSR. What happens after that I am not speculating on currently.

-dale

[ October 26, 2003, 12:35 PM: Message edited by: dalem ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dalem:

What happens after that I am not speculating on currently.

Doubtlessly a wise move.

I guess it hinges on two things mainly. The first is what kind of peace terms the Germans insist on. I've already mentioned what I think they would want. But they might not have been in a good position to insist. If Hitler is basically just looking to clear his western flank for a couple of years while he goes and tangles with the Üntermensch, then he might be generous, thinking that he can come back later to finish the job.

In that case, Britain gets to keep the Royal Navy, or at least sends it to Canada.

If Hitler insists on harsher terms, the Brits figure they have nothing to lose, so that gets us back to the BoB and possibly Seelöwe.

I don't know...the farther we move from the historical series of events, the harder it is to predict possible outcomes. Which is sorta whatcha said, ain't it?

Michael

[Other Means]

ok, can i narrow the focus for a minute. let's think about the fantastic one step at a time.

would Barbarossa have succeeded if Germany had not been fighting the commonwealth?

[dalem]

Originally posted by Other Means:

ok, can i narrow the focus for a minute. let's think about the fantastic one step at a time.

would Barbarossa have succeeded if Germany had not been fighting the commonwealth?

I think it would have had a much better chance, but resource commitment was only one of the factors we've generally come to acknowledge as critical for the campaign in the East.

-dale

[Midnight Warrior]

1. Maybe. From my reading three major factors led to the Japanese attacking the US.

1. They saw a window of opportunity with the Western eurpean colinial powers being either conquered ( France, Netherlands) and/or fighting for their lives (Britain) that left their aisan colonies vulnerable.

2. The US oli embrag in response to their moves in China forced the Japanese either to fight or back down in China.

3. The climate in Japan was militiaristic and they seemed to be spoiling for a fight.

If England was successfully invaded by the Germans then the first reason would be even more valid. However, if Great Britain negotiated a end to the fighting but maintained their sovereignty then the their ability to defend their colonial possesions in Asia may be increased in that they would not be engaged in fighting the Germans.

On the other hand reason 2 and 3 may have prevailed anyway.

2. Probably.

Hitlers stated reason for attacking Russia was that he thought that this would be a back door way ofbeating the British in that he thought that it was insane for the British to continue the war alone against german and thus they must be puting their hope that the Soviet Union would eventually join the allied side. Hitler thought that a quick defeat of Russia would demoralize Britain and cause them to throw in the towel. I have for a long time suspected that Hitler had a healthy respect for the British (having fought againmst them personally in WWI) and though he was shrewed enough to not be afraid of the weak intra war British Governments once the British started getting their act together under Churchill and he started loosing the battle of Britain he certainly seemed to not relish the idea of directly invading Britain ala sealine but lloked to indirect methods of knowcking Britain out such as the Battel of The Atlantic or quick strike in Russia. If the British quit (but still reamined a threat) he perhaps might have decided to quit while he was ahead.

Of course at the same time he had said that he intended to sieze large chunks of Russia in Mein Kampf and probably intenend to do so and the demoralizing the British to give up may have just been a rationalization or icing on the cake for his real motive of enslaving Euro Russia). Also, I am sure he thought that eventually one of these two great totlalitarian states must inevitable must destroy the other and that the longer he wait the stronger the Soviet Union would become. Also, with the British out of the game he might have felt emboldened to go into Russia even though the immediate nned of doing so may have been perhaps reduced with the end of the European shooting war. At any rate my guess is that he would have invaded.

[Sokal]

Originally posted by Hans:

Assuming a change of government in Britain and a negotiated peace.

1. Would the Japanese and Americans still clash?

2. Would the Germans still go for the Soviets?

3. Other possibilities?

Why would the UK go belly up in 1941 if it had survived the crisis of 1940? This isn't an idle quibble because it seems that US policy was quite sensitive to whether the UK stayed in the war. In the book Finest Hour, the point is made that US aid began flowing as soon as it looked like the Canadians (secretly) promised to let the US control the RN if it came to Canada and that the British were going to fight. The US was already mobilizing and the premise of helping the UK was that it was worthwhile if it bought time.

On the other hand we know that:

1) Germany was not anywhere near fully mobilized until 1942 and even then they never mobilized women (so the allies were ahead from 1940 on as far as full mobilization went)

2) as the German army studies of the 1970s have pointed out, Hitler thought that a second Hitler or successive Hitler would be needed to beat the US.

So...the US would have simply built up for a slightly longer haul and pumped a lot more lend-lease supply into Russia much sooner and faster. Japan would have been wiped out much sooner by an ealier and closer Russia-US alliance and the US and Russia would have partitioned China and the colonial world, built A-bombs and wiped out and partitioned the Third Reich by say 1946 or 1947.

I guess there would have been no Cold War and we would have a Colony on Mars.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dalem:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Other Means:

ok, can i narrow the focus for a minute. let's think about the fantastic one step at a time.

would Barbarossa have succeeded if Germany had not been fighting the commonwealth?

I think it would have had a much better chance, but resource commitment was only one of the factors we've generally come to acknowledge as critical for the campaign in the East.</font>

[Sergei]

Considering that Britain didn't surrender, why is Hans talking about hindsight in the thread title? How does one have hindsight of something that didn't exist? :confused:

[Hans]

Hi Sergei

"Assuming a change of government in Britain and a negotiated peace"

Just a question to generate some thought on the matter.

Hans

[flamingknives]

Not having to fight Britain means that Germany is free to use the Med., allowing the shipping of materiel, unhindered, through the Dardanelles (assuming the Turks cooperate) to the Black sea coast. Also, German factories and cities are not under attack by allied bombers.

Any lend lease has to go via the Pacific route, with attendant delays shipping it across continental Russia, as without the RN providing cover, the run to Northen Russia is not feasible in the face of U-boats.

This would help the German cause a great deal.

[dalem]

Michael-

I guess I'm looking at the German supply issue more in terms of what they wouldn't lose trying to hold the Med, as opposed to what they'd gain. A fair counter to that position now that I think about it is that for the Germans to win in the East they have to win in 41/42, and they weren't losing that much in the Med in 41/42, supply-wise.

But, I am also of the opinion that Barbarossa was a close one, and that if Moscow fell and could be held through the winter of 41/42 it would have dealt a crushing blow to the Sovs. It's hard to imagine the Germans doing a better job on the ground - their problems, as you point out, were more mobility-related. I do think that perhaps with the UK out of the picture the Sovs have to deal with just enough extra from the Germans without just enough aid from the Allies that it might tip the campaign.

Sidepoint: Assuming UK abandonment of NA (which is not necessarily a given even in the case of a negotiated surrender) would a "Southern Front" up to the USSR through the 'stans been of any real benefit to the Germans? I know it's sure fun to try it in Axis & Allies and Euro Front.

-dale

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dalem:

I guess I'm looking at the German supply issue more in terms of what they wouldn't lose trying to hold the Med, as opposed to what they'd gain.

Germany's supply problem in the East is not that the supplies did not exist, in fact piles of them were rotting in the fields along the rail lines on the Polish border. The problem was getting them from the Polish border to the troops at the front. How does not being engaged in the Med help that?

Even Flamer's imaginative scenario for sending shipping through the Dardenelles strikes me as unlikely as the Turks were being very careful about preserving their neutrality. I don't presently think they were allowing military loads to transit. In any event, it would have been simpler and more efficient to just send cargos down the Danube. But I don't know how much that was done either.

Sidepoint: Assuming UK abandonment of NA (which is not necessarily a given even in the case of a negotiated surrender) would a "Southern Front" up to the USSR through the 'stans been of any real benefit to the Germans? I know it's sure fun to try it in Axis & Allies and Euro Front.

The trouble with trying to extrapolate from games like that is that they have so simplified the logistical problems as to make them unrealistic in extreme cases. This is one such. The Axis combined simply didn't have the means to ship goods in the quantities needed across the Med, through the Middle East (assuming that there were even rail lines available for their use) and up over the Caucasus. Fact is, the Allies had to build a rail line up through the Persian Corridor for Lend-Lease that wasn't finished until either '43 or '44 (I'm not sure which). And they could bring much greater resources to bear on the problem.

BTW, the reason I'm so sure about this is that something along these lines was also one of my favorite what-ifs for years. It was only by arguing at great length with people who knew lots more than I did about the problems that I was persuaded otherwise.

Michael

[ October 27, 2003, 04:25 PM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[dalem]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by dalem:

I guess I'm looking at the German supply issue more in terms of what they wouldn't lose trying to hold the Med, as opposed to what they'd gain.

Germany's supply problem in the East is not that the supplies did not exist, in fact piles of them were rotting in the fields along the rail lines on the Polish border. The problem was getting them from the Polish border to the troops at the front. How does not being engaged in the Med help that?

</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by dalem:

Well, is it possible that some of the infrastructure used for supplying the Med could have been used to help supply the East?

Well, sure. But it would have only been a drop in the bucket. A wee tiny drop in a gigantic, huge bucket. So the Afrika Korps gets sent to Russia. That's two Panzer and one motorized divisions plus maybe several hundred supporting trucks to haul supplies. What they really needed was on the order of half a million trucks minimum. Even more, what they needed was a faster way to reguage the rail lines into the USSR and a bit more rolling stock to run on it once it's set up (plus of course the personnel to run the whole show). They needed to have all that ready and in place by June 22nd.

Logistics is hard. Even the Americans always had trouble with it and they were better at it than anybody else and by and large their armies were lavishly supplied compared to anybody else, even their allies.

The plain fact is that modern mechanized armies gobble up huge, simply stunning quantities of matériel. Most of that has to come from the factories of the mother country and be shipped to the front. The act of moving it to the front itself requires additional supply in fairly generous quantities. Putting an army in the field outside the mother country thus consumes several times what it would sitting in its barracks at home. If it's engaged in active offensive operations, it consumes several times even that amount. Logistics is a very, very BIG deal. Virtually all wargames slight it because it isn't what captures the imagination of the prospective buyer. That's understandable, but it has I fear produced a highly skewed perception of what is possible in the minds of a couple generations of players.

Michael

[ October 27, 2003, 05:40 PM: Message edited by: Michael Emrys ]

[dalem]

Michael-

I think many of us have a decent grasp of at least the basic fact that "logistics is vital". We're not all lost to the infinite stacking hex capacity problem.

But reasonable speculation can at least reinforce the reality of what did happen.

-dale

[MikeyD]

If the Brits had gone belly-up in '41 the U.S. today would probably be under the thumb of a fascist unelected war-mongering govenment who willfully ignores basic constitutional rights.

Hey... wait a minute! :eek:

[dalem]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

If the Brits had gone belly-up in '41 the U.S. today would probably be under the thumb of a fascist unelected war-mongering govenment who willfully ignores basic constitutional rights.

Hey... wait a minute! :eek:

Oh piss off. Things are just starting to get back to normal around here and you want to wave your peepee around?

-dale

[Other Means]

what would the Axis access* to oil situation have been after a British withdrawl from the war? i think that was a major contribution to the German defeat.

*say that 3 times fast.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Other Means:

what would the Axis access* to oil situation have been after a British withdrawl from the war? i think that was a major contribution to the German defeat.

*say that 3 times fast.

I suppose that in that case Hitler wouldn't have to worry about the British bombing Ploesti from Crete or coming at him through the Balkans, so there'd be no reason to invade either Yugoslavia or Greece. But none of that really effects the oil supply since the Brits never did bomb Ploesti so far as I am aware.

Michael

[Redwolf]

Here are some more possible effects for you to consider:

1) would lent-lease happen the same way if Britain was out of the war? I don't think so. So for the situation in the east Michael is correct pointing to the German shortage of trucks, but then the Russians would face a similar dilemma. A quick success in the East directly out of Barbarossa is unlikely, but some of the major successes the Russians had would be questionable without lent-lease.

2) If Britain went out of the war Germany would probably not have been required to invade Greece and Yugoslavia. Norway would not have to be occupied the way it was, along with Denmark. I think that frees a lot more resources than just the DAK.

[MAUS_TD]

In my opinion if the brits got out of the war before barbarossa the germans could have reached Moskou in time before the winter.

The luftwaffe could bring all of there planes to the east front.Many more divisions where then available.The kriegsmarine could send all her u-boats to the east and her navy.This means that the russians would have much trouble being resuplied.

By the time barbarossa started US didnt involve in the war so they couldnt help the USSR.

And if the germans could hold Moskou during the winter russia would fall.

I think that after the defeat of the USSR the US never would have declared war on Germany.

I dont think that germany would have attacked the US when they were not a immidiate threat.

So europe and parts of Afrika should be under German control the rest under the US.