Battalion actions impacting on a campaign

[Michael Dorosh]

In the CMX2 thread, which got onto the subject of campaigns, I proposed the following:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by jim crowley:

The outcome of a company or battalion level battle would never have had much overall impact on the larger theatre of operations. (emphasis added)

Tell that to Johnny Frost.

Or Julian Cook, who led a battalion across the Waal by storm boat to capture Nijmegen Bridge from the far side.

Or Karl Timmerman of "A" Company of the 27th Armored Infantry, who captured the Ludenforff Bridge at Remagen on 7 March 1945.

Hmmm...bridges seems to be a theme here; that is unintentional. </font>

[Sergei]

While an individual unit might occasionally make a difference at a certain time and place, the likelihood of one unit decisively changing the outcome of a whole campaign is low. Well okay, I guess if the Finnish StuG Battalion hadn't stopped the T-34's in summer of 1944, then Abba would probably have sung Waterloo in Russian. But I think that mostly these individual factors affect things like "when" and "at what cost", not whether the overall outcome would be attained. Take the Cook's case, for instance. What difference did it make? Germans got Arnhem anyway, and then kept it for some months. XXX Corps didn't open the road to Berlin.

Of course, then there's the chaos theory. If a butterfly flaps its wings in Brazil, could it cause an early winter in Russia?

[Michael Emrys]

I am tending to agree with Sergei. While Dorosh's theory has merit, I think his examples don't do a lot to substantiate it. It's awfully hard for me to recall any batallion actions that can be identified as having decisive effect on the outcome of a whole campaign. These things tend to even out over the long run and other, larger factors are the decisive ones.

Michael

[JonS]

2nd Rifle Brigade (battalion for you Seppos) at Snipe position near Kidney Ridge (actually, Kidney Depression), October 1942.

Most of the bn was lost, but the damage they inflicted on the AK armour changed the nature of the subsequent battles. Interestingly, at the time the Brits didn't realise just how much had been acheived.

Jon

[Mies]

I remember reading (from the top of my head) something in the CMAK Compannion book where a small number of para's stopped units of the Herman Goering Division reaching the invasion beaches on Sicily. Although arguable (the Germans apparently weren't very eager according to the account to press the attack either) armor could have done some serious damage to the disembarking troops.

Mies

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Mies:

I remember reading (from the top of my head) something in the CMAK Compannion book where a small number of para's stopped units of the Herman Goering Division reaching the invasion beaches on Sicily. Although arguable (the Germans apparently weren't very eager according to the account to press the attack either) armor could have done some serious damage to the disembarking troops.

Hmm. AIR, the armor mostly got past the paratroopers because the bazookas that were their main anti-armor weapon were ineffective against them. But just as it reached a point where it was about to overrun the troops on the beach, it was stopped by gunfire from a USN cruiser off the beach.

I suppose you could rate the crew of the cruiser about the same size as a battalion.

Michael

[Kingfish]

Micheal Wittmann at Villers Bocage

[Noba]

7RTR. Operation Compass.

They certainly provided unstoppable support at the sharp end, when they were running. But even at reduced numbers they were decisive in the whole campaign.... Except at Beda Fomm.

(Then you could name some of the units there).

Noba.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

Micheal Wittmann at Villers Bocage

But that didn't change the course of the campaign. The Germans still had to retreat, and with heavy losses.

Michael

[Frenchy]

2nd Bn, 274th stops 6th SS Mountain Division at Wingen-sur-Moder and destroys 2 battalions of 12th SS Mountain Regiment.

The loss at Wingen, a key communication and road net center, was of prime importance to the Seventh Army front, and if not recaptured immediately probably would have resulted in the withdrawal and reestablishment of the entire defensive line in that sector and give the Germans a route to the highly strategic Alsatian Plain.

[Ace Pilot]

How about Torpedo Squadron 8? Had they not pressed home their attack despite overwhelming odds, the Battle of Midway might have been a Jap victory, with the possible loss of invaluable American carriers.

Would that have changed the campaign in the Pacific?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Ace Pilot:

How about Torpedo Squadron 8? Had they not pressed home their attack despite overwhelming odds, the Battle of Midway might have been a Jap victory, with the possible loss of invaluable American carriers.

Would that have changed the campaign in the Pacific?

Hmm, that's a good one. I think you would have to share credit with the dive bombers who took advantage of the opportunity thus created and put their bombs on target. In something less than five minutes, 75% of the Jap carrier force had been put out of action.

And that certainly turned the tide of that particular battle.

Michael

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Kingfish:

Micheal Wittmann at Villers Bocage

But that didn't change the course of the campaign. The Germans still had to retreat, and with heavy losses.

Michael </font>

[Dave H]

Originally posted by Ace Pilot:

How about Torpedo Squadron 8? Had they not pressed home their attack despite overwhelming odds, the Battle of Midway might have been a Jap victory, with the possible loss of invaluable American carriers.

Would that have changed the campaign in the Pacific?

Maybe for a few months. Once the US started cranking out new carriers and battleships and cruisers and destroyers and submarines and airplanes, the IJN was through. Admiral Yamamoto knew that well enough.

While individual or unit heroics can make a significant difference at the tactical level, at the strategic level it's no more than a blip on the radar. Hardly a romantic view of heroes, is it?

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Kingfish:

Micheal Wittmann at Villers Bocage

But that didn't change the course of the campaign. The Germans still had to retreat, and with heavy losses.

Michael </font>

[Agua Perdido]

Originally posted by Dave H:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by AcePilot:

[Would it have changed the Pacific campaign if the Japanese had won at Midway?]

Maybe for a few months. Once the US started cranking out new carriers and battleships and cruisers and destroyers and submarines and airplanes, the IJN was through.</font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Sergei:

While an individual unit might occasionally make a difference at a certain time and place, the likelihood of one unit decisively changing the outcome of a whole campaign is low.

No doubt, but the original position was that it could never happen.

Well okay, I guess if the Finnish StuG Battalion hadn't stopped the T-34's in summer of 1944, then Abba would probably have sung Waterloo in Russian.

But I think that mostly these individual factors affect things like "when" and "at what cost", not whether the overall outcome would be attained.

For the most part, but the red flag to the bull in the original statement was never

Take the Cook's case, for instance. What difference did it make? Germans got Arnhem anyway, and then kept it for some months. XXX Corps didn't open the road to Berlin.

[/QB]

But the Canadians had a firm salient in the Nijmegen area from which to embark on the Rhineland operations in February. If the bridge had never been taken, not only would the few remnants that did escape Arnhem never have been rescued (not a big deal operationally), but the entire front line in that sector for the next 5 months would have been much different. Whether or not that would have played a role in the upcoming Battle of the Bulge, I don't know.

[CombinedArms]

I would come back to one of Dorosh's original examples:

Or Karl Timmerman of "A" Company of the 27th Armored Infantry, who captured the Ludenforff Bridge at Remagen on 7 March 1945.

Hmmm...bridges seems to be a theme here; that is unintentional.

The capture of the Ludendorff Bridge certainly changed the course of the campaign, diverting major resources of both the Allied and German armies to the Remagen area (which had been considered a low priority area by the Allies until the bridge fell.) Now, one could argue that the Germans were going to lose the war anyway, at this point, but it's always possible to expand the scale of any discussion with the point of trivializing a specific event. This did affect the war on the campaign level.

I think it's no accident, as Dorosh notes, that many battalion level battles influencing campaigns might have occurred at bridges. The capture or demolition of a key bridge is the kind of event on which a campaign can easily turn.

And if the Midway attacks changed the war for six months, that's influencing the war on a campaign level. It's a simple fact that the sinking of the four Japanese carriers did cause the defeat of their campaign to conquer Midway. It also indirectly shaped the course of the parallel Aluetian campaign. The Solomons campaign would almost certainly have taken a different course had the Japanese won at Midway. So that's three campaigns influenced by a single battalion level action, one fundamentally and two indirectly.

[simovitch]

Co. C, 51st Engineer Combat Bn. at Trois Ponts and Co. A, 291st Engineer Combat Battalion at Habiemont, Belgium.

Platoon sized elements of both companies were responsible for halting an entire reinforced Panzer Regiment (Kampfgruppe Peiper) during the Ardennes Offensive.

[Agua Perdido]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

And if the Midway attacks changed the war for six months, that's influencing the war on a campaign level.

I'll grant that point--winning Midway had the effect of ending the campaign immediately, which is certainly influential on the campaign level.

But to be fair, I don't think you can say it came down to a single "battalion" action. After all, each squadron is probably equivalent to a battalion (each is commanded by a major or equivalent and would be worth on the order of 1000-3000 points in CM, assuming 100-150 pts for USN aircraft of the era--rarity off, of course). There were three squadrons of torpedo bombers getting massacred on the morning of 4 June, not just VT-8, and the subsequent dive-bomber attacks were another three squadrons, plus two of fighters. If we count another two squadrons of stragglers, that looks like a reinforced regiment or even a short division.

Point being, this wasn't a small-but-crucial part of larger fighting, like a battalion fighting over a critical frontage in a corps section. The Midway air battles were the fighting (yes, I know, submarines, B-17s, blahblah--those are small-but-largely-irrelevant parts of the Midway fighting).

Agua Perdido

[Kingfish]

With regards to Midway, one could make the argument that the decision of one man affected the course of the entire campign, that man being Wade McClusky. His decision to continue searching for the Japanese carriers while already low on fuel, and thus chancing upon them just with their decks full of aircraft, and no fighter cover, was one of the most important of the war.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

With regards to Midway, one could make the argument that the decision of one man affected the course of the entire campign, that man being Wade McClusky. His decision to continue searching for the Japanese carriers while already low on fuel, and thus chancing upon them just with their decks full of aircraft, and no fighter cover, was one of the most important of the war.

You could point to the decision not to launch Tone's No. 4 aircraft also, but that has been debunked in recent histories as being insignificant.

More significant was the decision not to return munitions to the magazines while rearming the Japanese planes...or the decision to rearm itself.

[Splinty]

I would call a squadron of torpedo or dive bombers the equivalent of an armored company in firepower and a small platoon in personel. Although MK I torpedos and 500 pound bombs have much more explosive power than an armored Co's guns they are one shot weapons, so I think the ammo load of an Armored Co. adds up to about the same.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

The capture of the Ludendorff Bridge certainly changed the course of the campaign, diverting major resources of both the Allied and German armies to the Remagen area (which had been considered a low priority area by the Allies until the bridge fell.) Now, one could argue that the Germans were going to lose the war anyway, at this point, but it's always possible to expand the scale of any discussion with the point of trivializing a specific event. This did affect the war on the campaign level.

The argument in favor of the Remagen bridge seems awfully thin to me. When the big pushes across the Rhine came in the spring, they occurred north and south of Remagen. The simple reason was that the terrain behind the Rhine at that point was not conducive to the movement of large bodies of troops.

Seems to me that about the only contribution to the campaign that that crossing made was to draw troops from other zones, and I've never heard anything to indicate that that might have been decisive.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Splinty:

I would call a squadron of torpedo or dive bombers the equivalent of an armored company in firepower and a small platoon in personel. Although MK I torpedos and 500 pound bombs have much more explosive power than an armored Co's guns they are one shot weapons, so I think the ammo load of an Armored Co. adds up to about the same.

One point: Most of the Dauntlesses were armed with 1,000lb bombs. I don't recall what the mark number was on the torpedo, possibly Mk. XIII, but they wouldn't have been Mk. Is.

Michael